Shelley McKeown
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Neil Ferguson   *Editors*

Understanding Peace and Conflict Through Social Identity Theory

Contemporary Global Perspectives

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Social Identity and Peace Psychology: An Introduction

Reeshma Haji, Shelley McKeown, and Neil Ferguson

> *No man is an island entire of itself; every man*
> *is a piece of the continent, a part of the main;*
>
> —John Donne

Humans are inherently social beings. Indeed, there is a social psychological perspective that we have a fundamental, evolutionary-based need for interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). These social connections can promote cohesive ties, but they can also create or accentuate divisions between us and those who do not belong to our groups. This book will embark on a journey of understanding of how our group memberships, or social identities, can motivate us toward harm or harmony.

Peace psychology teaches us that peace is not simply the absence of conflict. Indeed, since decades ago, peace theorists have distinguished between negative peace, or the absence of violent conflict, and positive peace, the integration of society (Galtung, 1964). One key to understanding the transpiration of peace or conflict, and the consequences of these, may be our psychological attachment to our groups.

According to social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), our knowledge and emotional attachment to our group memberships have implications for our well-being and behaviour. Additionally, our group memberships provide us with a sense of self-esteem. A positive view of our own group depends in part on comparisons to other groups. In a process called intergroup differentiation, we attempt to distinguish our own group, the in-group, from out-groups, or other groups to which we do not belong. There is considerable evidence for intergroup discrimination, or the favouring of one's own group in the allocation of rewards. In fact, this even occurs when groups are assigned on trivial basis, such as random assignment to groups and overestimates or underestimates of the number of dots in an array (Tajfel, 1970, see Chap. 1 for a thorough description of SIT).

Given the substantial support for intergroup discrimination in resource allocation, it is perhaps not surprising that social identities can be responsible for conflict

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between groups. That is, however, not the whole story. Just as social identities can fuel conflict, they can also be harnessed in the promotion of peace. Through the lens of SIT, this book seeks to evaluate, inform, and explore how psychological attachment to our groups contributes to peace and conflict in today's global society.

Why Now? Why This Book?

Identity has been a widely researched construct that has been tackled by different epistemological approaches. It is our hope that this book will be a resource for scholars and students alike, including those from disciplines outside of psychology. Although the book is generally written from a psychological perspective, as a volume of the Springer Peace Psychology Book Series, identity and its role in peace and conflict is a topic of widespread relevance. As such, we apply our understanding of social identity theory within a peace psychology framework. According to Christie, Wagner, and Winter (2001):

> Peace psychology seeks to develop theories and practices aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence. Framed positively, peace psychology promotes the nonviolent management of conflict and the pursuit of social justice, what we refer to as peacemaking and peacebuilding, respectively. (p. 7)

Given the powerful influence of our attachment to our groups, a social identity approach to understanding peace and conflict is highly relevant in today's world; in which differences in cultural, religious, ethnic, political, and national affiliations seem to underlie most of the conflicts pervading the news. In undertaking this SIT approach, we have applied social identity theory to address both direct and indirect (structural) violence, and in the examination of both positive and negative peace. Whilst identity has been studied in multiple ways, what is new is our approach and, with it, our scope. The current volume attempts to provide a comprehensive theoretical and cross-cultural account of social identity theory applied to peace and conflict. The research and theory chapters trace the historical development of SIT, and bring us up-to-date with the latest innovations and advances. The country case chapters provide a diverse account of social identity as it relates to peace and conflict in different regions of the world. Importantly, this book does not put the emphasis on conflict alone. Rather, the chapters herein attempt to illustrate how social identity can be applied in the promotion of peaceful intergroup relations.

Our Travel Itinerary

We will embark on essentially two voyages, each with a number of stops along the way. The first, Part I of this volume, provides our theoretical foundation. The second, Part II of this volume, provides us with contextual applications in diverse geographical regions. Together, they aim to deepen our understanding and our

exploration of how social identity can fuel conflict or support the development or maintenance of peace.

In Chap. 1, Hogg provides us with a historical development of SIT up to present-day perspectives on the theory. We are given the benefit of the context in which Henri Tajfel formulated his predictions. Key principles of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory are described. The self-esteem hypothesis is introduced. Additionally, we are provided with strategies that groups may use to deal with negative status. We are also provided with more recent perspectives within SIT, such as entitativity and uncertainty-identity theory.

In Chap. 2, Martiny and Rubin provide a detailed account of the self-esteem hypothesis, with all its complexities. They emphasise the importance of a valid test of the second corollary of the hypothesis and describe what such a test would entail. We are also given an explanation of specific collective state self-esteem, which is crucial to understanding the nuances of the self-esteem hypothesis. Finally, we are provided with a very useful reformulation of the self-esteem hypothesis, as well as a demonstration of its generality and potential applications.

In Chap. 3, we venture deeper into the territory of identity uncertainty. In particular, identity threat is discussed by Lüders, Jonas, Fritsche, and Agroskin in terms of the problems that it poses for intergroup relations. Lüders et al. suggest how anxious uncertainty can be quelled by affirmation of a group to which one belongs and they apply their analysis to the timely issue of the refugee crisis currently being faced by various countries around the globe. In Chap. 4, we arrive at the intersection of SIT and another key theory in the psychology of intergroup relations, intergroup contact theory . In particular, Stathi and Roscini deal with this intersection within the context of multicultural societies, which are increasingly becoming the norm in today's world. They review traditional and more recent theoretical perspectives on acculturation, the process by which an immigrant community adapts to a host culture, and examine majority-minority dynamics as they relate to identity and social categorisation.

We then turn our attention to the application of SIT to the understanding of other socially relevant phenomena. In particular, Chap. 5 deals with the application of SIT to understanding tyranny and leadership. Innovatively, Reicher, Haslam, Platow, and Steffens draw on why people obey tyrannical leaders and offer examples of tyrannical leadership from across the globe as well as psychological studies of tyranny represented in the Stanford Prison Experiment and BBC prison study. At a neighbouring destination, La Macchia and Louis in Chap. 6 provide a much needed and timely integration of SIT and theories of crowd behaviour. Before doing so, they review competing accounts of crowd behaviour and of collective action. Through a social identity lens, they examine the case studies of crowd behaviour in the St. Paul's Riot, the Battle of Westminster, and the 2011 UK riots. La Macchia and Louis then suggest connections between SIT approaches and theories of crowd behaviour, ending with applications to peace and conflict.

In Chap. 7, Wessells takes us on a tour of how social identity can be applied to the perplexing problem of reintegrating into society children who previously served, often involuntarily, as soldiers in a conflict. This is a real-world situation fraught with identity-related challenges. In Chap. 8, Phillips De Zalia and Moeschberger

explore the role of semiotics and symbolic reminders of identity, linking dialogical self theory and social representtation theory to SIT through case studies of Northern Ireland and South Africa. In doing so, they illustrate how symbols are used to promote particular social identities in everyday life. Another application to daily living is provided by Muldoon, Lowe, and Schmid in Chap. 9 that deals with how SIT can be applied in the domain of health. In particular, we are provided with an exploration of the role of social identity as a key driver in psychological well-being and resilience in conflict and post-conflict environments, and how identity can shape reactions to political violence and the outcome of exposure to traumatic stress and political violence. Next we turn our attention to a topic that is of increasing worldwide concern and that has become the subject of policy debates. Specifically, in Chap. 10, Ferguson, McDonald, and Branscombe give us a view of how social identity theory can be used to inform theory and interventions related to global climate change. With these highly relevant applications with SIT in mind, we end our first voyage.

Our second voyage, that comprises Part II of the book, entails an expedition through our different country cases that have each dealt with their share of challenges related to peace and conflict. We begin with South Africa in Chap. 11, a country in which identity and social protest continues to be linked to violence since the fall of apartheid and the democratic elections of 1994. In this chapter, Meyer, Durrheim, and Foster offer a historically embedded and currently situated discussion of identity in the rainbow nation. In Chap. 12, we explore Uganda's postcolonial struggles with ethnic identity issues and related conflicts. Lapwoch and Amone-P'Olak then outline a number of strategies for promoting more harmonious interethnic relations and also emphasise the importance of construction of a national identity. Our next stop is Rwanda, where in Chap. 13 Moss examines the policy of recategorisation into a single group, with the goal of including all Rwandans under a superordinate identity, and what that means for subgroup identities that persist more than two decades since the genocide.

The next part of our journey takes place in Europe. In Chap. 14, Ferguson and McKeown explore one of the most prodigious testbeds for SIT, namely Northern Ireland. They chart the history of research on social identity and intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland and explore how research in Northern Ireland has advanced knowledge of SIT and intergroup relations in a number of key areas, such as social categorisation and intergroup relations, the role of identity in embracing the conflict, coping with stress and intergroup contact. Drawing parallels to relations in Northern Ireland, in Chap. 15 Psaltis and Cakal weave a narrative of identity, peace, and conflict in divided Cyprus. They discuss the role of history, narrative, and multiple identities drawing on empirical data amongst both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Our European excursion ends with Chap. 16, where Maloku, Derks, Van Laar, and Ellemers delve into the meanings of the new Kosovar identity that emerged after independence in 2008. This superordinate identity is problematic as the inhabitants associate themselves with the ethnic majority, Albanian; or the ethnic minority, Serbian. Social identity complexity and the common in-group identity model are applied to the analysis.

We then travel to the Americas. In Chap. 17, Lalonde, Cila, and Yampolsky teach us about the complexities of social identities in Canada, including clashes between Aboriginal Peoples and non-Aboriginals, between the English and the French, and between immigrants and those already established in the country. Historical and contemporary views of these conflicting identities are provided. In Chap. 18, Gonzalez, Gerber, and Carvacho offer a historical and political analysis of identities in Chile, including the hierarchical relations between the White, mestizo, and indigenous groups. These are traced from their colonial historical roots to present-day status inequities and tensions. There is also an analysis of the migration process in Chile, and how an intensified national identity is associated with opposition to immigration.

Our Latin American journey continues in Chap. 19 where Eller, Cakal, and Sirlopu provide a comparative analysis of empirical research conducted in Mexico and Chile. They explore the relationships between ethnic and national identities and health and well-being with samples of mestizos, and indigenous and non-indigenous Chileans and Mexicans. The findings from their studies illustrate the importance of identity abstraction on health and well-being in these two Latin American countries.

Finally, we venture to Asia and Australasia. First we travel to the United Arab Emirates in Chap. 20 where Maitner and Stewart-Ingersoll examine social identity at multiple levels, including Emirati identity, Arab identity in the broad sense, and identities relating to a stable multicultural social hierarchy. They also describe a dynamic process in which culture interacts with identity to predict the behaviour of multicultural individuals. Next, we stop at the Philippines in Chap. 21 where Montiel, Macapagal, and Canuday report on the progress which has been made toward peace between Muslims and Christians, but where conflicting ethnic identities remain associated with different reactions to proposed legislation supporting autonomy for Islamic groups in the Mindanao region. Finally, we arrive in Australia in Chap. 22 where constructions of identity in the contemporary diverse society come with their own complexities and challenges. Law and MacKenzie explore how different interpretations of Australian history impact on identity construction in contemporary Australia. In particular, Law and MacKenzie focus on conflicting interpretations of "Australia Day" and contemporary events such as recent terrorism in Sydney to discuss and analyse identity complexities in Australia.

At the conclusion of our second voyage, we more closely examine some of the more perplexing themes that pervade this book. In particular, our focus is on how social identity can be applied to the promotion of peace. We also suggest directions for future research, theory, and practice in this area. Importantly, we present possibilities for applying theoretical predictions and research findings related to SIT to complex real-world problems and how we might make this knowledge more readily accessible and more easily consumable.

Join us on this journey of understanding and exploration. We hope that you will find it enriching and generative. We also hope that it gives you hope. Just as SIT can be applied to illuminate our understanding of intergroup conflict, it can illuminate potential paths to peace.

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Part I
Theoretical and Contemporary Issues

Chapter 1
Social Identity Theory

Michael A. Hogg

Social identity theory was conceived and born as a theory of intergroup relations and conflict and cooperation between groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As it developed, it became a much broader social psychological theory of the role of self and identity in group and intergroup phenomena in general (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). However, intergroup relations has always remained a core feature of the theory; for the simple reason that what happens within groups is inextricable from and fundamentally affected by what happens between groups, and vice versa.

Chapter 1 describes the core tenets of social identity theory and its key sub-theories. My account largely follows the historical development of the theory from its early roots in the 1970s through to the present day. Although I describe all aspects of the theory, I place a greater emphasis on its contribution to our understanding of the social psychology of peace and conflict in society. For detailed overviews of classic and contemporary social identity theory that incorporates all its conceptual developments and applications, see Abrams and Hogg (2010), Hogg (2006) and Hogg and Abrams (1988).

Some Historical Context

Social identity theory was initially developed at Bristol University in the UK in the 1970s by Henri Tajfel, who essentially integrated his early classic scientific work on categorisation and social perception (e.g. Tajfel, 1969) with his passion to understand prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict in society. Tajfel was a

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Polish Jew who lost his entire family to the holocaust. He himself survived the war because he was a student at the Sorbonne in Paris at the outbreak of war in 1939 and enrolled in the French army. He was captured; and instead of being categorised as Jewish and sent to a concentration camp and certain death, he was categorised as French and survived the war in prisoner-of-war camps. Social categorisation and its consequences had an existential personal significance for Tajfel.

Tajfel and those he worked with to develop social identity theory also believed that the dynamics of prejudice and intergroup conflict were best understood as group phenomena generated by basic human motivations and cognitive processes impacted by people's beliefs about themselves, and about the society, social context, and immediate situations people find themselves and their groups in (Abrams & Hogg, 2004; also Billig, 1976).

Authoritarian Personality and the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

The rise of Nazism in Europe in the 1930s seemed to some social psychologists to be at least partly explained as a collective response to frustrated nationalism. To explain the underlying psychology, Dollard and his colleagues (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) developed their psychodynamic-based frustration-aggression hypothesis. Frustrated goals leave people in a state of heightened goal-oriented arousal that can only be dissipated through aggression—and typically the aggression is vented on those who are weak and different because they are easier targets. Group frustrations are thus directed as aggression on weaker or minority groups.

The ensuing Second World War cost about 60 million lives (3 % of the world's population), including the Nazi's systematic extermination of six million Jews and five million non-Jews. To post-war social psychologists, the behaviour of the Nazi regime seemed like collective pathology, so they invoked Freudian psychodynamic notions to explain how this might have arisen. According to Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), authoritarian child-rearing practices in Germany created a love–hate relationship between children and their parents that produced people with authoritarian personalities who worshipped power, authority, and conformity and redirected their hatred onto those who were weak and different.

These two analyses of prejudice, discrimination and intergroup aggression have had a high profile for decades due to their intuitive and popular appeal. However, early social identity theorists felt these approaches were limited (Billig, 1976). They felt that personality would only play a small role in prejudice (the main cause of prejudice was the fact of living in a culture of prejudice—see Pettigrew, 1958); and the link between frustration and group aggression was not a mechanical summation of individual frustrations and aggression—rather, it required group-membership-based processes of communication to construct and represent an ideology identifying and representing certain groups as causes of frustration and targets of aggression.

Realistic Conflict Theory

In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant social psychological theory of intergroup conflict in general was Muzafer Sherif's *realistic conflict theory* (Sherif, 1966). The theory claims that individuals have goals, sometimes quite elaborate goals, and configure their behaviour to achieve their goals. Many goals are mutually exclusive (e.g. securing a job); only one person can achieve it at the expense of the other, and so people compete, sometimes fiercely. Some individual goals, however, are difficult to achieve without help from others (e.g. building a house). In these latter situations, people are dependent on others to work cooperatively with them to achieve their goals. People are *promotively interdependent,* and to the extent that others cooperate with them to help them achieve their goals they grow to like them and develop bonds of mutual attraction that create a cohesive social group (cf. Hogg, 1993)

   Sherif, however, was most interested in the situation where *groups* have goals. He argued that when two groups have a mutually exclusive goal that only one group can achieve at the expense of the other group (e.g. world domination) then the groups compete, typically very fiercely. This is often accompanied by destructive intergroup behaviour and derogatory intergroup attitudes—the foundations of prejudice and discrimination and ultimately dehumanisation. In contrast, when two or more groups have a shared goal that can only be achieved by intergroup cooperation (e.g. fighting off a dangerous common foe) intergroup relations are less competitive and can even be cooperative and harmonious.

Categorisation and Discrimination: The Minimal Group Paradigm

Tajfel felt there was much to like in Sherif's more context-dependent approach to intergroup conflict; it certainly had better explanatory reach than dysfunctional personality and individualistic frustration-aggression approaches. However, he wondered whether something much more fundamental than competitive goal relations might be sufficient to generate differential in-group–out-group behaviour. Perhaps, the mere fact of being categorised as a member of a group was enough to lay the groundwork for intergroup conflict.

   To investigate this proposition Tajfel and his collaborators designed an intriguing research paradigm, the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). They ran a series of classic experiments in which British schoolboys, participating in what they believed was a study of decision making, were assigned to one of two groups completely randomly, but allegedly on the basis of their expressed preference for paintings by the artists Vassily Kandinsky or Paul Klee. The children knew only which group they themselves were in (Kandinsky group or Klee group), with the identity of out-group and fellow in-group members concealed by the use of code numbers. The children then individually

distributed money between pairs of recipients identified only by code number and group membership. This pencil-and-paper task was repeated for a number of different pairings of an in-group and an out-group member, excluding self, on a series of distribution matrices carefully designed to tease out the distribution strategies that were being used.

The results showed that against a background of some fairness, the children who had been categorised, in contrast to those who had not been categorised, strongly favoured their own group. This was a startling finding as the groups were indeed minimal. They were created on the basis of a flimsy criterion, had no past history or possible future, the children did not even know the identity of other members of each group, and no self-interest was involved in the money distribution task as self was not a recipient. Subsequent experiments were even more minimal in character—simply randomly categorising participants as members of X-group or Y-group (e.g. Billig & Tajfel, 1973).

Over the past 45 years, literally hundreds of minimal group experiments have been conducted across the globe with a very wide range of participants. The robust finding is that the mere fact of being categorised as a group member produces ethnocentrism and competitive intergroup behaviour (e.g. Diehl, 1990). Other studies have shown that there is an asymmetry—categorised individuals favour the in-group rather than discriminate against the out-group, unless they feel that the in-group is under threat, in which case full-blown out-group discrimination also emerges (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). There is also a suggestion that minimal intergroup categorisation can generate in-group bias at the implicit level and is thus an effect over which people may have no conscious control (Otten & Wentura, 1999). Minimal groups have become a core feature of social identity research—a Google Scholar search in July 2015 yielded 9310 publications referring to minimal groups.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory crystalised around an attempt to explain the minimal group findings; bringing together Tajfel's other scientific research on categorisation and social perception, and his social issues-oriented concern to explain prejudice, discrimination, and conflict in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Hogg & Abrams, 1988). At the core of the theory was Tajfel's classic definition of social identity as an "individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 292). Social groups, whether large demographic categories or small task-oriented teams, provide their members with a shared identity that prescribes and evaluates who they are, what they should believe and how they should behave. Social identities also, very critically, highlight how the in-group is distinct from relevant out-groups in a particular social context.

Intergroup Relations

Social identity theory initially focused primarily on intergroup relations—exploring the issue of conflict and cooperation between large-scale social categories. This early emphasis within the wider theory is often referred to as the *social identity theory of intergroup relations* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Social identity defines and evaluates one's self-concept and how one will be treated and thought of by others. For this reason, when people make comparisons between their own group and an out-group they are concerned to ensure that their own group is positively distinctive—clearly differentiated from and more favourably evaluated than relevant out-groups. Intergroup comparisons are intrinsically in-group-favouring and ethnocentric (Brewer & Campbell, 1976), and intergroup behaviour is effectively a struggle over the relative status or prestige of one's in-group. Higher status groups fight to protect their evaluative superiority; lower status groups struggle to shrug off their social stigma and promote their positivity.

The strategies that groups adopt to manage their identity depend on *subjective belief structures*—members' beliefs about the nature of the relationship between their group and a specific out-group (e.g. Ellemers, 1993; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Beliefs focus on *status* (what is my group's social standing relative to the out-group?), *stability* (how stable is this status relationship?), *legitimacy* (how legitimate is this status relationship?), *permeability* (how easy is it for people to change their social identity by "passing" into the out-group?), and *cognitive alternatives* (is a different intergroup relationship conceivable?).

A *social mobility* belief structure hinges on a belief in permeability; that intergroup boundaries are effectively soft and easy to cross. It causes members of lower status groups as isolated individuals to disidentify from their group to try to join and gain acceptance by the higher status out-group—they try to "pass". In reality, intergroup boundaries are rarely permeable and passing is unsuccessful, leaving those who attempt it in social identity limbo; excluded by both groups. Dominant groups often promulgate an ideology of social mobility and tolerate limited passing because it undermines and prevents collective action on the part of the minority.

A *social change* belief structure hinges on recognition that permeability is actually low; that intergroup boundaries are in fact hard and difficult to cross. It causes low status groups to engage in *social creativity*—behaviours aimed at redefining the social value of their group and its attributes, coupled with attempts to avoid (upward) comparison with higher status groups and instead engage in (lateral or downward) comparisons with other groups lower in the social pecking order. Dominant groups can sometimes promulgate a social change belief structure that encourages lateral or downward comparisons and competition among subordinate groups—an often very effective strategy of "divide and conquer".

Where a social change belief structure is coupled with recognition that the social order is illegitimate group members can develop *cognitive alternatives* (essentially a critical ideology and road map for the plausible achievement of social change) and

engage in *social competition*—direct competition with the out-group over status, which can range from debate through protest, to revolution and war.

But what about cooperation between groups, reduction of ethnocentrism and prejudice and the emergence of social harmony? Perhaps the problems of inter-group behaviour can be overcome by integrating warring factions into a cosy single superordinate group; thereby transforming conflictual intergroup behaviour into harmonious intragroup behaviour (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Sadly, this can be very difficult to achieve or sustain. People are often strongly attached to their social category membership and associated identity; there is a deep "cultural divide" between groups (Prentice & Miller, 1999). Attempts to encourage superordinate re-categorisation can be viewed as an identity threat that is resisted, often fiercely (e.g. Hogg & Hornsey, 2006).

More effective is crossed-categorisation, where people acquire a more textured and less identity-threatening representation of in-group–out-group relations; the groups are categorically distinct and separate but share identity on other dimensions (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). Also effective is a multicultural framing of intergroup relations in which group distinctiveness is celebrated as a valued facet of a diverse society (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), or construction of an intergroup relational identity in which groups actually partially define their own group in terms of their group's mutually cooperative relations with an out-group (Hogg, 2015). In all these cases, some form of superordinate leadership may be needed—and that can pose a very real challenge.

Self-Categorisation

The early 1980s witnessed a very significant development of social identity theory to revisit and specify more precisely the social cognitive bases of social identity phenomena, as part of a more general *social identity theory of the group* often referred to as self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987; see Abrams & Hogg, 2010).

Human groups are categories that people mentally represent as *prototypes*—fuzzy sets of interrelated attributes (attitudes, behaviours, customs, dress, and so forth) that capture overall similarities within groups and overall differences between groups. Prototypes represent attributes that maximise the group's *entitativity*—the extent to which a group appears to be a distinct and clearly defined entity. One way to think of a group prototype is what comes immediately to mind if, for example, I said to you "French", "hipster", or "terrorist". If many people in one group share their prototype of their own or another group the prototype is essentially a stereo-type—if you alone believe that all Martians have skinny green bodies and huge heads it's a prototype, but if pretty much all other humans believe this then the prototype is also a stereotype.

Overwhelmingly we make binary categorisations where one of the categories is the group that we are in, the in-group. Thus, in-group prototypes not only capture

similarities within the in-group but also accentuate differences between our group and a specific out-group. In-group prototypes can therefore differ, typically around a relatively stable core, depending on what the comparison out-group is—in-group prototypes are influenced by the intergroup comparative context. Context-based changes can be transient but if the context change is enduring the prototype changes more profoundly and more enduringly.

The process of categorising someone has predictable consequences. Rather than "seeing" that person as an idiosyncratic individual, you see them through the lens of the prototype of the category you have placed them in—they become *depersonalised* in terms of the attributes of the prototype. They are matched to the prototype and assigned to varying degree its attributes. Categorisation-based depersonalisation affects in-group members and yourself in exactly the same way. When you categorise yourself, you view yourself in terms of the defining attributes of the in-group (self-stereotyping), and since prototypes also describe and prescribe group-appropriate ways to think, feel, and behave, you think, feel, and behave group prototypically. Your own behaviour conforms to in-group norms. In this way, self-categorisation not only transforms one's self-conception but also produces normative behaviour among members of a group.

Social Identity Motivations

Social identity processes and phenomena are associated with two main motivational dynamics. The original social identity theory of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) focused on positive intergroup distinctiveness and self-enhancement. One of the most distinctive features of group life and intergroup relations is that groups and their members go to great lengths to protect or promote their belief that "we" are better than "them". Members strive for evaluatively positive intergroup distinctiveness because self is defined and evaluated in group terms and therefore the status, prestige, and social valence of the group attaches to oneself.

The pursuit of positive social identity may reflect one of the most basic of human motives for self-enhancement and self-esteem (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Thus, positive distinctiveness and the dynamics of group and intergroup behaviour may be motivated by self-esteem with the implication that low self-esteem motivates group identification and intergroup behaviour, and identification elevates self-esteem—the *self-esteem hypothesis* (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Research suggests, however, that (a) group-based self-esteem is more closely associated than individual-level self-esteem with social identity processes and phenomena, (b) self-esteem can be raised by group identification but low self-esteem is a less reliable cause of identification (high self-esteem people often identify more strongly—e.g. Leary & Baumeister, 2000), and (c) people are exceedingly adept at buffering themselves against the self-evaluative consequences of low status or stigmatised group membership (e.g. Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). See Martiny and Rubin (2016) for a review.

Although self-categorisation theory focused on cognitive process and representation rather than motivation (Turner et al., 1987), it contained within it intimations of a more epistemic categorisation-based motivation associated with social identity dynamics. *Uncertainty–identity theory* (Hogg, 2007, 2012) is based on the premise that feeling uncertain about our world and in particular how to behave and how others will behave can be unsettling, even aversive. Uncertainty makes it difficult to predict and plan behaviour in such a way as to be able to act efficaciously. Not surprisingly people try to reduce uncertainty about their perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviours. We are particularly motivated to reduce uncertainty if we feel uncertain about things that reflect on or are relevant to self, or if we are uncertain about self per se; about our identity, who we are, how we relate to others, and how we are socially located. Ultimately, people need to know who they are, how to behave, and what to think, and who others are, how they might behave, and what they might think.

Social categorisation is particularly effective at reducing uncertainty because it furnishes group prototypes that describe how people (including self) will and ought to behave and interact with one another. Such prototypes are relatively consensual ("we" agree that "we" are like this and "they" are like that)—thus, one's worldview and self-concept are validated. Social categorisation renders one's own and others' behaviour predictable and thus allows one to avoid harm and plan effective action. It also allows one to know how one should feel and behave.

The more self-conceptually uncertain one is the more one strives to belong, particularly to groups that effectively reduce uncertainty—such groups are distinctive, with high entitativity and simple, clear, prescriptive, and consensual prototypes. In extreme circumstances, these groups might be orthodox and extremist, possess closed ideologies and belief systems, and have hierarchical leadership and authority structures (Hogg, 2014).

Ideological and authoritarian belief systems, whether secular or religious, are often associated with conditions of social uncertainty and instability (cf. Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). Thus, to the extent that such belief systems are tied to group memberships, identification may mediate the link between social uncertainty and ideology. Another implication of uncertainty–identity theory is that subordinate groups may acquiesce in their subordinate status precisely because challenging the status quo elevates self-conceptual uncertainty to unacceptable levels (cf. Jost & Hunyadi, 2002). Indeed, although people prefer to identify with high than low status groups this preference can disappear under high uncertainty. Where people are self-conceptually uncertain, they are motivated by uncertainty reduction to identify equally with low or high status groups (Reid & Hogg, 2005).

A third motivational dynamic, which may be more closely related to uncertainty reduction than self-enhancement, is *optimal distinctiveness* (cf. Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). People try to strike a balance between two conflicting motives, for inclusion/sameness (satisfied by group membership) and distinctiveness/uniqueness (satisfied by individuality), in order to achieve optimal distinctiveness. Smaller groups over-satisfy the need for distinctiveness, so people strive for

greater inclusiveness, while large groups over-satisfy the need for inclusiveness, so people strive for distinctiveness within the group. One implication of this idea is that people should be more satisfied with membership of mid-size than very large or very small groups.

Social Norms, Influence, and Leadership

Social identity is expressed through normative behaviour. Norms map the contours of groups and social identities and are cognitively represented as group prototypes that describe and prescribe identity-defining behaviour (cf. Hogg & Smith, 2007). Within a given group there is usually substantial agreement on in-group and out-group prototypes—"we agree that we are like this and they are like that". Self-categorisation produces conformity to in-group norms (normative behaviour) because, as described above, it assimilates self to the in-group prototype (see Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Conformity is not surface behavioural compliance, but a deeper process whereby people internalise and enact the group's prototype.

Because in-group norms not only capture intragroup similarity but also accentuate intergroup distinctiveness they tend to be polarised away from the out-group and thus are often ideals that are more extreme than the group as a whole—conformity through self-categorisation often produces group polarisation (e.g. Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990).

The social influence process associated with identification-contingent conformity is *referent informational influence* (Turner et al., 1987; see Abrams & Hogg, 1990). In groups, people are highly vigilant for and attentive to reliable information about the context-appropriate group prototype/norm. Typically, the most immediate and reliable source of this information is identity-consistent behaviour of those members who are generally considered to be most prototypical of the group. Once the norm has been recognised or established, it is internalised as the context-specific in-group prototype to which people conform through self-categorisation.

This process endows prototypical members with greater influence than non-prototypical members within the group—a point that serves as the foundation of the *social identity theory of leadership* (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Hogg, Van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012), see also Reicher, Haslam, Platow, and Steffens (2016). Although norms are the source of influence within groups, some members embody group norms better than others—they are more prototypical and are thus disproportionately influential. Prototypical members occupy a de facto leadership role in the group; and leaders who are prototypical are more influential and effective as leaders than are less prototypical leaders. Their effectiveness is amplified because they are assumed to be strongly identified with the group and are thus trusted to be acting in the group's best interest and unlikely to do the group harm. Paradoxically, this allows them to diverge from group norms more than less prototypical leaders—they can be normatively innovative, which is a hallmark of leadership (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008).

Differentiation Within Groups

Group norms capture and express intragroup similarity. However, groups are almost always internally differentiated. One key differentiation that has far-reaching consequences is differentiation in terms of perceived prototypicality. We have already seen that prototypically central members are more influential than less prototypical members. Less prototypical members, particularly those who are prototypically marginal, are not liked or trusted much by the group, and are therefore not only relatively uninfluential but can be viewed with suspicion as deviants who potentially threaten the group (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001). Indeed, people on the normative boundary between in- and out-group, particularly if they are generally not very likeable individuals, are disliked more and are more strongly rejected if they are in-group than out-group members—they are treated as "black sheep" (Marques & Páez, 1994).

Overall, according to the theory of *subjective group dynamics*, reactions to marginal members stem from the fact that marginal members can threaten the normative clarity and integrity of the group (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Thus, a marginal member who diverges from the group norm in a direction that leans away from the out-group (called pro-norm deviance) accentuates intergroup distinctiveness and is therefore less normatively threatening than one who leans in a direction towards the out-group (called anti-norm deviance) and blurs intergroup boundaries—the latter invites a more negative reaction from the group than the former.

Although marginal members are generally perceived and treated unfavourably, they may sometimes fulfil important social change functions for the group (Hogg & Wagoner, in press). For example, deviants can serve as in-group critics (e.g. Hornsey, 2005), or as minority groups that challenge the accepted wisdom of the majority (e.g. Nemeth & Staw, 1989). In both cases, it can be a struggle for marginal members to be heard, but their contribution to the group is, ultimately, constructive—minorities and critics are effectively trying to change the group's identity from inside.

Marginal members can sometimes be very damaging to the group. Minorities that feel they have no voice within the group may ultimately fragment the group by forming a schism (Sani, 2005); and individuals who feel they are or are treated as peripheral members of a group that is important to their identity may become zealous extremists on behalf of the group in an attempt to be accepted by the group as loyal central members (Hogg & Wagoner, in press).

Crowds and Protests

Members of groups often gather together collectively to act in unison (see La Macchia & Louis, 2016). Large public gatherings of this nature are characterised as crowds, demonstrations, rallies, protests, and so forth. One popular view in social psychology is that crowds provide anonymity and strip away

responsibility and accountability—people become deindividuated such that primitive antisocial aggressive instincts are no longer held at bay by societal norms (cf. Zimbardo, 1970).

The *social identity model of deindividuation* (SIDE model) has challenged this perspective on crowd behaviour, arguing instead that crowd events are just like any other group phenomenon where people identify with a group and are depersonalised in terms of the group's attitudinal and behavioural norms (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Depersonalisation means viewing yourself as a category representative rather than a unique individual and is associated with a change in identity, whereas deindividuation refers to a loss of identity that is associated with primitive antisocial and aggressive impulses.

According to the SIDE model, depersonalisation can produce antisocial and aggressive behaviour, but only if people identify with a group that has a prototype prescribing such behaviour (Postmes & Spears, 1998). Crowds can sometimes seem volatile, but this is because they are unusual events; members are uncertain about the context-appropriate normative behaviour of the group, so they seek guidance as they behaviourally triangulate on the appropriate norm. From a SIDE perspective crowds are purposive, norm-governed, goal-oriented intergroup events that often have a very salient and visible out-group. In this respect, they resemble collective protest and encounter many of the wider obstacles to social mobilisation.

The study of social protest is the study of how individual discontents are transformed into collective action—how and why do sympathisers become mobilised as activists or participants? Mobilisation reflects the attitude–behaviour relationship—sympathisers hold sympathetic attitudes towards an issue, yet these attitudes do not readily translate into behaviour (Klandermans, 1997). It also resembles a social dilemma; protest is generally *for* a perceived social good (e.g. equality) or *against* a perceived social ill (e.g. oppression), and since success benefits everyone irrespective of participation but failure harms participants more, it is tempting to *free ride*—to remain a sympathiser rather than become a participant. Leadership is critical in mobilising a group to take action. In particular, the leader needs to be viewed as a just person who can be trusted to be acting in the best interest of the group and its members. Ultimately, however, it is social identification that increases the probability of social action and collective protest (e.g. Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Conclusion

Chapter 1 has provided a brief overview of social identity theory, mapping its historical development since the original formulation in the 1970s. I have described both classic and contemporary aspects of the theory and have tried to place greater emphasis on aspects that are directly relevant to understanding peace and conflict in society. Social identity theory is a unified conceptual framework that explicates group processes and intergroup relations in terms of the interaction of social

cognitive, social interactive, and societal processes, and places self-conception at the core of the dynamic.

The theory was born out of Tajfel's scientific research on categorisation and social perception, his personal passion to explain prejudice and discrimination, and his opposition to the prevailing personality and individualistic explanations. The *minimal group studies* (e.g. Tajfel, 1970) provided a proximal platform for the original *social identity theory of intergroup relations* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This was broadened and more tightly cognitively grounded by Turner and his students as the *social identity theory of the group*/*self-categorisation theory* (Turner et al., 1987). The two main motivational processes associated with social identity theory are captured by the *self-esteem hypothesis* (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988) and by *uncertainty–identity theory* (Hogg, 2007)—*optimal distinctiveness theory* (e.g. Leonardelli et al., 2010) provides a third perspective on social identity motivation.

A key component of social identity theory is its analysis of the influence process responsible for the recognition, construction, and internalisation of group norms— *referent informational influence theory* (see Abrams & Hogg, 1990), and the role of leadership in this process—the *social identity theory of leadership* (Hogg et al., 2012). The fact that groups are internally differentiated into prototypically central and prototypically peripheral members has far-reaching consequences not only for leadership and influence but also for the psychology of inclusion and exclusion, as described by the theory of *subjective group dynamics* (e.g. Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). Finally, the SIDE model explains how identity, influence, and leadership processes interact to affect social mobilisation and collective action (e.g. Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Regarding peace and conflict in society, the underlying dynamic is one in which people protect and promote the status and entitativity of social identities that are central and important to their self-concept. The way they do this is guided by what they believe is possible given the nature of their group's position in society. Prototype-based leadership and the behaviour of and the group's treatment of marginal and central group members play a key role in all of this.

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Chapter 2
Towards a Clearer Understanding of Social Identity Theory's Self-Esteem Hypothesis

Sarah E. Martiny and Mark Rubin

Social identity theory was developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the 1970s (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975). It provides a nonreductionist social psychological explanation of intergroup conflict. Its most fundamental assumption is that group behaviour is more than a collection of individuals behaving *en masse*. Instead, group behaviour is linked to the group's psychological representation or *social identity*. Hence, social identity theory, or SIT, focuses less on how individuals operate within social groups and more on how social groups operate within the minds of individuals.

In this chapter, we focus on a key proposition in SIT—that group members are motivated to protect and enhance the positivity of their group in order to protect and enhance their self-esteem. We begin by explaining this *self-esteem hypothesis* in detail and summarising the results of research that has tested the hypothesis. We then explain several theoretical caveats of the self-esteem hypothesis and discuss recent work that proposes a dynamic relation between collective self-esteem and group-related outcomes. Based on these caveats and new research, we present a reformulated version of the self-esteem hypothesis. We conclude by explaining how the self-esteem hypothesis can be broadened to take into account other identity management strategies and by outlining some directions for future research.

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The Self-Esteem Hypothesis

SIT is based on two of Tajfel's "great ideas" (Turner, 1996). His first great idea is that social categorisation leads to the cognitive accentuation of (a) similarities between people who belong to the same group and (b) differences between people who belong to different groups. These accentuation effects help to explain the shift from self-perception as a unique individual—or *personal identity*—to self-perception as a stereotypical in-group member who is interchangeable with other in-group members—or *social identity*.

Although Tajfel's first idea explained why people *identified* with their in-group, it did not explain why they tended to *favour* their in-group over out-groups—the so-called *in-group bias* effect (e.g. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). This is where Tajfel's "second great idea" came into play. He assumed that people obtain information about the value of their in-group by making intergroup comparisons with salient out-groups on relevant comparison dimensions, and that these comparisons are focused on establishing a positive in-group status or *positive in-group distinctiveness*. Hence, people not only share a social identity with other in-group members, but also favour in-group members because they want to make their in-group more positive than comparable out-groups. Tajfel and Turner explained this rationale in more detail in their classic 1979 chapter. We paraphrase their explanation below:

1. People tend to have a psychological connection to the groups to which they belong; this connection is conceptualised as a social identity.
2. People also have a need for positive self-esteem, and this need motivates them to behave in ways that create, maintain, and protect the positivity of their social identity.
3. One way to increase the positivity of a social identity is to increase the social status of the in-group upon which the social identity is based.
4. Collectively favouring an in-group and derogating out-groups (i.e. in-group bias) can increase the social status of the in-group relative to the status of out-groups and, consequently, it can increase the positivity of the associated social identity.
5. People are motivated to engage in in-group bias in order to create, maintain, and/or protect a positive social status for their in-group and, consequently, a positive social identity.

Abrams and Hogg (1988; Hogg & Abrams 1990) explained Points 4 and 5 in what has since become known as the self-esteem hypothesis. Corollary 1 of the self-esteem hypothesis predicts that successful intergroup discrimination enhances self-esteem (see Point 4), and Corollary 2 of the self-esteem hypothesis predicts that depressed or threatened self-esteem motivates discrimination (see Point 5).

Evidence for the Self-Esteem Hypothesis

Over 50 studies have tested the self-esteem hypothesis, and several reviews of the evidence have concluded that, although the majority of evidence supports Corollary 1, there is much less evidence for Corollary 2 (for reviews, see Abrams & Hogg,

1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; for a meta-analysis, see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000). So, although successful intergroup discrimination has been shown to improve in-group status and the positivity of in-group members' social identities and self-esteem, there is much less evidence that the need for self-esteem motivates people to engage in intergroup discrimination. Hence, we know that intergroup discrimination has a psychological effect but we are less clear about its psychological cause.

The lack of support for Corollary 2 has left an explanatory vacuum in this area that some researchers have sought to fill with other theories of intergroup discrimination (e.g. system justification theory, social dominance theory; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). However, this jump to alternative explanations may be premature. Although the lack of evidence for Corollary 2 may be because this part of self-esteem hypothesis is invalid, it may also be because this part of the hypothesis has not yet been tested correctly (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, 2004).

One of the attractions of the self-esteem hypothesis is its simplicity. However, this simplicity belies several important theoretical caveats and qualifications that need to be taken into consideration in order to provide a valid test of the hypothesis. Below, we consider some of these caveats to clarify the conditions that must be met in order for researchers to provide valid tests of the self-esteem hypothesis. It is only after such tests have been conducted that we can be more confident about the veracity of the self-esteem hypothesis.

Caveats of the Self-Esteem Hypothesis

To begin with, the self-esteem hypothesis needs to be understood in terms of a particular type of intergroup discrimination and a particular type of self-esteem. The discrimination in question is called *social competition* (Turner, 1975), and it refers to a competition for social status and superiority in which groups strive to be *positively distinct* from one another by, for example, winning socially valued intergroup competitions. Importantly, SIT does not propose that the need for self-esteem motivates other types of discrimination. Examples of other types of discrimination include *realistic competition*, in which groups compete over material resources in order to meet specific group goals (Sherif, 1967), and *consensual discrimination*, in which groups reflect the social reality of an intergroup status hierarchy by rating low status groups more negatively than high status groups on status-relevant dimensions (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004). The distinction between these different types of discrimination is important because any given instance of real-world intergroup discrimination can involve a mixture of different forms of discrimination, and this mixture will reduce the sensitivity of tests of the self-esteem hypothesis. Valid tests of both corollaries of the self-esteem hypothesis need to unconfound these various types of discrimination and focus on the relation between self-esteem and social competition per se.

The self-esteem hypothesis also needs to be understood in terms of a particular type of self-esteem called *specific collective state* self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, 2004; Turner, 1999, pp. 24-25). Specific collective state self-esteem refers to the current evaluation of a specific social identity, and it can be contrasted with *global, personal, trait* self-esteem, which refers to an overall evaluation of one's personal self across extended periods of time. Many tests of the self-esteem hypothesis have been insensitive because they have used measures of global personal trait self-esteem rather than specific collective state self-esteem (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, 2004; Turner & Reynolds, 2001, p. 140).

There are also two individual difference variables that are likely to impact on the tendency for people to meet their need for self-esteem via intergroup discrimination. The first variable is in-group identification, which refers to the degree to which people perceive themselves to be typical group members as well as how important and emotionally significant they perceive the in-group to be to the self (e.g. Leach et al., 2008). Although in-group identification and collective self-esteem are likely to be positively related (e.g. Leach et al., 2008; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), they can also be considered to be conceptually separate from one another. Hence, one may like or dislike in-groups (collective self-esteem) that one considers to be important or unimportant to the self (in-group identification; Correll & Park, 2005; Milanov, Rubin, & Paolini, 2014). Crucially, the self-esteem hypothesis only applies to people who identify with their social groups; that is people who see themselves as group members and perceive their in-group to be an important part of their self (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 41). People with low or no in-group identification do not care about their in-group or the implications of its status for their self-esteem. Hence, they will be least likely to conform to the predictions of the self-esteem hypothesis.

The second individual difference variable that may moderate the tendency to meet the need for self-esteem by engaging in intergroup discrimination is global personal trait self-esteem. As Rubin and Paolini (2014) recently explained, "prejudice and discrimination represent relatively direct and blatant forms of self-enhancement, and people with low self-esteem prefer more indirect and subtle forms of self-enhancement because they lack the confidence to engage in more direct forms (Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988)" (p. 266; see also Aberson et al., 2000). Consistent with this reasoning, Long, Spears, and Manstead (1994) found an interaction between personal and collective self-esteem such that people with high personal and low collective self-esteem displayed greater discrimination than people who possessed the other three possible combinations of personal and collective self-esteem. Apparently, the combination of high personal and low collective self-esteem provides both the confidence and the motive to engage in intergroup discrimination.

Aside from individual difference variables, social norms may also impact on the relation between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination. As Rubin and Hewstone (2004) pointed out:

the societal value of intergroup behavior determines the behavior's potential for creating or protecting high ingroup status. In theory, any form of intergroup behavior can be used to create or protect ingroup status as long as group members perceive it to have a positive societal value. (p. 825)

Hence, the societal value of intergroup discrimination must be taken into account when determining the effect of this behaviour on self-esteem and the role of self-esteem in motivating such behaviour (Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, & Doosje, 2009, p. 507; Tajfel, 1979, pp. 184–185; Turner, 1999). Consistent with this interpretation, Scheepers et al. (2009) found that intergroup discrimination *reduced* rather than *increased* group members' self-esteem when fairness was a prevailing intergroup norm because discrimination contradicted prescriptions about the correct (i.e. fair) way to behave. Tajfel famously argued that research studies do not take place in a sociocultural vacuum (Tajfel, 1981), and his point is particularly relevant when testing the self-esteem hypothesis. In practice, researchers need to interpret their research findings in the context of the specific social norms that their participants use to ascribe meaning and value to groups, status systems, and intergroup behaviour.

Finally, the SIT literature focuses on creating, maintaining, and protecting a *positive* in-group status and a *positive* social identity. However, this phrasing may have biased researchers to focus on only one side of the self-esteem hypothesis. The underlying principles of SIT imply that group members should also be concerned about *avoiding negative* in-group status and a *negative* social identity. Rubin, Badea, and Jetten (2014) recently advanced this *negative identity avoidance hypothesis* in order to explain why members of low status groups use in-group favouritism to draw even in status with high status out-groups rather than to attempt to surpass them in status.

A Dynamic Model of Collective Self-Esteem

Recent evidence has highlighted a further potential caveat to the self-esteem hypothesis in the form of initial levels of collective self-esteem and identity threat. Numerous studies have demonstrated that group members who are high in (collective) self-esteem show stronger in-group bias and out-group derogation when they are placed in situations of identity threat (e.g. Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brown et al., 1988; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). For example, work by Branscombe and Wann (1994) showed that group members who were highly identified with their group discriminated against an out-group significantly more in an in-group threat condition than in the no threat condition.

From our point of view, these empirical findings are important in showing that neither high collective self-esteem nor identity threat alone increases group members' motivation to react with discrimination. Instead, *threatened high collective self-esteem* appears to be the key precondition for subsequent discrimination (for

the same argument, see Martiny & Kessler, 2014; Martiny, Kessler, & Vignoles, 2012). This notion is in line with research on *threatened egotism* (e.g. Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Bushman et al., 2009; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). In this research, Baumeister et al. (1996) argued that, in contrast to the classic view which predicts a negative relation between self-esteem and violence and aggressive behaviour, the combination of high self-esteem and threat triggers defensive behaviour. People who have a strong motivation to see themselves very positively are strongly motivated to react when their favourable view of themselves is challenged. This motivation is triggered by a discrepancy between a favourable self-appraisal and a much less favourable external appraisal. One reason why people with high self-esteem react so strongly to threats against their positive self-appraisal is because they are extremely reluctant to revise their self-appraisals in a downward direction (Baumeister et al., 1996). This peculiar aversion to negative self-appraisal among people with high self-esteem is consistent with empirical evidence demonstrating that people wish to hold positive views of themselves and seek to enhance their self-appraisal whenever possible (e.g. Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988) as well as with work demonstrating peoples' motivation to maintain consistent self-appraisals (e.g. De la Ronde & Swann, 1993; Swann, 1987).

Noting the paucity of evidence for the second corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis, we argue that a parallel process to the threatened egotism process that occurs at the personal level may also take place at the group level. More precisely, we propose that group members who have high collective self-esteem experience a large discrepancy when negative intergroup comparison outcomes are made salient and, consequently, they are especially motivated to restore their positive view of the in-group. Concomitant identity threat is also discrepant with people's motivation to maintain consistent self- and group appraisals. Thus, in line with Martiny et al. (2012), we argue that the positive evaluation of the in-group is taken as a standard in a comparison situation and that incoming negative information is compared to this standard. The larger the discrepancy between the standard and the incoming information, the stronger should be in-group members' motivation to protect their positive in-group view, and thus the stronger their motivation to cope with this identity threat by deploying identity management strategies. In support of this dynamic collective self-esteem model, Martiny et al. (2012) demonstrated across three studies that social identity threat led to the motivation to show social competition especially for group members who were high in collective self-esteem.

Research on comparison processes at the individual level (e.g. Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995) has shown that the first part of the social comparison processes is intuitive and automatic, and that this first process is followed by a second, more effortful correction process that accepts outcomes as valid if they are in line with the person's self-appraisal, and corrects or undoes information that is perceived as incorrect or unwanted. Following Martiny and Kessler (2014), we extend these findings to the group level and argue that group members initially process all incoming information automatically. However, as soon as they realise that all or part of the incoming information about the in-group is not in line with their group appraisal, they correct these outcomes in an effortful cognitive process (i.e. deploying identity

management strategies). This means that, for example, when two groups compete on an important dimension (e.g. two soccer teams play a match), all group members will automatically process the comparison outcome (i.e. which team won the match). For the losing group, and especially for those who have high levels of collective self-esteem, the negative comparison outcome (i.e. losing the match) will deviate from their positive view of the in-group (e.g. "we are a great soccer team"). For this reason, they will be especially motivated to undo this negative comparison outcome in an effortful, second process. For example, they may derogate the winning out-group on a different dimension (e.g. "maybe they play better soccer than we do, but our team is more fun"). Several empirically testable predictions can be derived from these hypotheses.

First, correction processes that take place after unfavourable group comparison outcomes need cognitive resources. Supporting this prediction, Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, and Leemans (2001) replicated the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) in a dual task paradigm and found that group members who strongly valued the in-group spent more cognitive resources processing information about the deviant in-group members than did group members who did not value the in-group as strongly. These results suggest that group members who are high in collective self-esteem are motivated to restore their positive group image, and that this process of restoring the group image demands cognitive resources.

Second, if restoring an unfavourable comparison outcome needs cognitive resources, then group members should not be able to achieve this outcome when they lack these resources. Hence, cognitively busy or distracted group members should not be able to restore their positive group-appraisal which in turn should lead to negative emotions (for a more detailed argument, see Martiny & Kessler, 2014). Consistent with this prediction, research shows that group members who are high in collective self-esteem respond with negative emotions when they are under cognitive load and confronted with identity threat. These high levels of negative emotions arise because the threatened group members do not have enough cognitive resources available to cope with this threat by deploying management strategies (Martiny & Kessler, 2014).

A Reformulated Self-Esteem Hypothesis

We believe that it may be helpful to reformulate the self-esteem hypothesis in order to take into account the various caveats and qualifications that we have highlighted above. Our reformulated self-esteem hypothesis is as follows:

1. The self-esteem motive: Among people who identify with their in-group and who are sufficiently confident to engage in direct group enhancement, the need for specific collective state self-esteem motivates socially competitive behaviour for in-group status. Depending on specific social norms, this behaviour may take the form of intergroup discrimination, and it is likely to be most apparent among group members who had initially high collective self-esteem and have suffered an identity threat.

2. <u>The self-esteem effect</u>: Intergroup behaviour that leads to an improvement in in-group status will elevate the specific collective state self-esteem of in-group members who identify with their group.

We concede that this reformulated hypothesis is not as simple or neat as the original version. But the social world is not neat, and we believe that our reformulated hypothesis does a better job of capturing the complexities of the underlying SIT principles and recent evidence regarding the dynamic nature of self-esteem processes.

Expanding the Self-Esteem Hypothesis to Other Identity Management Strategies

Our preceding sections discussed the various limits and qualifications of the self-esteem hypothesis. However, it is also important to acknowledge the generality of the self-esteem hypothesis and its applicability to previously unidentified areas of intergroup relations. Traditionally, tests of the self-esteem hypothesis have been limited to the relation between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination. However, intergroup discrimination (viz., *social competition*) is only one of several ways of coping with negative intergroup comparison outcomes. In Tajfel and Turner's (1979) early work, besides arguing that group members show social competition in order to improve the status of the whole group, the authors introduced two further strategies to deal with negative comparison outcomes: *individual mobility* and *social creativity*. Individual mobility comprises both literally leaving the group and joining a group that is evaluated more positively, and merely psychologically distancing oneself from the former in-group in order to increase one's individual status. Social creativity is a rather broad category because it involves all responses that "are based on primarily cognitive changes of parameters that define the intergroup comparison context which the actual status inequality between groups is derived from" (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998, pp. 701–702). A great deal of previous research has investigated the way in which sociostructural conditions determine which type of identity management strategy is chosen (e.g. Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993). However, much less research has investigated the relation between collective state self-esteem and these identity management strategies. The extension of the self-esteem hypothesis to identity management strategies other than social competition may help us to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the motivational processes that underlie intergroup behaviour and conflict in a broader variety of situations. In the following section, we provide a short overview of the limited amount of existing work that has investigated the relation between collective self-esteem and other identity management strategies. We then discuss how this work could be extended in future research.

Existing research has mostly investigated the relation between in-group identification and individual mobility. This work shows that when the in-group is not able to fulfil the group members' need for positive collective self-esteem, group members who do not feel a strong attachment with their group (i.e. low group identification) tend to leave the group (Bernache-Assollant, Laurin, Bouchet, Bodet, & Lacassagne, 2010; Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Jetten, Iyer, Tsivrikos, & Young, 2008). For example, Ellemers et al. (1997, Study 1) indicated that threatened low identifiers more strongly desired individual mobility compared to high identifiers, independent of the permeability of the group boundaries. However, in this study the authors neither manipulated identity threat nor did they specifically assess collective self-esteem which—as outlined above—is conceptually separate from general identification with the in-group. Recent empirical research, however, has manipulated social identity threat and measured collective state self-esteem in advance (Martiny et al., 2012). In contrast to the earlier work, this research demonstrated that group members with low levels of collective self-esteem showed a *reduced* motivation to leave the in-group. The authors argued that this finding is in line with earlier work in the social identity tradition because it indicates group members' motivation to increase the affiliation with the in-group when facing social identity threat (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). However, this work did not take into account the permeability of group boundaries. For this reason, further research should investigate the combined effects of prior levels of collective state self-esteem, social identity threat, and sociostructural conditions such as the permeability of group boundaries on in-group members' motivation to show individual mobility.

Concerning social creativity, research has shown that highly identified group members, when threatened, will use social creativity strategies such as compensating the negative feedback in an alternative domain (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Ellemers & van Rijswijk, 1997). For example, Cadinu and Cerchioni (2001) gave group members positive, negative, or no feedback and showed that high identifiers increased compensation on an alternative dimension after negative feedback but decreased after positive feedback. In contrast, low identifiers did not show this compensation bias but responded to negative feedback by distancing themselves from the in-group. Future research needs to investigate the role of specific collective state self-esteem in these processes.

In addition to these classic identity management strategies, research has also shown that the in-group overexclusion effect—peoples' tendency to misclassify ambiguous individuals as members of the out-group rather than the in-group—is driven by group members' motivation to maintain a positive view of the in-group. Rubin and Paolini (2014) demonstrated that participants misassigned significantly fewer individuals to the in-group than to the out-group when the in-group was evaluated positively and the out-group was evaluated negatively but not when these valences were reversed. Hence, consistent with the dynamic model of collective self-esteem, group members were only motivated to protect the in-group from out-group intrusions when the in-group had a positive valence and not when

it had a negative valence. Further research demonstrates that threatened group members change their perceived intragroup variability strategically in order to maintain positive self- and group perceptions (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Rubin, Hewstone, & Voci, 2001; for a review, see Rubin & Badea, 2012).

Summary and Directions for Future Research

In this chapter, we first presented SIT's self-esteem hypothesis and discussed its main limitations and qualifications. We then developed the self-esteem hypothesis further by presenting a dynamic model of collective self-esteem. Based on this model and the previously discussed limitations, we provided a reformulation of the self-esteem hypothesis. Finally, we extended the self-esteem hypothesis by examining the relationship between collective state self-esteem and other identity management strategies.

In the last two decades, surprisingly little research has been conducted that aimed to develop SIT's self-esteem hypothesis. This is even more surprising when considering the prominent role that SIT plays in the intergroup relations research tradition. We think that investigating the antecedences and consequences of group members' reactions to negative comparison outcomes is an important research aim, and one that will provide a better theoretical understanding of not only SIT's motivational processes but also intergroup conflicts and their potential solutions. In the modern world, where conflicts between groups seem to escalate on daily basis, it is even more important than ever to investigate and understand intergroup conflicts from a (social) psychological perspective. We will only be in a position to develop potential solutions for these conflicts and thus ensure peaceful cooperation between members of different groups if we take group members' need for a positive collective self-esteem into consideration. We need to understand why people are so reluctant to accept negative information about their in-groups and how they are likely to react to negative comparison outcomes. For this reason, we hope that the limitations of the self-esteem hypothesis that we discussed in the first part of this chapter as well as the dynamic model of collective self-esteem that we outlined in the second part of the chapter will not only inspire new research in this area but also help practitioners to understand that intergroup conflicts are not always driven by conflicts about resources but are often driven by fundamental human needs such as peoples' personal and collective self-esteem.

Several research questions derive from the outlined limitations of the self-esteem hypothesis. For example, besides social competition, do other forms of discrimination, such as realistic competition and consensual discrimination, enhance collective state self-esteem, and how do they do so (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004)? What conditions define the relations between collective and personal self-esteem (Long et al., 1994)? Are people who have low personal self-esteem especially motivated to join high status groups in order to compensate for their low levels of personal self-esteem at the collective level (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992)? Is such a compensation even possible? Does the combination of high personal and low

collective self-esteem provide the right combination of confidence and motivation to lead to intergroup discrimination (Rubin & Paolini, 2014)? Under which conditions are group members more motivated to avoid a negative social identity rather than strive for a positive social identity (Rubin et al., 2014)?

We also hope that the outlined dynamic model of collective self-esteem will stimulate further research. For example, if group members with low levels of collective self-esteem do not choose individual mobility when facing social identity threat, then what strategies do they choose and why? When do group members who do not value their group choose to leave their group and when do they decide to stand by their group in the face of social identity threat? Are there further, maybe long-term, consequences of people's inability to cope with social identity threat when they are cognitively busy or distracted? Under which conditions are group members willing to down-regulate their group appraisal after negative comparison outcomes? Can conditions be created under which other motives, such as the aim for accurate information, override the motivation to protect one's positive social identity? What further kinds of identity management strategies should be investigated in relation to collective state self-esteem?

The aim of this chapter was to move beyond the blunt question of whether self-esteem motivates intergroup discrimination. Instead, we aimed to provide a more complete picture of the various issues and nuances that need to be taken into account when considering the empirical evidence for the self-esteem hypothesis. In addition, we aimed to develop theory further by presenting a dynamic model of collective self-esteem and a reformulation of the self-esteem hypothesis. We hope that this will inspire researchers to investigate the many open questions that derive from this important theoretical development.

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Chapter 3
Between the Lines of Us and Them: Identity Threat, Anxious Uncertainty, and Reactive In-Group Affirmation: How Can Antisocial Outcomes be Prevented?

Adrian Lüders, Eva Jonas, Immo Fritsche, and Dimitrij Agroskin

Currently more than 60 million people have been driven from their home countries by war and persecution to seek peace and protection elsewhere (UNHCR, 2015). Those who survive the often arduous flight through deserts and overseas on their way to safety usually find themselves confronted with not only uncertainty about their future, but also mistrust and rejection by local citizens. As a consequence, many withdraw into fringe groups of people who share the same fate. On the other side, citizens in wealthier countries see themselves confronted with rapid and unpredictable changes in their environment and many of them fear they will forfeit their wealth, safety, and traditions by the influx of incoming refugees. The growing popularity of radical right-wing parties and movements in many European countries provides painful evidence that a state of such heightened anxiety and uncertainty creates a perfect breeding ground for ethnocentric thinking and antisocial behaviour. However, at the same time, many people feel the urge to donate money and clothes to refugees, and volunteer to help them cope with language and administrative barriers.

   This chapter is intended to shed light on how people cope with threats that cause them to question their assumptions about themselves or their familiar environment. We focus on people's need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control as underlying identity motives. According to the anxiety-to-approach model of threat and defence (Jonas et al., 2014), violations of these needs trigger neural processes sensitive to goal conflict and potential dangers that catalyse an aversive state of *anxious uncertainty*. As a consequence, people automatically engage in

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defensive behaviours to relieve aversive feelings and to re-establish approach motivation. Given that identity motives largely derive from group membership, affirming one's social identity may represent a functional tool for maintaining a positive self-view in the face of threat. Unfortunately, such reactive in-group affirmation is often accompanied by in-group bias and xenophobia and may also foster radical antisocial reactions (Hogg, Kruglanski, & van den Bos, 2013). However, as illustrated above, antisocial thoughts and behaviours are not inevitable consequences of threat. Depending on personality and contextual variables, people may use different threat coping strategies and may even engage in prosocial reactions in terms of intergroup cooperation and appreciation. Synthesising findings from several approaches related to threat and defence, we apply the anxiety-to-approach model to group-based defences as a common response to identity threat. We highlight the role of different moderators that influence the way in which individuals cope with a given threat as this may help to make better predictions about the direction of threat-related outcomes.

In the following sections, we describe how social identification provides individuals with a sense of self by fostering their underlying identity motives on a *cognitive*, *affective*, and *behavioural* dimension. We review findings showing that threat to these motives (i.e. identity threat) results in anxious uncertainty, which may be soothed by strengthened belief in one's in-group as this helps individuals to re-establish approach motivation on a neural level. We provide evidence that reactive in-group affirmation is often accompanied by antisocial behaviour, such as hostility to out-groups and extremism, before we examine dispositional and situational moderators that may help to prevent antisocial responses and foster socially constructive coping strategies. Finally, we discuss the role of political leaders and mass media in the current European refugee crisis and provide implications for future research.

Motives Behind Group Identification

The capability of reflexive consciousness and self-awareness allows human beings to integrate feelings, experiences, and ambitions into sets of assumptions about themselves, which they use to develop an idea of who they are and the person they strive to become in the future. As the self operates predominantly within social interactions, identity construction occurs primarily by comparing oneself with relevant others. It has been the core assumption of the social identity approach (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) that people derive a sense of identity by categorising themselves and others as members of specific groups. As people strive to establish and maintain a positive self-image, intergroup comparison represents a functional tool for receiving information about the relative value of one's social identity. Thus, on an *affective* dimension, being part of a highly rated collective and feeling positively distinct from relevant out-groups allows people to think and feel positively about themselves.

For decades, self-enhancement has been considered a core motivation underlying social identification until sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) highlighted the relevance of groups for a person's need to be equipped with stable and valuable social bonds. From this perspective, self-esteem serves as a gauge for one's relative social value within groups, aimed to prevent social rejection. Adding a further social identity motive, uncertainty-identity theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007) interprets social categorisation as the attempt of an individual to reduce the experience of epistemic vagueness and resulting self-concept uncertainty (see also Hogg, 2016). Thus, UIT rather refers to a *cognitive* dimension of identity as self-categorisation decreases information complexity by enabling people to define themselves and others on the group level. As group members share common assumptions about how to behave and what to strive for, collective norms and worldviews help individuals navigate through life in accordance with others. Further extending the list of social identity motives, the model of group-based control (Fritsche et al., 2013) suggests people's desire to perceive the world as controllable through their autonomous self (Stollberg, Fritsche, & Baecker, 2015) to determine social identity construction. Specifically, on a *behavioural* level, groups serve people's need for control as they provide a sense of collective agency.

Even though there is still a lack of consensus about the range of motives that underlies (social) identity construction, there is a large body of evidence highlighting the relevance of motives of epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control (c.f., Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). In the next section, we illustrate how groups satisfy these needs on a *cognitive*, *affective*, and *behavioural* dimension.

Cognitive Motives of Identity

Human beings want to understand the world around them to be able to make predictions about future events. Therefore, people usually prefer clear answers and explanations over those that are vague and blurry. This holds for the very basic needs of self-preservation (e.g. being certain of a secure place to stay, or knowing that one will be provided with sufficient nourishment), but also for more abstract assumptions about the self and the meaning of existence in general. However, as objective verifiability (at least for the latter) does not exist, groups help people validate their assumptions on the basis of collective cultural agreements. As groups differ in their norms and worldviews, social identification tells an individual about his or her specific place in the world.

Many researchers have highlighted that groups facilitate people's need for meaning and epistemic understanding. As one of the most prominent approaches, UIT states that through self-categorisation, people start to see themselves and others as interchangeable members of a specific group and to describe the self in terms of the in-group prototype. Hence, uncertainty decreases due to a lowered density of information with which people perceive themselves and their social

environment. The meaning maintenance model (MMM; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006) posits that inconsistencies between people's present experiences and their mental representations violate their perception of meaning and give rise to palliative responses that relieve aversive feelings and restore consistency. According to the MMM, people may either solve a threat directly or focus on alternative resources (e.g. in-groups), which are not affected by a given threat, a process that was termed *fluid compensation*. In a similar vein, the Reactive Approach Model (RAM; McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010) posits that inconsistent self-relevant cognitions give rise to an aversive state of anxious uncertainty that motivates people to mask negative feelings by idealised extremes of confidence in the self or social identity.

As Hart (2014) noted, even though these theories vary in their terminology (e.g. meaning vs. uncertainty) they do all refer to the same motive of *epistemic equilibrium*. Thus, in the current chapter we will use this term substitutionally for the different facets of epistemic motivation that underlie identity construction. Given the importance of epistemic equilibrium for identity, the picture becomes clearer why so many people in Europe (and elsewhere) feel threatened by the changes in their familiar environment that are caused by the influx of incoming refugees such as border controls, congested stations, and accommodation centres in public places.

Affective Motives of Identity

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) states that because people are generally motivated to hold a favourable view of themselves, they strive for positive distinctiveness of their in-group in comparison to out-groups. As a touchstone, people compare status-relevant attributes of their own group with those of other groups. In the case of a negative evaluation (i.e. when the in-group is perceived as being less attractive), people will leave their group. Or, if this is not possible, they will engage in intergroup competition aimed at social status change or reinterpret unpleasant group attributes in a way that they align with their striving for positive self-evaluation. The latter can happen either through a shift of attention to more favourable aspects of the in-group or by depreciation of the out-group attributes.

Sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) also underscores the role of group membership for maintaining self-esteem, but does so from a rather individualistic angle. In contrast to a social identity perspective, self-esteem is assumed to result from an individual's connectedness within the group (i.e. belonging) and not via intergroup comparisons that determine the value of the self. Thereby, self-esteem reflects the quality of valuable social relations available to an individual, and hence serves as a monitoring system to prevent rejection and social devaluation of the individual within groups. Thus, according to sociometer theory, self-esteem is not about how people feel and think about themselves, but how others value them in a given situation (state self-esteem) or in general (trait self-esteem). Support for this assumption comes from research showing that higher self-esteem correlates posi-

tively with feelings of belonging and acceptance, whereas lower self-esteem is associated with rejection, maladaptive efforts to be attractive to others, and self-devaluation (for a review, see MacDonald & Leary, 2012).

From this perspective, it seems reasonable why most people in their daily lives would be more anxious to meet the expectations of their fellow group members to avoid devaluation than to make an effort on behalf of others who do not belong to their group. However, as groups strongly vary in their certain assumptions about what is worth striving, people might gain social recognition through a broad array of different behaviours that may range from the promotion of intergroup cooperation to agitation and violence against foreigners.

Behavioural Motives of Identity

People wish to have control over their actions and their physical and social environment in a way that outcomes are contingent on their intentions and desires. Fritsche et al. (2013) developed a model of group-based control (GBC), proposing that people can maintain or restore a sense of control through the self by defining their self on the group level (i.e. on the level of social identity) and acting as a group member. Defining the self in terms of "we" (instead of "I") may help to maintain the perception that the self has control, because, heuristically, groups are perceived as homogeneous agents that exert control over their environment. In fact, Stollberg et al. (2015) found that, when reminded of lacking personal control, people were more prone to identify with agentic (vs. non-agentic) groups. In addition to mere identification, people have been shown to cope with threatened personal control by engaging in collective behaviour, indicated by increased in-group bias (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhanel, 2008; Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014), conformity with in-group norms (Stollberg, Fritsche, & Jonas, submitted), and pursuit of in-group goals (Fritsche et al., 2013). The latter effects of threatened personal control have been shown to be most pronounced when in addition to personal control threat, in-group agency was also at stake or when in-group identification was high (Fritsche et al., 2013; submitted). Recently, Greenaway, Haslam, Cruwys, Branscombe, and Ysseldyk (2015) showed a direct link between social identification and subjective control perception. In a set of studies, group identification predicted stronger feelings of personal control among participants. Moreover, experimentally primed group identity buffered participants against threat to their perception of agency.

Thus, besides serving epistemic and self-evaluative functions, group membership provides individuals with a sense of control due to collective agency and may become especially relevant when control is thwarted on the personal level. This has particular implications for the understanding of why people with relative low power in their daily lives often tend to be more frightened of cultural mixing and support radical xenophobic parties and movements (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Fritsche et al., submitted).

When the Self Becomes Blurred: Identity Threat, Anxious Uncertainty, and Reactive In-Group Affirmation

When identity motives are threatened, this can evoke negative emotions and an avoidance-oriented mindset (Jonas et al., 2014). Many researchers have investigated responses to threat with regard to particular identity motives. Two typical reactions have been observed: first, threat provokes an aversive state of anxious uncertainty (McGregor et al., 2010; Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011); and second, people engage in reactive defence mechanisms that help to reduce negative feelings either directly by resolving a threat at hand or by indirectly providing alternative resources that are not affected by the threat (for a review, see Jonas et al., 2014). The large overlap of findings in the threat and defence literature inspired Jonas and colleagues to develop a general process model of threat and defence that can serve to explain why people tend to affirm their social identity in the face of threat. In this chapter, we use this model as a theoretical framework to describe how people cope with experiences that challenge their underlying identity motives.

Anxiety-to-Approach Model of Threat and Defence

Feeling uncertain about important aspects of the self, holding a fragile view of one-self and one's social connections, or struggling with a feeling of lacking control can pose a threat to one's identity. Research suggests that being confronted with threats to various aspects of the self leads to an arousing state of anxious uncertainty and motivates efforts to escape from this feeling by means of reactive defensive strategies. On a neural level, this process seems to be driven by a tandem system responsible for the detection and regulation of goal conflict (Corr, DeYoung, & McNaughton, 2013). Immediately after detection of a threat, anxious uncertainty arises as a consequence of predominant activity of the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). BIS activity is hallmarked by a suite of *proximal* symptoms, including increased vigilance for potential sources of threat as well as for new information plus efforts to escape from negative thoughts and circumstances. Sometimes, heightened vigilance may help people generate possible solutions. For example, feelings of social isolation increased recall of social information (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000) and led to faster detection of smiling faces in a crowd (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009). However, proximal defences may be insufficient or elusive, for example, when violation of epistemic needs leads to the perception of illusory patterns and conspiracies (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Moreover, if people are unable to escape from a threat, they show avoidance-oriented defence reactions that help them turn their attention (temporarily) away from it (e.g. by avoiding self-focus; Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998). Persistent BIS activity has been shown to have deleterious effects for an individual such as decreased life satisfaction, increased state anxiety, and social avoidance (Routledge

et al., 2010). Thus, most people do not respond to threat with persistent BIS activity. Rather, after a while they seem to down-regulate BIS activity by either managing the threat at hand or engaging in an array of *distal* defences.

Distal defences often are *fluid*, hence sharing no direct content with a given threat and satisfy global psychological needs that are diminished by the threat and restored by the defence (e.g. when a lack of personal control causes people to seek control by affirming powerful in-groups or systems; Fritsche et al., 2008; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008). According to the anxiety-to-approach model, distal defences are approach oriented as they help an individual to re-establish predominant activation of the behavioural approach system (BAS). We hypothesise that groups represent a fruitful source for re-establishing approach motivation as they give rise to approach-oriented defence mechanisms that help people maintain their need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control. Hence, reactive in-group affirmation should be a common response in the face of threat.

Evidence that Identity Threat Causes Anxious Uncertainty

The idea that the experience of conflicting thoughts and actions leads to an aversive state of arousal has already been described by Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). However, for a long time, *dissonance*-related feelings could be shown only indirectly, for example, when the misattribution of aversive feelings to a benign source eliminated typical defensive responses (Zanna & Cooper, 1974). This changed when researchers started to use more subtle measures of self-reported affect related to BIS-specific anxious uncertainty. For instance, McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) showed that epistemic threats caused participants to respond more strongly to BIS-related adjectives, as thinking about an unresolved personal dilemma heightened participants' agreement with terms such as "I feel uneasy", "…unclear", and "…confused about identity". In the same manner, Nash et al. (2011) found that threats to self-relevant goals led participants to report stronger feelings of "confusion", "anxiety", and "uncertainty". On a neural level, the BIS is closely linked with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008), a brain region that is activated by conflict, errors, and distress (Corr, 2011). Accordingly, heightened ACC activity was found after cognitive dissonance (Kitayama, Chua, Tompson, & Han, 2013) as well as after threats to participants' need for belonging (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), and perception of control. For example, in a study by Salomons, Johnstone, Backonja, and Davidson (2004), the ACC responded more strongly to uncontrollable than to controllable pain.

In sum, there is neural, behavioural, and self-report evidence for anxious uncertainty following different kinds of threat that challenge people's underlying identity motives. As mentioned above, in the absence of direct resolutions, affirming one's group identity may be a fruitful resource to mask anxious uncertainty and re-establish predominant BAS activity. Keeping this in mind, it appears reasonable that

so many people emphasise the need to preserve their cultural values and traditions. However, in view of refugee issues, retreat to one's own group may impede integration processes, and even lead to social tensions and mutual mistrust. In the next sections, we will first highlight the benefits of groups for coping with a given threat, before we review empirical findings that have linked reactive in-group affirmation to antisocial attitudes and behaviour.

Favouritism of In-Groups over Out-Groups as Approach-Oriented Defence Strategy

As groups confer abstract benefits, including epistemic understanding and meaning (Hogg, 2007), social status (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979), belonging (Leary & Baumeister, 2000), and collective agency (Fritsche et al., 2013), we propose that heightening these aspects of social identity in case of threat may help people to effectively overcome aversive feelings and catalyse approach-motivated states of relief. Support for this assumption comes from numerous experiments in which participants responded with in-group-related attitudes and behaviour after having been exposed to various types of threat. For example, Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, and Moffitt (2007) demonstrated that experimentally manipulated uncertainty on a personal level (e.g. by letting participants reflect on those aspects of their lives that made them feel uncertain [vs. certain] about themselves, their lives, and their future) enhanced participants' identification with highly entitative in-groups. Similar results were also found by McGregor and colleagues where participants reacted to a personal goal conflict (e.g. thinking of a complex yet unresolved personal dilemma) with an exaggerated perception of social consensus for group-related worldviews, in-group bias, and worldview defence (McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005; McGregor et al., 2001). Attachment threats also caused worldview defence among those high in attachment-related anxiety (Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005) and made participants more susceptible to social influence, as conformity with the opinion of others might enhance their chances to be (re-)admitted into a group (Carter-Sowell, Chen, & Williams, 2008). Although some researchers have found stronger intergroup discrimination following threats to participants' self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997), others did not (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). However, there is broad consensus that self-esteem is a crucial moderator for group-related responses to threat, as people with low self-esteem are especially likely to tend to engage in social defences (Jonas et al., 2014). With regard to the control motive, the picture is clearer. In two series of experiments, for instance, Fritsche et al. (2008; 2013) manipulated personal control (i.e. by having participants think about the possibility of being left by their beloved partner [vs. leaving the partner] or aspects of their life that gave them a sense of lacking [vs. high] personal control) and found that decreased feelings of control enhanced in-group bias with regard to different in-groups based on gender, nationality, or artificial assignment in the lab, in-group identification, and in-group support (e.g. support of political parties or action groups).

There are theoretical as well as empirical reasons to believe that reactive in-group-related attitudes and behaviour reflect approach-oriented defence mechanisms as the same and other threats also caused reactive approach motivation as measured with neurophysiological, perceptual, and self-report markers (e.g. Greenaway et al., 2015; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013; Nash et al., 2011). According to Jonas et al. (2014), one aspect of the approach-oriented character of social identification lies in the function of groups to bolster idealistic goals that are supported by the in-group's worldview. Consistent with this assumption, in a study by McGregor et al. (2010), the effect of a relationship threat on personal projects was mediated by the extent of idealism associated with those projects. Moreover, as power has been closely linked to approach motivation (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), groups high in collective agency may become highly attractive to an individual in case of threat whereas less agentic groups may lose their appeal. Consequently, Fritsche et al. (2008) found collective agency (measured by items such as "If you were to support your party, would you have a feeling of together we are strong?") to mediate the effects from lacked personal control on group identification. Additionally, Stollberg et al. (2015) found that people who were reminded of lacking personal control increased their identification with agentic in-groups, which, in turn, elevated their perception of collective agency. Aside from these findings, McGregor, Haji, and Kang (2008) have shown that reflecting on meaningful group membership prior to a threat can buffer against anxious uncertainty and reactive in-group favouritism.

In sum, there is evidence showing that in-group affirmation may help people overcome negative feelings of anxious uncertainty caused by a given threat. However, often there is only a thin line between the feeling of being socially bounded and the tendency to adopt a closed-minded view of others who do not necessarily share one's understanding of the world. Therefore, many have investigated the relationship between identity threat and the readiness to support radical and extreme behaviour against out-group members.

Identity Threat, Extremism, and Radicalisation

A survey conducted by the European Commission in spring, 2015 revealed Immigration to be seen as the major challenge facing the European Union (Eurobarometer, 2015). Moreover, the results showed a significant increase in peoples' concerns for terrorism, most likely as a consequence of the attacks on the French magazine "Charlie Hebdo" on January 7th 2015 when 17 people were murdered by Islamic extremists. Even if many European citizens showing willingness to help incoming refugees, at the same time support for radical right-wing movements as well as violence towards refugees increased (e.g. Eddy, 2015).

Research has shown a direct link between the experience of threat, reactive group affirmation, and extreme antisocial responses. Accordingly, threat to the satisfaction of people's epistemic needs has been linked to religious and ideological fundamen-

talism, zealotry, dehumanisation, and support for authoritarian leadership (Hogg et al., 2013; McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008). Moreover, social exclusion has been found to increase aggressive behaviour (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001) as well as prejudice against and rejection of immigrants (Aydin, Krueger, Frey, Kastenmueller, & Fischer, 2014). In the same manner, indicators of control motivation have been found to mediate hostile ethnocentrism following control deprivation on the personal level (Agroskin & Jonas, 2013). As Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson (2010) noted, when people are under threat, one explanation for the heightened appeal of radical groups lies in their high entitativity combined with an explicit action component to achieve their goals (i.e. radical strategies). Thus, in case of threat, people may feel that radical groups will do a much better job fulfilling their desire for epistemic equilibrium and collective agency. Moreover, as many extreme ideologies rest on the assumption of superiority over others, radical groups also nourish needs for positive self-evaluation more effectively than groups that believe in equality.

According to the anxiety-to-approach model, another aspect can be added to explain antisocial elements of reactive group identification after threat. Given that anger catalyses approach motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), hostile components of group-related reactions can be interpreted at least partly as approach-oriented defence strategies. Support comes from findings showing that reactive aggressive and displaced hostility as response to threat is mostly pronounced among subjects high in dispositional approach sensitivity (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). However, future research is needed to examine the exact role of anger and other approach-related aspects of in-group affirmation that lie between the perception of threat and hostile defence reactions.

## Is there Another Way Out? Predicting Alternative Responses to Threat

Given these findings, there is a fairly clear but bleak picture of the relation between the experience of threat and antisocial responses. However, there is ray of hope that reactive in-group affirmation does not inevitably result in closed-mindedness and hostility towards others. As described in the introduction of this chapter, people often differ in their strategies for coping with a given threat. For instance, with regard to the current "refugee crisis", some might feel motivated to help incoming refugees cope with the hurdles regarding their asylum application instead of falling into a xenophobic mindset. There are also findings from laboratories showing that specific conditions can lead people to be less affected by a given threat or to foster benevolent aspects of their group identity (Jonas et al., 2008). Accordingly, personality variables related to dispositional BIS/BAS sensitivity (e.g. self-esteem) as well as situational factors (e.g. salience of prosocial group norms and values) have been found to moderate the direction of threat-related outcomes (for summaries, see also Fritsche et al., 2011; Jonas & Fritsche, 2013).

Thus, although in contrast to the large number of studies that show antisocial defence responses to threat, the number of studies that provide alternative outcomes is negligible; there is a promising trend in research emphasising the role of personal and contextual factors in threat and defence processes. In the next section, we integrate the above mentioned findings into a schematic model that may help make predictions about the prosocial or antisocial direction of outcomes when one's sense of identity is threatened.

Applying the Anxiety-to-Approach Model to Group-Based Defences

Figure 3.1 illustrates how the anxiety-to-approach model (Jonas et al., 2014) can be specified for understanding group-based defences as response to identity threat. This specification combines findings from different theories related to threat and defence that show group-based defence responses with neurophysiological correlates of anxious inhibition and approach motivation. Path A describes the immediate responses after the perception of threat to identity motives. On a neural level, threat is detected by the BIS, which subsequently triggers an aroused state of anxious uncertainty. It is noteworthy that anxious uncertainty differs conceptually from epistemic uncertainty or related concepts such as meaninglessness. Whereas epistemic uncertainty refers to a violation of the need for epistemic equilibrium, anxious uncertainty reflects a global state of coflict-induced BIS activity that tells people that "something is going wrong in a bad direction". Consequently, threats to epistemic needs may evoke anxious uncertainty in the same way as other threats do. Given that this state of increased BIS activity is highly aversive, people are motivated to escape from negative feelings and get into a more pleasant state that is hallmarked by predominant activity of the BAS. As shown by Path B, people therefore may affirm their group identity because this serves their need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control, hence helping them to re-establish approach motivation. However, such group-based defence strategies often result in antisocial responses such as in-group bias or hostile behavioural reactions. This is because rather than value diversity with its inherent complexity, it might be easier to fulfil one's needs by holding a clear prototypical picture of others paired with feelings of superiority about one's own group. Furthermore, in-group bias might be a by-product of elevated in-group identification following identity threat, and, as in-group bias is the default norm in most groups, favouring the in-group might be an expression of collective action and thus collective agency.

Still, several factors have been proposed to influence responses to threat in a way that provides hope that antisocial responses are not an inevitable outcome. Path I describes the most direct way in which people may differ in their response to threat, namely, the initial appraisal of present experiences as challenge or threat. Path II refers to individual differences in threat vulnerability. Although there is still room for investigation, some factors linked to dispositional approach sensitivity have

Fig. 3.1 An application of the anxiety-to-approach model to group-based defences following identity threat

been thought to make people more or less prone to the experience of threat and to influence their individual coping strategies (e.g. self-esteem, need for closure/need for structure). Path III refers to the contextual salience of prosocial norms and values prescribed by the cultural worldviews of one's group. When under threat, people tend to use cultural worldviews as an orientation to adjust their behaviour and assumptions. Research has shown that consequently, when prosocial components related to participant's group identity are salient, they react to threat in accordance with these aspects.

Path I: Perception of Threat

As mentioned by Jonas and Fritsche (2013), people can differ in how they appraise a potentially threatening situation. For instance, in wealthier countries, many might be threatened by the fact the influx of thousands of refugees seeking asylum whereas others may not be affected at all or even see it as an opportunity (e.g. for preventing negative outcomes due to demographic changes). According to the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), people may interpret a situation as a challenge when it appears controllable and can be linked to personal growth and success. In contrast, a situation that is overtaxing and linked to failure would be perceived as a threat. Hence, a crucial factor for explaining subjective reactions while coping with a potential threat lies in the way in which it is perceived by an individual. For example, many people who advocate for multicultural societies argue that cross-cultural interactions would enrich all parties due to mutual

learning and understanding. In contrast, people who protest mixed cultures focus primarily on possible threats such as diminished well-being and loss of tradition.

Some factors have been revealed to influence the perception of threat in social interactions. For example, Alter, Aronson, Darley, Rodriguez, and Ruble (2010) demonstrated that highlighting beneficial aspects of a situation in a test scenario made people impervious to stereotype threat. Thus, even in unfavourable situations, highlighting potential benefits and including alternative aspects that might change the nature of threat may help prevent negative outcomes. Research on the role of perceived control in the prevention of threat effects showed that reminding people of, at least partial, personal control over potentially threatening events, such as terrorism, or personal consequences of economic crises (Greenaway et al., 2014), eliminated threat effects on ethnocentric responses (i.e. prejudice). According to Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, and Salomon (1999), challenge and threat are at least conceptually related to approach and avoidance motivation, as they describe motivationally relevant states that refer to goal-relevant scenarios and involve both cognitive and affective processes. As goal striving is closely linked to approach motivation, the perception of challenge may represent a functional mechanism for coping with a discrepant situation directly without first blundering into a state of anxious uncertainty.

Path II: Dispositional Moderators of Threat-Related Outcomes

According to Jonas et al. (2014), people who are particularly high in BIS-related and low in BAS-related personality traits respond more strongly to threat as they show higher levels of anxious uncertainty and defensive behaviour. Up to now, individual differences in self-esteem and need for structure/need for closure have appeared to be the most likely sources of differences in threat-related responses. Both have been linked to dispositional BIS/BAS sensitivity and found to moderate people's general vulnerability to threat (Agroskin, 2015; Jonas et al., 2014).

Self-Esteem

In research on threat and defence, self-esteem is thought to play a key role in individual differences in threat-related outcomes. High levels of self-esteem have been linked to dispositional approach motivation as well as to BAS-related life satisfaction, meaning, vitality, and exploration motivation (Jonas et al., 2014). Moreover, those high in self-esteem seem less prone to threat as they show higher levels of approach motivation immediately after the experience of threat (McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009). In contrast, their low self-esteem counterparts respond to threat with increased inhibition, avoidance motivation, and BIS-related negative affect. Thus, it is not surprising that participants with high self-esteem favour approach

goals following a relationship threat, whereas such with low self-esteem favour avoidance goals (Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Holmes, 2009). Jonas et al. (2014) proposed that individuals with lower amounts of self-esteem are more likely to invest in social resources in case of threat whereas those with high self-esteem tend to invest in personal goals. Thus, for people with low self-esteem, shared social categories with out-group members such as farmers helping farmers (e.g. Farmers, 2015) and students helping students may represent an opportunity to prevent antisocial responses to threat. However, it is noteworthy that higher levels of self-esteem have also been linked to heightened aggression and hostility after threat. For example, in a study by McGregor and Jordan (2007), participants with high explicit self-esteem but low implicit self-esteem were more likely to mask feelings of threat by engaging into defensive zeal and extremism. Additionally, Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) reviewed evidence that high self-esteem can foster hostile responses following ego threats (i.e. when a positive self-view is challenged by an unfavourable external appraisal).

Thus, in sum it appears that self-esteem represents a vital buffer against threat-induced anxiety that helps individuals high in self-esteem cope with a threat faster and more effectively than their low self-esteem counterparts. Nonetheless, identity threat might prompt high self-esteem people to react with more hostility, especially when important aspects of the self are unstable (i.e. high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005).

Need for Structure/Need for Closure

As people differ in their dispositional vulnerability to ambiguity and epistemic vagueness, the two closely related constructs personal need for structure (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) and need for closure (NFC; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) have become particularly important in research on threat and defence. People high in epistemic needs generally tend to show higher amounts of ethnocentrism following threat and share a stronger desire for social consensus about attitudes and beliefs within their group. They perceive out-group members to differ more strongly from their in-group and are less tolerant towards alternative worldviews. Thus, in case of threat, NFC leads to a syndrome of "group centrism" that is hallmarked by a suite of antisocial responses such as in-group favouritism, a preference for homogeneous groups, and rejection of people who do not act in line with group norms (for a review, see Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011). Given that the need for closure scale is highly correlated with measures of BIS sensitivity (Corr, Hargreaves-Heap, Tsutsui, Russell, & Corr, Hargreaves-Heap, Tsutsui, Russell, & Seger, 2013), it is not surprising that people high in NFC are more vulnerable to threat and respond more negatively to unambiguous and unfamiliar information, such as that provided by cultural out-groups. They may also have an increased desire to reduce uncertainty by increasing in-group identification resulting in in-group bias (Hogg, 2007). McGregor, Haji and Kang (2008) demonstrated that the antisocial response

tendency of participants with high epistemic needs can be reduced if they have the opportunity to affirm their in-group identity immediately after threat. The authors found this mitigating effect resulted from the amount of self-certainty and self-worth participants felt by affiliation with the affirmed groups. Thus, for people who tend to be more prone to epistemic threat and BIS-related anxiety, the knowledge of a valuable and stable social identity might help them maintain a sense of certainty in the face of threat without engaging in hostile defensive reactions.

There are additional factors that should be addressed by future research. For instance, in a set of studies conducted by Mikulincer and Shaver (2001), attachment security was shown to attenuate the appraisal of threat caused by an out-group immigrant and significantly decrease the negative evaluation of out-group members after participants' self-esteem or cultural worldview had been threatened. Moreover, Agroskin, Jonas, and Traut-Mattausch (2014) showed that participants high in victim sensitivity responded to threat with increased vigilance towards malevolent cues while they sought order and protection. As victim sensitivity was positively correlated with dispositional BIS sensitivity, the authors conclude that victim sensitivity may reflect a hyper-vigilant negativity bias toward attributing malevolence to others combined with the motivation to avoid threat. Such findings may help explain why many supporters of populist parties and movements react to threat with increased patriotism while simultaneously strongly condemning their local political and economic systems.

In sum, dispositional moderators may play a key role in explaining individual differences in threat and defence dynamics. This also appears to be validated by real-life experiences: For example, conservative parties tend to be more sceptical towards incoming refugees than liberal parties. As political conservatism has been linked to higher levels of need for closure and lower self-esteem (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), one may assume that followers of conservative political parties are more strongly identified with the ethnic in-group and thus more prone to in-group bias or feel more threatened when reflecting on changes caused by cultural mixture than do liberal voters. Thus, comprehensible and clearly structured strategies offered by authorities (such as concrete sub-goals and timelines) paired with social recognition (e.g. by media) and collective agency (e.g. "we can manage"; c.f., "Migrant Crisis", 2015) might help those whose personalities render them more vulnerable to threat to be less exhausted by the ongoing influx of immigrants.

Path III: Salience of Prosocial Norms and Values

So far, we have reviewed results showing that groups help people cope with threats to their identity by serving their underlying need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control. Thus, shared norms and worldviews that allow individuals to validate their assumptions in the face of threat are essential to ensuring that they are on the right track. At the same time, group-based defences transform

individual actors into collective actors, as a social identity is adopted. Moreover, on a neurophysiological level, worldviews contain abstract goals to strive for; hence group-related values and ideals represent vital mechanisms for activating approach-motivated states of relief in the face of threat.

Yet given that most cultural groups contain an array of different assumptions about how to think and behave in different situations and under various conditions, why do the majority of findings show antisocial responses, even though many worldview-specific assumptions explicitly refer to prosocial values of trust, charity, and compassion?

Jonas et al. (2008) explored whether the contextual salience of primed pacifist norms would affect German participants' responses to threat (i.e. a nuclear armed Iran). As expected, without the pacifism prime, threat salience decreased their approval of peaceful conflict-resolution strategies. However, when pacifism was primed, the results changed in a way that threat significantly increased participants' interest in peaceful solutions. Comparably, Schumann, McGregor, Nash, and Ross (2014) tested whether reminding participants of their religious social identity would reduce typical antisocial reactions to threat and found support for their assumptions in a number of studies. A single-sentence religious belief system prime (i.e. which religious belief system do you identify with?) paired with a self-threat (i.e. frustrated academic goals) decreased endorsement of revenge and worldview defence in contrast to a no-prime condition. However, religion seems to cut both ways, as in case of threat it may also foster fanaticism and radical behaviour, which is sadly proven by the ongoing religious terror perpetrated by fanatic groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram. One explanation may lie in the difference between the salience of injunctive norms that define how one *should* behave and descriptive norms that show how others *actually* behave (for most people in Western societies, religious values represent prosocial injunctive norms, whereas radical groups use them instead as descriptive norms to justify their antisocial behaviour). There is evidence suggesting that especially in case of threat, people may chiefly orientate on how their fellow group members think and act in a given situation (c.f., Hogg & Reid, 2006). For instance, recent studies by Stollberg et al. (submitted) have convincingly demonstrated the group-based nature of the effects of threatened personal control on norm conformity. Control threat increased students' approval of university curriculum changes only when a clear majority of other German students was said to approve of these changes, in comparison to situations where two out-groups (Polish and Czech students) but not the in-group approved of the curriculum changes, or when in-group and out-groups all displayed similar medium levels of approval (see also Jonas & Fritsche, 2013).

Thus, with regard to the actual debate on how to deal with incoming refugees, there are two practical ways to avoid hostility and xenophobic responses. First, political representatives should not jump on the populist bandwagon in the hope of garnering votes but instead should promote the prosocial norms and worldviews that belong to the citizens of their country and explicitly describe the expectations of how citizens should behave. Given that they serve as role models, other public figures such as artists and celebrities (also mass media schools, churches, etc.) may

also play a key role in promoting prosocial norms and values in case of threat. Second, with regard to descriptive norms, it seems of great relevance to promote alternatives to antisocial attitudes and behaviour in everyday life, for example showing citizens' responses of solidarity and open-mindedness in mass media coverage. This is also important with regard to refugees' behaviour, as they will also orientate themselves on their fellow group members. It seems reasonable that giving refugees a chance to take part in society will foster their attempts to integrate and will support the development of mutual trust.

Conclusion

In the current chapter, we have reviewed research as well as real-life evidence showing that threats to people's sense of self as epistemically certain, positive, socially included, and agentic may foster xenophobic attitudes and hostile behaviour towards out-group members. However, there is a ray of hope that this is not inevitable, as studies that focused on the moderators and mediators in threat and defence dynamics extended the field by providing alternatives to the unilinear *threat leads to socially destructive attitudes* view. As research on this topic is still in its infancy, it is hoped that future research will provide more insights by focusing on the underlying factors of threat and defence processes. This might include a clearer differentiation between the effects of different identity motives that are violated by a specific threat and research on personal moderating factors as well as the interplay between different motives when coping with a given threat (cf., Hart, 2014). Moreover, the inclusion of neurophysiological correlates related to approach may help impart a deeper understanding of the functionality of different defence mechanisms. Because in real life it is often easier to seek simple "quick and dirty" solutions than to reflect on an unpleasant problem intensively, research should also search for factors that foster attempts to cope with a given threat directly and in a sustained manner.

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Chapter 4
Identity and Acculturation Processes in Multicultural Societies

Sofia Stathi and Claudia Roscini

Widespread anti-immigration attitudes in Western societies, as well as destructive terrorist acts such as 9/11 in New York, and the more recent 11/15 attacks in Paris, highlight the urgency to study and discuss identity integration and multiculturalism. The above events have raised social, political, and academic debates on how to live peacefully in multicultural societies, avoiding conflict among different cultural groups. At a social level, there are intense discussions regarding the successful integration of migrants in receiving societies. Countries such as Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the UK are generally considered *multicultural* since they experience cultural and social changes, as well as transformation of their population demographics as a consequence of globalisation and large migration waves (see Lalonde, Cila, & Yampolsky, 2016 for a discussion of migration and multiculturalism in Canada; and Law & Mackenzie, 2016 for a discussion of these issues in Australia).

Migration takes place due to different reasons that vary across countries and times. Primarily, migration is the outcome of economic reasons. For example, Southern Europeans moved within Europe as a consequence of the economic crisis of 2008. In addition, migration can be prompted by asylum seeking due to war or persecuted political and social ideology. In recent times, many countries have received large numbers of refugees from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Egypt. At a political level, some European leaders already adopted a clear position with respect to the resulting multiculturalism. In 2011 David Cameron[1] declared the failure of multiculturalism in the UK and the lack of a strong British collective identity; similarly,

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[1] As published by BBC news on the 5th of February 2011, during his first speech as prime minister, when talking about radicalisation and the causes of terrorism, David Cameron said "We have failed to provide a vision of the society to which they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values" (BBC News, 2011).

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Angela Merkel[2] criticised multiculturalism and Nicolas Sarkozy[3] pointed to its failure. Before condemning or praising multiculturalism, however, from a social psychological perspective it is important to clarify what multiculturalism is, which processes it implies, and which factors can determine its success or failure. To this end, in this chapter we will discuss multiculturalism with a focus on *acculturation*, a fundamental process that is very closely associated with multiculturalism; and on *social identity*, a key motivational factor that underlies acculturation processes.

The term multiculturalism was originally adopted in Canada as a policy goal, in order to recognise the migrants' need to maintain their ethnic culture and to simultaneously adopt the Canadian one. In fact, politically, multiculturalism corresponds to "the recognition of group differences within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national identity" (Modood, 2013, pp. 2). Living in a multicultural society with a positive multicultural ideology, indeed, implies the integration of distinct cultural groups in addition to the preservation of each group's ethnic and cultural identity (Van der Veer, 2003). Within social psychology, multiculturalism entails the examination of core topics, such as social identity, intergroup relations, and attitudes towards ethnic out-groups (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004).

Multiculturalism embraces political norms, laws, principles, and beliefs typical of a contemporary liberal democracy, but at the same time it represents a social and political challenge (Modood, 2013). Multiculturalism is a complex and demanding process both for societies and for individuals. In multicultural contexts, people with different languages, cultural norms, religions, values, and gender roles strive to manage, negotiate, and integrate their identities. The process of integrating people's distinct identities (ethnic, national, cultural, religious) can be challenging and can sometimes lead to intergroup conflict (Phinney, 1991). This conflict can escalate to hate crime, terrorism, and even genocide (Bourhis, Montaruli, El-Geledi, Harvey, & Barrette, 2010). To a large extent, the outcome of the negotiation between (often conflicting) identities determines the success of the acculturation process.

Taking into consideration the interplay between identity and acculturation in multicultural contexts, this chapter will discuss the role of social identity in the acculturation process with the aim of understanding the dynamics that can minimise conflict between groups and facilitate positive and peaceful intergroup relations. Indeed, Berry (2004), considered acculturation as one of the fundamental domains relevant to the analysis of intergroup relations and the resulting intergroup harmony or conflict. This chapter will discuss the main theories on acculturation, and draw links with social categorisation approaches. Finally, the chapter will discuss how individuals with mul-

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[2] On the 17th of October 2010, the BBC news quoted Angela Merkel's speech where the German Chancellor said that "the approach to build a multicultural society and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other…has failed, utterly failed" (BBC News, 2010).

[3] As reported by the Daily Mail on 11th of February 2011, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy condemned multiculturalism saying: "We have been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the country that was receiving it" (Daily Mail Reporter, 2011).

tiple cultural identities manage these along a continuum of identity integration (see also Maitner & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2016 for a description of how identity and culture interact to predict behaviour of multicultural individuals in the UAE).

The Acculturation Process: Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives

Sociology, cross-cultural psychology, and social psychology argue that acculturation is relevant to societies that are culturally plural (Berry, 1997, 2003) and that it corresponds to a dynamic process of reciprocal influences between different groups. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, acculturation was described as inclusive of *"those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture pattern of either or both groups"* (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936, p. 149, quoted in Berry, 1997). More recently, Gibson (2001) underlined that acculturation relates to the changes deriving from contact with dissimilar groups. Therefore, identity principles are of paramount importance when attempting to understand the process of acculturation.

The literature on acculturation has looked into the process mostly from the perspective of minority groups, i.e. the groups that enter a new social/cultural setting (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). Cheng, Benet-Martìnez, and Harris Bond (2008) differentiated between *immigration-based acculturation*, when people move to a new country and need to manage or negotiate the balance between different cultures, shaping new identities through the acquisition of languages, norms, and traditions of the new country; and *globalisation-based* acculturation, when people develop a multicultural identity and a sense of belonging to a worldwide culture through contact with different ethnic groups that are present in a country. Usually, the immigration-based acculturation refers to minority groups while the globalisation-based to majority groups. Based on the above, when analysing the process of acculturation it is important to consider the characteristics of specific minority groups (e.g. ethnically visible or non-visible immigrants, the reasons of migration, political, demographic and social conditions; Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997) as well as the characteristics of receiving societies (i.e. individualistic versus collectivistic, orientation towards pluralism and multiculturalism; Berry, 2005). The interaction between minorities and receiving societies can lead to different acculturation outcomes (Bhatia & Ram, 2001) that can eventually determine agreeable or conflicting relations between respective groups.

It is also important to clarify that the acculturation process can occur both at a group and at an individual level (psychological acculturation; Graves, 1967). As a collective phenomenon, acculturation implies changes in the culture of the entire group, whereas as a psychological process acculturation signals to a transformation in the mindset and in the identity of single members of a group that is experiencing acculturation. Sabatier and Berry (1996) note that psychological acculturation

implies personal changes in people's identities, attitudes, and values and, as a result, group changes regarding social, institutional, and cultural topics also occur. Zane and Mak (2003) argue that acculturation can take place in different domains, such as people's identities, but also languages, beliefs, and cultural knowledge. We will return to the issue of psychological acculturation when discussing bicultural identity integration. Prior to this, the main theories regarding acculturation will be briefly examined, and then the link between identity and acculturation will be analysed.

Berry's Strategy Model (1990)

The main theoretical approaches on acculturation are Berry's Strategy Model (1990), the Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis et al., 1997), and the Concordance Model of Acculturation (Piontkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002). For the purpose of this chapter, Berry's model is reviewed and the main differences with the subsequent models are identified.

Berry's strategy model (1990) is a fundamental paradigm on acculturation; it is a bi-dimensional model with particular emphasis on identity. The model describes the acculturation process as a result of the interaction between two components: the extent to which people want to identify with the original ethnic culture (i.e. *cultural maintenance*) and the extent to which they are willing to identify with the mainstream/receiving one, as well as participate and interact with the majority culture (i.e. *contact participation*). Further research on these dimensions led to the use of the term *cultural adoption* as a more informed way of referring to contact participation (see Bourhis et al., 1997), so this is the term that we will use here.

Based on the combination of high-/low-level cultural maintenance and cultural adoption, Berry (1980) theorised four different acculturation strategies. The four strategies correspond to attitudes and behaviours of majority and minority groups, with identification playing a core role underlying their development (Berry, 2011). The strategies are labelled differently according to which perspective (majority or minority) is taken. From the perspective of minorities, the acculturation strategies are: *integration*, when members of the minority groups highly identify with both the ethnic and the mainstream culture, *assimilation*, when they do not identify with their ethnic culture, but want to interact and get assimilated in the mainstream culture, *separation*, when minority members highly identify with their ethnic culture and do not want to interact with that of the majority and *marginalisation*, when they identify low with both cultures, or in other words when they do not feel connected to either of the two. In the case of the majority group, instead, there is *mutual accommodation* when the majority group supports the minority's wish to maintain its ethnic culture as well as adopt aspects of the majority's, *melting pot* (or *pressure cooker* when forced) when the majority supports assimilation, *segregation*, when the majority group keeps ethnic minorities separated and *marginalisation* (that has been relabelled as *exclusionism*) when the majority expects the minority not to be in contact with the majority and, at the same time, renounce its ethnic origin.

Marginalisation is the acculturation strategy that could potentially cause more conflict and negative outcomes for societies and individuals (Berry, 2005). In contrast, integration is the most positive and balanced strategy, requiring the majority group to be open and inclusive and the minority to have a strong desire for contact (Berry, 1991). This way both majorities and minorities recognise the importance of identifying with (sometimes very) different cultures and, at the same time being part of a common culture, too (Berry, 1997). However, integration, although optimal, is not a strategy that can be adopted effortlessly by group members. The reasons behind the strenuousness in adopting integration strategies can be due to both societal and individual factors. Berry and Kalin (1995) argue that integration can be achieved only in multicultural societies that have specific preconditions such as multicultural ideology, low levels of prejudice, and positive intergroup attitudes towards the out-groups. An additional precondition, particularly relevant to this chapter, relates to the degree of identification with the society where the acculturation process takes place, as experienced both by majority and minority group members. Specifically, identification with a receiving society can sometimes be very limited in the case of minority group members (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006).

The Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM; Bourhis et al., 1997)

Despite its contribution to the acculturation literature, Berry's strategy model does not take into account personal and structural characteristics of the groups (Rudmin, 2003; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010), for example, individuals' social and educational backgrounds (Cornelius, 2002; Steiner, 2009), age at the time of migration (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), and socioeconomic status and resources in the context where acculturation takes place (Rohmann, Piontkowski, & van Randenborgh, 2008; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). With the aim of complementing Berry's model, the Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM; Bourhis et al., 1997) retheorised acculturation (see also Bourhis, Barrette, El-Geledi, & Schmidt, 2009) by focusing on the interactive nature of intergroup relations in the acculturation process. Thus, three elements play a key role here: the acculturation strategies chosen by the majority group, the ones adopted by the minorities, and the interpersonal and intergroup outcomes deriving from the combination of the acculturation strategies. In the case of minority groups, the acculturation strategies proposed by the IAM are: *individualism*, which considers people as single individuals instead of members of cultural groups, *integrationism*, *assimilationism*, *separatism*, and *marginalisationism*. In the case of majority groups, the new suggested strategies are *individualism*, when members of the majority groups consider themselves as individuals with no sense of belonging to groups, *integrationism*, *assimilationism*, *segregationism*, and *exclusionism*, which is associated with the belief that minority groups can never be part of the mainstream society (Bourhis et al., 2009).

A further premise of the IAM, which is linked to the political and practical aspects of multicultural societies, relates to the role played by policies implemented (or not) in the countries where the acculturation process takes place. It is important to note

that the policies are related to the identities of the relevant groups. According to the IAM, there are *state immigration policies* and *state integration policies*: the former relate to the kind of ethnic groups accepted in the country based on their number, status, and origins, while the latter relate to the policies adopted by the government in order to facilitate integration. State immigration policies create categories of minority groups such as temporary workers, refugees, illegal immigrants, shaping this way people's identities, and potentially impacting on the choice of acculturation orientation. State integration policies, instead, indicate the institutional conditions adopted by the government that aim at integrating majority and minority groups. Combinations of state immigration policies and state integration policies could create the conditions for either successful integration, or indeed, negative and conflicting relations within the society where the acculturation process occurs.

Concordance Model of Acculturation (CMA)

Piontkowski et al. (2002) theorised on groups' power disparity and the extent to which they can control the acculturation process in the Concordance Model of Acculturation (CMA). The authors underlined the fact that usually majority groups have more power than minorities since they are represented more in authorities and institutions; and consequently, they have more power over public policies. CMA points to examining the fit between the acculturation strategies that minority groups want to adopt and the strategies that the majority group wants minorities to adopt. With this model, more dissonance between majority and minority preferences relates to higher levels of (perceived) threatening contact, and reduced success in acculturation. In sum, CMA suggests that in the acculturation process it is necessary to consider the fit between the preferences of both majority and minority groups, to use a dynamic approach to understand the effects of one group's acculturation choice on the other group, as well as to investigate the consequences of the acculturation process on intergroup relations (Brown & Zagefka, 2011).

In the first part of this chapter, the main theories on acculturation have been examined, pointing to the complexity of the subject. As emerged from this brief review, majority and minority identity plays a key role in determining whether acculturation will be a harmonious or conflicting process. In order to further analyse acculturation through the lens of social identity, this chapter will now briefly discuss the main theories on social identification. More specifically, the focus will be on the link between identity and acculturation, with the purpose of understanding the framework that underlies the integration of different identities (Haritatos & Benet-Martinez, 2002).

Social Identification During Acculturation

Various social psychological approaches can be combined to allow a thorough understanding of the interaction between majority and minority groups' acculturation process (Van Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006). For example, the Contact

Hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1997), Similarity-Attraction Hypothesis (Byrne, 1971), Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001), and Common In-group Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) can all provide a framework of understanding majority and minority relations in the context of acculturation. In addition, negative stereotypes (Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007), the perception of the out-group as threatening (Tip et al., 2012; Ward & Masgoret, 2006), and social ideological variables such as social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Van Oudenhoven & Hofstra, 2006) can affect how peacefully the process of acculturation will occur. Importantly, theories on categorisation and identity offer a particularly relevant perspective of understanding the acculturation of majority and minority groups in multicultural contexts. A close examination of the role of identity and its changes in the acculturation process is essential in order to understand the factors that can enhance intergroup relations and reduce intergroup conflicts.

In Schwartz, Montgomery, and Briones (2006) review of identity and acculturation, the concept of identity is represented as an "anchor" during the transitional and adaptive period of the acculturation process. The salience of identity is stronger among adolescents and young adults (Arnett, 2000), since at this period people creatively form new identities by mixing different aspects of their ethnic and mainstream heritage (Schwartz, 2001). Schwartz et al. (2006) argue in favour of an *adaptive* identity that is composed of a coherent personal identity (Schwartz, 2001) and a coherent social identity (Brown, 2000). With an adaptive identity, people can face the challenges that derive from the acculturation process and at the same time, maintain positive feelings toward the groups with which they identify.

From an intergroup perspective, according to Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identity derives from the awareness of being part of a social group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) identified social categorisation and group comparison as the key components of SIT. SIT suggests that people strive to obtain and maintain a positive image of themselves through constant comparisons between their in-group and relevant out-groups. Through comparisons, people are able to create or maintain a sense of positive distinctiveness for their in-group, which reinforces their own positive identity. In this search for positive intergroup distinctiveness, the self-concept is described in terms of "we" rather than "I" (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The tendency to reinforce the in-group's positive distinctiveness is stronger for those who identify highly with their group and who perceive themselves as prototypical members of the group. However, a strong in-group identity can lead to ethnocentrism and can manifest in the form of in-group favouritism or out-group derogation (Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Jewish Canadians, for example, who identify strongly with their religion held more conservative political attitudes and were less open to interfaith relationships compared to those who identified less strongly with their religion (Haji, Lalonde, Durbin, & Naveh-Benjamin, 2011). This can be particularly problematic in a context where ethnic majorities and minorities coexist and thus distinct identities become salient.

A prominent model that makes use of categorisation processes with the aim of *reducing* intergroup conflict is the Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM; Gaertner

& Dovidio, 2000). CIIM suggests that by recategorising social identity from separate groups into a common group at a superordinate level, people can develop more positive attitudes towards former out-group members (who are now in-group members in a more inclusive group). This process of recategorisation can be facilitated by emphasising Allport's (1954) conditions for optimal contact, for example equal status and common goals (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). CIIM can be helpful when considering the facilitation of acculturation, and more precisely, of integration. Following the principles of the model, a superordinate national identity (such as being British, for example) can include all the ethnic subgroups (such as Black British, British Asian, and White British). Promoting an inclusive superordinate identity can indirectly facilitate a successful acculturation process as it can create the conditions for the integration of different cultural identities (Bastian, 2012).

Unfortunately, however, a superordinate identity may pose a threat to people who identify highly with their ethnic culture, since the culture's distinctiveness may be threatened. Indeed, group identification is a significant moderator of intergroup distinctiveness threats (for meta-analysis, see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001). High identifiers are likely to attempt to restore in-group's distinctiveness after perceived threats, by differentiating from relevant out-groups. In other words, following strategies that aim at promoting a common identity, people who identify highly with their ethnic group may feel threatened by the loss of in-group distinctiveness; and react with more bias towards the out-group (Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006). On the other hand, perceptions of increased similarity (e.g. via a common identity) can lead to less bias for low identifiers (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). This suggests that promoting a common, inclusive identity as a way of enhancing integration, may in fact trigger reactive responses from individuals who identify highly with their in-group. Importantly, and pertinent to acculturation dynamics, Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, and Snider (2001) showed that minorities and majorities prefer different types of recategorisation strategies, dual identity, and one group, respectively.

The *dual identity approach* (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996) came to address criticisms of CIIM that argued that group members may resist the blurring of boundaries between the groups because of fear of losing their distinctiveness (Brewer & Miller, 1988) or where the two groups differ in size, power, or status (Brewer & Gaertner, 2001). Gaertner et al. (1996) suggested that group members do not have to renounce their original identities entirely but rather sustain both their superordinate and subgroup identities salient. This strategy represents the incorporation of Hewstone and Brown (1986); Brown and Hewstone, (2005) mutual intergroup differentiation model in the recategorisation approach. It is argued that keeping subgroups salient and simultaneously promoting a superordinate identity can enhance the generalisation of positive intergroup attitudes. From the perspective of acculturation strategies, the dual identity approach can allow groups to sustain the distinctiveness of their cultural and ethnic identity and at the same time be part of an inclusive (national or state) identity.

When individuals identify with two or more social groups (national and/or ethnic) at the same time, integration is facilitated (Berry, 1997). Multiple social categorisation suggests that different identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but can

occur simultaneously (Phinney & Alipuria, 2006). A basic difficulty with multiple social categorisation is "*integrating or otherwise managing an internal complexity involving two potentially conflicting, often enriching, parts of one's ethnic, racial, or cultural self*" (Phinney & Alipuria, 2006, p. 211). According to multiple social categorisation principles, group members can follow different approaches: (a) they can identify with only one of the cultural groups they belong to, (b) they can create a new category they identify with, (c) they can identify with all the groups they belong to and then switch between them, and (d) they can simply think about themselves as individuals instead of group members. It is worth highlighting that the above four identification approaches are in line with principles of the Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis et al., 1997) and its acculturation strategies.

At the individual level, the degree to which multiple identities are integrated within the self-concept is described by the concept of *bicultural identity integration* (BII; Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002). BII refers to the extent that bicultural people perceive their multiple identities to be compatible or in opposition to each other (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005) based on a continuum where the two opposite poles are represented by compatibility and incompatibility (Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martínez, 2006). The changes in people's identity during acculturation can be affected by factors such as the internal flexibility of cultural identity (Arnett, 2003), the degree of similarity between the ethnic and the majority culture (Rudmin, 2003), possible experiences of discrimination (Brown, 2000), societal support to maintain the ethnic culture (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), as well as in-group's norms and religious identification (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). With such a large number of individual and societal variables involved, successful identity integration is not always feasible. Indeed, people vary on their level of BII: high levels of BII indicate that people highly identify with both cultures and perceive them as compatible, whereas low levels indicate that the different cultures are kept separate, perceived as incompatible, and often cause internal conflict (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002).

The concept and measurement of BII have two different components (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005): *cultural distance*—"the degree of dissociation or compartmentalization versus overlap perceived between the two cultural orientations" and *cultural conflict*—"the degree of tension or clash versus harmony perceived between the two cultures"—(Nguyen & Benet-Martìnez, 2007, p. 108). These two components are in line with other important concepts of acculturation (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005): cultural distance can be theoretically linked to cultural identity alternation versus fusion (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993) and cultural conflict can be seen as similar to role conflict (Goode, 1960) and identity confusion (Baumeister, 1986). As such, the literature has placed significant emphasis on whether identities are (or are perceived to be) compatible or incompatible; when they are compatible, integration is facilitated. When they are incompatible, conflict can arise.

In addition to factors such as age, gender, immigration policies, and years of living in the receiving society, BII is also predicted by factors such as personality traits, socioeconomic disadvantages (Phillips & Pittman, 2003), differences in cultural orientation between majority and minority groups (Côté, 1993), degree of similarity between the two cultures (Rudmin, 2003), lack of social and institutional support

(Côté, 2000), and support for the maintenance of the heritage culture in the new society (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Moreover, it has been suggested that low bicultural identity integration is caused by the perception of being culturally isolated (Berry, 1990), difficulties in intercultural relations (Tzeng & Jackson, 1994), and cultural and ethnic stereotypes and prejudices (Crocker & Major, 1989); all variables that are also linked with conflicting intergroup relations. Higher levels of BII, or successful integration of the different identities, is associated with higher levels of social solidarity (Berry, 2011), adjustment (Ward, & Kennedy, 1994), well-being (Berry, 1998), self-esteem, life satisfaction, cognitive complexity (Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006), psychological satisfaction (Liebkind, 2001), and creativity (Cheng, Sanchez-Burks, & Lee, 2008). Lower levels of BII are, in contrast, associated with isolation (Rudmin, 2003) and communicative misunderstandings (Padilla, 2006).

Conclusion

Multicultural societies facilitate contact among sometimes very distinct groups. As such, identity issues become salient and newcomers or even more established migrants often experience internal conflict among their (cultural, religious, and national) identities. From an intergroup perspective, conflict often arises when people perceive symbolic or realistic threats targeting their identity in a multicultural context (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Given that acculturation is taking place when there is an interplay between minorities and majorities (Berry, 1990), it is crucial to understand how identities, for individuals and groups, can be integrated successfully with minimal or no conflict. The literature on acculturation suggests that this process always involves a transformation of identity in order to adapt to a receiving society, in the case of minority groups; or to live in a multicultural context, in the case of majority groups. These identity changes can be challenging.

Let us briefly take the case of migrant women: they have to define their identity beyond (hypothetical) dichotomies such as western–eastern, local–foreign, and modern–traditional, and beyond the accompanying stereotypes. Migrant women, as suggested by Weinreich (1983), face the challenge of resolving incompatible identities, particularly when the values and the ideologies between original and new cultures are very different, or indeed conflicting. Women may attempt to resolve the conflict by adopting multiple identities and identifying with more inclusive ones (Mirza, Meetoo, & Litster, 2011).

Another example is that of British Muslims. In the case of British Muslims, religion does not only relate to beliefs, but to an important identity in its own right, with religious identity being often more salient than ethnic identity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Thus, British Muslims have to manage religious, cultural, national, and ethnic identities, a process that can be quite demanding. A possible way to resolve the identity conflict that may occur in the case of Muslims who live in Western countries could be found in promoting identification with a superordinate culture, especially if this includes a multicultural ideology, as well as sustaining identification with the religious group; that is, adopting a dual identity approach.

Stronger identification with a multicultural and inclusive culture can predict personal openness to interfaith relationships, or in other words, it can promote positive intergroup contact (Cila & Lalonde, 2014).

This chapter demonstrates how identity processes are closely associated with acculturation in multicultural societies. Understanding the identity dynamics involved in the acculturation process could facilitate the positive outcomes of acculturation and help toward establishing peaceful intergroup relations. Consistently, historical and present-day events have pointed to how unsuccessful acculturation processes can result in or precipitate catastrophic actions. This is applicable both for majority groups, which may, for example promote discriminative policies and the marginalisation of entire minority communities; and minority groups, which may support intergroup distrust, isolation, and even violence. These are issues that cannot be easily addressed by modern societies. Simply denouncing multiculturalism, like many political leaders have done, cannot bring about positive change in contexts that are undergoing, unavoidably, acculturation processes. In such contexts, it is important to understand how identity can motivate and determine acculturation, and how it can be used to maximise the potential of integration. Future research should examine different multicultural contexts and aim to create interventions that combine theories on identity and acculturation, public policies and educational programmes that collectively support integration. Political leaders, policy makers, educators, and importantly, social scientists need to work together in an effort to promote tolerance and respect among groups.

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Chapter 5
Tyranny and Leadership

Stephen Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, Michael Platow, and Nik Steffens

> *"I have a heart that needs to love, and I now feel great satisfaction in the love of my Fatherland, as I love the Duce above everything else. Because the Duce makes me tremble with excitement, because I only need to hear his words to be transported in heart and soul into a world of joy and greatness"*
>
> (Athe Gracci cited in Duggan, 2013, p. 229).

From the outside, it is easy to see tyrannies in terms of repression and of loathing. When we think of Nazism, we think of the Gestapo, the camps, the terror which rendered opposition perilous at the very least. Equally, when we think of Italy's fascist period, our overwhelming image is of grim-faced blackshirts. Certainly, we would not wish to diminish in any way the violence and brutality of either regime. Yet, if we want to understand how such systems worked, why they were able to thrive, and hence how they can best be opposed, such a focus may be misleading. From the inside, the most striking aspect of tyrannies may be the sense of participation and of devotion. To put it slightly differently, when we analyse the outpourings of Nazis and Fascists, we tend to focus on "hate speech". What should concern us more is "love speech".

Much of this love is centred on the figure of the leader. This is clear in the words of Athe Gracci, cited above, taken from Duggan's (2013) account of the voices of ordinary Italians in the period of fascist rule. He regards such devotion as much more than a curiosity. Indeed Duggan's central argument concerns "the crucial

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importance of the figure of Mussolini to emotional and political engagement with the regime" (p. xvii).

A similar picture emerges from Eberle's (2012) study of the thousands of letters written to Hitler by ordinary Germans between 1925 and 1945. Rather than force securing consent, Eberle argues, Hitler was explicit that his ability to use force depended upon his popularity. This in turn depended upon creating an intimate relationship between the population and their leader. As Harris puts it, in her introduction to Eberle's analysis: "the secret to the Third Reich's success during its height in the 1930s and early 1940s was Germans' sense that they could engage in a conversation with their leader, and that he was in some way listening" (2012, p. 1).

If we want to understand the psychology of tyranny, then we must address why and when people embrace authoritarian leaders. How can people be devoted to figures who take away their freedom and threaten extreme violence to any who would question, let alone oppose, them? But before we can do this it is first necessary to address the nature of leadership itself and to specify what authoritarian leadership is.

On the Nature of Tyrannical Leadership

Leaders, Followers and Social Groups

There is a vast literature on leadership, which we have no space to review in any detail here. However, a general survey of the field (e.g. as provided by Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) reveals that in recent decades "great man" theories—which suggest that leaders have a set of special personal qualities that set them apart from the mass—have given way to theories which see leadership as resting upon a social relationship between leaders and followers. On the one hand, transactional models see leadership as a form of exchange: if the leader can give followers what they want, they in turn will do what the leader wants. Transformational models see this as underestimating the extent to which leaders reshape the desires and goals as followers. But these come perilously close to reinstating notions of leaders as being endowed with special qualities such as charisma (Burns, 1978; Bass & Riggio, 2006).

Perhaps what is most striking about these various approaches is less what they include than what they exclude. To be more specific, they generally ignore the fact that leadership is something that takes place in groups. A leader is always a leader of a specific group—a faction, a party, a nation, whatever. For those of us who look at Hitler and Mussolini now, they appear as strange, almost absurd figures and we certainly have no sense of intimacy or devotion to them. They were leaders of Germany and of Italy at a distinct moment in time. Thus, to understand leadership we cannot limit our focus to the leader alone, we cannot limit it to just leaders and followers; we have to examine the relationship between leaders and followers within a social group defined by both place and time.

One obvious exception to this is Freud's *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, first published in 1921 and translated into English in 1922. Freud starts with an appreciative summary of Gustave Le Bon's classic crowd psychology—the notion that people lose their identity in the crowd, revert to a common primitive "racial unconscious", and therefore become both extremely suggestible and extremely atavistic in their actions (Le Bon, 1895/1947, see also La Macchia & Louis, 2016). However, he criticises Le Bon for neglecting the importance of leadership in his analysis. The leader, for Freud, is akin to the father of the primal horde or the hypnotist in therapy. He (for Freud's vision is highly gendered) controls both individual group members and binds them together in the group. To use Freud's own words:

> *"A primary group… is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego"* (1922, p. 80).

Put slightly differently, it is the shared vertical relationship of veneration to the leader which generates the horizontal bonds of identification between group members. This stress on a love relationship (a libidinal tie) between leaders and followers captures the intense personal relationship that we have commented upon. But the problem of characterising this relationship as prior to group identification is that it places no boundaries on the power and influence of the leader. As acknowledged by even those who are sympathetic to Freud (e.g. Ernesto Laclau in his, 2005, analysis of populism), this all too easily leads to the conclusion that leadership is necessarily a top-down process in which anything the leader says will be accepted by followers. In these terms, leadership inherently involves subjugation to the leader's dictatorial will, with the only choice being between benevolent or else toxic dictatorship. Democratic leadership, by contrast, is an oxymoron and a logical impossibility.

It follows that, if we want to avoid an equation of leadership with tyranny, we need to provide an alternative conceptualisation of the relationship between group members, leaders and social groups. The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provides just such a reconceptualisation.

The Social Identity Analysis of Leadership

As outlined by Hogg (2016), the social identity approach places the act of identification—seeing oneself in terms of one's membership of the relevant social category (e.g. "I am German", "I am a Catholic")—firmly at the start of group process. Where people identify with a given social category they seek to conform to the norms, values and beliefs which characterise this category. They will therefore be more likely to be influenced by those who are in a position to understand these norms, values and beliefs and to interpret what they mean in concrete terms for action in context (Turner, 1991, see also McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). In other

words, group members will be swayed by those who are themselves emblematic of the group—in more technical language, those who are most in-group prototypical.

However, even if someone is indeed highly prototypical, it doesn't mean that anything they propose will be supported. For even if they themselves represent what the group stands for, it is still necessary that what they propose and what they do is seen as consonant with group understandings and group interests. Thus, from a social identity perspective, the primacy of identification places limits upon the process of influence and hence upon the ability of anyone to sway group members.

While not labelled as such, this model of influence clearly lays down the basis for a model of leadership. Over time, social identity theorists have made the connection more explicit. At first, the emphasis was very much on the construct of in-group prototypicality (e.g. Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998). More recent work endorses the importance of prototypicality but suggests it is just one of several dimensions along which leadership is framed by social identity process (for a summary of evidence, see Haslam et al., 2011; see also Steffens et al., 2014, for a validation of this multidimensional approach).

First, then, leaders need to be seen as "one of us", as part of the group and as representing group values. But it is important to stress that this does not mean that leaders should be typical of other group members. It means that they should represent the core characteristics which we value in our group and which make us distinctive from others—characteristics we may believe in but which few of us actually live up to. Prototypical, then, is very different to typical. It means that the leader has to be an extraordinary rather than an ordinary member of the group (Steffens, Haslam, Kessler, & Ryan, 2013).

Second, leaders need to be seen as "acting for us". Certainly to be seen as acting for one's own interests is extremely corrosive for effective leadership, which explains why would-be leaders are often reluctant to be seen as seeking power. In this regard, the emperor Cincinnatus is often presented as a model of the good leader—a man who had to be persuaded out of retirement to defend Rome against the Aequians and who, once he had succeeded, quietly went back to his farm (Livy, 1922). It is even worse to be seen as acting for an out-group. Indeed, far from favouring leaders who are just and fair, unless there are explicit group norms to the contrary, we generally favour leaders who will favour in-group over out-group members (e.g. Platow, Hoar, Reid, Harley, & Morrison, 1997).

Third, it is not enough to simply act in the in-group interest. Successful leaders need to deliver for the in-group. They need to transform group norms and values into lived realities—a process we refer to as "collective self-realisation" (Reicher & Haslam, 2006a). This does not necessarily mean economic success or victory in competition; what counts as success will depend upon the specific norms and goals of the group in question and will therefore be very different in different circumstances. But whatever form it takes, collective self-realisation lies at the root of the powerful positive emotions that can occur in groups (Hopkins et al., 2016) and the powerful positivity towards leaders who are seen to have made it happen.

Collective self-realisation can occur at two levels. On the one hand, it is a matter of building norms and values into the practices of the group itself. In this way, group

practices become a performance of identity and the leaders who create these performances act as impresarios. Hitler's Nuremburg rallies are a case in point. These were choreographed so that the leader would emerged from the order ranks of Nazis and mount a raised dais above them: of the mass yet dominating the mass, an embodied demonstration of the fuhrerprinzip on which the Nazi vision of an ideal German society was to be built (Spotts, 2002).

On the other hand, collective self-realisation is a matter of actions taken to transform the practices of the wider society. Shifting from Hitler to Mussolini, it is relevant to cite one of the Italian dictator's acolytes, Giovanni Giurati. Mussolini, he believed, was the man "to chase moral and civil disorder, heresy and war, not just from Italy, but from the face of the earth" (Duggan, 2013, p. 79). Or, to cite another, Alberto De' Stefani, Mussolini did not just exalt "national sentiment and the power of the State, in opposition to the democratic, pseudo-liberal, pacifist and humanitarian ideologies"—something seen to exemplify an ancient Italian tradition going back to the Romans—he was the man who turned "the word" into "action" and, we may add, who turned action into the (mercifully brief) reality of the Italian fascist state (Duggan, 2013, p. 79).

The fourth and final dimension of "identity leadership" is on a different level, and encapsulates the other three. As we have argued, those who share identification as members of a common social group seek to act together on the basis of the meanings associated with the group identity. This means that those who are able to define the nature of this identity have the potential to mobilise collectivities in favour of their proposals. That is, it is through their capacity to define identities that leaders acquire social power. As a consequence, rival leaders, seeking to mobilise people to different ends, will contest the meanings associated with group identity. Leaders, then, must craft a sense of us. To be successful, they must be skilled *entrepreneurs of identity* (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Such entrepreneurship must encompass all aspects of what a leader does, leaders don't just wait and hope that they will be seen as exemplifying the group prototype; they actively construe the group identity and their own selves so as to establish a consonance between them. This is not limited to what they say about themselves and the group, but extends to all dimensions of what they do and even how they look. Let us use two examples, one serious and one more frivolous, to illustrate this point.

By many estimates, Franklin D. Roosevelt was one of the greatest of all US Presidents. But when, at the age of 39, in 1921, he was struck down with what was thought to be polio (then, often dubbed "infantile paralysis") it was thought to be the end of his political career. After all, surely a politician had to be virile, energetic, autonomous—everything that was negated by his disability. But Roosevelt persisted. Still, when he first stood for President in 1932, during the depths of the depression, and decided to go on a whistle-stop train tour around the country, his advisors strongly counselled against displaying his ravaged body to the public. Yet the sight of Roosevelt painfully, but successfully, dragging himself from the train to his podium resonated both with his audience's sense of hardship and with his message of an America able to triumph over economic paralysis (Leuchtenburg, 1995; Rosenman, 1952). This is best expressed in Roosevelt's most famous words, taken

from his inaugural speech of March 4th 1933: "this great nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper. So first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyses needed efforts to convert retreat into advance".[1] In short, Roosevelt had the entrepreneurial skill to convert his body from a liability into a symbol of the nation's path.

Now, let us turn from the (almost) sublime to the (almost) ridiculous. In 1993, the Conservative MP, Bill Walker, stood up in the British Parliament to propose legislation that would make Scottish devolution more difficult. In order to claim that he was talking for, and not against, the Scottish people and the Scottish interest, Walker, resplendent in tartan, began: "I stand before you, madam speaker, wearing the dress of Highland Scotland". But at this point he was interrupted by a fellow MP who objected: "On a point of order Madam Speaker, my honourable friend… suggested that he was in Highland dress. He is in nothing of the kind. He misled the House and I have reason to believe that he is wearing little red pants under his kilt" (cited in Haslam et al., 2011, p. 154). Such is the gravitas of the "mother of parliaments". Our point, though, is that when it comes to establishing that you are of the group, that you are for the group and that you deliver to the group, then everything in your performance—even your underwear—can matter.

Leadership and Democracy

One of the key contributions of the social identity approach is that it resolves the issue of agency, which has bedevilled traditional approaches to leadership and which—as we have seen—also constitutes a key problem for the Freudian account. The question is whether the agency of leaders and that of followers are inherently at odds with each other; in sociopolitical terms, is strong democratic leadership possible? Whether wittingly or not, most approaches suggest it is not possible. They flip-flop between rendering the leader completely autonomous and able to impose anything upon followers (great man theories) to making leaders completely dependent upon pre-existing preferences of followers (transactional theories) and then back again (transformational theories). But, by placing the leader–follower relationship within a frame that equally encompasses both of them—the social group—the social identity approach opens up the possibility that both can be involved in defining the nature of social identity and hence determining forms of social action. Strong leadership can facilitate rather than exclude the participation of group members in this process. It can promote respect and harmony within and between groups as much as derision and conflict.

It is important to stress that, in opening up the possibility of strong democratic leadership, social identity models do not exclude undemocratic forms. On the contrary, it is precisely through its stress on leadership as a process of social identity

[1] For the full text see http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-inaugural/

management, and the centring of analysis on the balance between leaders and group members in arriving at the definition of social identity, that these models are able to specify how and when leadership will be more democratic or more authoritarian.

In our analysis of *The New Psychology of Leadership*, we have identified three broad types of leadership based on three different orientations to the definition of identity (Reicher, Haslam, & Platow, 2014). The first, we call "ideal democratic" leadership. Here, the leaders seek to facilitate an inclusive discussion about "what we are" and hence what our policies and priorities should be. Here, the leader assumes no necessary priority and the mass of group members are given an equal voice in defining the collective identity. This idea is often promulgated through the metaphor of a "conversation"—a national conversation, a fireside conversation or whatever. But often when leaders claim to be having a conversation, it obscures a second and far more common form of leadership which we term "asymmetrical" or "hierarchical" leadership.

Hierarchical leadership denotes a situation where leaders claim priority in terms of the definition of identity and seek to essentialise their particular versions of "who we are" as the only possible versions. In other words, even as they are involved in constructing identity, they seek to hide the activity of construction. They portray themselves more as archaeologists revealing what was already there and will always be there.

There are a number of ways through which such essentialised versions of identity can be achieved. Perhaps the most common is the use of history. Or rather, to be more precise, a number of events will be selected to represent the "true" identity of the group and hence to define an essence which continues unchanging across time and outside of history. Different choices of events will then lead to very different versions of identity (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, for an extended analysis).

But even if hierarchical leadership seeks to establish a leader's version of identity as the one "true" version, it still positions that leader as no more than an interpreter of who we are. That is, a distinction still exists between the leader and the identity and this has a number of important implications. To start with, as an interpreter, there is always the possibility that the leader is fallible in their interpretation of identity. As a consequence, criticisms of the leader's version as well as alternative versions of identity are possible and legitimate. Equally, criticisms of the leader are possible and legitimate. All in all, hierarchical leadership still allows for democratic debate even if it tries to tip the terms of the debate in the leader's favour.

All that changes with the third type: authoritarian leadership. Here, the leader is elided with the group itself. He or she becomes the embodied manifestation of the identity. For example, the Indonesian dictator Sukarno symbolically represented himself as the Javanese hero and demigod Bima (see Wilner, 1984). He altered his speech away from the quiet cadences of the Indonesian elites to the crude booming tones associated with Bima. Physically, he emphasised his large muscularity, again so dissonant with the graceful fine features of the Javanese aristocracy but so reminiscent of Bima. He even drew upon the colour black, a symbol of strength always associated with Bima, by carrying a black baton wherever he went. Sukarno did not just draw on Bima, he became Bima and hence Indonesia. For a more succinct way of encapsulating this relationship between leader and group, we can refer to the

climactic words with which Rudolf Hess concluded the 1934 Nüremburg rally: "The Party is Hitler. But Hitler is Germany just as Germany is Hitler" (cited by Kershaw, 2001, p. 69). Moreover, Hitler returned the compliment: "I know that everything you are, you are through me, and everything I am, I am through you alone!" (cited in Fest, 1974, p. 159).

As we shall now examine in some detail, once the distinction between the leader and the group is obliterated, the space for debate and dissent also disappears. Under authoritarian leadership, the leader quite literally defines the group and gives group members no say over what the group is and what the group can or should do. They can only follow. It is important to stress that not all leaders who are elided with the group will use this to deny debate (Nelson Mandela is a case in point). It is equally important to stress that those who do so will not limit themselves to rhetorical denial of dissent, our point rather is that we should be wary of turning representatives into icons for this creates the conditions for leaders to become tyrants.

The Tyrannical Consequences of Authoritarian Leadership

As analysts, looking at tyranny from the outside, we understandably concentrate on all its many unpalatable dimensions. But from the inside, and for tyranny to succeed, it must have its attractions. Let us start with one of these, one which we have already had cause to mention when discussing Freud's *Massenpsychologie*. We refer to the intense, libidinal, almost erotic tie between leaders and the led. While we may doubt Freud's explanation, that does not mean to say that we dismiss the phenomenon. Indeed, it is striking, when one reads accounts of those who have attended rallies addressed by authoritarian leaders, that instead of feeling an anonymous part of the mass, they have a sense of making personal contact, of being personally addressed by the leader and of the intensity of that relationship. To quote from one early Nazi who saw Hitler speak: "I looked at him as he passed by and felt that he met my glance. All who have ever seen him must have felt the same way. The shouts of Heil Hitler continued" (cited in Abel, 1986, p. 271). And another: "I felt as though he were addressing me personally. My heart grew light, something in my breast arose. I felt bit by bit something within me were being rebuilt" (cited in Lindholm, 1990, p. 102).

The ability to engender such feelings is often held as the mark of a leader's charisma. Yet, unless one can explain the basis of charisma this only serves to redescribe—or, at worst, to mystify—the phenomenon. From a social identity perspective, we are more likely to see a leader as charismatic if we see them as prototypical of our group ("one of us"; see Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & Spears, 2006). What is more, when leaders are seen as prototypical of a group with which we identify (e.g. committed Democrats who see Obama as prototypical of the Democratic Party) we have a sense of having a personal bond with them (Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014). Moreover, experimental research that reproduces these patterns shows that these are not simply associations, but also

causal pathways. In-group prototypicality is thus not just a correlate of, but also a basis for charisma, and also for a sense of personal connection to the leader.

To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate that the social identities we derive from group memberships are every bit as meaningful to us personally as the identities attached to our unique individuality. They define who we are, what we care about, what we strive for (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010). Accordingly, insofar as we represent ourselves personally in terms of our group membership then we also feel a sense of personal connection to those who represent the group.

In sum, whereas Freud argues that group members are linked horizontally to each other through their relationship to the leader, a social identity approach argues that leaders and group members are linked to each other through their mutual relationship of identification with the group. In this way, we retain the ability to explain how followers feel personally engaged with leaders, but without implying that this is always an unequal engagement.

Extending this same logic a step further, it follows that the more we identify with the group and the more the leader is identified with the group, the stronger our bond to the leader (a point confirmed empirically by Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, Platow, et al., 2014). At the point where the self is fused into the group and the group is elided with the leader, then the follower becomes inseparable from the leader. This point is chillingly articulated by one early Nazi, describing his experience of hearing Hitler speak in Bonn in 1926: "The German soul spoke to German manhood in his words. From that day on I could never violate my allegiance to Hitler" (cited in Abel, 1986, pp. 152–153).

Moreover, in this quotation, we see not only the intensity and the intimacy of the bond to an authoritarian leader, but also begin to glimpse the impossibility of dissent. If the leader has become the embodiment of the group (e.g. Hitler as "the German soul"), then any distancing from the leader becomes a distancing from the group, any attack on the leader becomes an attack on the group; difference becomes apostasy and debate becomes betrayal. Moreover, and here's the rub, it becomes distancing, attack and betrayal of ones own self as defined through the group. Accordingly, divergence from the path the leader sets out becomes unconscionable – and the impossibility of dissent is not just a matter of self-policing by group members, it is also vigorously policed by authoritarian leaders and their agencies.

To illustrate these points with a more contemporary example, Penic, Elcheroth and Reicher (in press) recently examined the relationship between what have been called "modes of attachment" to the nation (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006), and criticism of the nation's excesses. More specifically, the research was interested in the claim by Roccas and her colleagues that such criticism is not a function of how strongly one identifies but rather a matter of how one orients to group authorities and whether one regards criticism as a way of strengthening or weakening the group. Critical patriots, argue Roccas et al., using evidence from Israel, can both love their group and criticise their group (see also Packer, 2008). Indeed they can love their group precisely by criticising it. We found exactly this pattern in Serbia, in the aftermath of the wars of the 1990s. But we didn't find such a relationship in Croatia, principally because, in that country, there was no space for critical patriots. Why?

The answer lies in the fact that, for Croatians, these wars, locally named "the Homeland War" were seen as founding the modern nation, and the Croatian leader of the time, Franco Tudjman became regarded as the "Father of the Nation". In this context, those who openly criticised either the war or Tudjman's role within it were deemed unpatriotic, alien and illegitimate. This, indeed, was the reaction to an episode of a documentary programme entitled "Tudjman's legacy" aired on Croatian television, which became a cause célèbre and the subject of an extended debate in the national parliament. In concrete terms, the outcome of this was that the show was suspended for a month, and several of those involved in its production were given formal warnings. Such was the outcry against the editor that he had to be placed under police protection.

Particularly revealing is the following intervention in the parliamentary debate. Rather than criticising Tudjman, averred the speaker, his speeches should have been broadcast: "so our children can see who the great man was, instead of my daughter asking me in the morning (…) "how come they are speaking like that about our Franjo?" (cited in Penic, Elcheroth, G, & Reicher, in press). Here, criticism of the "father" (as expressed through the personalised diminutive "Franjo") is represented as an assault that distresses the children of the nation, as manifested through the child of the speaker. And what could be more nasty, vicious and unwarranted than upsetting a harmless little child?

There is one final twist to our argument. If followers identify with a group which is embodied through the leader, then an attack on the leader becomes not only an attack on the group but also an attack on oneself. Understanding this helps to make sense of one of the more perverse features of twentieth century dictatorships. Getty and Naumov (1999) provide a comprehensive and relentless document-based account of the Soviet terror of the 1930s. They show that the repression was not simply the work of Stalin, but a matter of consensus. From the inside it was seen less as a terror and more as a "war on terror" aimed against agents or dupes of fascism who posed a pressing threat to the Soviet Union (see Overy, 2004). But, what is perhaps even more remarkable is that many of those indicted and facing execution colluded in their own repression—even though they knew themselves to be entirely innocent of what were often entirely trumped-up charges.

The power of the analysis lies in how, through presenting the original transcripts of the trials, Getty and Naumov reveal what the revolutionary leader Karl Radek once called "the logic of confession"—a logic which, once fully developed, makes these extraordinary acts seem almost banal. The starting point is the familiar elision between leader, party and people. This is exemplified by the speech of Ivan Akulov at the plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee (the CC) in January 1933: "Stalin's policy is our policy, the policy of our entire party. It is the policy of the proletarian revolution… and these gentlemen [i.e. those accused of dissent] will never succeed in separating us from our leader" (p. 80).

The next step is to suggest that, in challenging an accusation by the Party, rather than accepting one's guilt (as a good Communist should) one is claiming that the Party (and hence both Stalin and the people) are fallible, thereby weakening them precisely at the moment when need to be strong in order to counter the mortal threat

of German fascism. This is a repeated theme in the trials as defendants who dare defend themselves are hectored for that very act. The defendants are thereby positioned as the aggressors. This is exemplified in the following attack on Bukharin, possibly the most prominent of all those who were purged: "When I read Bukharin's note concerning the charges against him I felt such disgust, as if you saw before you a snake, a viper. I'm sure everyone of you felt the same. From first word to last this note is steeped in vile insinuations and assaults from the CC. It is steeped in a spirit of confrontation, in which he perceives himself as offended or oppressed by somebody" (p. 385).

The dilemma, then, is that the defendants themselves were committed Communists, whose lives were committed to the revolution and who accepted the leading role of the Party (and the General Secretary within it) as the voice of the proletariat—and who were also aware of the gathering threat of fascism. They accepted that to defend themselves as individuals would weaken the leader, the party and the people through which they defined themselves personally. Did they then seek to protect their personal selves at the cost of damaging their social selves or vice versa? Many put their social self first and confessed even if that meant death. Bukharin himself tried a middle path: "while pleading guilty and admitting to the overall validity of the fantastic charges made against him, he nevertheless refused to confirm specific details of the supposed conspiracy.... he may have been trying to fulfil his party duty… by simultaneously confessing and defending his personal honor" (p. 526).

Bukharin was duly executed the day after his trial. He was well prepared for this fate, though. For in the course of his trial, he wrote a letter to Stalin—"perhaps the last letter I shall write to you before my death"—in which he assured the Soviet leader that he understood how the fate of the proletariat (as promoted by Stalin) was more important than his own fate. His sole expressed regret was not for his own imminent death but for the implication that he was disloyal to the group and its leader. As he put it: "my heart boils over when I think that you might believe that I am guilty of these crimes" (p. 558, emphasis in the original). More generally, to adapt Radek's turn of phrase, the elision of leader with the group entails a logic of tyranny whereby not only is criticism, dissent and debate rendered illegitimate and subject to repression, but dedicated group members collude in this repression even when they are its victims.

On the Acceptance of Tyrannical Leadership

This far we have been analysing the nature of tyrannical leadership: we have argued against the notion that strong leadership is necessarily undemocratic but rather claimed that tyranny stems from a particular relationship between leaders and followers in defining the group identity whereby, whatever the leader is, does or says *ipso facto* characterises who we are. We then examined exactly why and how such a form of leadership leads to the destruction of any space for debate or dissent. What we have not yet done, though, is to explain why and when followers would accept or even

embrace such forms of leadership. That is what we will do briefly in the space that remains to us—briefly, because these are matters that (to some extent) we have addressed before (e.g. Haslam & Reicher, 2012a,b; Reicher & Haslam, 2012, 2014).

One of the strange paradoxes of our discipline is that, although we have been much concerned with issues of authority and tyranny, we fail almost completely to address these "why and when" questions. That is because we tend to take submission to authority as given even as a characteristic of particular individuals (as in authoritarian personality research) or of human beings in general. Indeed the two most famous bodies of research in the history of psychology—Milgram's Yale Obedience studies and Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment—are characteristically represented as showing, respectively, that people are predisposed to follow the orders of authority, no matter how toxic, and that people are predisposed to accepting the roles in which they are cast, no matter how oppressive (see Reicher & Haslam, 2006b; Reicher, Haslam, & Miller, 2014). So it doesn't make sense to ask *when* we succumb to tyranny because it is assumed that *whenever* there is tyranny, we can't help but succumb to it.

But this leads us to a second and perhaps even stranger paradox. Even as these classic studies are represented as demonstrating that human conformity is natural, so what they actually show is the ubiquity of resistance. Across all the obedience studies conducted by Milgram—where experimenters urge participants to inflict an escalating series of electric shocks on "learners" (actually Milgram's confederates) each time they make errors on a learning task—the majority of participants (52 %) eventually disobey rather than obey the experimenter.

Equally, in Zimbardo's Stanford experiment—where students were randomly divided into Prisoners and Guards and immersed in a simulated Prison—nearly all the Prisoners challenged the Guards at the start, some continued to the end, and only a minority of the Guards (of whom one, dubbed "John Wayne", stands out) acted repressively or tyrannically. What is more, in one final twist to the tale, it is precisely this message of resistance alongside conformity (rather than of the inevitability of conformity) which makes these studies relevant to the wider world. For even in the most brutal carceral regimes that human beings have managed to devise, there is always some evidence of resistance to the extent that sometimes the prisoners are successful in taking over the prison (Haslam & Reicher, 2012c).

It was these considerations that led us to run our own prison study. We wanted to revisit Zimbardo's contention that people "naturally" adopt the group roles into which they are cast and, in particular, that they will abuse positions of power. We also wanted to reconsider the lesson that Zimbardo drew from this: that we always should avoid groups and power. In our study, as in Stanford, ordinary men were divided into Prisoners and Guards. If anything, this showed that our previous scepticism about the inevitability of conformity was too mild. The Guards were highly reluctant to accept their power and use it to maintain the system. The Prisoners were highly reluctant to accept their powerlessness and to accept the system. The result was that, in a short period of time the Prison hierarchy collapsed. But, for present purposes, it was what happened next that was particularly interesting (see Reicher & Haslam, 2006b for details).

After the fall of the Guards' regime, the participants met together and decided to set up a non-hierarchical system—a "Commune"—in which all chores and all resources would be discussed collectively and allocated equitably. Unlike the original Prisoner-Guard arrangements, this was a system that most of the participants themselves embraced and believed in rather than one imposed from the outside. But despite this, the new system quickly collapsed and in the wake of this those who believed in it were ready to accept the imposition of a quasi-fascist regime. The reasons why this happened can be encapsulated by three key moments in the short history of the Commune (these can be seen in full detail by watching the BBC documentary series "The Experiment"; Koppel & Mirsky, 2002).

First, two of the "Communards", who had taken responsibility for the allocation of chores, were discussing what to do if people declined to do the task they had been given (they were aware that there were dissenters amongst them who were not keen to do their share). "Give them another task", suggested one. "What happens if they don't want to do that too", replied the other. And then there was a long silence. Certainly, there was no suggestion of going beyond polite requests in the attempt to enforce the procedures of the Commune and deal with those who sought to undermine it.

The second moment centred on a bowl of salty porridge. Breakfast, on the second day of the Commune was all but inedible. While this was simply a blunder on behalf of the caterers, it was not seen as such. The dissenters used the opportunity to argue that it was a signal from us, the experimenters, that we would not tolerate an egalitarian system and that, if the Communards tried to persist, we would in effect starve them into submission. For the Communards themselves, the situation began to look hopeless: they faced internal dissent that they didn't know how to deal with without asserting coercive power (something they were unwilling to do); they also faced external dissent which they felt was unchallengeable. As one supporter put it, they now had all the responsibilities and efforts of making a system work and yet still it seemed unworkable.

The third moment was when the dissenters took centre stage. After the breakfast incident, and seeing the demoralisation of the Communards, they called a meeting of all participants. The supporters of the Commune sat round a long table, the dissenters stood at the front and the lead figure (PB) berated the assembly in foul and violent language. He started by invoking the breakfast incident: "We're eating fucking shit because the regime of yesterday [i.e. the Commune] doesn't work. Irrespective of your fucking beliefs, a little bit of moderate force does work". PB went on to threaten the Communards with further disruption, but also to offer himself as a bulwark against disruption, to berate them for their failure to stand up for themselves, but also to offer them praise:

> *"You shithouses I said it, didn't I? You didn't have the balls. These guys [i.e., the other dissenters who were centrally involved in disrupting the Guards' regime] have got fucking balls because they put their money where their mouth is and did something about it. And I know you're sitting there quietly because to a lot of you the words I'm saying do make sense. And I find standing here that I have more in common with these two than you lot. I hate to say, you're fucking great guys, but you're arseholes. You're alright while you're fucking eating the food and drinking the beer, but when it comes to payday, get rid of the fucking surplus men. That's what it's down to, isn't it?"*

In effect, he both threatened them with patriarchal violence and offered them patriarchal protection. This offer was then made explicit: revert to the previous system but with the Communards as Prisoners and the dissenters as Guards. The Communards certainly didn't embrace this suggestion, but it is striking that, with one sole exception, they did not protest, instead sitting quietly, looking despondent, some with their heads in their hands or on the table. PB finished by reminding everyone of the impasse they faced: "Right, I'm ajourning then. Give me a shout when you have a bad fucking dinner".

Soon after this, the study came to an end. The Communards admitted that they had lost faith in their ability to run an effective system and that their faith in democracy had diminished. This was matched by psychometric evidence suggesting that their authoritarianism had increased to a point where it was statistically indistinguishable from the authoritarianism of the dissenters. It is worth underlining the importance of this finding for it suggests that those whose original ambition was to create an egalitarian social system had by the end of the study become as authoritarian as those who wanted to disrupt that system and implement a harsh hierarchy. Lest anyone miss the wider resonance of what they proposed, these would-be "new guards" had requested a uniform of black shirts, black berets and black sunglasses. Even if they would not voluntarily allow themselves to be locked (literally) into the new tyranny, they had lost the will to defend the old democracy.

In analytic terms, we suggest that the slide towards authoritarianism derived from the failure of a democratic group which in turn stemmed from the unwillingness of group members to assert group power in defence of their group values. These were the conditions under which group members began to experience their democratic rights and responsibilities as a burden. These were the conditions under which an authoritarian discourse centred upon submission to patriarchal power became credible. These were the conditions under which the offer of patriarchal protection became attractive.

In effect, what we are arguing is that authoritarian leadership becomes attractive under conditions where alternative systems fail to create a viable order. Some of those conditions of disorder are produced by the authoritarian leadership itself: they simultaneously organise social conflict and promise to keep it under control (an approach that was central to the rise of the Nazi Party; see Bendersky, 2000). Some of those conditions arise out of the inadequacies of alternative leaderships. Indeed the great tragedy of our Communards was that, in avoiding the exercise of power for fear that it would turn them into tyrants; they helped create the conditions under which tyranny could flourish.

Perhaps this is a good place to recall the closing words of Berthold Brecht's parable of Nazism: The Resistable Rise of Artuo Ui:

If only we could act instead of talking,
We wouldn't always end up on our arse.
That was the thing that nearly had us mastered;
Don't yet rejoice in his defeat you men!
Although the world stood up and stopped the bastard,
The bitch that bore him is in heat again[2]

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[2]Retrieved from https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/download/attachments/75699736/Brecht-TheResistibleRiseofArturoUi.pdf on 1st June 2015.

Authoritarian leadership becomes attractive, then, not because of deficiencies of the psyche but because of deficiencies of action. And far from avoiding groups and power (as Zimbardo, 2006, counsels) it is essential to exercise group power in order to enact democracy. As long as we fail to understand this, the conditions for tyranny to reproduce itself will be assured.

Conclusion

Our argument in this chapter can be simply summarised: strong leaders are not necessarily tyrants just as strong groups are not necessarily tyrannies. To believe that they are is not just a wrong-headed understanding of the problem, it is part of the problem. For tyranny is fundamentally a matter of the specific content (the values and norms) of specific groups, and of a specific relationship between leaders and ordinary group members in defining that content. Democracy requires strong effective leaders involving group members in open debate as to how to sustain strong, inclusive and equitable groups. Nelson Mandela is a good case in point. His willingness to don a Springbok shirt (previously a symbol of apartheid privilege) at the final of the 1995 Rugby World Cup was critical in bringing Whites into the "Rainbow Nation" and marginalising those supporting conflict against majority rule (Carlin, 2008). It follows that those who undermine the possibility of strong democratic leadership—either in theory or in practice—play the tyrants' game for them.

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Chapter 6
Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action

Stephen T. La Macchia and Winnifred R. Louis

Crowd behaviour and collective action are integral to historical and political developments; they are the hands that turn the wheels of conflict and peace and propel societal change. Crowds engaging in collective action are the very embodiment of mass political mobilisation, as seen in countless examples from the Arab Spring to the Occupy movements to European anti-austerity rallies. In this chapter, we examine the contribution of social identity theory to understanding crowd behaviour and collective action, and discuss possibilities for continued theoretical integration and promoting social change. We first discuss competing theories of crowd behaviour, showing how those based on the social identity approach have progressed our understanding. We also discuss how the application of such an approach to understanding specific riot events has led to a conceptual and theoretical synthesis of collective action and crowd behaviour. We then examine social identity explanations of collective action more broadly, before analysing the apparent disconnect between established models of crowd behaviour and those of collective action, with a view to theoretical integration. Finally, we address the role of social identity in peace and conflict more broadly, and discuss future directions in this area of research.

Theories of Crowd Behaviour: From Impulse to Identity

Given the immense role of crowd behaviour in societal history and development, it makes sense that many competing theories have been proposed to explain it. Here we discuss only the main theories that have influenced the psychological study of crowds, reviewing their merits and historical progression. We also show how the

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social identity approach to crowd behaviour has emerged from this progression and added nuance and real-world utility to the field.

Classical Theories

Contagion theory. The psychological study of crowds grew from late nineteenth century attempts to understand, repress, and even harness rising tides of worker unrest (Reicher, 1984b, 2000). The most influential attempt was Le Bon's (1895/1947) *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, which argues that crowds are naturally and inevitably uncivilised, as their participants revert from individual conscious rationality to collective unconscious irrationality. McDougall's (1920) *The Group Mind* similarly argues that crowds are emotional, impulsive, unrefined, irresponsible, and easily manipulated. Both authors' theses rest on the central idea that crowds provide anonymity, allowing unconscious antisocial motives to emerge (a process referred to as *submergence*), and that these motives and the resulting behaviours then spread rapidly and contagiously through the crowd.

Convergence theory. A challenge to the contagion theorists' idea of a *collective* unconscious came from Allport (1924), who argued that the apparent motives and behaviours of crowds are a manifestation of the *individual* unconscious. Rather than subjugating individuality, the crowd setting acts as a lens that magnifies individuals' latent motivational and behavioural tendencies. Hence, people of similar tendencies come together into crowds, and their sentiments and behaviours "converge" into what is observed as crowd behaviour. Like contagion theory, convergence theory relatively neglects social factors and context and frames crowd behaviour as inherently irrational, two points that would be challenged by later theories. Nonetheless, these classical theories pioneered the idea of crowd behaviour as a unique psychological phenomenon produced by group processes. The theories also agreed that despite often appearing chaotic and unpredictable, crowd behaviour could be controlled and manipulated by authorities and dissidents alike. This idea of crowd behaviour as a potential tool or weapon has motivated governments' interest in crowd research since its inception (Reicher, 1984b, 2000), a fact visible even in more recent theories.

Deindividuation Theory

Following WWII, increased interest in the psychological mechanisms underlying mass killing gave birth to an experimental renaissance in social psychology, and hence to an experimental approach to understanding crowd behaviour. Deindividuation theory (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969) proposes that the anonymity, high arousal, and group cohesion of the crowd setting reduce participants' sense of themselves and those around them as individuals.

Under the right conditions, according to the theory, this leads to weakened self-restraint against impulsive, irrational, and antisocial behaviour (Festinger et al., 1952; Zimbardo, 1969). However, the validity of supporting studies is disputable: all involve small groups (cf. large crowds), and the "antisocial" behaviours observed consist of such atrocities as complaining about one's parents (Festinger et al., 1952) and taking extra Halloween candy (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). On a conceptual level, deindividuation theory suffers from the same limitations as the classical theories. Namely, it pathologises crowd behaviour and neglects the influence of group-based motives and external conflict. Therefore, it cannot explain why crowds sometimes act in volatile ways, and other times in calm and even prosocial ways.

Emergent Norm Theory

Whereas previous theories conceptualise crowd behaviour as inherently impulsive and irrational, emergent norm theory (R. H. Turner & Killian, 1972, 1987) recognises that crowd behaviour—like all group behaviour—is governed by rules. According to this theory, the process that leads to impactful crowd behaviour begins when the crowd forms in response to some extraordinary event, outside of the context of ordinary societal/organisational norms. During this process, referred to as *milling*, leading or prominent members establish a basis for the crowd's formation and coming action. On this basis, certain individual members of the crowd then behave in expressive or purposive ways that attract attention from fellow crowd members. Through shared membership in the crowd and tacit approval, these behaviours come to be perceived as implicitly normative, and as more and more people join in, the emergent norm then becomes the collective behaviour of the crowd. One limitation of emergent norm theory is that contrary to the concept of milling, studies show that behavioural influence and escalation in crowds can happen very rapidly (e.g. Reicher, 1984b, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000). More broadly, as in prior theories, crowd members are envisioned as mindlessly following cues given by the situation and those around them. On the contrary, it is evident that even violent and destructive crowd behaviour usually follows some kind of group-based logic and purpose.

The Social Identity Model of Crowd Behaviour

Addressing the shortcomings of previous theories, Reicher (1984a) applied self-categorisation theory (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; J. C. Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) to account for how the instrumental and symbolic motives of crowds and the individuals within them could produce crowd behaviour. This social identity approach (see also Reicher, 1984b, 2000) emphasises the flexibility and plurality in how people define themselves, ranging from

personal identity through different levels and dimensions of group membership (e.g. social group, religion, political beliefs, gender). Each of these levels of identity is associated with certain meanings and goals, which in turn guide behaviour. Crowd behaviour is thus explained not as the result of individuality being lost or subsumed within the crowd, but as the result of individuals defining themselves (*self-categorising*) as members of the crowd or larger group it represents, and behaving according to its shared meanings and understandings.

Reicher's initial study (Reicher, 1984a) examined science students' and social science students' attitudes towards animal vivisection, and related behavioural intentions, as a function of being in a group (vs. participating individually) and "deindividuated" (vs. individuated). Results showed that immersion in a group and (to a lesser extent) "deindividuation" (anonymity) increased adherence to in-group norms (norms of the group participants belonged to) but not out-group norms (norms of a group participants did not belong to). Thus, Reicher's findings are consistent with Postmes and Spears' (1998) later meta-analysis, which found that behaviour under anonymity is shaped by group norms. In Reicher (1984a), the pattern of results indicated that the effect was driven by activation of the group-relevant social identity. Neither anonymity nor immersion in a group led to an overall increase in antisocial or prosocial intentions (i.e. to heckle or help the person talking about vivisection, respectively)—only an increase in those behaviours that were consistent with the in-group's position on the issue. In implicating social identity salience in such a way, Reicher's model introduced an emphasis on ideology and intergroup processes that would allow the empirical study of crowd behaviour to set foot in the historical and political landscape—something previous theories had failed to achieve.

Riot Studies: A Coup for the Social Identity Approach

Elaborating on the social identity account of "deindividuation", the social identity model of crowd behaviour has had a profound and lasting influence on the field. This is due mainly to its development in applied studies of politically significant instances of crowd behaviour—specifically, urban riots.

The St. Pauls' Riot

The first study applying the social identity model to riots was Reicher's (1984b) analysis of the April 1980 riot in St. Pauls, Bristol. From newspaper reports of the event and interviews with rioters, Reicher determined that the riotous actions by locals, who were responding to aggression and harassment by police during and following their shutdown of a café, were neither senseless nor chaotic. Rather, they reflected the shared motives of an antagonised community: the violence, burning, and looting was orderly and directed at symbolic targets (e.g. police vehicles and buildings), and the crowd remained within the confines of its locale

(the St. Pauls' neighbourhood). In addition, rioters felt a strong sense of positive identity as members of the St. Pauls' community before and after the event. This is not to say, however, that such an identity acted as a deterministic script for the ensuing conflict; Reicher's analysis suggested a reciprocal interplay between social identity and crowd behaviour, such that the behaviour also served to reinforce and redefine the identity.

The Elaborated Social Identity Model of the Crowd

Building on these powerful insights, subsequent riot studies (e.g. Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000) continued to illustrate the importance of categorisation and identity processes in riots, detailing how these processes led to the eruption and escalation of conflict over time. Reicher (1996) fleshed out his original social identity model (Reicher, 1984a) into the elaborated social identity model elaborated social identity model of the crowd (ESIM; see also Stott & Drury, 2000). ESIM predicts that shared social identity defines norms that determine both the behaviour of the crowd and who participates in it. Diverse group norms account for the variety and normative limits of crowd behaviour where previous theories do not (Stott & Drury, 2000). The model also accounts for change both within the context of the event and within the broader social context thereafter (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000). In the context of crowd events such as the riots analysed, the model proposes that the development of a crowd gathering (i.e. protest) into a crowd conflict (i.e. riot) is essentially the product of two asymmetries: one of categorisation and one of power relations (Drury & Reicher, 2009). Regarding categorisation, for example, crowd participants who view themselves as peaceful and legitimate protesters are viewed by police as a violent threat; police who see themselves as responsible defenders of public order are seen by the crowd as brutal and authoritarian. Regarding power relations, the police are usually much better equipped and organised and therefore able to impose their will on the crowd and the event (e.g. in terms of the crowd's movement).

The 2011 UK Riots

Flash forward two decades from the St. Pauls' Riot, and a wave of urban rioting sweeps England, the likes of which have not been seen during the interceding time. In riposte to the subsequent moral denouncement of the riots by politicians and commentators, Reicher and Stott (2011) present an analysis of the riots based on their decades of prior, social identity-based research. The authors argue that the riots were products of political expression by communities galvanised by years of perceived economic injustice and mistreatment by authorities, including heavy-handed police response to initially peaceful demonstrations. In Reicher and Stott's analysis, parallels to earlier riots are clear. Community identity was shaped and

strengthened by longstanding grievances and thwarted attempts at peaceful protest. Antagonism and escalation were triggered by a police show-of-force. Violence and destruction were not wanton, but rather followed group norms, mainly being directed at symbolic out-group (police) targets and embodying a sense of redressing a societal power imbalance. Based on these findings, the authors recommend increased sensitivity and community engagement by police, as well as decreased use of forceful and indiscriminate riot control tactics. They also recommend that politicians and media cease characterising rioters as mindless, criminal, uncivilised, and lacking a legitimate cause. Essentially, the case is made for prevention of future similar unrest by authorities and commentators avoiding actions that are likely to fuel social identity dynamics that induce, exacerbate, and sustain riots.

Crowd Behaviour as Collective Action

By placing due emphasis on historical and political context and the dynamics of identity and intra- and intergroup relations, the social identity approach to crowd behaviour has built a bridge between crowd behaviour research and collective action research. It has done so by treating the examined crowd behaviour events as *purposive*, rather than as incidental and compulsive. Hence, protests, riots, and other purposive forms of crowd behaviour are, by definition, instances of collective action. As it happens, social identity theory has paved roads to the bridge from both sides: researchers of collective action have also propagated their own social identity-based models and theories. Before we examine these and their points of connection to crowd behaviour research, let us review the main theories of collective action research in their historical context.

Theories of Collective Action: From Pathology to Participation

Broadly, *collective action* can mean any coordinated behaviour by a group of people, but the term is usually defined in social psychology and related fields as action taken on behalf of a group or groups in order to influence their status, conditions, and/or identity (Louis et al., 2016). Such action is usually examined in the form of political behaviour.

Pre-Social Identity Accounts of Collective Action

Like crowd behaviour, collective action has a long and rich history of theoretical development that starts with irrationalist approaches to understanding mass political movements. Here we briefly summarise these and later approaches prior to those

based on social identity theory. For a more detailed summary of this theoretical progression, see Louis et al. (2016).

Dysfunction accounts. Some prominent theorists have argued that individual neurosis or psychopathology is the root cause of participation in mass political action (e.g. Lasswell, 1930), and of certain political beliefs themselves (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Others have implicated common psychological biases or faulty thinking, as in the case of cognitive dissonance and religious collective action (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956) or manipulative social and media influence on voter behaviour (e.g. Converse, 1964). While they may offer important theoretical insights explaining some of the processes underlying collective action and social influence in general, these irrationalist approaches fail to account for the evident motivation and instrumentality of mass protest movements.

Function and expression. From the 1950s onwards, collective action theorists moved away from pathology and towards motivation and purpose. Grievance accounts explained protest as functioning to serve symbolic (e.g. Blumer, 1951) and concrete (e.g. Lane, 1965) desires of aggrieved peoples. Structural functionalism (e.g. Smelser, 1962) implicated sluggish government response to rapid social change, and relative deprivation theory (e.g. Runciman, 1966) implicated actors' perceived gap between their real and ideal societal status. These theories focused on collective action as motivated by a pursuit of concrete social change, and both addressed the complex phenomenon whereby people may increase their protests even when they appear to be prospering. Other approaches focused on expressive social movements and how collective action serves symbolic and psychological needs (e.g. Gusfield, 1963). This was particularly relevant to new pride/identity movements by women and racial and sexual minorities in the 1960s and afterwards (see Handler, 1992). In the 1970s, however, collective action research returned from this focus on expression and symbolism back to a focus on structural and economic motives. Most notably, resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) proposed that groups make opportunistic use of their social and material resources to address ever-present grievances and strains and thus gain further resources.

Social Identity-Based Theories of Collective Action

Just as they did for crowd behaviour, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its elaboration, self-categorisation theory (J. C. Turner et al., 1987, 1994), overhauled the study of collective action. New social psychological theories and models were formed that employ a group-level focus and place social/collective identity—and not individuals' motives and dispositions—at the heart of collective action.

Politicised collective identity. Klandermans (1984) proposed an expanded resource mobilisation model predicting individuals' participation based on *perceived* (rather than actual) costs and benefits to the group. By taking into account participants'

expectations about the participation and reactions of others, this model brings in social psychological factors such as interpersonal interaction, persuasion, and the influence of past experiences and social networks. On an applied level, the model speaks to how participation in action can be induced by manipulating contextual factors (e.g. timing, strategy, arena) in ways that tip the balance of perceived participation costs and benefits.

Building on this work, Simon and Klandermans (2001) later proposed an elaborated, three-pillar model whereby collective identity, the struggle for power, and the broader societal context form the basis of collective action. Here, both expressive/symbolic and instrumental/concrete motives are accounted for, whereas previous approaches (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Smelser, 1962) had largely focused on one side or the other. The politicised collective identity model is also the first to take into account the role of third parties (e.g. the general public; see also, e.g. Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2014). Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008) further added an emphasis on embeddedness in community social networks as a driver of collective identity and thus of collective action.

The integrative social identity model of collective action (SIMCA). van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) sought to lay out the causal processes predicting collective action more definitively and quantitatively. Their model, SIMCA, proposes that three factors jointly predict collective action: injustice, efficacy, and identity. It is the first model of collective action to account for emotion quantifiably, with affective perceptions of injustice (i.e. anger) predicting collective action more strongly than non-affective injustice perceptions. It adds clarity to the role of identity proposed by Simon and Klandermans (2001) by showing that it is the extent to which a group's identity is *politicised*—rather than merely salient—that predicts collective action. SIMCA remains arguably the most influential quantitative model of collective action in social psychology. It has been applied to domains as diverse as environmental collective action (e.g. van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010) and religious conflict (e.g. Tabri & Conway, 2011). It has also spawned a wave of subsequent theoretical models that have elaborated on its key processes (e.g. Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009).

The encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA). Thomas et al. (2009) proposed a more causally complex variation on SIMCA. Rather than causally preceding injustice and efficacy perceptions, social identity is proposed to *encapsulate* elements of these factors as group norms or moral convictions, thus mediating the influence of group-based emotion and self-efficacy on collective action. Rather than proposing EMSICA as a rewrite or replacement of SIMCA, the authors contend that EMSICA and SIMCA complementarily account for the development of collective action in different instances—and even potentially the same instances—of collective action (Thomas et al., 2009). Namely, SIMCA is proposed to account for situations/ways in which social identity affects group reactions to injustice and development of efficacy leading to collective action, and EMSICA for situations/ways in which social identity is produced or shaped by these factors. Hence, evidence has been found simultaneously for both models/processes within the same dataset (e.g. Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007).

New models. Whereas SIMCA and EMSICA place collective action participation predominantly as the outcome variable predicted by the antecedent factors (including social identification), later models (e.g. Becker et al., 2011) also account for the *effects* of participation in collective action. In these models, collective action participation increases emotions (particularly out-group-directed anger), which in turn increase the likelihood of future participation. Similarly, researchers examining opinion group identity conceptualise this identity as both a product and an antecedent of collective action (e.g. McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). Other new work (e.g. van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011) emphasises the role of moral convictions in predicting collective action, with the role of perceived morality particularly visible in the age of globalised activist and terrorist movements (Thomas & Louis, 2014; Zaal et al., 2011).

Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action: The Case for Theoretical Integration

Having reviewed the theoretical models of crowd behaviour and collective action, it becomes clear that there is a high degree of conceptual overlap. This is apparent not just in terms of the nature of the behaviours and events that are studied (i.e. political movements and conflicts), but also the ways in which social identity theory has informed the theories and models constructed. However, few researchers have yet taken advantage of this overlap: crowd research and collective action research remain, for the most part, separate literatures. It is clear that both literatures would benefit from more theoretical integration, in the sense of crowd behaviour research borrowing features and insights from collective action theories/ models, and vice versa. To make this case, we first examine why and how the two literatures remain separate, and then discuss some specific examples of how they could be integrated, as well as what this would mean for the conceptualisation of social identity in relation to crowds and collective action. We then, on this basis, address the role of social identity in peace and conflict more broadly, and discuss future directions in this area of research.

Crowd Action versus Collective Action

The main reason why few researchers have ventured across the bridge between crowd behaviour and collective action (in theoretical terms) appears to be a levels-of-analysis difference. From the beginning, theories of crowd behaviour have focused on particular behavioural events/actions, such as protests and riots, many of which take place within a short timespan such as a single afternoon (e.g. Reicher, 1984b, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000). For this reason, even in social identity-based

studies (see previous citation), analyses have emphasised temporal and situational dynamics, documenting how intergroup and identity processes have behaviourally unfolded in real time. Collective action research, on the other hand, has typically focused on campaigns taking place over months and even years (e.g. Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). This longer timescale means that more stable influences have been emphasised, such as attitudes and moral convictions, and their relationships with identity and participation often mapped in hypothetical and future timespace. Intentions to engage in collective action are usually assessed prospectively, whereas participation in crowd events (i.e. actual behaviour) is usually assessed retrospectively. Altogether, these differences mean that crowd behaviour and collective action research have often examined different behaviours and events, from different angles, using different variables.

Potential Points of Integration

Despite differences in the particular cases analysed and the methods used to do so, the social identity-based crowd behaviour and collective action literatures share some things in common. For example, both are concerned with political behaviour and participation, including community activism (e.g. Reicher, 1984b; Reicher & Stott, 2011), student protests (e.g. Becker et al., 2011; Reicher, 1996), and national (e.g. Klandermans et al., 2008; Stott & Drury, 2000) and international (e.g. van Zomeren et al., 2010) protest and activism. The two literatures also share an emphasis on social identity as a key factor, placing it as a connector between group membership and political purpose and motivation, and between such motivation and (group-norm-consistent) behavioural engagement (Reicher, 1984a). Social identification is also identified in both literatures as a force that sustains participation through time, with the act of participation itself reinforcing in-group identification and thereby increasing the chances of future participation (Becker et al., 2011; Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Stott & Drury, 2000; Thomas et al., 2009). Given these commonalities, the two literatures can borrow from one another to address existing shortcomings and increase theoretical and practical utility.

What crowd behaviour theories can offer the study of collective action. Social identity research on crowd behaviour contains elements that could be addressed in collective action research. Methodologically, such crowd behaviour research emphasises the real-time unfolding of behaviour, and participants' retrospective experiences of this (see Reicher, 1984b, 1996; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott & Drury, 2000). Collective action research, on the other hand, has typically examined hypothetical or planned behaviour (e.g. Becker et al., 2011; Klandermans, 1984; Thomas et al., 2009). Insofar as crowd events such as protests represent specific instances of collective action, the higher temporal and situational fidelity of crowd behaviour research could be a useful complement to collective action models. For example, the

causal processes proposed by SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and EMSICA (Thomas et al., 2009) could be tested within specific collective action events and campaigns (e.g. behaviour escalating shortly after the point at which perceived injustice becomes emotionally charged or identity becomes politicised). Also, the strength and sequence of connection between multiple participation events could be examined as a function of the experiential characteristics of those events and resulting changes to social identification and other predictor variables.

On a related note, the causal complexity and reciprocity acknowledged in social identity models of crowd behaviour (e.g. Reicher, 1984a, 1984b; Stott & Drury, 2000) could be further applied to collective action models. Social identity is recognised not only as a cause of beliefs, intentions, and participation, but also an effect and mediator. Although some collective action researchers have taken notable steps in this direction (e.g. Becker et al., 2011; Thomas & Louis, 2014)—including van Zomeren and colleagues themselves (2012)—the predominant SIMCA model historically has emphasised unidirectional causation from identity to injustice and efficacy perceptions, and from these three predictors to collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2010). The complex and varied developmental progression of real-world examples of collective action, however, clearly requires dynamic analyses (see Louis et al., 2016; van Zomeren et al., 2012).

What collective action theories can offer the study of crowd behaviour. Recent models of collective action have also incorporated elements worthy of consideration in the study of crowds. In particular, examining how moral convictions determine and shape participation (van Zomeren et al., 2012; Zaal et al., 2011) could enrich accounts of crowd events by speaking to the heterogeneity of acting groups, a factor underscored as important in the Reicher riot studies (Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Stott & Drury, 2000). Rather than such heterogeneity merely being a function of multiple pre-existing groups coming together to comprise a crowd, it could be examined more closely as a moral or normative landscape. Emergent identity and behaviour processes could be shaped according to the strength of individuals' and subgroups' convictions. The role of moral convictions also speaks to the spread of protest and riot movements across time and national borders, helping research accounts to stitch crowd events together into a global historical context. Collective action researchers' focus on hypothetical and future participation (Becker et al., 2011; Klandermans, 1984; Thomas et al., 2009) can also contribute to this, in that future and continued crowd event participation and behaviour could be predicted as key outcomes.

Another aspect of recent collective action models that could complement crowd behaviour models is the acknowledgement of the role played by third parties (Saeri, Iyer, & Louis, 2015; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Crowd behaviour events have been typically been conceptualised as dyadic interactions (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1996) that are nonetheless embedded in a socio-historical context. This embeddedness entails, at the very least, that observers and commentators outside of the conflict dyad are also involved. Specifically, they may contribute to a discourse that influences how social identity and categorisation processes play out in subse-

quent, related crowd events (Reicher & Stott, 2011). Discourse and involvement by sympathiser groups are also likely to make a contribution, as they sometimes do to collective action movements more broadly (Saeri et al., 2015; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008).

Reconceptualising collective action. The social identity-based literatures of crowd behaviour and collective action can and should be theoretically integrated, given the points of connection and complementarity we have discussed. The result would be a fuller and more seamless social psychology of political and social movements. The groundwork for this integration has already been laid. For example, Reicher and colleagues (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000) have spoken to the influence of crowd events—and how they play out in terms of social identity—on collective action and social change in the wider social context and timescale. This historical-dynamic perspective is consistent with a fundamental point we made earlier in this chapter: crowd behaviour, as it is normally studied, *is* a form of collective action. People come together in groups to act on behalf of those groups, in accordance with shared values, goals, and meanings. Logically, it follows that collective action can be reconceptualised to include (both planned and spontaneous) participation in crowd events.

This reconceptualisation would involve considering collective action in both a broad, strategic sense (i.e. social and political movements), and a situational, crowd-behavioural sense (i.e. the social and situational dynamics of particular instances of protest and mass representation). At both levels, social identities—which should be considered as plural, nested, and interactive (see Louis et al., 2016; Louis, Mavor, La Macchia, & Amiot, 2014)—have been shown to bind individuals' beliefs, intentions, and behaviour to each other and to those of their groups. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) will thereby continue to provide a frame within and between (what we hope will be) ever more temporally and contextually sensitive empirical models of collective action.

Social Identity and Peace and Conflict

Being central to prevailing psychological models of crowd behaviour and collective action, social identity is also highly relevant to the study of peace and conflict more broadly. If peace and conflict can be conceptualised as alternative normative forms of collective action (see Louis, 2014), the group identities to which those norms belong play a central role in peace and conflict proliferation. All societal conflicts are inherently intergroup affairs, and the identities of the groups involved shape and are shaped by the conflict (e.g. Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Reicher, 1984b, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000). Such social identities and group dynamics influence whether political movements behave peacefully or violently, which may ultimately influence their success (Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Pratto, & Saab, 2013; Thomas & Louis, 2014).

Comparison of the causes and effects of different forms of collective action (hence including forms of crowd behaviour) is a promising direction for future research that can further illuminate the role of identity and norms in social change and conflict.

Another way in which social identity drives conflictual and peaceful forms of crowd behaviour and collective action—and thus the very mechanics of history—is through intragroup processes such as leadership (see Reicher, Haslam, Platow, & Steffens, 2016). This is an aspect that to date has received comparatively little attention in both crowd behaviour and collective action research. This must change if these two topics are to be successfully integrated with each other and with the broader study of peace and conflict (Louis, 2014; Louis et al., 2016). After all, conflict, peace, and societal change are not solely the work of groups, but also of the influential people within them. Fortunately, there is a growing social identity literature on leadership that is continuing to speak to this. Haslam and colleagues' work on *identity entrepreneurship* in particular (e.g. Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2013; Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, & Kessler, 2013) addresses how visionary individuals manage to bring about social change by pioneering and redefining group identities (see also, e.g., Subašić et al., 2008).

Recently, official commemorations marked the 50th anniversary of the iconic 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery Marches staged by the Alabama Voting Rights Movement. These marches were more than an act of civil disobedience aimed at one group's particular political goal—they were an example of crowds engaging in collective action for societal peace and equality against the weight of brutal and systemic racial conflict. The crucial roles of Black American and Civil Rights Movement identities in this action—and the shaping of these identities by leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr.—exemplify the intersection of collective action and crowd research with historical peace and conflict.

Conclusion

At the time of writing, as at any time in modern history, the news is replete with stories and images of crowd-based collective action taking place around the world. The convergence of crowd behaviour and collective action defines the moment-by-moment unfolding of politics and history, a convergence that should be echoed in the psychological study of these two topics. Social identity theories of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1984a, 1996) and collective action (Becker et al., 2011; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008), as we have detailed, have benefited from a century of study, and stand poised both to learn from and to shape the next century. Societal change is driven by the daring actions of the many and of the few. As we researchers seek to understand more about how this happens, let us dare to develop expanded and integrated models of collective behaviour.

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Chapter 7
Reintegration of Child Soldiers: The Role of Social Identity in the Recruitment and Reintegration of Child Soldiers

Michael G. Wessells

Contemporary armed conflicts have taken a deadly turn in regard to children, defined under international law as people under 18 years of age. In the intra-state conflicts that are now the dominant form of war and political violence, communities are frequently targeted directly by groups that seek to dominate and terrorise populations. As evident in conflicts such as those in Syria, Colombia, South Sudan, and Central African Republic, among others, children are among the main casualties since they comprise about half the population.

In addition, large numbers of children, having been socialised into systems of violence, become actors in political violence (Wessells, 1998). Significant numbers become associated with armed forces (state armies or actors) or armed groups (non-state actors such as rebel groups). At present, there are significant numbers of child soldiers in approximately 20 countries on four continents. Girls and boys who are soldiers may perform roles such as fighters, cooks, porters, spies, bodyguards, or, depending on the context, sex slaves (Brett & McCallin, 1996; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994; McKay & Mazurana, 2004). The exact number of child soldiers is unknown because recruiters hide their exploitation of children. Although child soldiers are not a new phenomenon (Cook & Wall, 2011; Drumbl, 2012), commanders today are more likely to place children in combat roles. Even a 10-year-old boy can wield an AK-47, which is widely available in sub-Saharan Africa for the price of a chicken (Wessells, 2006). In addition, children are typically plentiful in war-affected countries.

Children become associated with armed forces or armed groups through a combination of forced and nonforced recruitment, or by being born into armed groups (Brett & McCallin, 1996; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994; Wessells, 2006). However it occurs, child soldiering constitutes a significant impediment to peace. Following the signing of a ceasefire, children may retain their soldier identities and use their

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weapons to meet their basic needs, thereby supporting systems of violence. A high priority for peacebuilding, then, is to transform children's identities as warriors by aiding reintegration into civilian life that prizes peaceful values and behaviour.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role of social identity in children's recruitment and reintegration. Having considered briefly social identity processes, the first part of the chapter examines how in ideologically laden conflicts and also ones in which entire families and communities become militarised, social identity plays a powerful role in children's recruitment. In addition, children who had been recruited by force or other means frequently undergo an identity transformation as armed groups resocialise them to see themselves and to be seen by others as soldiers and warriors. Next, the chapter explores how children's identity as soldiers or former soldiers can impede their reintegration into civilian life. The third section analyses what has been learned about how to support the reintegration of former child soldiers, including steps to address the identity challenges described above. Because there is scant literature on social identity in regard to child soldiers, the analysis offered in this chapter draws extensively on the author's experience of working with former child soldiers in diverse countries, with particular emphasis on Sierra Leone and the peacebuilding dimensions of reintegration.

Social Identity and Child Recruitment

The connections between social identity and child recruitment likely vary significantly according to the context. In situations in which children themselves decide to join an armed group, particularly in identity conflicts, both social identity processes and a history of violence and oppression could lead children to become soldiers. In situations of forced recruitment, social identity processes may not lead children to take up the gun, yet the recruited children may nevertheless take on new social identities as soldiers. Thus, there are reciprocal relations between social identity and recruitment. To set the stage for the analysis of these relations, this section begins with an overview of social identity processes as they pertain to child soldiers.

Social Identity and Self-Categorisation

Social identity is that part of the self-concept that is derived from perceived membership in a group. Social identity is a product of social cognition. It is dynamic and changes according to one's situation and social influences. A boy who views himself as a civilian and a family member in one context may develop an identity as a soldier if the context changes. Further, children may construct multiple social identities that are negotiated according to their circumstances. For example, an Afghan boy who lives at home with his family but who sometimes joins his family in fighting against the Taliban might have multiple social identities as "son of X"; as part of his particular family or village; as a devout Muslim; and as a member of an armed

group. When his village is under attack, the soldier identity becomes most salient, whereas in times of peace, his family and Muslim identities may be most salient.

The importance of social identity processes is best seen through the combined lenses of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Riecher, & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory depicts people as cognitive agents who naturally form categories such as in-groups and out-groups based on considerations of similarity, social status, and perceived legitimacy. In-group members are favoured over out-group members, but this favouritism in itself does not lead to the extreme forms of discrimination, oppression, and violence that are evident in political conflict and violence. Although social identity does not directly cause violence (Cairns, 1996), it may contribute to armed conflict when one's in-group experiences real or perceived threats of attack. For example, a Tajik boy in northern Afghanistan who perceives the Taliban as a threat to his relatively non-politicised form of Islam and to his family and community may decide to fight the perceived invader. In such contexts, social identities may link with diabolical enemy images (Silverstein, 1989; White, 1984), moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), and motivation to engage in violence (White, 1984).

According to self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987), people categorise themselves at different levels of abstraction, from the singular "I" (personal identity) to the more inclusive "we" (social identity) and even the most inclusive level of "we humans". Without conscious intent, people accentuate the differences between categories and also the similarities within categories. When the social category is highly salient and accentuation processes are strong, people undergo a process of depersonalisation or self-stereotyping wherein they see themselves as somewhat interchangeable with other exemplars of their social category. Thus, a child who sees himself as an individual at one moment may at another see himself as a "soldier".

Among the determinants of self-categorisation are perceiver readiness, comparative fit, and normative fit. Of particular relevance to child soldiers is normative fit, defined as the extent to which the perceived behaviour or attributes of a person or group fit with the perceiver's social expectations, which in turn are based on social norms and world knowledge. For example, a civilian who sees a boy wearing a uniform and carrying a gun may automatically categorise the boy as a "soldier". Such normative fit may also lead the boy to categorise himself as a soldier.

With these complementary theories and the social identity approach (Stets & Burke, 2000) in mind, we now turn to how social identity both influences and is influenced by recruitment.

Identity Conflicts and Child Recruitment

The influence of social identity on children's recruitment is most conspicuous in identity conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013; Burton, 1993; Goy & Woehrle, 2000; Rothman, 1997), that is, conflicts that are fought along the cleavage lines of ethnic or other identity. Animated by existential fears, these conflicts frequently entail hardened

enemy images on both (or all) sides and stimulate views that violence is not only justified but necessary for the survival of one's identity group. Quite often, both sides create romantic images of heroic warriors who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the motherland or for purposes of liberation.

Developing political consciousness in such circumstances, children are socialised to identify with their own ethnic group, which is defined in part by its opposition to the demonic Other. Although such an identity does not directly cause violence, it becomes a stimulus for violence when it becomes integrated with powerful emotional wounds, survival fears, and experiences of victimisation. This integration frequently leads to moralistic thinking (the good "Us" and the evil "Them") and rationalises violence as a means of revenge or of survival and heroism.

The situation of many Palestinian children in the West Bank illustrates this dynamic.[1] Living in a situation of ongoing conflict with a much more powerful Israeli opponent that is viewed as an oppressor, Palestinian children typically develop a strong Palestinian identity that is defined in part by its opposition to Israelis. As Palestinian children grow up, they experience directly the hardships imposed by the Israeli military occupation. They see their lands being confiscated, experience or hear of violent attacks by settlers, suffer humiliations at checkpoints, and endure economic hardships associated with the occupation. Witnessing repeated Israeli attacks on Gaza and the denial of freedom to Palestinians in Gaza, they become convinced of the implacable hostility of the enemy. Frustrated by their oppression and an inability to obtain their goals, such as statehood through nonviolent means, many Palestinian teenagers engage in stone throwing and other acts of political violence against Israeli troops or civilians. Consequently, many Palestinian youth are detained and interrogated, and many are subjected to torture (UN, 2011).

In this context, the suffering and experiences of violence of Palestinian children become integrated into their social identity and serve as warrants for additional violence. As a result, many Palestinian children and youth decide to join the struggle for the armed liberation of Palestine, even if that includes the use of terrorism in a situation of asymmetric warfare. Indeed, Palestinian teenagers frequently view becoming jihadis and fighting against Israelis as part of their commitment to protecting their homeland and identity. Animated by a strong sense of identity and collective victimisation, Palestinian child soldiers find meaning in violence, which they regard as the only instrument at hand for achieving the liberation of their people (Garbarino, Kostelny, & Dubrow, 1991; Punamaki, 1996). These motives are evident in the words of a Palestinian teenager, Ayat al-Akhras, who in 2002 blew herself up outside an Israeli supermarket, killing two Israeli civilians. According to the videotaped message she left behind:

> I am the living martyr, filling the cry of the martyrs and orphans, the mothers who have buried their children, and those who are weak on earth. I tell the Arab leaders, don't shirk from your duty. Shame on the Arab armies who are sitting and watching the girls of

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[1]A reverse yet similar dynamic occurs on the side of Israeli children. Although this section examines how identity and victimisation lead to violence, it does not condone the violence.

Palestine fighting while they are asleep. I say this as a cry, a plea. Oh, al Aqsa Mosque, Oh, Palestine. It will be *intifida* until victory. (Hammer, 2004, p. 160)

Similar dynamics are visible in the recently ended war in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese dominated government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE). In this conflict, the predominantly Tamil people of the northeast experienced decades of discrimination and oppression. The LTTE aimed to liberate Tamils through fighting, which led the government to use spies, detainment, and torture as means of obtaining information that might yield military advantage. As politically conscious actors who wanted to liberate their people, youth frequently joined the armed struggle through their own decision. Also, the LTTE imposed at various points during the war a quota system (HRW, 2004) that required each household to give one of its members as a recruit, with children often being selected or selecting themselves in this process. Inside the LTTE, girls were trained as suicide bombers since they were seen as more likely than boys to slip through security checkpoints. Called the Liberation Birds, these girls pledged to take cyanide capsules that they wore around their necks in order to avoid giving away sensitive information in case they were captured by the enemy (Cragin & Daly, 2009). Both girls and boys who fought were hailed as heroes and fought with promises of eternal salvation should they die. If they were killed, their families were honoured and their daughters or sons hailed as heroes. The importance of identity and homeland resonate in the narratives of children in the LTTE:

> "This is the most supreme sacrifice I can make. The only way we can get our Eelam [homeland] is through arms. That is the only way anybody will listen to us. Even if we die." (Teenage boy; cited in Joshi, 2000)

The role of social identity in the recruitment of child soldiers is visible in many other conflicts as well. In Somalia, for example, children join al Shabaab in part as a means of achieving a positive identity in a politicised, extremist Muslim group that views violence as necessary and divinely justified. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and other countries, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) has proven to be highly adept at recruiting teenagers not only from the conflict zones but also from countries such as the UK and the USA. Although much remains to be learned about how ISIS recruits youth, the case of "Jihadi John" and others indicate the importance of computer media, direct social contact, discrimination in their current living circumstances, and extremist ideology that glorifies extremist, violent forms of Islam and that denigrates the West as morally corrupt and as oppressors of Muslims.

Effects of Child Recruitment on Social Identity

Social identity and victimisation are not the primary factors leading to children's recruitment. Many children are recruited by force without regard to their social identity (Brett & McCallin, 1996; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994; McKay & Mazurana, 2004; Wessells, 2002). They may be captured individually at gunpoint or

rounded up in groups from markets or schools. In addition, children frequently decide to join armed forces or groups due to a diversity of push and pull factors (Brett & Specht, 2004; Wessells, 2006) that have little to do with social identity. Push factors include living in violent families, extreme poverty, lack of food or other necessities, or lack of education and opportunities in civilian life. Pull factors often include access to money, power, belonging in a "surrogate family", and access to training that had not been available in civilian life.

Regardless how children have become part of armed forces or groups, their recruitment transforms their social identity. Once a child takes up a gun or wears a uniform, both civilians and members of armed forces or groups immediately categorise him or her as a soldier and regard the child with approbation or fear. In the Sierra Leone war, for example, local people feared child soldiers who had been recruited by the rebel group RUF (Revolutionary United Front). Since the RUF frequently attacked and looted villages, people's categorisation of children as part of the RUF led them to view the children with fear.

At the same time, children's recruitment produces shifts in self-categorisation. In the USA, which allows the recruitment of 17-year-olds, new child recruits frequently describe themselves by saying "I'm a soldier now" and acting in ways that are consistent with the normative expectations that go with the soldier's role. This likely begins a reciprocal process in which self-categorisation as a soldier enables role consistent behaviour that leads others to see the child as a soldier and to act in ways that strengthen the soldier identity.

The solider identity may be strengthened by the armed groups telling new recruits that they can never go home and must accept their fate as soldiers. In northern Uganda, the so-called Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) recruited tens of thousands of children (Annan, Blattman, & Horton, 2006) and told them that now they are soldiers and that government forces would kill them if they escaped. To deter escape attempts, the LRA regularly killed escapees by having other child soldiers surround the escapee and beat him with large sticks (HRW, 2003).

Armed groups also demand, encourage, and reward violent but obedient behaviour by child recruits as a means of resocialising them for combat and stamping out or dampening moral concerns about killing. Although not all child soldiers fight or carry weapons, commanders groom particular children for fighting and often use a mixture of intimidation, punishment, and reward to train children to become fighters. Children who cower in fear in their first firefight may be beaten or scolded, whereas those who exhibit bravery or effectiveness in combat may be promoted or given privileges. Over time, many children learn to be soldiers and even to fight and to kill, and this has powerful implications for their subsequent reintegration into civilian life.

Identity Challenges to Reintegration

Following armed conflict, a high priority is to create a secure environment, stand down opposing armies, and begin the arduous processes of building peace and a stable society. A frequently used instrument in this effort is a national programme

for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former soldiers (Bryden & Scherrer, 2012; Giustozzi, 2012). DDR is oriented toward demilitarising society and helping former soldiers to transition peacefully into civilian life. Most often, DDR programmes are connected with wider efforts at security sector reform that create a single, unified national army. DDR programmes first disarm former soldiers by having them turn in their weapons. Next, soldiers are demobilised, that is, officially transitioned out of the armed forces or groups and given papers indicating their civilian status. Third and most important, former soldiers are reintegrated into civilian life. As aids in this process, former soldiers typically receive benefits such as small amounts of cash, seeds and tools, clothing, and other small items. Whereas disarmament and demobilisation processes can occur rapidly, reintegration is an extended process that is measured in years.

DDR processes face a multitude of challenges such as chronic poverty, social divisions, and social inequities that help to make societies that ripe for ongoing violence (Collier et al., 2003). Different factions or subgroups may be uncontrolled and have little political will to disarm. Children, too, may be unwilling to put down the gun if they see fighting and violence as their best option for obtaining food and meeting basic needs. In most post-conflict zones, the profound scarcity of jobs and livelihoods are significant challenges to reintegration (Collier et al., 2003).

A related challenge is how to support the reintegration of girls, whose needs and situation may differ from that of boys (McKay & Mazurana, 2004; McKay, Veale, Worthen, & Wessells, 2011; Wessells, 2006). Because adults frequently dominate over children, UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund) and other actors typically guide a DDR process for children, whereas the government and actors such as UNDP (the United Nations Development Program) guide a separate DDR programme for adults.

No matter how the DDR process is structured, it will likely encounter challenges related to social identity. The importance of social identity issues is underscored in the Paris Principles (UNICEF, 2007), which guide the technical aspects of DDR for children. These Principles define reintegration as

> "the process through which children transition into civilian society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities in a context of local and national reconciliation." (p. 7).

As this definition indicates, reintegration is more than putting down the gun and returning to one's home. To reintegrate, former child soldiers need to transition and construct meaningful identities as civilians. The reintegration process is in part a process of identity transformation.

However, former child soldiers face significant challenges in remaking their identities as civilians. These challenges relate to how families and community members categorise the formerly recruited children soldiers and to how former child soldiers view themselves. Although these external and internal aspects of children's identity interact and influence each other, they are considered separately below for purposes of clarity.

Challenges Related to Others' Categorisations and Perceptions of Former Child Soldiers

Formerly recruited children's identity as soldiers frequently stirs fear, desire for revenge, and stigma, which individually or collectively blunt social acceptance and limit reintegration. The fear regarding former child soldiers may be real, perceived, or a mixture of the two. Perceiving their returning children as trained killers, families frequently fear that the former child soldiers will kill them in their sleep. Augmenting such categorisations is the unruly behaviour exhibited by former child soldiers—girls as well as boys. For example, returning former child soldiers in Sierra Leone frequently argued with their parents and engaged in disobedient behaviour such as fighting and drinking at night. Such behaviour sat poorly with parents, as respect for parents and obedience to parents comprise defining criteria for children's well-being in Sierra Leone (Stark, Wessells, King, Lamin, & Lilley, 2012).

Community members, too, categorise returning children as soldiers or as the "Other" and regard them with fear and contempt. In Sierra Leone, community people often recoiled at the sight of young people who walked through the community with a military swagger. Community people asked "How are we supposed to take these people back, after they attacked and killed community members and stole from us?" Also, community members frequently watched how the returning former soldiers related to their families, using this as an indicator of whether the children will likely integrate into civilian life. Visible struggles between the family and the former child soldier or the families' outright rejection of the former child soldier boosted community fears and impeded the children's acceptance and reintegration.

In Sierra Leone, former child soldiers' return to their communities sometimes evoked desires for retaliation. These desires were particularly strong when community people remembered particular horrendous deeds such as the child having killed members of the community during the war. In addition, people stereotyped the returning child as a "soldier", thereby awakening desire for revenge against those who had attacked the village while minimising the child-related aspects of their social categorisations. Desires for revenge also ran high when members of competing groups that had fought against each other during the war returned to the same village.

Perhaps the greatest single obstacle to children's reintegration is stigma (Bettancourt, Agnew-Blais, Gilman, Williams, & Ellis, 2010; McKay et al., 2011; Wessells, 2006). The categorisation of returning children as soldiers places them in a category of "Other" and invites name calling such as "rebel boy" or "rebel girl." In places such as northern Uganda, former boy soldiers have told me that they were having trouble fitting in with their communities and had dropped out of school because people called them "rebel boys" and taunted them. The stigma is particularly strong for girls, and it typically extends to children they had given birth to while in the armed forces or armed groups. In Angola, the stigma for girls was so strong that the girls who had been recruited kept it a secret for many years (Wessells, 2010).

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that categorisation as a child soldier invariably causes problems of stigma, fear, and retaliation. In so called liberation struggles, in which identity groups heroise their soldiers and in which families and community members fight side by side, former child soldiers may experience high levels of community acceptance. Unfortunately, the categorisation of child soldiers as heroes may help to maintain militarised identities and social norms among both the children and their families and communities. As this example illustrates, community acceptance is necessary for successful integration but it is not sufficient. As noted in the Paris Principles, there must also be wider processes of reconciliation or peacebuilding that help to transform militarised communities and societies toward peace.

Challenges Related to Children's Self-Perceptions and Categorisations

Former child soldiers often negotiate multiple identities. Even if they have learned to categorise themselves as soldiers, they may also retain, even in the background, their view of themselves as children and civilians and look for opportunities to escape (Wessells, 2006).

Nevertheless, many former child soldiers are ambivalent in regard to their civilian identity. Child soldiers who have learned to kill may doubt whether community people or the Government will ever accept them back into civilian life after what they have done. As a result, they may cling to their soldier identity. The ongoing salience of the soldier identity contributes to some children taking decisions to become mercenaries. For example, some of the former child soldiers from the war in Sierra Leone subsequently decided to join armed groups in the Liberian war. Also, significant numbers of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone chose not to go home following the war but instead sought anonymity in the buzzing capital city, Freetown.

Identity ambivalence is also evident among the majority of former child soldiers who have never killed anyone. Although many former soldiers want to live as the majority of young people do, they worry they will be unable to transition easily since they are most familiar with military life and still see themselves as soldiers. As said by a 20-year old from Sierra Leone who had spent many of his formative years with the RUF,

> "I know how to be a soldier and to fight. I can use weapons, train, and decide how to attack. I have thought of myself as a soldier for years… I haven't been in my village since I was a little boy. My parents saw me last as a child. I have no job and people look at me like maybe I am a troublemaker." (Wessells, 2006, p. 181)

The self-categorisation as a soldier and doubts about transitioning may be particularly strong among children who had spent many of their formative years inside armed groups (Boothby & Knudsen, 2000).

Children's self-categorisations may also be problematic when the DDR process or civilian life places children in a subservient role that is counter to the role and the identity that had been prevalent inside the armed group (Brett & Specht, 2004). In the war in Mozambique, the opposition group FRELIMO cultivated child identities as freedom fighters and narratives of social equality for women and men. After the war, young women who had integrated values of equality into their social identities found it difficult to adapt to civilian life, which required women to adopt more subservient identities and roles (McKay & Mazurana, 2004; West, 2004). Further, girls who had been commanders in conflicts in Sierra Leone and other countries have expressed pride in their ability to organise people, think strategically, and make life or death decisions. As a result, they feel frustrated and belittled by DDR programmes that expect them to become tailors. Similarly, boys who have been commanders may be reluctant to go to school with much younger children or to take orders from an ordinary teacher who has never seen combat (Wessells, 2006). Too often, DDR programmes have limited impact because they are conducted in cookie-cutter manner, do not bother to listen deeply to children, and do not draw on children's own insights regarding what they need in order to reintegrate.

Despite these challenges, most former child soldiers exhibit significant resilience and manage to reintegrate into their places of origin or into other self-selected environments (Wessells, 2006, 2009).

Enabling the Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers

The reintegration of former child soldiers is highly contextual and resists attempts to create a reintegration blueprint. When the formerly recruited children used to belong to groups that attacked the villages into which the children wish to reintegrate, there may be a need for community level peacebuilding. Such a need would be less prominent in other conflicts in which children stay at home at night but during the day serve as porters for armed groups fighting in a popular war. In the latter context, children will likely have weaker soldier identities and fewer challenges to community acceptance. Further, there may be significant gender differences in regard to reintegration, as formerly recruited girls may have different war experiences and needs that do formerly recruited boys (McKay & Mazurana, 2004; Wessells, 2006).

One universal is that reintegration is a social process that involves actors at the family, community, and societal levels. NGOs frequently organise reintegration supports at these different levels, with varied levels of success (Shepler, 2014). Some evidence indicates that formerly recruited children who reintegrate on their own, without formal assistance, do as well as children who have received formal reintegration supports (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007). Even when reintegration occurs without NGO involvement, though, multi-level supports are needed in order to enable children to redefine themselves as civilians and adapt to civilian life.

Family Level Supports

Most former child soldiers have been separated from their families, and they may not know the location of their families, who may have been displaced. Conversely, families often do not know where their formerly recruited children are. An essential first step, then, is to enable family tracing and reunification (Hepburn, 2006). In many contexts, photos of children are placed on kiosks or electronic media with requests for parents or relatives of the missing children to come forward and identify them. Providing logistical support such as transportation, reintegration supporters help to reunite the children with their parents, or, if they cannot be found, members of the children's extended family. Parents or other caregivers are briefed on the reintegration process and the role of family support within it.

Family reunification, however, is not sufficient in enabling the shift in categorisation from soldiers to civilian family members. As discussed above, the returning children need to have good family relations and to avoid problematic behaviour such as fighting with or disobeying their parents. Accordingly, it is useful for reintegration workers to make follow-up visits to families to help them manage any conflicts that have arisen and to advise them on how to move forward.

The importance of family relations and also of economic supports is visible in regard to the reintegration of girls who had become mothers during their time in the armed group. These girls may see their primary identity as that of mother. Other people may begin categorising such girls as civilians and mothers rather than soldiers if they see the girls acting as proper mothers who feed and protect their children, teach them good behaviour, and support non-militaristic values. Participatory action research conducted with such mothers in three countries found that the ability to earn a living was crucial to the girls' fulfilment of their roles and identities as mothers and civilians (McKay et al., 2011). With this in mind, the girl mothers decided in groups how to earn money and learned basic business skills such as selling and keeping books. Working individually or in groups, they earned money through activities such as petty business, collective farming, or animal husbandry. As they used their earnings to buy food and medicines for their families, and as they sent their children to school, they came to be seen by community members as good mothers and valued civilians rather than as soldiers or a "lost generation".

Community Level Supports

At the community level, an important initial step is to break or weaken the stereotypes of former child soldiers as perpetrators who had harmed the community. In Sierra Leone, where the armed groups had inflicted extensive suffering on local communities, people had little empathy with the recruited children. Through dialogues with people working on reintegration, community people learned how many children had been recruited at gunpoint, and some had been forced to kill members

of their own families and communities as a means of breaking communal ties. This empathy helped them to see the children less as hardened soldiers than as young people who had suffered and been exploited by adults. As a result, communities created new narratives about the children, often using proverbs, songs, and other cultural media that repositioned the returning children as "our children" and enabled greater acceptance of them.

A fundamental support for children's reintegration is education. Former child soldiers frequently grieve their loss of their education and say they want more than anything to be like other children and go to school (Wessells, 2006). In Sierra Leone, children's well-being is frequently defined in terms of attending school and "being serious" as a student (Stark et al., 2012). Being in school helps community people and peers to see returning former child soldiers as children and as civilians. However, former child soldiers will most likely benefit from participating in education if they receive accelerated or catch-up education together with other, similar children and if steps are taken to reduce negative stereotypes and the tendency of other children to call them "rebel boys" or "rebel girls".

Former child soldiers may also need psychosocial support that promotes holistic well-being. Through play, group discussions, and social integration with other children who had not been recruited, former child soldiers regain a sense of being civilians and become seen as being like other civilian children. Psychosocial support may also include cultural practices that help to promote a sense of cultural identity and of being acceptable to other members of one's cultural group. In Angola, for example, former child soldiers often viewed themselves as haunted by angry, all powerful spirits of the people they had killed. Both they and members of their communities viewed this as a communal affliction, since the spirits could cause illness or death in other people. As a result, local people feared and avoided former child soldiers, who were seen as being spiritually contaminated. To address this situation, traditional healers conducted communal cleansing rituals that involved washing out a child's spiritual impurities, making offerings to the angry spirits, and announcing that the child was no longer a soldier and could do everything with other members of the community (Wessells & Monteiro, 2004). These rituals produced immediate relief among the former child soldiers and increased sharply their level of community acceptance. Most important, the rituals reinforced the children's identity as civilians.

Community reintegration supports may also require steps toward reconciliation. In northern Sierra Leone following the war, for example, former child and youth members from different armed groups that had fought each other were returning to their villages. Village people feared them and also worried that fighting would occur between the former members of the different groups. To address this situation, ChildFund Sierra Leone used a method of superordinate goals (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) coupled with a restorative justice approach (Wessells & Jonah, 2006). First, communities identified a project that would help their war-affected children. Whereas some communities decided to rebuild a damaged school, others elected to build a health post, or to repair a bridge that enabled commerce with other areas. The construction was done cooperatively by cross-cutting work

teams that included members of the former rival groups. The members of the different groups had been selected as open to this approach, and they had been mentored about what was expected of them and how to manage conflict in a constructive manner.

As the teams did the construction work and earned money, village people began to see them not as soldiers but as civilians who were giving something back to the communities, thereby promoting restorative justice. Restorative justice is highly useful in enabling reintegration of former child soldiers who are seen as having done bad things and as being accountable to communities (Drumbl, 2012; Wessells, 2006). The project succeeded in improving relations between the members of the different armed groups and also between former child soldiers and community members, and it helped to position the former child soldiers as civilians. This example highlights the links between reintegration and peacebuilding, and it also serves as a reminder that former child soldiers are not hapless victims but active agents in reintegration.

Societal Level Supports

To succeed, reintegration work at family and community levels must be backed by constructive reintegration supports at the societal level. Economic reforms are frequently needed in order to ensure the long-term viability of markets and the effectiveness of livelihood supports for former child soldiers. Also, legal and economic reforms are frequently needed in order to end or reduce the inequities and structural violence that enables armed conflict and ongoing child recruitment. Similarly, there may also be a need for changing policies that privilege particular groups over others. Further, the reintegration of formerly recruited girls will likely be incomplete unless they include steps to correct gender injustice and discrimination against girls and women. Particularly following long-term conflicts, ongoing efforts to demilitarise society and to promote peaceful attitudes, values, behaviour, and social norms are a high priority. If the society is divided along ethnic, religious, or other identity lines, high priorities include promoting equally the well-being of all groups, encouraging respect for difference, and enabling higher-level social identities such as "We are all citizens of country X" or "We are all human beings who have equal rights under the law".

Conclusion

As important as reintegration is, it is primarily a responsive approach that seeks to address problems facing children who have already been recruited. A critical question that warrants concerted attention is whether it makes sense to allow children to be recruited and then try to pick up the pieces afterwards? A more sensible approach

is to focus equally on prevention. At present, one of the greatest barriers to prevention is that many states, including the USA and the UK, continue to recruit children (17 year olds), even though they cannot participate in hostilities until they have legally become adults at 18 years of age. In addition, many countries have international policies that inadvertently contribute to children's recruitment. For example, the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq stirred images in countries such as Afghanistan that the USA seeks to dominate Muslim people, thereby leading young Muslims to become jihadis who fought against the USA. This pattern resonates with the current international recruiting effectiveness of ISIS, which calls young Muslims from different countries into the struggle against Western values and for a particular, if extremist, form of Islam. As this example illustrates, work on prevention must include a critical examination of the foreign policies of all countries and at the social inequities that lead divergent social identities to become potential sources of violence.

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Chapter 8
Symbolic Reminders of Identity

Rebekah A. Phillips DeZalia and Scott L. Moeschberger

When social identities are being used to promote either violence or reconciliation between conflicting groups, semiotics play an integral, if often implicit, role in the promotion of those identities. The symbols within a society help to connect individuals to the previous generations, promote valued cultural narratives, and provide a perceptual filter through which societies view the world (Phillips DeZalia & Moeschberger, 2014). One way to understand the symbolic reminders of identity is through the lens of the dialogical self and social representations. Instead of seeing social identities as static entities in which we place ourselves and individuals, Dialogical Self Theory (DST) views them as continually shifting in their importance and connection with each other as they negotiate their position within the self (Hermans, 2001b). Social Representation Theory (SRT, Moscovici, 1988) adds another integral element by analysing the ways in which communities affect and are affected by the changing beliefs—the social representations—embedded in society. Social representations are created, adapted, or eliminated in our environment to emphasise, modify, or devalue certain social identities that the individuals use to initiate and perpetuate a conflict or encourage peace.

These symbolic reminders of our identity can be promoted through political and social movements as well as through historical narratives of previous struggles and victories passed through the generations. By emphasising certain aspects of our identities, leaders can encourage political engagement and solidarity with those who they perceive as part of our in-group along with bias and aggression against the

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out-group. Although these semiotic reminders are often subtle, they are emotionally salient and can significantly impact the trajectory of a conflict.

This chapter will be divided into three parts. We will describe the basic components of DST and SRT, explain how they connect with SIT, and finally give a real-world example of the semiotics of SIT in peace and conflict works by exploring Northern Ireland and South Africa. Although many researchers connected with the world of SIT and peace psychology have discussed concepts that can easily be connected to DST and SRT (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Kelman, 2001; Staub, 2001), these theoretical frameworks are rarely used and not commonly understood in the peace and conflict world. It is necessary to understand the terminology and concepts of these theories to grasp their influence in conflict and reconciliation.

Dialogical Self Theory

Hermans' (2001a, 2001b) based his theory on the dialogical self on the work of Bakhtin (1993) and James (1890) and on the belief that the self is not a singular, static entity. As Valsiner describes, "the dialogical self is a theoretical entity (self) which is organised (exists) through a process of dialogical relations between its sub-parts" (2007, p. 149). When one is thinking of the self and relating to others, one is guided by the dialogue of the various aspects of the self, known as *I-positions*. These I-positions have a hierarchical relationship, with each having varying degrees of salience and importance at different times. For example, while one is at work, the I-position of "employee" could be most salient. At home, the I-position of spouse, parent, or child can take precedence. When something significant happens in society, one's view of self as a member of the society can reach the top of the hierarchy. On September 11, 2001, many found their identity as an "American" more salient and a catalyst for guiding behaviour than it was on September 10 of that year.

At any given time, multiple I-positions are in dialogue within the individual or between individuals. The intrapersonal process is known as autodialogue, in what Valsiner defines as the "multivoicedness of the self" (2002, p. 256). More than one I-position can be active at a time and interacts with the other I-positions to change the hierarchy as well as potentially create new I-positions. This dialogue can also occur between individuals, in what is defined as heterodialogue. "When Bakhtin refers to 'multivoicedness', he not only has in mind the simultaneous existence of different individual voices, but also the simultaneous existence of an individual voice and the voice of a group" (Hermans, 2001b, p. 262). Although this theory focuses on one's view of oneself, it is necessarily a social process.

The social element of this is guided by culture, through the use of semiotic mediation. Signs are created and used by social institutions within the culture to guide individuals towards approved I-positions and to silence those that are unwanted (Valsiner, 2002, 2007). These signs do not simply encourage I-positions in the moment but "make the distinction between the immediate next *possibilities, impossibilities,* and *potential possibilities* of our feeling and thinking, facing the future"

(Valsiner, 2003, p. 55). When signs guide us to a particular future and its related I-positions, they are called *promoter signs*. These can be things such as songs, uniforms, pledges, ceremonies, remembrances, individuals, and historical narratives and can be both implicit and explicit.

An example of a social institution using a promoter sign to guide individuals to a particular I-position and its related *possible* future was the Lee-Jackson-King holiday that was celebrated in Virginia until 2000. Martin Luther King Jr. day is a federal holiday. However, the day for Robert E Lee and Stonewall Jackson is only celebrated at the state level, specifically in a few southern states. Virginia combined its remembrance of Lee, King, and Jackson into one day. Celebrating the memory of the leader of the civil rights movement at the same time as one promotes the memory of the leaders of the confederacy—that is forever linked with the slavery— promoted the I-positions of Rebel, Southerner (as opposed to Yankee), and resister of civil rights. It discouraged people, especially children learning about the civil war and civil rights in school, from the idea that their ancestors had been on the wrong side of history or that the role of Virginia in these events was something to regret. Using the confederate flag as a sign of "southern pride" and deemphasising its racial connotations (Moeschberger, 2014) would be a similar process.

Social Representation Theory

Social Representation Theory is related to the dialogical self in that it helps to explain the way that social institutions use symbols to promote specific ideas within a society. Moscovici defines social representations as "a specific way of understanding, and communicating what we know already" (2001, p. 31). Social representations have: "a collective nature; an ability to anchor novel events to those previously experienced; a hierarchical structure that entails a core basis with peripheral components; and a semiotic element" (Phillips DeZalia, 2011, p. 1050; Wagner, 1994). Social representations guide individuals within a society towards specific beliefs and identifications. They can be seen as a form of promoter signs, albeit ones that require a social element (Markova, 2003, 2006). At their core, social representations are meant to guide individuals towards particular realities and connect them with their communities. They establish thoughts that come to be the basis of the community belief system, automatic assumptions to which the members can return when confused.

Every social representation has at least one core thema that is essential to its existence as well as several peripheral themata that help to connect the core to the social world. These themata are based on antinomies—oppositional dyads—e.g. love–hate, justice–injustice. These antinomies are implicitly passed down through generations and remain on the periphery until events make them more salient to the community (Markova, 2003). It is at that time that they may become their own themata and lead to the creation of relevant social representations. For example, in Rwanda, many people had heard of clans and knew the one to which they belonged.

However, they were not very relevant to everyday life until the government decided to promote the historical narrative of clans to emphasise the unity (over the division) of its people (Phillips DeZalia, 2014). Now school children are explicitly taught about clans and it seems like a rather common sense idea, or fact, within the society.

Social representations are created by promoting the related themata and *anchoring* them to firmly established social representations. Through *objectifying*, the social representations solidify their salient position within the society. "Social representations theory highlights the dynamic and reactive nature of representation that develops, supports, or challenges different positions and associations in different contexts" (Howarth, 2007, p. 135). An example of anchoring and objectifying would be when George W. Bush referenced the crusades when discussing America fighting in the Middle East. By anchoring the new idea of the need for this conflict to the established narrative of the crusades, it made the actions more salient. Now, through objectifying, many Americans would relate the conflict in the Middle East to a struggle between Christianity and Islam, and referencing this *common sense* representation more easily gets Americans to accept what is happening as necessary.

Just as themata can reside at the core or periphery of a social representation, the social representations themselves can abide in different areas of society. Some are belief based, being implicitly passed down through collective memory and traditions. Others are explicitly taught and considered more knowledge based (Markova, 2003). Regardless of the format, social representations guide community thinking and actions, and, as previously mentioned, can promote specific I-positions or view of the self within the society.

Social Identity Theory

There are significant links between DST, SRT, and SIT. Figure 8.1 shows some of the connections between the three concepts.

Many of the concepts commonly discussed in SIT have direct links to some of the terms we have just defined. Although I-positions do not have to be social in nature, many are and would thus be considered social identities. The salient factors we use to categorise individuals can easily be symbolic in nature and fall into the category of promoter signs. In addition, the inherent oppositional nature of in-groups and out-groups—an essential component of SIT, especially as it relates to peace and conflict issues—is directly linked to the notion of antimonies. You cannot know who you are and what you believe without also knowing who you aren't and what you disavow. Now, we will break these links down into more detail.

We'll start with a discussion of the link between social identities and social representations. As Howarth (2007) states:

> Social representations and social identities must be seen as two sides of the same coin. In positioning ourselves in relation to others—that is, in asserting, performing, or *doing* identity—we reveal our perspective on the world and our ways of seeing and constructing

Fig. 8.1 Relationship between SIT, SRT, and DST

> the world, or our social representation. And just as identities tie us to particular communi-
> ties of others and simultaneously highlight what is individual and unique about us, repre-
> sentations carry traces of our collective histories and common practices while revealing the
> possibilities of resistance and agency. (p. 133)

It is through social representations that social institutions direct us to the pro-
moted social identities. Individuals are taught the social identities for their commu-
nities via belief-based as well as knowledge-based representations. Whether it is
historical or folk narratives, educational curricula, songs, remembrances, or uni-
forms, individuals are guided towards particular social representations and their
related identities. Liu and Laszio (2007, p. 97) describe it as a revision of the "col-
lective memory and the social representation of history […] These representation
appear as narratives and work as folk histories in accordance with the identity needs
of the groups". These are not stable, rigid representations but malleable ones based
on the current situation.

Through the processes of anchoring and objectifying, social representations are
revived, revised, or created to promote the necessary identities for the group.
Anchoring, connecting new phenomena to established representations, allows new
and foreign concepts to be better understood and embraced. One can think of
anchoring as a form of social categorisation. Howarth (2007) states that SRT is
"primarily about the social, psychological, historical, and ideological dynamics of
the production and *reproduction of knowledge*—particularly knowledge that relates
to the social categorisation, differentiation, and identification of social groups and
communities" (p. 134, italicises added). When we first meet individuals, we want to
understand them in terms of who and what we already know. We are not comfortable
with ambiguity nor novelty. Just as we anchor new ideas to established ones, we
also categorise individuals based on groups we have previously formed in our
minds.

These new phenomena/groups can become their own recognised categories and can be used independently through objectifying. For example, when Israel was being created in the post-World War II world, well-known historical narratives of the Israelites finding their promised land after the exodus were used to anchor the idea of this new nation. In addition, similar narratives and related social identities were used to unify people who may have had differing identities—e.g. Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews—into a new superordinate identity of Israeli. Now, over 70 years later, this identity is self-sustaining via the process of objectifying. However, one component of keeping this identity and the related representations alive is to silence those that differ. Liu and László explain it as "social representations of history structure the 'objective' situation through a process of selective interpretation, biased attribution, restricted assessment of legitimacy and agency, and by privileging certain historically warranted social categories and category systems above other alternatives" (2007, p. 87). The representations connected to the privileged and desired social categories and identities are promoted whereas those that differ from this preferred narrative are eliminated or ignored.

Another connection between SIT and SRT can be seen in the "oppositional dyads" that are inherent in both theoretical perspectives. In SIT, they are called in-groups and out-groups. In SRT, they are called antinomies. For both theories, you cannot understand who you are and what you believe without also understanding who you aren't and what you must avoid. For all of the good characteristics of our in-group, there must necessarily be the opposite negative characteristics of our out-groups. And at given times, different elements become more salient. Whatever identities—or themata—are most critical for a society in a given moment are the ones that will be promoted by the leaders of that society.

In some ways, social identities and the dialogical self have a more obvious link. Hermans' (1996) concept of I-positions and their hierarchical yet flexible nature can easily be described as various social identities that adapt based on society and the current situation. For example, on July 4, one's identity as an American may feel more salient than it does on the third or fifth because patriotism is promoted on that day. One's I-positions can be seen as a collection of all the personal and social (or collective) identities within an individual's self-concept. And the way in which these I-positions/identities interact can vary. Valsiner states that, "[t]he relationship between diverging I-positions at the same level of depth of semiotic mediation can take multiple forms. Some of these forms maintain the multivoicedness of the self" (2002, p. 256). At any given moment, more than one I-position can be interacting and negotiating their positions within the individual's self-concept. One's identity with regard to family, community, work, etc. are constantly in dialogue and working or conflicting with each other. A part of this dialogue also includes "communication between collective voices" (Hermans, 2001a, p. 56). When this dialogue includes individuals outside of the self, they may be called external I-positions (Hermans, 2012), or the previously mentioned heterodialogue (Valsiner, 2002). These include coworkers, family members, friends, and neighbours who help guide our view of self. They can promote certain social identities or encourage their silencing.

Additionally, the dialogical self is related to Gaertner and Dovido's belief that "whether a person's personal or collective identity is more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others" (2000, p. 37). At various times, different I-positions (identities) take precedence and this can be guided by one's experiences and interactions with others. As Coakley states, "Different combinations [of I-positions] achieve dominance in the imagination at different times and in response to different situations" (2014, p. 54). Whether we categorise someone as part of our in-group or as a member of an out-group is affected by which identity is the *loudest* in the dialogical self. These can also be intentionally shaped to ensure the salience of specific identities. For example, Kelman (2001) explains that "although national identities are generally constructed out of real experiences, these experiences can be ordered in different ways, resulting in different boundaries and priorities" (p. 195). This ordering is done by either social institutions or the individual and social representations can play an integral part in this process by encouraging ideals or historical narratives that promote specific identifications. It is through semiotic mediation, the use of symbols to guide thinking and identification, that this process takes place.

This encouragement can be facilitated by the use of promoter signs, symbols that make certain I-positions more salient. As previously mentioned, these promoter signs, symbols that guide us to potential futures and their related identities, can be things such as uniforms that mark you as a member of a group or than can be individuals who are endorsed by society as people one must emulate. When they are the latter, they are also external I-positions (Hermans, 2012). Promoting Martin Luther King Jr. as a hero of the Civil Rights Movement would be an example of this and is meant to guide individuals towards a superordinate social identity. The use of Dr. King as a promoter sign is not reserved for the United States. Societies around the world can use his work and the meaning behind it to guide their members towards specific beliefs and actions.

Peace and Conflict

This leads us to connection to the peace and conflict element of this chapter. The fact that "Much of the violence in the world today appears to be caused by heightened social identities, by groups that define themselves as 'us versus them'" (White, 2001, p. 154) has been well researched. However, when looking at peace and conflict within a society, it is also imperative that one also looks at the symbols that are used in this process (Phillips DeZalia & Moeschberger, 2014) and how they promote certain social identities while silencing others.

One link between semiotics, identities, and peace and conflict is what Staub calls "group self-concepts, or the socially shared way members perceive and experience their group" (2001, p. 164). One could see this group self-concept as a version of the multiple I-positions within the dialogical self. It can be both positive and negative, unlike the social comparison common in social identity research and is influenced

by the ideologies within the society. Staub (2001) defines ideologies as "blueprints for the organisation of societies and relations among individuals" (p. 165). Another way to describe ideologies would be to say that they are social representations based on themata that are important for the current needs of society.

If a society's leaders want to promote a conflict, they must maintain an "us versus them" way of thinking. Historical narratives that remind people of the conflict must be supported and the social representations as well as the perceptual filters through which people view the other group (Phillips DeZalia & Moeschberger, 2014) must guide individuals towards the division and the need for continued conflict. Many of these social representations would fall into the belief-based category. They are not based on facts or research but more on collective memory and a common sense feeling that this is the way it has always been and always will be.

Whether it is landmarks, holidays, songs, stories, or uniforms, societies must find a way to "promote the cause of their collective struggle" (Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou, & Vrachimis, 2014, p. 62). The conflict becomes the most salient part of the group identity and leads to a cycle of continued violence. As Staub (2001) describes:

> In the course of this past history, not only the view of the other but the identity of each group [in the conflict] as well has come to be defined around this enmity: the other is my enemy, and I am the enemy of the other. In short, group self-concept comes to center on violent conflict with the other group. (p. 170)

As the social representations connected to this struggle become stronger, new experiences are understood by being anchored to these established representations. Every experience is viewed through this lens. It helps guide individuals to the *next possibilities* for future interactions with the out-group as well as *impossibilities* and *potential possibilities*. Any interaction with others will be initiated and analysed through the related social representations.

Although social representations can be used to continue a conflict, they may also be used to encourage reconciliation. For example, in Rwanda, the government overtly changed the historical narratives—and the related social representations—to encourage a superordinate in-group identity that promoted reconciliation (Phillips DeZalia, 2014). Social identities, like social representations, must also change if reconciliation is going to occur after conflict. As Kelman (2001) states:

> The stubborn resistance to change in collective identities is widely recognized and taken for granted. Yet identities have to change, or at least tacitly, if protracted identity conflicts are to be settled and, certainly, if they are to be resolved in a way that transforms the relationship and opens the way to reconciliation. (p. 194)

New narratives, and their related social identities, are anchored to previously established ideas and stories until they could stand on their own and, in time, potentially silence their predecessors. One's social identity cannot be drastically changed in a moment, but it can be gradually revised as different themata become more salient.

Although it is clear that creating a subordinate identity is an effective way to connect individuals who were previously in differing in-groups, there is debate on the need to silence the conflicting subordinate identities in order for reconciliation to be successful. The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM; Gaertner, Dovidio,

& Bachman, 1996) focuses on the importance of a superordinate identity in the promotion of peace. By recategorising individuals into one inclusive social identity, they can focus on their similarities rather than previous conflicts. In contrast, the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002) emphasises the need to maintain individual subordinate identities within the superordinate one. By allowing individuals to maintain a connection to their previous in-groups, they are less likely to reject the new superordinate one. MIDM can be seen as a variation of the dialogical self. One's self-concept involves a multitude of I-positions. It is not necessary to eliminate all but one. Although a group attempting reconciliation may work to have the superordinate identity become the most salient, it is possible for multiple in-group identities to coexist and dialogue with each other.

When using either the MIDM or the CIIM approach to facilitate reconciliation, individuals within a society must recategorise both themselves and others. This recategorisation is facilitated through the promotion of established as well as novel social representations. Whether it is songs, ceremonies, narratives, or landmarks, individuals are guided by those in control of society to use specific social identities. The representations used in this process can be explicit—e.g. through the creation of holidays—but they can also be implicit. This implicit process could be the silencing of former social identities and the elimination of their discussion in a public form. As Phillips DeZalia (2014) describes, the Rwandan government has eliminated the discussion of the traditional view of the Tutsi and Hutu social identities, although they may still continue in a more private, modified form. In order to encourage identification with the superordinate category of Rwandan, the government uses social representations and promoter signs—such as songs, educational curricula, statues, and holidays—to guide individuals to the desired labels.

Northern Ireland and South Africa

Two countries that offer great examples of the semiotics used to promote social identities to encourage either peace or conflict are Northern Ireland and South Africa. We will look at each individually. In Northern Ireland, tensions between Protestant/Unionist or Loyalist and Catholic/Nationalist or Republican communities tend to run high during the "marching season". The most contentious parades of the season happen every year on July 12, when parades are held to commemorate the victory of the Protestant William of Orange over the Catholic King James II in the Battle of the Boyne (See Ferguson and McKeown, this volume for more detail on the Northern Irish conflict). This is an example of using historical incidents to anchor and promote the Protestant identity in Northern Ireland. Via the process of objectifying; the related social identity of Orangemen has been created—orange being the colour of Protestants, linked to William of Orange. Social institutions have been created to promote the endorsed identities. For example, some in Northern Ireland belong to the Orange Order, a fraternal social affiliation connected to the Protestant social identity.

Anchoring one's identity to the view of Protestants in history and objectifying the related modern social representations helps to keep the I-Position of Protestant as the most salient one within the dialogical self. One way this is done is by supporting the themata of pride about historical accomplishments related to historical Protestant leadership figures. For example, the July 12 parades often feature signs celebrating Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation. This anchors the social identity of a Northern Irish Protestant to a common reference point of Protestants worldwide. This approach also uses the specific battle being commemorated (the Battle of the Boyne) to connect (anchor) the broader stance of conflict with the Catholic community, causing this historical event to function as a symbol, or promoter sign, of the tensions between these two communities. In the Protestant narrative, William of Orange is victorious, and the parades are a celebratory national event that families attend annually. As stated in SIT, one will find ways to view one's in-group in a favourable light. The symbols within the society will encourage this bias. The same event may be given different symbolic importance to switch the meaning for the out-group. In the Catholic narrative, these commemorations are viewed as "triumphalism" and contribute to an ongoing sectarian stance in the country.

It is important to note that the contentious issues are not primarily religious in nature, but stem from conflicting aspirations about Northern Ireland's relationship with the UK. Since most British descendants were from a Protestant minority on an island with an indigenous Catholic population, the issues became comingled with religion, sometime intentionally and other times by association. Unionists/Loyalists uphold loyalty and allegiance to the British crown, in contrast to the Irish Nationalist/Republican desires for a separate and united island of Ireland. These social identities at the extreme identify as Loyalist and Republican, alongside the religious affiliation that describes most in those communities. In this case, religion is actually used symbolically as a promoter sign for each community. It becomes a tool in the narrative of each community rather than the tensions actually being theological in nature. When individuals speak of their Protestant and Catholic identities, it is an implicit way to guide people towards the related social representation of Loyalist versus Republican. Because of this, you will have those who will tell you that they are an atheist in one breath; but also a Protestant, or a Catholic in another. Because of the actual meaning of the identities, this is not a conflict at all.

These identities and their related symbols can be better understood by incorporating our previous figure of the links between SIT, SRT, and DST as seen in Fig. 8.2

The antinomies of Loyalist vs. Republican and Protestant vs. Catholic are also examples of opposing in-groups and out-groups. These can also be considered social identities (or I-positions) and are linked to related identities such as Orangeman or Northern Irish. Many social representations or symbols act as promoter signs guiding individuals towards the encouraged identities that will promote violence or reconciliation. These include iconic heroes such as Martin Luther and William of Orange. They also consist of the parades on July 12, the banners (often with images of the 95 Theses and the related heroes), and references to the Crown.

Fig. 8.2 Northern Ireland Symbols related to SIT, SRT, and DST

An attempt to negotiate a more unified social identity as "Northern Irish" might reference St. Patrick, who is viewed by the Orange Order as Protestant, and viewed as Catholic by others, but who is celebrated by all at some level. In the political scene, there are smaller political parties, like the Alliance Party, that have tried to take a non-sectarian stance. To the extent that a traditionally Nationalist party, like the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) focuses on working conditions, healthcare, and education, rather than the traditional lines of divide (which focus on the goal of either unity with the Republic of Ireland or loyalty to the current position in the UK), there is more opportunity to have meaningful political exchange. Efforts to focus on "normal" political issues for the working class can promote social representations connected to a superordinate identity to bring that one to a more salient position within the self.

One place that exhibits some success in renegotiating social representations is in post-conflict South Africa (see also Meyer, Durrheim & Foster, this volume). While (understandably) a long way from a truly unified national identity, Mandala made strategic efforts to move from a focus on racial identity, to foster a superordinate identity of "South African" that is inclusive and moves beyond apartheid. He attempted this by shifting the national focus to a rugby team. Although this was a sport that may have at one time been more prominent in one community, all South Africans could understand the social representation of supporting one's team against the opponent. During the critical years of transition out of apartheid, Mandala threw his support behind a common national team that encouraged the entire country to focus on cheering on victories on the rugby pitch versus other nations rather than warring with each other. By encouraging the I-position of "supporter of the national team," Mandela helped to make the related I-position of South African more salient.

In striving for this direction, he also created a national flag and a national anthem to attempt to generate national unity and used semiotics proactively to create space for a broader identity that superseded the conflicts between Afrikaaner and Black/coloured identities. While there is certainly a long way to go, these are strategic choices by a leader that demonstrate an awareness of the need to renegotiate social representations in ways that move towards peace.

Conclusion

Both Northern Ireland and South Africa show the use of symbols to promote desired social identities. For Northern Ireland, many use these symbols to promote further division. When one uses the identity of "Protestant", it is not just a religious identity but a political one as well. If someone flies the Orange Standard outside his house or plants orange lilies in his garden, it is more than just a colour. It is a semiotic link to the social identity that is most salient within himself. For South Africa, Mandela's cheering for the national rugby team was not simply a sign of his interest in the sport. It was a way to connect all South Africans under a common identity of sports fan. This was a more subtle, implicit way to link previously warring groups.

While there has been significant research conducted on the importance of social identities in peace and conflict, the semiotics utilised in this process are often ignored. Something as subtle as a story, a song, a flag, flowers, a word choice, or a uniform can be a strong indicator of specific identities even if individuals outside of the community may be oblivious to their significance. These symbols play an integral part in the changing salience of the multiple identities contained within the self and their dialogue with each other. In order to not only end a conflict but promote lasting reconciliation, it is essential to examine—and potentially modify, create, or eliminate—the symbols present within that society.

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Chapter 9
Identity and Psychological Health

Orla T. Muldoon, Robert D. Lowe, and Katharina Schmid

Groups are central to the business of war and political violence. An analysis of the children who are most likely to experience war is instructive. Many of those most severely affected by war and political violence are resident in the poorest regions of the world. In the year 2000, 300,000 people died as a direct result of conflicts (WHO, 2002). Worldwide, the rate of mortality associated with political violence varied from 1 per 100,000 population in high-income countries to 6.2 per 100,000 population in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2002). Further, the highest rates of fatalities due to war were in African countries, with approximately 32 fatalities per 100,000 of the population (WHO, 2002). Besides the many thousands who are killed each year, huge numbers are injured, including some who are permanently disabled. Others are raped or tortured, or suffer disease and famine. Again, available evidence suggests that those at highest risk of these experiences are those living in the least affluent nations (Cairns, 1996; WHO, 2002).

At the most fundamental level then, exposure to political violence and war is related to the affluence of the nation to which you belong. Not only then does your national group membership shape the experiences you have, but the relative affluence of your nation is central to the likelihood of being exposed to war. And your experiences during wartime will be shaped, sometimes very profoundly, by your

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gender group. For example, sex crimes during times of war. have been widely reported, and those victimised are disproportionately female, again a group-level variable (Swiss & Giller, 1993). The use of rape as a weapon during war often has long-term consequences for girls and women as a consequence of the trauma experienced but also because of their subordinate group and/or associated religious group memberships (Kellezi, Reicher, & Cassidy, 2009). On the other hand, the business of war and political violence has been constructed as a masculine pursuit (McWilliams, 1997), placing young men at particular risk of being represented within fatalities and casualties of war (Cairns, 1996).

Equally, war experiences themselves are not evenly distributed within a nation or population affected by the same conflict (Barber, 2009; Cairns, 1996). Take for example, Northern Ireland, which is a relatively affluent area globally (though one of the most disadvantaged in the UK and EU) but where there is considerable evidence that violent experiences have been, and continue to be, distributed unevenly across the population. Young people from deprived backgrounds in Northern Ireland generally report greater experience of political violence than their middle class counterparts, males more experience than females, and ethnic minority group members (Catholics) more than those from the majority group (Protestants) (Muldoon & Trew, 2000; Smyth, 1998). Comparable differences associated with affluence, gender and minority and majority group status have been reported in other regions affected by conflict (Bryce, Walker, Ghorayeb, & Kanj, 1989; Simpson, 1993; Slone, Kaminer, & Durrheim, 2000; Slone & Shechner, 2009).

Any analysis of the impact of political violence, then, needs to acknowledge the role of social structures, group divisions and power. Sociologists and social psychologists have grappled with this issue in relation to both intergroup relations and political violence. For example, both critical analysts and social dominance theorists have gained insights into victimisation by violence and oppression by dominant groups against subordinate groups (Jochnick & Normand, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Scholars both within and outside psychology, addressing the legacies of colonisation, have considered how subordinate group members can be seen as both victims and perpetrators of violence as a consequence of their social position (Bulhan, 1985). Such findings have resulted in the foregrounding of structural divisions in sociological explanations of war and political violence (Bobo, 1999; Mills, 2000). To date, psychologists have been slower to use these group-level factors to enhance our understanding of how children negotiate and adapt to challenging circumstances of war and political violence.

Groups, Identity and Health Risks

The relationship between exposure to political violence and subsequent psychological distress is also complicated by group membership. Equivalent experiences are not appraised in the same way by all who experience them and these differences in subjective appraisal of violent events are often linked to group memberships and identity

positions relative to the conflict. This is most clearly illustrated and evidenced in relation to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Muldoon & Lowe, 2012). Diagnosis of PTSD hinges on experience of an extreme traumatic incident (Criterion A1). De Jong et al. (2001) report extensive experience of extreme traumatic events amongst their sample from Algeria: 84 % had been exposed to crossfire, 83 % to bombings and that 41 % witnessed the death of their loved ones. The amount of conflict related trauma reported through the war in Croatia by a sample of schoolgoing children was also considerable (Kuterovac, Dyregrov, & Stuvland, 1994) and in Northern Ireland Muldoon and Trew (2000) reported a substantial number of children reported having been caught in a riot (23 %), witnessed guns being fired (24 %) and/or experienced a bomb scare (60 %). Similarly, Summerfield (2001) points to evidence indicating that 99 % of a sample from Sierra Leone met the experiential and symptomatic criteria for PTSD. These authors suggest that these findings reflect the severity of experiences to which these samples have been exposed, yet the rates of PTSD, even in these contexts, tend to be between 10 and 15 % of the total population (Muldoon & Downes, 2007). And these figures suggest that the notion that these events are "unusual" or "extreme" does not capture the reality of life in many regions of the world, where such events are appraised as unexceptional or at least part of the backdrop of everyday life.

The current inclusive definition of traumatic events which qualify as a criterion A1 stressor has resulted in a 59.2 % increase in total population life experiences which could be used to diagnose PTSD (Breslau & Kessler, 2001). The crucial feature of the DSM-IV's expanded stressor criterion is that there is now an important emphasis placed on a newly defined criterion A2 which requires that the individual's response to their traumatic event was one of "intense fear, helplessness or horror" (APA, 2000, p. 439). The development of the disorder therefore depends not only on the event itself, but on a variety of other crucial factors, not the least of which is the individual's subjective appraisal of the event, which may be linked to a host of social and personal variables as well as previous traumatic exposure. Therefore the important factor is not only exposure to a traumatic event, but also the manner in which a person appraises that event.

Lazarus and Folkman (1984) argue that stress is the outcome of a two-phase process of appraisal. Primary appraisal involves the perceiver assessing the degree to which a particular stressor poses a threat, and secondary appraisal involves the perceiver's assessment of their ability to cope with the threat. While much of this research on stress accepts that social context, Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, and Penna's (2005) integrated social identity model of stress is the first to place groups, and their associated social identities at the heart of the stress process. They suggest a more complex model of stress in which appraisal processes and stress outcomes are structured by group membership. Empirical support for the model is also available. Haslam, O'Brien and colleagues (2005) provide a simple illustration of how group membership mediates the experience of stress. They asked two groups of participants to rate the levels of anticipated stress in both their own and another occupational group. Both groups rated their own occupations as less stressful than the other group's occupation despite the fact that one group was comprised of bomb

disposal officers, the second group being bar workers. Indeed, one of the bomb disposal officers describes his occupations as "not something out of the ordinary" despite the very real risks he routinely faced (Haslam et al., 2005, p. 365).

Muldoon and Lowe (2012) argue that the appraisal of stressful and traumatic events is fundamentally related to group memberships and identity and that this is particularly the case relative to the stress and trauma associated with political violence where group memberships and identity are central to the conflict itself. In situations of intractable political conflicts, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the conflict in the Basque region and that in Northern Ireland, social identification is of pivotal importance in meaningful and everyday ways (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kelman, 1999; Lowe & Muldoon, 2014). Available evidence certainly suggests that social identities mediate the experience of potentially traumatising events (Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes, 2009). Where such events can be explained as being consonant with social identities, this attribution of meaning appears to lower the traumatic response. For example, Basoglu et al. (1997) showed that in a comparison of political and non-political prisoners in Turkey who experienced torture, political prisoners showed lower Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS) than non-political prisoners, despite often experiencing greater levels of violence over a longer duration. Again this suggests the physical parameters of events are not alone responsible for experienced trauma, but rather identities can buffer mental health even in the face of torture.

In effect, it would appear that social identities can provide a framework for making sense of adversity. However, this meaning-making will only assist positive reinterpretation where there is a good fit between the identity and the traumatic experience (Muldoon et al., 2009). Ankri, Bachar, and Shalev's (2010) study of reactions to bus bombings in Israel exemplifies the importance of this fit. They found that ultra-orthodox Jews, a highly identified group, reported significantly higher levels of distress than the non-ultra-orthodox survivors of such attacks. Within the ultra-orthodox faith, victimisation is perceived as just retribution for previous wrong doings. Thus the meaning attributed to the attacks by ultra-orthodox Jews, as a consequence of their valued social identity magnified the impact of the events. Thus, whether social identities are a resource or an obstacle to individual resilience in the face of traumatic experiences depends on the content of those identities and how this shapes processes of meaning-making.

Identity as "Coping"

A recent line of research within social and political psychology has examined the role of social identification as a consequence of negative experiences associated withholding membership in a given group. This has been specifically concerned with the extent to which social identity related stressors can impact upon self-esteem and psychological well-being, including the extent to which social identification positively or negatively influences well-being, by mediating the relationship between identity related stressors and psychological effects. Considerable research

evidence has now been accrued that suggests members of disadvantaged groups cope with adversity by increasing identification with their disadvantaged group (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014).

These findings have been articulated in Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey's (1999) rejection-identification model (RIM), which predicts negative direct effects of adversity and discrimination on well-being, and also positive indirect effects on well-being, via increased social identification. The RIM thus reconciles a mixed body of research that has found, on the one hand, that perceiving discrimination due to one's group membership can lead to a range of adverse psychological health consequences, including greater psychological stress (Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000), lower self-esteem (e.g. Verkuyten, 1998), depression (Contrada et al., 2001; Finch, Kolody, & Vega, 2000) and even poorer physical health (e.g. Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999). On the other hand, groups typically subjected to discrimination such as minority ethnic groups do not necessarily hold poorer psychological health and well-being than other groups (e.g. see Major, McCoy, Kaiser, & Quinton, 2003; Verkuyten, 2001 for a review). Specifically, the RIM describes that perceiving rejection or discrimination due to one's group membership may lead individuals to identify more strongly with their in-group, which then has a positive impact on psychological health, effectively reducing the potential adverse direct consequences of perceived discrimination (see e.g. Giamo, Schmitt, & Outten, 2012; Ramos, Cassidy, Reicher, & Haslam, 2012; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003).

Once we begin to think about war and political violence, we move towards thinking about direct acts of aggression and violence rather than adversity and discrimination. And in times of war, distinguishing between victims and perpetrators is never straightforward. Indeed, the concept of victimhood itself can be central in shaping and consolidating social identities. Groups often develop a collective narrative and memory of the conflict that indicates that the rival group continuously inflicted unjust and immoral harm upon them throughout the conflict. In this way, many groups present themselves as the disadvantaged group during hostilities. This collective sense of victimhood has important effects on the way individuals and societies manage the course of the conflict, and adjust to their experiences during war and peace time (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2010). And it is probably universally the case that even in very violent or asymmetric intergroup conflicts, at least one and very often both sides believe themselves to be *the* victim in that conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2009).

Schmitt and Branscombe (2002) argue that the subjective meaning and consequences of perceived discrimination against an out-group depend on the position of one's group in the social structure. The context in situations of intractable conflict is often one that is built on the negative interdependence (Kelman, 1999) of identities implicated in the conflict, where each group perceives the other group as threatening to its own group identity. As such, the mere existence of the out-group together with their expression of identity can be perceived as threatening, over and above the more direct or immediate threats associated with political violence (Kelman, 1987, 1999). Until recently, the majority of research in this area had primarily been carried out among groups holding minority status or devalued group memberships. Increasingly, however, it is apparent that issues of threat and threat perception are central to the

support for violence and intergroup hostility amongst both majority and minority group members.

We have recently proposed a threat-identification model (TIM; Schmid & Muldoon, 2015), which is a dual-pathway model for how perceived intergroup threat may affect psychological well-being. It is loosely based upon Branscombe et al.'s (1999) RIM, and extends these predictions to the consequences of perceived intergroup threat on health. The TIM argues that although perceived intergroup threat, a negative identity-based stressor, may have a direct adverse effect on psychological well-being, it can also lead to increased social identification, and thereby indirectly protect psychological well-being. Thus the threat-identification hypothesis suggests threat positively affects social identification, and social identification co-varies positively with psychological well-being, thus mediating the relationship between perceived intergroup threat and well-being. These predictions are based on two premises. First, perceiving a threat to one's in-group prompts an increase in social identification, as has been proposed (Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984) and evidenced by social identity research (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999; Ethier & Deaux, 1994). Second, identification is an important resource for coping with elevated intergroup threat perceptions, having as it does positive implications for psychological well-being and health (see e.g. Crabtree, Haslam, Postmes, & Haslam, 2010; Cronin, Levin, Branscombe, van Laar, & Tropp, 2012; Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Muldoon & Lowe, 2012; see also Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, & Alexander, 2012 for a recent edited volume on the link between social identity and psychological health).

An additional key element to consider in the threat-identification process is that threat, particularly in the context of intergroup conflict, can be perceived by both dominant and subordinate groups. Rejection-identification processes, understood to arise as a consequence of the experience of perceived discrimination, have largely been documented and associated (though not exclusively) with minority or subordinate group membership. However in situations of intergroup conflict, perceptions of threat are evident in both dominant and subordinate groups. Indeed in some instances it is the ostensibly more powerful group in the conflict that perceives the higher level of threat (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Mac Ginty & Du Toit, 2007), not least because the conflict represents a very real threat to the status of the group. Group position is also centrally important to the perceptions of the conflict by groups (Muldoon, 2013) involved as well as to the wider community of witnesses (Mac Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson, 2007).

Those engaged in conflict from a position of power (a majority or dominant group) are often seen as morally questionable; whilst there is generally moral kudos attached to the minority group position by the wider international community (Mac Ginty et al., 2007). So for minority group members, this attribution of illegitimacy to the majority group behaviour can fuel identification (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009) and may be used to justify even violent collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). On the other hand, for majority group members, because of their tendency to orient to concerns about morality and moral behaviour (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), questions about legitimacy of their actions can act to undermine identification and perceived collective worth of the group. As such, in conflict situations, the role of perceived threat on identification

and well-being may have very different consequences for majority and minority group members. Available empirical data confirm differential effects for majority and minority group members. A cross-lagged analysis found that when controlling for perceptions of threat and identity at time 1, perceived threat was seen to predict strength of identity for majority and minority group members at time 2 (Schmid, Muldoon, & Loowe, under review). However, this increased identification across time was found to be predictive of better psychological health in minority group members only, leading the authors to conclude that minority group members are more effective at harnessing collective identity in support of psychological health.

Conclusion

The social identity approach is one that grew from an interest in understanding the psychological basis of prejudice and discrimination in the aftermath of the Second World War. Subsequently, the approach has been applied to a range of settings to understand group loyalties during conflict and how they act to maintain support warring factions. For example, in Northern Ireland it has been empirically demonstrated that experience of violence is related to support and sympathy for political violence (Hayes & McAllister, 2001). Similarly, Muldoon et al. (2009) found that reported experience of violence in a large-scale survey was significantly related to strength of identification irrespective of preferred nationality. Generally, then it can be said that conflicts have been shown to polarise identities and as a consequence contribute to poor relation between groups, effectively embedding the conflict further.

Where perceptions of threat emanating from the out-group are amplified by contexts that construct the conflict as a win–lose scenario (also known as a zero-sum game), the difficult relations between groups are exacerbated. For example, Schmid and Muldoon (2015) found higher perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat were associated with higher levels of ethno-religious identification. These resultant strong social identities can then serve to embed the identities of the conflict further.

For this reason, social identities have been viewed as the psychological basis of political conflict. Furthermore, social identities and, more particularly, strong social identities have often been viewed by psychologists and non-psychologists alike as dysfunctional and even pathological. However, the perspective offered in this chapter is one that considers social identities as normal and indeed the psychological reification of socially divided societies. These identities offer us a way of interpreting the social divisions that surround us and further provide resources to bolster psychological health. In short, we argue that social identities and heightened perceptions of intergroup threat associated with conflict are not only group-level but also individual-level outcomes, since conflict constitutes, at its core, inherently stressful experiences. Thus although identities and intergroup threats hold a distinct group-level component, with the potential to challenge the well-being of the group per se, they also hold the potential to challenge individual psychological well-being (Muldoon & Lowe, 2012). In this way, identities can be seen as important resources for those negotiating the stressful environments affected by political violence, yet paradoxically they are also

the mindsets that can serve to impede progress to peace and reconciliation. Policy and practice in this area must work to respect identities in post-conflict societies in order to protect those made most vulnerable by their experiences.

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Chapter 10
Global Climate Change: A Social Identity Perspective on Informational and Structural Interventions

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Climate change is one of the major challenges facing the world today. As levels of carbon emissions continue to build in our planet's atmosphere, scientists predict a wide range of harmful effects on the natural environment. This includes an increase in extreme weather events (such as heatwaves, droughts, and wildfires) and an increase in resource degradation (such as shortages of food and water, biodiversity loss, and worsened pollution; IPCC, 2014). As a result, climate change is likely to cause considerable damage to plants, animals, and ecosystems around the world, and this damage would persist well into the foreseeable future.

Scientists predict a range of harmful effects on human societies as well, including an increase in interpersonal violence and intergroup conflict. Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of studies on the relationship between climate change and violence from around 8000 BCE to 2010. They found that for every one-standard deviation increase in temperature or rainfall, interpersonal violence (such as assault) increased by 4 % and intergroup conflict (such as civil war) by 14 %. Changing climates appear to magnify the drivers underlying violence and conflict, such as poverty and economic shocks (IPCC, 2014). The harmful effects also include mass dislocation and more environmental injustice. With extreme weather, degraded resources, and greater conflict, people will increasingly become displaced from their homes and be forced to migrate to other places, especially in low-income and developing nations (IPCC, 2014). In effect, climate change can damage important social identities (Jetten, Haslam,

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Iyer, & Haslam, 2010), as well as personal and collective well-being (Doherty & Clayton, 2011). Thus, climate change is as much a concern for peace and conflict, as it is for the natural environment.

Given the threat posed by climate change, there is a growing need for action to mitigate carbon emissions and begin adapting societies to the most likely consequences. This means that there is a need for *behaviour change*—change in individuals' everyday behaviours that contribute to carbon emissions. In the United States, individual households contribute roughly 38 % of the national emissions and roughly 8 % of the worldwide emissions (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009). Thus, it is imperative to minimise the behaviours that increase emissions (such as electricity or gasoline consumption) and to increase the behaviours that reduce emissions (such as better home insulation or use of solar panels; Karlin et al., 2014). Even if technological solutions are eventually found, people will still need to change their behaviour to accommodate these advancements. This also means that there is a need for *policy change*—change in corporate and governmental practices that contribute to carbon emissions or encumber effective adaptation to climate change. The support of business and political leaders is imperative for articulating the climate threat to the public, as well as taking steps to minimise its damaging effects on societies and the natural environment.

Over the past decade, the discipline of psychology has become increasingly interested in climate change. Indeed, there has been a growing push to understand reactions to climate change and willingness to take action to prevent and reduce its impacts. This push has been reflected in increasing public calls about the urgency of climate change and its relevance to psychology. For instance, climate change has been called "one of the major threats facing humanity" (Clayton et al., 2015) and psychology has been called on to "help save the world" (Oskamp, 2007). As Swim et al. (2011) point out, psychology is well positioned to help us clarify the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours associated with both mitigation and adaptation. Such calls contributed to the assembly of a task force report on climate change (APA, 2009), as well as a subsequent report on its psychological impacts (Clayton, Manning, & Hodge, 2014).

This push to understand climate change has also been reflected in the growing number of scientific publications on the psychology of climate change. To assess this growth, we conducted a PsycINFO search for publications that mentioned "climate change" or "global warming" over a thirty-year period (1985–2014). Figure 10.1 shows a substantial increase in publications, particularly following the release of *An Inconvenient Truth*, a documentary film about Al Gore's attempts to educate the public about climate change (Bender & Guggenheim, 2006). The correlation between year of publication and number of publications is significant, $r(28) = .78$, $p < .001$, and continues to be robust regardless of whether non-peer reviewed publications are included or excluded. If the focus is shifted to publications after 1996, the last year without a single publication on the psychology of climate change, the correlation becomes even stronger, $r(16) = .90$, $p < .001$. These results are consistent with, as well as extend, earlier analyses demonstrating the growing imperative in psychology to understand climate change (Swim, Markowitz, & Bloodhart, 2012).

Fig. 10.1   PsycINFO references on "climate change" or "global warming" from 1985 to 2014

Climate change and its link to social identity are particularly relevant to peace psychology for at least two reasons. The first is that climate change reflects underlying *structural violence* against social groups and the natural environment (Pilisuk, 1998). Climate change emerges from the unsustainable extraction and consumption of natural resources that people depend upon for meeting their basic needs. In effect, climate change is slowly harming people by making it even more difficult for them to sustain the conditions necessary for physical and psychological well-being, particularly among the most vulnerable populations around the world (Doherty & Clayton, 2011). This means that incorporating climate change into peacebuilding programmes has become a necessary task in our warming world (Matthew, 2014). In addition, as groups struggle more and more to fulfil their needs, this increases the potential for *episodic violence*—quick and dramatic harms that result in considerable displacement, suffering, and fatalities (Christie, 2006). Indeed, it is not possible to develop a lasting peace without protecting the environment (Winter, 2003).

Nevertheless, there is still a need for psychology to cultivate a deeper, more integrative discussion about climate change. In particular, the field still lacks parsimonious and integrative theoretical models to fully engage researchers, policymakers, and the public more generally. Clayton (2012) points out that more integrated theory across psychology and other disciplines is a necessary step forward. Fielding, Hornsey, and Swim (2014) also suggest that now is the time to integrate social psychological knowledge on climate change with current climate models in other disciplines. We argue that the social identity perspective can make important contributions to the wider efforts of psychologists to develop stronger theoretical models and more effective interventions for climate change. This perspective has already made valuable contributions to areas such as organisational (e.g. Haslam & Ellemers, 2011) and

health psychology (e.g. Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, Dingle, & Jones, 2014). Indeed, the social identity perspective is beginning to make important contributions to environmental psychology and, more specifically, climate change (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Postmes, 2015; Rabinovich & Morton, 2011).

In this chapter, we outline a social identity perspective on addressing global climate change. We begin by highlighting the differences between individualistic and social identity approaches to climate change. We then describe how a social identity perspective offers novel insights in the two primary kinds of intervention in environmental psychology—*informational interventions* that encourage personal behaviour change by providing informative or persuasive, sustainability-relevant messages, and *structural interventions* that promote collective behaviour change by creating new sustainability policies for corporate or government institutions. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of a social identity perspective for environmental and peace psychology, as well as for interventions to reduce the antecedents and consequences of climate change for social groups and the natural environment.

Psychological Perspectives on Global Climate Change

Individualistic Perspectives

The psychology of climate change and environmental issues more generally has traditionally been dominated by individualistic perspectives, which are based on three core principles. First, *people are generally motivated by their self-interest*. Indeed, environmental psychologists often focus on a wide range of internal motivations—including attitudes, beliefs, biases, goals, habits, needs, and values. Such motives are the predominant predictors of behaviour in the key theoretical models in the field, such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), Norm Activation Model (NAM), Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN), and Goal Framing Theory (GFT; see Steg & Nordlund, 2013 for a review). For instance, the NAM suggests that personal norms (i.e. feeling obligated to protect the environment) motivate sustainable behaviour, and outlines variables that promote their activation (such as problem awareness and a sense of efficacy for environmental change). When theoretical models emphasise internal motivations for climate-relevant actions, they generally suggest increasing personal responsibility (Frantz & Mayer, 2009) and behavioural self-regulation (Bamberg, 2013) to encourage sustainable outcomes.

Second, *people are generally resistant to psychological and behavioural change*. From an individualistic perspective, internal motivations are considered relatively fixed and stable entities within individuals, whether grounded in their biological tendencies or previous conditioning. For instance, Steg, Bolderdijk, Keizer, and Perlaviciute (2014) point out that values are thought to

be relatively stable and enduring, transcending situations and affecting a variety of motivations and behaviours. Similarly, Klockner and Verplanken (2013) suggest that stability is one of the core features of habit-driven behaviour. Since internal motives are relatively stable, people cope with change by psychologically and behaviourally resisting its occurrence. Additionally, resistance to change is seen as a fact that should be harnessed or redirected in psychological interventions. For instance, van Vugt, Griskevicius, and Schultz (2014) propose that humans' inherent self-interest could be redirected by developing sustainable programming that results in direct personal gains, such as protecting people's ability to pass genetic material into the future. Thus, individualistic interventions generally emphasise accommodation of internal motivations, rather than directly working to counteract them.

Third, *social groups generally represent external motivations acting upon individuals*. In effect, social groups are seen as problematic when it comes to developing effective interventions for a couple of reasons. Since people are driven by self-interest, they are only likely to prioritise collective interests in a limited range of situations. For instance, Schultz (2014) outlined a number of behaviour change strategies and suggested that the group-related ones (such as social norms) will be most effective when there are few perceived benefits and barriers to performing behaviour. Moreover, since people's internal motivations are assumed to be resistant to change, collective interests are unlikely to serve as stable motivators, even in these limited situations. For instance, Lindenberg and Steg (2014) suggest that group-related change strategies (such as norm-guided actions) are precarious because they require wider support, are undermined by deviance, and their effects typically decay over time. From an individualistic perspective, social groups do not represent a viable focus for interventions because they are—like the other external motives that confront individuals—weak, unstable, and likely to elicit individual resistance to change.

Social Identity Perspectives

Despite the historically individualistic focus of environmental psychology, social identity perspectives are increasingly represented in research on climate change. These perspectives are also based on three principles. First, *motivation is not solely determined by self-interest, but rather is an outcome of self-categorisation processes*. From a social identity perspective, it is problematic to explain behaviour in terms of personal self-interest because people can categorise themselves as individuals (i.e. personal identities) or as group members (i.e. social identities). The importance of group membership for motivation is consistent with neuroscience research showing that our brain regions are adapted for developing and maintaining group bonds, rather than for simply pursuing self-interests (Lieberman, 2013). Furthermore, self-categorisation is context dependent. When people self-categorise as group members, they focus on their shared, collective

interests, rather than their personal self-interests. In these contexts, in-group norms are self-defining and motivate collective behaviours to positively differentiate the in-group from relevant out-groups (Reynolds, Subasic, & Tindall, 2015).

Second, *when the context changes, self-categorisation can change as well*. This means that people could resist or support possible change depending on the identity salient in a given comparative context. From a social identity perspective, it is problematic (and pessimistic) to characterise people as resistant to change because this does not explain the conditions under which resistance occurs, nor does it explain how the conditions that will spark support for change come about. As Reynolds and Branscombe (2015) point out, people do not exist as separate from culture, nature, or history, and their motivations are variable depending on the social identity that is salient in a given context. Thus, when the comparative context is stable, self-categorisation is likely to remain stable and people are likely to be relatively resistant to behavioural change. However, when the context is unstable, self-categorisation will likely change and people will be open to new behavioural options in line with shifts in their self-categorisation (Reynolds et al., 2015). When particular identities are consistently made salient, people will be more resistant to change, although it is not necessary, nor sufficient, to appeal to relatively fixed internal motives to explain behavioural stability.

Third, *social groups provide a frame of reference for motivation and behaviour*. From a social identity perspective, it is problematic to suggest that collective interests are a limited or unstable source of motivation (Reynolds & Branscombe, 2015). In fact, self-interests are only self-relevant and self-defining in *intragroup contexts*—where comparisons between individuals and in-group members become salient. In these contexts, personal identities can be recognised and challenged by prototypical (i.e. higher status) in-group members. Such challenges help to motivate personal change. Furthermore, group interests are only self-relevant and self-defining in *intergroup contexts*—where comparisons between in-groups and out-groups become salient. In these contexts, collective identities can be recognised and challenged by prototypical in-group members. Such challenges help to motivate collective change. Given the inherently global and intergroup nature of climate change, it is clear that understanding and harnessing the power of collective interests will be critical to successful efforts to address this important issue. In effect, interventions developed without due attention to group memberships are themselves precarious, as they neglect the frame of reference that is most likely behind the collective behaviour change needed to address climate change.

Delivering Information for Personal Behaviour Change

Individualistic Perspectives

Environmental psychologists have long sought to change personal behaviours that affect sustainable outcomes. The key interventions employed to do so are informational interventions wherein communicators deliver messages to audiences to

foster the reduction of unsustainable behaviours in favour of sustainable ones. Such interventions are often premised on the notion that people have a *knowledge deficit*—that people either lack knowledge about the issue of climate change or about the potential strategies for mitigation and adaptation to it. Therefore, providing information is thought to remediate this deficit and promote an increase in sustainable behaviour. According to Schultz (2002), the simple provision of information is particularly helpful when a new intervention programme is initiated, when there is a change to a current programme, or when a programme is particularly complex for the audience.

Although the knowledge-deficit approach has its share of critics, most informational interventions continue to assume that information is critical for changing personal sustainability behaviours. For instance, social marketing interventions (Maibach, Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, & Mertz, 2011; McKenzie-Mohr, 2011) promote sustainable behaviour by segmenting audiences and targeting particular behaviours within them. This allows communicators to make messages more accessible and to focus audience attention on behaviours that make a significant contribution to sustainable outcomes. Additionally, tailored information interventions (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2007) encourage sustainability by fitting messages to the unique attributes of audiences—their distinct motivations and barriers to individual behaviour change. This allows communicators to reduce the information overload arising from exposure to multiple behaviour change messages (van der Werff & Steg, 2015). Through targeting and tailoring messages to particular audiences, individualistic interventions attempt to decrease knowledge deficits or accommodate inherent biases that undermine behaviour change.

One challenge for individualistic interventions is that people will undoubtedly distrust some communicators and their informational messages. This means that messages will need to be shaped to maximise the acceptance of preferred behavioural changes. Hence, environmental psychologists have developed a variety of informational strategies (APA, 2009). One strategy is to suggest that preferred climate behaviours are personally beneficial in some manner, such as providing additional leisure time or unrecognised financial incentives. For instance, Lanzini and Thogersen (2014) found that providing people with financial incentives elicited more sustainable purchasing behaviours than providing them with encouragement and praise. Another strategy is to suggest that preferred behaviours are easy and effective solutions for climate change. For instance, Lanzini and Thogersen also found that financial incentives increased the performance of low-effort behaviours, such as energy and water conservation. By highlighting personal benefits, such as monetary compensation or convenience, interventions enhance internal motivations for personal behaviour change to help address climate change.

The challenge of distrust also means that messages will need to be shaped to maximise the rejection of current, unsustainable behaviours. Indeed, van Vugt et al. (2014) suggest that people are unlikely to discontinue such behaviours because sustainability threats are harder to perceive (see, touch, etc.), particularly for slow-moving, temporally distant, and global issues. Accordingly, environmental psychologists have recommended that climate change messages

should be delivered in a personal, tangible, and vivid manner (Moser, 2014). For instance, Leiserowitz (2007) discusses a number of strategies for communicating climate change risks: presenting them as a clear and immediate threat, outlining the local and regional consequences, highlighting impacts on weather and health, and openly discussing uncertainties in predictions. Although such strategies could overcome human biases by making climate change seem more real, they could also raise other concerns associated with uncertainty and fear-based messages. For instance, Fritsche, Cohrs, Kessler, and Bauer (2012) found that people exposed to climate threats (e.g. heatwaves and wildfires) reported stronger authoritarian and system-justifying attitudes than those exposed to neutral climate information (e.g. climate and geography facts).

Social Identity Perspectives

From the social identity perspective, personal change is not viewed as an outcome of targeting, tailoring, and delivering information. Instead, behavioural change is an outcome of the changing context—shifting comparisons between individuals and their social groups provide the impetus for personal change. In fact, information does not have a fixed or objective meaning, but rather is infused with meaning by perceivers in a particular comparative context. This helps us to explain why information is received and acted upon differently across contexts. For instance, Swim and Becker (2012) found that Germans were more willing than Americans to conserve energy, in part because of stronger biospheric and ethical (vs. egoistic and cost-oriented) concerns. Additionally, Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010) found that "carbon offsetter" identity remained a strong predictor of sustainable intentions, over and above most theory of planned behaviour predictors (i.e. norms and control). A social identity perspective suggests that meaning is not an inherent property of objective information or unique individuals, but rather is a context-dependent outcome of self-categorisation processes.

Furthermore, the meaning of information varies as a function of salient social identities and its relevance for in-group norms (Reynolds et al., 2015). For instance, Seyranian, Sinatra, and Polikoff (2015) conducted an intervention on water conservation in an affluent neighbourhood in California. Participants were presented with four sets of information: knowledge deficit (water saving tips), personal identity (encouragement to reduce water use laden with singular pronouns of "I" and "you"), social identity (similar to personal but with plural pronouns of "we" and "us"), and social norms (descriptive and injunctive information about household water use relative to a neighbourhood mean). Participants exposed to knowledge-deficit messages reported greater water use than participants in the other conditions. Given the centrality of sustainability for Californian identity, it is perhaps unsurprising that the other messages revealed similar results—when norms are highly legitimised, they increase the correspondence between personal and in-group identities. Indeed, Masson and Fritsche (2014) found that highly self-invested participants reported stronger climate-friendly intentions as a function of sustainable group norms, particularly for challenging climate-friendly behaviours.

From a social identity perspective, trust in communicators and their messages depends on whether the promoted behaviours are seen as prototypical for in-group members. This suggests that interventions need to maximise the prototypicality of preferred behavioural changes. For instance, Schultz and Fielding (2014) examined attitudes toward recycled drinking water in Queensland, Australia. At Time 1, participants completed measures of perceived knowledge and risk of recycled water, as well as positive emotions and acceptance toward it. At Time 2, participants received information about the recycling process that varied the communicator's salient identity. The communicator was presented as a scientist from South East Queensland (a superordinate identity) or as a scientist without mention of their regional affiliation (an unknown identity). For participants who strongly identified with South East Queensland, the superordinate intervention reduced perceived risk, increased positive emotions, and enhanced the acceptability of recycled drinking water at Time 2. Thus, increasing communicator prototypicality increased favourability toward recycling water. This is consistent with Rees and Bamberg's (2014) study showing that the relationship between neighbourhood identification and intentions to participate in collective climate action is mediated by stronger in-group norms of climate engagement.

The social identity view also suggests that informational interventions need to maximise the perception that unsustainable behaviours are now peripheral (i.e. no longer reflect in-group norms) and could elicit rejection from other group members (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2006). For instance, Morton, Bretschneider, Coley, and Kershaw (2011) found that increased seniority among engineers was related to more entrenched company norms against sustainable policies. This implies the necessity of making unsustainable practices more peripheral to foster sustainable change. Indeed, emphasising the non-prototypicality of behaviours could even bolster sustainability. For instance, McDonald, Newell, and Denson (2014) had participants review a list of 26 sustainable behaviours and either circle behaviours that they would be willing to perform (an inclusion mindset) or cross out behaviours that they would not be willing to perform (an exclusion mindset). Participants who crossed out sustainable behaviours (i.e. excluded them as "peripheral" based on norms of perceived difficulty) reported increased willingness to perform the remaining behaviours (i.e. viewed them as more prototypical) than participants who circled them. In effect, focusing on the peripheral status of some group behaviours makes others seem more prototypical (e.g. easier to do) and thereby increases willingness to perform sustainable behaviours (i.e. they seem more desirable).

Structuring Policies for Collective Behaviour Change

Individualistic Perspectives

Environmental psychologists have also sought to change collective behaviours that shape sustainable outcomes. The primary interventions employed to do so are structural interventions wherein policymakers create and institute in-group

policies (e.g. corporations and governments) that regulate collective behaviours. Such interventions are often premised on the notion of social dilemmas—contexts in which short-term, personal interests are pitted against long-term, group interests. For instance, Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons" outlines how rational actors' consumption of shared resources can eventually result in their depletion or degradation. Hence, individuals who continue to consume resources initially receive larger payoffs, but in the long run the collective receives smaller payoffs as resources are destroyed. This is particularly true when a greater number of individuals choose to act in terms of their self-interests, rather than their collective interests.

Accordingly, most individualistic interventions involve developing strategies to enhance environmental policies that would otherwise be resisted because of their impact on self-interest. One common strategy is based on applied behavioural analysis (i.e. a conditioning or learning approach), which attempts to shape observable behaviours by modifying their antecedents or consequences. For instance, Schultz and Kaiser (2012) discuss the use of prompts and contingencies to change behaviour. Prompts are messages that people are exposed to prior to a behaviour, such as "Please turn off the lights". When prompts are properly structured—clear, simple, positive, or in close proximity to behaviour—they facilitate performance of preferred behaviours. Contingencies are rewards (such as rebates or tax breaks) and punishments (such as fines or energy costs) for the performance of behaviours. Despite concerns about the higher costs of the applied behavioural approach, providing rewards after behaviours seems to increase them, whereas providing punishments after behaviours seems to decrease them. As a result, creating effective policies is seen as a matter of finding the right mix of rewards and punishments that accommodate self-interested human nature, in the service of long-term collective interests.

The challenge for individualistic interventions is that people could feel disrespected (or even manipulated) by policymakers and their policies (Mols, Haslam, Jetten, & Steffens, 2015). This means that social policies will need to be structured to maximise support within relevant constituencies. Bolderdijk, Lehman, and Geller (2013) suggest employing rewards rather than punishments as a way to lessen resistance to policy changes. Rewards could include monetary consequences, but they could include non-monetary ones as well (such as special privileges or public recognition). Additionally, Bolderdijk et al. advise that people prefer "soon and certain" rewards over "distant and uncertain" ones. Indeed, soon and certain rewards appear to activate brain regions linked to motivation, while distant and uncertain ones appear to activate regions linked to behavioural self-regulation (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Thus, individualistic interventions imply that policymakers should develop and advocate incentive structures with a clear procedure and timeline for rewarding sustainable change.

The challenge of disrespect also means that policies should be structured to maximise opposition to the current, unsustainable policies. This could involve framing the penalties in a favourable manner. For instance, Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber (2010) conducted studies about the labelling of carbon emission surcharges

on products (e.g. carbon offsets on airfare) for key political parties in the United States—Republicans, Independents, and Democrats. They found that labelling products as "carbon offsets" rather than "carbon taxes" significantly increased the proportion of Republicans and Independents choosing the more expensive, sustainable policies. This could also involve adding rewards to compensate for the penalties in the policy packages. For instance, Garling and Schuitema (2007) reviewed transportation policies, such as reducing car use to improve urban problems (e.g. traffic congestion or air pollution). They suggest that adding incentives, such as improved public transportation or new tax breaks, could bolster the acceptability of transport policies. This means that penalties for unsustainable behaviour could prove effective when they are at least somewhat supportive of our individual self-interests.

Social Identity Perspectives

The social identity perspective suggests that collective behaviour change is not an outcome of structuring policies with the right mix of rewards and punishments. Instead, change represents an outcome of the intergroup context—changes in comparisons between in-groups and out-groups provide the impetus for collective change. Indeed, consequences do not have a fixed or objective meaning, but depend on the comparative context. This helps explain why policies are received or acted upon differently across contexts. For instance, Peters and Steffens (see Haslam & Reicher, 2012) found that self-identified "environmentalists" saw President Obama's 2009 Copenhagen speech as more charismatic when his policies were portrayed as helping the United States meet its emissions targets, than when they were portrayed as not helping meet its targets. Moreover, Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, and Jeffries (2012) found that climate change deniers were more willing to support sustainable behaviours when doing so was portrayed as supporting economic or technological development, rather than as avoiding the risks of climate change. A social identity view suggests that meaning is not an inherent property of rewards/punishments or unique social groups, but rather is a context-dependent outcome of self-categorisation processes.

Furthermore, the meaning of policy packages varies as a function of salient identities and their relevance to in-group norms (Mols et al., 2015). For instance, Unsworth and Fielding (2014) manipulated political identity salience among liberals and conservatives, and then measured their beliefs about climate change and support of government policies to mitigate climate change. The salience of political identity reduced conservatives' belief in anthropogenic climate change, as well as their support of government policies (such as a carbon tax) to mitigate climate change. Salience had no effect on liberals who reported strong climate-friendly beliefs and support across conditions. In addition, Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, and Verplanken (2011) varied the intergroup context to examine its influence on sustainable behaviour. In their work, British participants

were asked to write down the ways that being British differed from being Swedish (an upward climate action comparison) or from being American (a downward climate comparison). They were then asked about their willingness to contact politicians and take climate action flyers. Participants who compared themselves to Americans reported more willingness to contact their politicians and took more flyers than participants who compared to Swedish citizens. In effect, the same policymakers and policies took on different meanings as a function of salient group identities, and their associated self-stereotypes and in-group norms.

From a social identity perspective, feeling respected by policymakers and their policies depends on whether promoted behaviours are viewed as prototypical for in-group members. This suggests that interventions need to enhance the prototypicality of policy initiatives. For instance, Bliuc et al. (2015) examined intergroup conflict between climate sceptics and believers, and its influence on sustainable intentions and donations. They found that opinion group identification predicted intentions and donations for both sceptics and believers. These findings show that self-categorisation and behavioural prototypicality play a meaningful role in climate policy-relevant behaviours. Additionally, Seyranian (2014) examined whether leaders' use of inclusive language (such as "we" and "us") would increase the prototypicality of leaders and their policies, as well as sustainable intentions, in the context of promoting renewable energy on a university campus. Participants in the inclusive (vs. noninclusive) language condition rated leaders more positively, perceived renewable energy as more in-group normative, and reported stronger intentions to get involved in renewable energy action on campus. Taken together, these studies suggest that greater prototypicality of policymakers and policies encourages pro-climate intentions and behaviour.

A social identity perspective also suggests that structural interventions should maximise the perception that unsustainable practices are now peripheral (i.e. no longer represent in-group norms) and could elicit rejection from other group members. For instance, Sheldon, Nichols, and Kasser (2011) examined the influence of identity salience and content on recommended carbon footprints in the United States. They exposed participants to three identities without explicitly mentioning identity content (Missouri student, human, or American) and one identity (American) explicitly mentioning content as prototypical (e.g. expressive and generous) or peripheral (e.g. selfish and materialistic). Participants then read about carbon footprints and how they harm the environment, as well as completed measures of their recommendations for Americans' carbon footprints (related to travel, housing, and food). Participants in the prototypical identity condition recommended deeper reductions in Americans' footprints than those in the other four conditions. Similarly, Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith (2010) found that system justifiers were more likely than non-system justifiers to report pro-climate intentions and action when portrayed as preserving American culture. This suggests that stressing the peripheral in-group status of unsustainable behaviour could be a useful avenue to promoting collective change.

Implications of a Social Identity Perspective

Moving Beyond Individualistic Views

The historical prevalence of individualistic views in climate change research is steadily giving way to social identity perspectives. There are at least three benefits of moving to a social identity perspective. The first is that social identity perspectives *encourage deeper integration of psychological knowledge* than is possible with individualistic views. For instance, individualistic perspectives treat individuals and groups as if they were distinct and separate. This leads the field to accumulate knowledge about them in relatively isolated academic "silos" (Gifford, 2009). In fact, one important difference between environmental psychology and peace psychology is the broader emphasis on collective processes in the latter. Social identity perspectives encourage us to integrate knowledge across different levels of analysis in order to deepen our understanding of global and intergroup issues such as climate change (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012). The social identity perspective on "individuals as in-group members" offers us a novel starting point for empirical research, as well as a comprehensive, parsimonious, and generalisable account of global climate change—beyond individual behaviour in individualistic countries (Branscombe & Reynolds, 2015; Jetten, McAuliffe, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006).

The second benefit of moving to a social identity perspective is that it *offers a strong potential for challenging the unsustainable status quo* compared to individualistic views. For instance, individualistic views focus attention on "stable individuals" over "unstable groups" as targets for intervention (e.g. Lindenberg & Steg, 2014). When psychological views emphasise self-interest, personal responsibility, and self-regulation, they repeatedly make personal identities salient, thus recreating the personal stability that they presuppose (Reynolds & Branscombe, 2015). They also minimise attention to the upstream variables that generate the structural violence behind climate change (Christie, 1997). Thus, individualistic views could unwittingly support the unsustainable status quo by focusing on outcomes—rather than causes—of structural violence (Haslam, 2014). Social identity perspectives highlight the comparative context and its potential for creating new opportunities for personal and collective change. Stability and change cannot represent implicit assumptions within perspectives, but must be theoretically explained and empirically tested. If groups rather than individuals are our human default (Lieberman, 2013), we should spend more time on what keeps us apart, rather than on what brings us together (Turner & Reynolds, 2010).

The third benefit of moving to a social identity perspective is that it *provides greater political sensitivity* than individualistic views. For instance, individualistic perspectives seem to treat interventions as if they were mostly about changing individual behaviours (e.g. Steg et al., 2014). The difficulty is that interventions are actually based on underlying social identities—those held by interventionists and their targeted populations (Mols et al., 2015). This means that interventions are inherently political because they mobilise particular identities and demobilise

others (Haslam, 2014). The "tragedy of the commons" is not a matter of clever incentives, but rather of salient group identities (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). From a social identity perspective, interventions necessarily involve promoting and managing relevant identities. Interventionists need to recognise that their choice of strategies is not simply about their approach (individual, technological, etc.), but also about their support for certain in-group identities (Haslam, 2014). Indeed, effective climate change interventions must acknowledge and manage the competing identities related to sustainability (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012; Rabinovich & Morton, 2011).

Principles for Climate Peacebuilding

The social identity perspective illuminates a number of new strategies and techniques for communicators and policymakers interested in creating effective, psychological interventions to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation. There are at least three general principles to keep in mind when developing social identity-informed interventions. The first is that *fostering personal change likely involves perceptions of emerging in-group norms* (Reynolds et al., 2015). While researchers are focused on individuals and promotion of sustainable behaviour, they are not focused on why people are cooperating with unsustainable group practices, nor what encourages them to stop cooperating with these practices. One possibility is that people simply perceive that their in-group norms are becoming increasingly sustainable, and they stop cooperating to become prototypical in-group members (Ferguson, Branscombe, & Reynolds, 2011). As in-group opinion leaders, people can highlight and challenge the unsustainable personal identities of other group members to elicit acceptance of emerging norms (Platow, Haslam, Reicher, & Steffens, 2015). Thus, informational interventions could be particularly useful for encouraging non-cooperation with unsustainable practices. This is particularly so given that structural violence relies upon a mix of ignorance and complicity to maintain support for environmental damage and injustices (Christie & Noor, 2012).

The second principle is that *collective change likely involves the embedding of in-group norms into everyday policies and practices* (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2015). This means that it is important to understand how specific norms become and remain prototypical within groups. Indeed, social group discourse is generally infused with multiple norms, and opinion leaders are motivated to establish certain ones as most representative of prototypical in-group behaviour (e.g. McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013; Smith et al., 2012; Subasic, Reynolds, & Mohamed, 2015). Such discourse invariably highlights and challenges the current social identity with competing visions for the in-group's future behaviours (Reicher & Haslam, 2012). This also means that it is important to construct policies that promote the prototypicality of environmental sustainability. Given that structural violence is perpetuated by ignoring and marginalising alternative in-group voices (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008), it is important to be as inclusive as is possible when

developing policies and during any subsequent negotiations (Batalha & Reynolds, 2012). Nonetheless, should sustainable in-group norms become marginalised during this process, their supporters could consider participating in non-violent actions to contest the established policies (Pilisuk, 1998; Schwebel, 2006).

The third principle is that *identity leadership fosters change by shaping the comparative context* (Haslam et al., 2015). Prototypical in-group members can encourage personal change by modifying the intragroup context (Branscombe & Reynolds, 2015). By developing and refining in-group norms around climate-friendly behaviour, these opinion leaders can build acceptance of the emerging group identity. They can begin to create a novel future that in-group members can embrace in their everyday lives. Additionally, group leaders can promote collective change by shaping the intergroup context. By positioning sustainability as part of what makes the in-group distinct (i.e. relative to important out-groups), climate-friendly behaviours become more readily includable within group policies. Leaders can mobilise support for novel in-group identities in institutional policies, which helps members to live out sustainable identities in the world. This dual emphasis on changing intragroup and intergroup prototypicality in context facilitates the emergence and establishment of new in-group identities (Reicher & Haslam, 2012). This view challenges the historic notion that people are beholden to their biological capacities and social conditioning, but rather can, and do, change in order to pursue a brighter in-group future (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, Kashima, & Crimston, 2013; Reynolds & Branscombe, 2015).

Overall, the advantage of a social identity perspective is that it helps environmental and peace psychologists to see that climate change is a clear threat to lasting peace in the world. By conducting research and developing interventions that challenge the structural violence behind climate change, psychologists can help to mitigate the direct violence that occurs when people cannot meet their basic needs. The normalised depletion and degradation of natural resources remains one of the major challenges for personal and collective well-being in the world today. Although we might currently have the luxury of peacebuilding rather than peacemaking, this luxury will quickly disappear in our gradually warming world.

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Part II
Worldwide Perspectives

Chapter 11
Social Identity Theory as a Theory of Change: The Case of South Africa

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Twenty two years on from the 1994 democratic elections, South Africa is still not a peaceful society. True, the political fatalities which characterised the civil war between 1961 and 1994 declined sharply after reaching peaks between 1990 and 1993; that is, during the protracted phase of negotiations between all parties. Despite the official status of political peace, on many other dimensions South Africa is a particularly violent society. Police figures for reported cases of criminal violence for the year 2012/2013 were as follows (in a population of 53 million): murder: 16,259; attempted murder: 16,363; aggravated robbery: 105,888; serious assault: 185,893 and common assault: 172,909. Sexual offences, including rape, reported for the year 2012/2013 numbered 66,387. Violence against women, standardly under-reported, has been consistently high for years (all numbers from Kane-Berman, 2013). State violence, while considerably muted since apartheid era death squads and torture, has not ceased entirely. The average figure over the past decade for deaths per annum as a result of police action is 751. Complaints received by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate against police violence numbered 6728 in the 2012/2013 year, of which 62 % involved allegations of torture or assaults by state police officials. Police themselves come under violent attack. Since the 1994 elections, an average of 150 police officials were killed each year (Kane-Berman, 2013, p. 818).

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However, from the perspective taken in this chapter the most salient form of violence is due to social protest action by ordinary citizens. The South African Survey (Kane-Berman, 2013) reports an average of 1,071 cases of public violence per annum between the years 2004 and 2013 which include service delivery protests, industrial action and political conflict; that is in the region of 10,000 protest incidents over the past decade. If *protests* were extended to events not classified by the police as *public violence*, the case numbers would be even larger. The number of civil protests not following legislative procedure is also on the rise: Protected strike action decreased from 54 % in 2012 (53 of 99 work stoppages) to 48 % in 2013 (55 of 114 work stoppages; Department of Labour, 2014).

This is the central paradox of the South African situation: Why are the levels of violence this high even though South Africa is a democratic state? How can we understand this feature of society? This chapter will reflect on the intergroup dimension of violence and protest in South Africa. Much of the violence we witness is rooted in the race, class and gender inequalities produced by colonial and apartheid rule. We will use social identity theory to explain responses to inequality, arguing that a particular set of protest oriented identity resources were developed in the struggle against apartheid, and that these continue to be used strategically today. We highlight how these identities are constructed—and reconstructed—through the rhetoric of South Africa's post-apartheid leaders and provide examples of how they serve to legitimise diverse political struggles for social change.

Social Identity Theory and Social Change

In his essay, "The cognitive aspects of prejudice", Tajfel (1981) asserted that prejudice and hostility often arose rationally from "the logic of the situations within which they arise" (p. 128). Human motives and action are shaped by how people give meaning to the situations they are in.

> "… the best way to predict whether a person will harbour hostile attitudes towards a particular group and what will be the content of these attitudes is to find out how he (sic) understands the intergroup situation" (p. 130).

Tajfel (1981) proposed that identity provides the primary ground for understanding the nature of the relations between groups. As elaborated, especially by self-categorisation theory, people understand situations in terms of identity categories, and their thoughts, feelings and actions are determined by whatever identities are "salient" in that situation. Although categories of identity and associated traits are forged historically, the theory of identity salience explains how they can be switched on or off in a situation. This explains how humans are able to act rationally in a "social environment which is in constant flux" (p. 131). Categories of identity become psychologically potent as individuals identify with a particular category and make favourable or unfavourable social comparisons with out-groups (See Hogg, in press for more information on the development of social identity theory).

In the light of this theory, Billig (2002) argued that social identity theory was developed as a theory of social change: It describes the psychological conditions that allow subordinate groups to resist their material, economic and realistic disadvantage. Collective action in the form of resistance will be "reawakened" only when subordinate groups begin to deny the "presumed characteristics associated with its low status", begin to see their deprivation as unjust and develop cognitive alternatives to the status quo (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 38).

Tajfel appreciated that this process of reawakening has a historical dimension. For example, Tajfel and Turner (1979) remark on the development of ethnocentrism among Black Americans after the Second World War. Although the material conditions of African Americans improved during this time, rising expectations together with the group's sense of system illegitimacy provided cognitive alternatives upon which to ground social creativity and social competition strategies of social change.

In this chapter, we will describe the historical awakening of resistance among Black South Africans who were oppressed during centuries of colonialism and apartheid rule. In addition to highlighting the psychological mechanisms by which meaning was given to the situation, we will also consider how identity categories have been developed and used rhetorically to reawaken protest by mobilising people. Tajfel was writing before the "discursive turn" in social psychology, and his understanding of the way people make meaning of situations is overly dependent on the perception paradigm of the "new look" and cognitive approaches that were dominant at the time. A second generation of social identity theorists have argued that social categories are defined in talk and in persuasive rhetoric where they are "used strategically in order to achieve influence" (Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997, p. 105). We will contribute to this literature by describing how oppressed identities were mobilised for collective action in the liberation struggle in South Africa and how political leaders today shape social categories strategically through their narrative. We then discuss three examples of social protest action in contemporary South Africa that illustrate how historically developed understandings of oppressed identities are used to mobilise people for collective action today.

Oppressed Identities in South Africa: A Historical View

Before proceeding with an outline of the history of oppressed people in South Africa, it is useful to state that resistance was there from the start. Even before European settlement in 1652, local people attempted to repel crews of passing ships. In 1488, local Khoe people had a skirmish with the crew of a Portuguese ship under Diaz at the site of the present town of Mossel Bay. In 1510, a Portuguese force was defeated by the Khoe on the shores of Table Bay in Cape Town resulting in the death of the admiral d'Almeida and 50 of his men (Ross, 2012). Even when apparently defeated, for instance, at the end of the wars of conquest in 1879, indigenous people bounced back and learned new strategies of resistance. We argue that the key social identity deployed in movements of resistance across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries

in South Africa has been that of racially oppressed people, manufactured through South Africa's political system, but that meanings, emphases and alliances around this core identity have constantly shifted.

The African National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1912, initially under the name of the South African Native National Congress (NNC) in response to political exclusion from the 1910 constitution of the new Union of South Africa. In gathering together both modern and traditional elements of the subjugated people, the NNC aimed to achieve two things: One, to create unity from division of all sorts; and two, to forge a national movement to fight for rights and freedom. Initially it was only African men; women were accepted only as affiliate members in 1931 and as full members in 1943. To emphasise the African aspect of common identity, the organisation shifted its name to ANC in 1923. Predominance of mission-school education for much of the ANC leadership meant that the particular version of nationalism embraced by the ANC for the first three decades was a liberal-Christian outlook with admiration for many European and liberal values, as well as, of course, patriarchy. The dominant ANC stance on nationalism was an assimilationist position until the 1940s. In terms of Social Identity Theory, there was not yet a clear *cognitive alternative*.

During the 1940s, a group influenced by Anton Lembede developed a view of African nationalism which initiated increased militancy. The early 1940s saw increased urbanisation among the Black working class (the local industrial revolution), greater scepticism of White political motives, and the Second World War also presented new hopes among African people. The ANC Youth League was launched in early 1944 with Lembede as first president just 30 years old. Lembede's Africanism was a cure for a lost nation and continent. It was a pan-African vision of African destiny, unity and freedom. It was a message which promoted a spirit of Africa, a love for Africa's blackness, of pride in the past, a challenge to feelings of inferiority and the necessity for self-reliance. The Youth League developed a 1944 creed and despite Lembede's sudden death in 1947, a 1949 Programme of Action under the banner of African nationalism was implemented. This in turn led to the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and 1953 (thousands of trained volunteers were imprisoned for defying laws perceived as unjust, such as the carrying of passes), a fourfold increase in ANC membership and the potential start of mass Black mobilisation (Gerhart, 1978).

During the 1950s, the dominant trend in the ANC swung back to the traditional liberal nationalism and cooperation with other organisations including Whites in the Congress of Democrats. The two-day Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955—a multiracial alliance of 3,000 people taking the form of a mock national convention—voted clause by clause to adopt the Freedom Charter, the most significant cognitive alternative to date, which shifted direction away from African nationalism: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White". This is the famous signal of "non-racialism" (see Everatt, 2009; Frederickse, 1990). Following this historical event, the label of non-racialism (poorly defined as it always has been) became the identity badge of the Congress Movement, endorsed more as a hope or as a loosely framed intention by a multiracial gathering, than as a systematic doctrine. The ANC itself is not an entirely non-racial organisation: Over the 104 years of its history, only African men have held the presidency of the ANC. Nevertheless, non-racialism has been the battle cry that informed the later ANC oriented "rainbow nation" and constitution.

The notion of non-racialism promoted in the Freedom Charter is thus very difficult to achieve. It could be argued that non-racialism has enabled today's identity struggles as nothing is pinned against it.

It is not surprising that relations between the two factions within the ANC became strained during the years of the Treason Trial (156 people, including Nelson Mandela, were tried for treason from 1956 to 1961). In 1958, an Africanist group broke away to form the Pan-African Congress (PAC), which was led by Robert Sobukwe from April 1959. There were now two distinct alternatives for Black people in the struggle against an increasingly rampant and repressive apartheid regime. The ANC initiated its armed struggle in December 1961, after both ANC and PAC were outlawed and all other avenues of change were closed.

Parts of the Africanist identity position returned (with the ANC and PAC in exile) in the late 1960s in a new guise: Black Consciousness (BC). It focused on *social creativity* as a cognitive alternative and emphasised again psychological aspects, such as overcoming inferior status, discovering Black pride and the notion of self-reliance: Black students cut ties with liberal White student organisations and established their own plan of action. Biko (1978), for example, described the psychological effects of oppression in identity terms: "… the black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man, completely self-defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression" (p. 29), and he argued that the first step in reawakening resistance was the promotion of a collective black consciousness, infused with "pride and dignity" (p. 29).

Mobilisation in terms of BC probably had a good deal to do with revival of resistance and the youth revolt of 1976 and onwards through the 1980s, since the ANC and PAC were all but obliterated by the apartheid repressive machinery from the mid-1960s. However, BC did not take a narrow Africanist stance; Black identity embraced all sectors of oppressed peoples. In 1994 and in subsequent elections, both BC and Africanist political parties have fared poorly at the polls, indicating little political influence, but the South African student protests in the years 2015 and 2016 have seen a considerable revival of BC ideas, indicating that it is not quite dead yet.

There is a third and final identity beacon for those subjugated by colonialism and apartheid: social class. Both trade union and communist movements have been active in South Africa since the 1920s. For much of the past century, the ANC in uneven fashion has been in alliances with both communists and trade unions. That is still the case at present in the form of the Tripartite Alliance (a strategic partnership between the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the Coalition of South African Trade Unions). During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a great deal of research and fierce debate regarding the relative merits of class and race in explanation of the South African situation (Wolpe, 1988). At stake, or so it seemed to participants at the time, was the very direction of the struggle. Note that gender and feminism were generally pushed aside. These debates, never conclusive, have been summarised superbly by Steven Friedman (2015) who concludes that this academic discourse, despite the intensity, did not have much influence on major political organisations. Nonetheless, class issues—and especially the identity categories of "the workers" and "the poor"—have been a third lens or reference point, and in a country with such great material inequality as South Africa, will continue to be salient. The triangular formation of

African nationalism (and BC), the "non-racialism" of the congress tradition and the neo-Marxist notion of class have constituted the discursive repertoires from which oppressed racial identities have been constructed.

Oppressed Identities Post-1994

Since 1994, South Africa has been governed by three democratically elected presidents: Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) and Jacob Zuma (since 2009). Mandela aimed to create a non-racial society as enshrined in the Freedom Charter and promoted by the ANC from the mid-1950s: After South Africa's relatively peaceful transition from an oppressive political system to democracy, Mandela consciously promoted peace-building by attempting to replace racial identities with an overarching national identity and promoting oneness. Mandela's approach thus reflects the common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011), which postulates that a common in-group identity serves to reduce prejudice. The oppressed are freed from oppression by changing their social identification.

Consequently, the first years of South Africa's democracy were characterised by hope and pride and arguably less of a focus on racial identities than at any other point in South Africa's history. Mandela's rhetoric reflects this. In his speeches, he largely omitted explicit reference to racial groups, but made use of unifying metaphors instead. For example, in his inauguration speech in 1994, he referred to the jacaranda tree—an alien tree brought from Brazil in the nineteenth century—and through this indirectly implied that South Africa was home to indigenous and non-indigenous people alike:

> To my compatriots, I have no hesitation in saying that each one of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the bushveld. Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal renewal. (para. 6) […] That spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw our country tear itself apart in a terrible conflict, and as we saw it spurned, outlawed and isolated by the peoples of the world. (para. 7)

From a social identity perspective, the creation of an inclusive overarching identity should have decreased the salience of race as a category of identification. An indication of the success of this inclusivity approach is provided by Finchilescu and Dawes (1999) who explored the changes in the level of group identification among adolescents between 1992 and 1996. While the level of identification as *South African* stayed relatively constant for Black and English speaking White participants, more coloured, Indian and Afrikaans-speaking Whites saw themselves as South African in 1996 than in 1992. At the same time, though, members of all racial groups also increased their ethnic identification (with the exception of Indians). The apparent success of the inclusivity rhetoric was shown in Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier's (2001) research. In data collected in 1997, they found that the large majority of South Africans felt proud to be called South African. At the same time, race as an identification category seemed

to be losing its importance. Franchi and Swart (2003) investigated what identities South African undergraduate students referred to when asked to describe themselves. Only approximately one quarter of the students used overt racial identities. Oppressed groups referred to this category more often than White South Africans. This is in line with Duncan (2003) who also reports a greater acceptance of racial and cultural differences among oppressed racial groups. Franchi and Swart assume that the results reflect an attempt to block out race as a category of identification since it seemed inappropriate and detrimental to the reconciliation of the country. Indeed, participants often referred to race more implicitly by talking about the apartheid past and its implications for the present and future. A study by de la Rey and Boonzaier (2002) supports the fact that race did indeed still form part of South Africans' identities at the turn of the century. In their qualitative research with Black and coloured participants, they found that participants rejected the racial classifications they had been given during the apartheid years, but nonetheless described themselves in different racial terms. Mokgatle and Schoeman (1998) found that their Black participants, assessed approximately 3 years after South Africa's transformation, identified strongly with their racial group, and indicated a deliberate separation between themselves and other racial groups in South Africa. Nonetheless, they were striving towards in-group–out-group integration, reflecting a decrease in interracial conflict.

One consequence of the emphasis on an overarching national identity was an inward focus, which served to create cohesion and political, social and economic stability in a highly divided society. As an unintended outcome, however, it emphasised a different form of "us" and "them": That of being South African versus non-South African. Xenophobia towards African immigrants, particularly from Black South Africans, had been simmering since the 1990s. It flared up severely in 2008, indicating the definite end of South Africa's honeymoon period. In May 2008, 62 people were killed in attacks on African immigrants and it is estimated that between 80,000 and 200,000 people were displaced (Igglesden, 2008). This was despite Mbeki's attempts to broaden people's group identification. Under the umbrella *African renaissance*, he sought to establish an African rather than national identity. In his inauguration speech in 1999, for example, he made frequent reference to South Africa being located in Africa (e.g. "We too, as the peoples of South Africa and Africa, must together run our own Comrades Marathon, as comrades who are ready to take to the road together [...]" (para. 43)). The reference to Africa had become even more prominent in Mbeki's second inaugural speech in 2004. Unlike Mandela, he also openly and frequently referred to racial categories:

> It was a place in which to be born black was to inherit a lifelong curse. It was a place in which to be born white was to carry a permanent burden of fear and hidden rage. (para. 7) [...] We are proud that every day now, black and white South Africans discover that they are, after all, one another's keeper. (para. 22) [...] We share this and other goals with the rest of our continent and the African Diaspora, as well as the billions across the globe who continue to suffer as millions in our country do. Nothing can separate us from these masses with which we share a common destiny. Rather, we must and will at all times strive to strengthen our links with them, together, to determine what we must do to solve our shared problems. (para. 37) [...] Our common task is to ensure that these historic initiatives succeed in their objective of taking Africa forward to the victory of the African Renaissance. Democratic South Africa will play its role vigorously to promote the achievement of this goal. (para. 39)

This example illustrates Mbeki's attempt to create an overarching (African) identity, while at the same time recognising and valuing subgroup identities (in this case racial identities) as clearly distinct groups, who hold common goals. From a social identity perspective, this approach is commendable: Hogg (2010) points out that research in the social identity line has shown that both valuing distinctiveness and shared goals of subgroup identities are necessary conditions in order to transition from an intergroup conflict situation to intergroup harmony. Thus, even though the concept of the "rainbow nation" is seen as characteristic of Mandela's presidency, it actually lent itself more to Mbeki's approach; that is the building of a society in which different racial groups are *acknowledged*, but *together* form a whole.

It has been argued, though, that among White South Africans the increased salience of race might have created feelings of division rather than contributed to unity. Based on Mbeki's speech at the National Editor's Forum in 2003, for example, Wasserman (2005) claims that Mbeki seemed to suggest that African black individuals were more authentic than White, coloured and Indians South Africans. He saw those as *African* who were African due to their racial group and ancestry. In line with this, Gibson and Gouws' (2000) research revealed that *African* was indeed the preferred category of identification by Black South Africans, while most White individuals identified as *South African* instead. In his analysis of data collected in 2000/2001, Gibson (2006) found that those who identified more strongly with their racial group (Black, coloured, White, Indian, Asian) also identified more strongly with being South African. This relationship was less strong for those who primarily identified as being African.

Rather than adopting a narrative of *reconciliation*, as Mandela had done, Mbeki advocated racial *transformation*. According to Mangcu (2014), his driving force was the assumption that reconciliation would only be possible once racial justice had been achieved—thus necessitating a focus on race as an identity resource. Mangcu further asserts that Mandela's emphasis on non-racialism had prevented the realisation of racial justice. When entering the terms *Mandela black sellout* in an internet search engine, it quickly becomes evident that there are other—predominantly Black—voices who stress, like Mangcu, that Mandela's attempt to decrease the salience of race as a social category was a sell-out of Black South Africans, but afforded White South Africans the opportunity to ignore the past. In Mangcu's words "The more that whites deny the past, the more that [sic] blacks feel angry, and they become fodder for race con men who use people's genuine misery to feather their own nests. A more nuanced discourse still has to emerge to get South Africa out of this vicious cycle" (p. 33). The common identity approach adopted by Mandela, which did not acknowledge racial subgroup identities, thus denied those who identify with an oppressed racial group the opportunity to be acknowledged as oppressed—and to legitimately resort to social action.

This then suggests that the renewed increase in the salience of race as a category of identification per se, which was witnessed in Mbeki and Zuma's presidencies, was appropriate. What became viewed as problematic was the way in which these

racial identities were constructed: Wasserman's (2005) analysis of Mbeki's National Editor's Forum speech suggests that the rhetoric around race has not been neutral. Mangcu (2014) even goes so far as to describe Mbeki's stance as racial nativism, suggesting that he portrayed members of the indigenous racial group as more South African and African, thus reflecting the stance taken by the ANC in the 1940s. According to social identity theory, a focus on subordinate identities who share a superordinate identity with common goals is not sufficient to create intergroup harmony. Subgroup identities also need to equally form part of the overarching identity (Hogg, 2010). Mbeki's narrative may thus not have met this last condition.

When Zuma became president in 2009, he re-diverted the emphasis from racial identification to that of an overarching identity and emphasised unity, oneness and inclusion. His rhetoric was initially reminiscent of Mandela's. In his inauguration address on 9 May 2009, for example, he stated:

> At that moment a new nation was born, a nation founded on the fundamental principles of human dignity and equal rights for all. A nation founded on the promise that 'never, never and never again' would this land experience the oppression of one by another. We gather here determined to renew that most solemn undertaking, to build a society in which all people are freed from the shackles of discrimination, exploitation, want and disease. (para. 3)

In this speech, he not once made use of the terms *race* or *racial* and only twice referred to *Black and White* individuals. Six years later, racial identities have become more prominent in Zuma's rhetoric. He uses race specifically to construct an oppressed identity in order to justify racial retribution:

> On this day, 27 April 1994, we held our first democratic elections, signalling the end of racist apartheid rule. Today we remember that historic moment. We are celebrating our triumph over institutionalized racism, repression, state-sponsored violence and the enforced division of our people based on race or ethnicity. (para. 5) […] Under the leadership of former President Nelson Mandela, we demonstrated to the world that a new nation can rise from the ashes of racial intolerance and ethnic polarization. We had a successful transition in 1994 and began building a new united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa. (para. 9) […] With our massive industrialisation and infrastructure programmes, we consciously include black people, women, the youth and persons with disability to enable them to participate in the economy. To further expand black economic empowerment, we are on course to grow a new crop of black industrialists. (para. 28) […] As we enter the third decade of our freedom, we recommit ourselves to the vision of building a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. […] (para. 38). Zuma (2015)

Even in relation to schooling, he chooses to mark race rather than class as the oppressed identity when he remarks in the same speech "The quality of school education for black people is poor" (para. 42). It is possible that the three conditions argued to be required for intergroup harmony, outlined by Hogg (2010), are not sufficient in situations with protracted conflict. The South African case suggests that justice—in this case racial retribution—may need to be added as a fourth necessary precondition.

The analysis of these narratives provides evidence of how intergroup identities are constructed strategically, serving to legitimise economic and social policy as well as

influencing public perception. Depending on the way in which identities are constructed, particular cognitive alternatives for oppressed groups become available. They provide legitimacy for certain groups to see themselves as oppressed and to protest for social change. For the most part, South Africa's leaders have constructed particular racial rather than class identities, even though class and race are no longer as closely intertwined as in the past as illustrated in the following section.

Social Identities of Resistance in Contemporary South Africa

The examples below show how constructions of oppressed identities are used in South Africa today to justify three forms of activism and resistance: xenophobic violence of the marginal working class and unemployed, class struggles of the working class during and in the aftermath of strike action in Marikana and the Rhodes must fall movement of the middle class. While these events could be—and indeed have been—explained using a variety of different approaches, we deliberately focus only on a social identity based account. This is not meant to discount other explanations, but serves to highlight the strategic use of identities and the process in which particular identities get activated to mobilise for change.

Xenophobia

During the past decade, there have been sporadic outbreaks of xenophobic violence in South Africa. Most recently, seven people were killed and thousands displaced in xenophobic violence that erupted in April 2015, purportedly in response to a speech by the Zulu King, who called for foreign nationals to return to their countries of origin (Xenophobia in South Africa, n.d.).

Xenophobic violence in South Africa has a specific race and class patterning. On the one hand, it is racialised, both in terms of the perpetrators and the victims of violence, who are almost exclusively Black Africans. It is for this reason that the phenomenon has been called *Afriphobia* or *negrophobia*. On the other hand, xenophobic violence is perpetuated by the poor. Together, these race and class coordinates point to an explanation of xenophobic violence in terms of failed transformation in South Africa. Valji (2003) links xenophobia to the rise of social service delivery protests, attributing both to the "violent competition [that] is playing out amongst the poor" and to the "absence of the long awaited benefits of democracy" (p. 13). Likewise, Nyamnjoh (2006) argues that poor African immigrants are targets because they are "often ready to settle for less than their market value and for more exploitation than their "liberated" South African counterparts can stomach" (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p. 31).

Interviews with supporters and perpetrators of xenophobic violence show how race and class are condensed together in the idea that foreigners stand in the way of transformation in South Africa. For example, one of the anti-foreigner protesters

interviewed by City Press in April 2015 attributed his unemployment to the presence of foreigners:

> And when for some reason you don't get paid at the end of the month, they [the foreigners] don't complain. When I complain, the bosses target me and say South Africans are full of s**t.
>
> The majority of employees at the security company I worked for are Zimbabwean. My manager is also Zimbabwean and he pushed me out saying I talk too much. And I was only standing up for my rights. Now I'm sitting unemployed unable to support my daughter and my wife. (Inside the angry xenophobic mob, 2015)

Foreigners are seen to stand in the way of the oppressed, undermining their protest against injustice. From this perspective, xenophobic violence is simply a way of claiming one's rights as an oppressed South African in a system that unfairly advantages foreigners. It is a form of collective action by an oppressed group against a system of illegitimacy.

Philippa Kerr identified similar arguments when she interviewed farm workers in De Doorns, a town in which grape farming is the main source of income, in the wake of a xenophobic attack on Zimbabwean migrants in November 2009. South African workers construed the cosy relationship between Zimbabweans workers and White farmers as a "kick in the teeth" for historically oppressed workers. As one interviewee said:

> in apartheid, they [the white people] gave us drink and so on. We made them great, but today they say we are bad … but all those years, we worked under them drunk … the white people chased us off the farms so that we are now sitting in squatter camps. And now they want to put other people from other countries in our place. (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013, p. 589)

The oppressed identity has its origins in apartheid and the history of racist exploitation on farms—that included the *dop-stelsel*, by which farm labourers were paid wages in wine—and is thus both class- and race-based. Today, this identification provides the platform for action against injustice in the form of concrete *cognitive alternatives*: the foreigners must return home, so we can get what is rightly ours.

Marikana

Marikana is a small town of close to 20,000 people in South Africa's Northwest. Founded in the late nineteenth century on farm land, agriculture remained the primary source of income until the 1970s when mining was introduced in the area. It soon took over as the main economic driver. Marikana made international news when, on 16 August 2012, clashes between the police and miners who had embarked on a wildcat strike led to the death of 34 people. It was the most lethal attack of members of the South African police force against civilians since the advent of democracy in South Africa. The protests in Marikana gave rise to strike action in other South African mines, and by the end of 2012 there had been more industrial action than in any other year since 1994. The number of strikes increased by 15.1 % in 2013, with mining houses losing the highest proportion (27.9 %) of the overall

number of working days lost due to strike action (Department of Labour, 2014). Poor working and living conditions and large pay disparities contribute to workers recognising organisational hierarchies as illegitimate, and themselves as marginalised and oppressed. This is explicitly mentioned by two mineworkers interviewed by Alexander, Lekgowa, Mmope, Sinwell, and Xezwi (2013):

> The conditions in the mines are those of oppression. (p. 96) South Africa is a democratic country but we as mineworkers are excluded from this democracy (p. 99)

In his analysis of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2013, Preston (2014) found that five of the 20 companies with the largest pay disparities between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and lowest paid workers were mining houses, including Lonmin, the mining company that employed the striking miners in Marikana. Letsoalo and Molele (2012) report in The Mail & Guardian newspaper that in 2012, an average mine worker earned 70,000 South African Rand, while the annual salary of Lonmin's Chief Executive Officer amounted to 24 million Rand. This gap is increasing: Between 2009 and 2013, average increases in CEO base salaries were 10 % per annum, while the average salaries across all employees increased by less than 8 % (Preston, 2014). This development together with the brutality used against the miners in Marikana further increases perceptions of oppression and paves the way for group collective action.

As outlined earlier in this chapter, identities are fluid and activated strategically. The identity of the oppressed among the mineworkers in Marikana provides an illustrative example. Unlike in the xenophobic attacks, nationality as a category of identification seemed to play no role; even though the largely Black and male mineworkers include Black individuals from deprived economic background from both South Africa *and* surrounding African countries. Differentiating between local and foreign workers had no relevance in the oppressed identity in this case. Equally so, race and gender, which are prominent categories of identification in many social contexts in South Africa, were mentioned, but did not seem to serve the construction of an oppressed identity in this particular context.

In fact, gender did not feature in any of the interviews with male miners presented by Alexander et al. (2013), though it appeared relevant to outsiders. Phakamile Hlubi, a reporter covering the events at Marikana for the TV station eNCA, for example, describes her experiences when trying to get close to the striking miners on 14 August 2012 in a documentary produced by Moloi and Naidoo (2013, 40:21):

> The first thing I noticed was that there were no women at all. […] we met up with a cameraman from SAPA [South African Press Agency], a white cameraman, and he asked for a lift in our car. So he was sitting in the back, two black females in the front driving towards this koppie. […] So she reverses the car and as we reversed the car somebody notices that we've got a white man in the car and then the atmosphere changed completely and instantly we could feel the hostility. One of the men yelled at us […] "There's a white person in the car". And you could tell at that stage we had a lot of the miners around the car. And they became very enraged. And suddenly they started running after the car. […] As women we had transgressed a law. We didn't realise that the miners had created this sacred space. And there were these rules. There were no women allowed, no white people allowed, no cellphones allowed.

Equally so, race was referred to in only few personal accounts by miners themselves, a possible indication that the close alignment between race and class in South Africa is slowly decreasing. The statement of a mother whose son was shot in the Marikana massacre illustrated this:

> Marikana was a sign of how things have changed since Mandela. Now we have a black government killing poor black people. Now we have black-on-black oppression. (Tolsi, 2013, "Mandela would have come for us", para. 19)

Those miners who did comment on the relationship between race and class indicated a variety of views on whether or not *Black* formed part of the category of the oppressed. While at times ways were found to equate race with class (e.g. "For one, a White person here in the mines gets a better pay than a Black person and they are more eligible for promotion and that oppress[es] us black people more" (Alexander et al., 2013, p. 99), it also became evident that there was some discomfort when this long-standing belief was challenged, as expressed by this miner:

> […] the second person who came back to us was black from management, not the one we wanted to talk to." (Alexander et al., 2013, p. 86).

The statement also indicates that race has become a less clear indicator of oppression in certain social situations. While the oppressed in the case of Marikana were Black, so were individuals in relevant higher status groups (management, government), meaning that a reference to race did not serve the creation of an oppressed identity. Instead, by far the most commonly referred to category in Alexander et al's (2013) interviews was related to class: that of the *worker*. The identity of the *worker* was constructed by differentiating him from other social groups. In the case of Marikana, it was distinguished explicitly from groups that were projected as being powerful; the government, the mine management, the police and also the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)—even though the union's sole purpose is to strengthen the plight of the worker. One mineworker stated:

> There must have been a deal between our management and NUM […]. So we told them [NUM] that we could see that they were unwilling to help us, so we will go to management ourselves, because we were the ones who were suffering, and they were just sitting comfortably and drinking tea […]. We have been struggling, while the union leaders were comfortable, drinking tea. When they have a problem, the management helps them quickly. (pp. 94–95)

The effect is a picture of the worker as isolated and oppressed:

> There are no parties fighting here, only workers, workers are fighting for their rights and they want their money and they are being killed by the NUM [National Union of Mineworkers] and [NUM President] Zokwana and the mine and the government that we vote for every day. (p. 86)

By highlighting the isolation and low status of the *worker*, perceptions of the illegitimacy of the status hierarchy are heightened and with it the likelihood to resort to *social competition* as a cognitive alternative among those whose oppressed identity has been mobilised.

Rhodes Must Fall

So, is it race or class that is the foundation for resistance in post-apartheid South Africa? This question became the focus of a somewhat unpleasant debate about social change between University of Cape Town (UCT) colleagues, Xolela Mangcu and Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, in the context of the "Rhodes must fall" protests on the campus and in the country since 2015. The "Rhodes must fall" campaign started in March 2015 with a Black student at UCT flinging human faeces onto a statue of Cecil John Rhodes, situated in a central place of the university's main campus. For years prior to this, there had been unsuccessful attempts to advocate for the statue's removal, which is seen as a symbol of colonisation and exploitation of Black people. Though the "poo protest" was condemned as inappropriate action in some quarters, it drew substantial media attention and facilitated the mobilisation of student action. Later in the same week, approximately 2,000 students protested for the removal of the statue. Further protest actions followed under the banner "Rhodes must fall", including a three week long occupation of the university's administrative building by a couple of hundred of almost exclusively Black students. The Rhodes statue quickly became a symbol for a lack of transformation in South African university culture, spreading to other historically White campuses and starting a debate about statues in other public spaces.

In their lead article, Seekings and Nattrass (2015), both White academics, argued that the politics of racial pain—as practised by some Black students in their protest against the Rhodes statue—obscures "other forms of injustice and indignity besides racism". They had in mind especially the class-based privileges that keeps "students from bad schools and poor backgrounds … whether Black or White", from enjoying education "at the elite institution of UCT" (all quotes para. 8). In essence, they were arguing that protesting students were a privileged lot, who were using arguments about racism to advance their agenda at the expense of the truly disadvantaged.

In his reply, Xolela Mangcu (2015) argued that racism is "a primary form of injustice and indignity" shared by Black South Africans regardless of class, "It is the existential pain of black people that Seekings and Nattrass will never have to experience" (para. 1). On the same website, in turn, Seekings and Nattrass accused Mangcu of flirting with class denialism, whereas Mangcu accused his colleagues that they "minimize racist injustice" (para. 23) with their liberal ideas and social policy that says "Bring us your poor and we will do good to them" (comment section).

Despite their differences, both parties were united in grounding their arguments and views about social change in characterisations of oppressed identities. It was politics of victimhood. Seekings and Nattrass' views were informed by concern for students from "truly disadvantaged backgrounds—almost all of whom are black" and "who grew up in an impoverished home and went to a typical rural school" (Mangcu, 2015, Reply by Jeremey Seeking and Nicoli Nattrass, para. 4). Likewise, Mangcu's views of change voiced concern for "the pain of Black people" (Mangcu, 2015, Reply by Xolela Mangcu, para. 8) who have been assaulted by racism all their lives, as has "been happening for 500 years" (Mangcu, 2015, para. 8).

Neither party would disagree that oppression in South Africa has both race and class elements. But the distinction becomes important in arguments like this because of the different rhetorical possibilities and constraints of race versus class framing of oppression. As a Black man, Mangcu is able to speak about the pain of racism in a way that Seekings and Nattrass cannot. For example, Mangcu can tell his colleagues that "Racism protected your privilege and dignity all your lives, and it assaulted me all my life" (Mangcu, 2015, Reply by Xolela Mangcu, para. 8). Seekings and Nattrass cannot deny this, but they can use class arguments to level the playing field. They are able to point to the potentially self-serving and self-interested nature of such race-based arguments by the class-based retort that "elite background and education advantage some people over others in the same racial group" (Mangcu, 2015, Reply by Jeremey Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, para. 4).

In addition to showing how effectively oppressed identities can be used to ground arguments for social change, the debate also shows how important first person narrations of such oppression can be. Whites are unable to speak of their experiences of the pain of racial oppression, and likewise the Black middle class are on shaky rhetorical ground when they privilege race over class. Nonetheless, as the debate shows, resistance and social change can be motivated both by oppressed peoples themselves and by advantaged peoples on behalf of the oppressed.

Conclusion

A wide range of values, ideologies and aspirations have been used to mobilise populations for social change. Foremost among these have been ideas about various kinds of social, economic and technological progress accomplished by groups and nations. Often these ideas have been advanced by dominant groups, who have sometimes articulated a racist vision of social change that has even included ethnic cleansing as a vehicle to achieve these aims (e.g. Nazi genocide).

In this chapter, we have identified another identity-based resource for articulating a vision of social change. It revolves around the construction of an oppressed identity and it develops a vision for social change by proposing concrete *cognitive alternatives*. The formula is simple: develop a portrayal of an unjustly oppressed and pained subject and advance a set of cognitive alternatives that resolves the illegitimacy and the oppression.

In the chapter, we have shown how this rhetorical resource was developed historically in South Africa. Although colonialism and apartheid produced resistance right from the start, it was a long time before the socio-psychological conditions were right for this to translate into a popular movement. Using the language of Tajfel and Turner (1979), we might say that a "social change" belief system had not yet emerged in which cognitive alternatives to oppression could be realised. We have argued that such a belief system did eventually arise as the product of political action, and that the central character of this system was the figure of the agent of change—the oppressed class of Black South Africans.

This category of identification allowed oppressed people in South Africa to act collectively to promote change in diverse areas—labour strikes, civil disobedience, protests against the regime and taking action against informers and agents of oppression within the Black community.

But the change from apartheid to democracy has not brought an end to protest and collective action. On the contrary, protest is more prevalent today than it has ever been. In this chapter, we have argued that the central figure in this protest is the character of the (racially) oppressed. The identity category and the social change belief system that were forged in the struggle against apartheid have been reformulated and reinvigorated in the post-apartheid context. They are powerful rhetorical and ideological resources for mobilising people, for resistance and for collective action.

In our brief review of three moments of contemporary struggle, we have shown how the discourse of oppressed identities can be flexibly tailored to diverse race, class and political interests, and can even be used by the relatively privileged to mobilise others for one or another vision of social change.

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Chapter 12
Social Identity and Conflict in Northern Uganda

Grace Lapwoch and Kennedy Amone-P'Olak

In Uganda, ethnic identity has been crucial in defining intergroup relationships at local, regional and national levels (Stonehouse, 2011). This chapter draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to explain intergroup relations in post-independent Uganda. After independence, ethnic identities have pervaded political parties and national institutions, such as the army and civil service, and have determined access to national resources. Although many factors including economic, religious and political have been associated with the political turmoil that engulfed Uganda after independence, shared allegiance constructed around common ethnic identity has made a significant contribution (Stonehouse, 2011). In Uganda, social identity has been associated with the polity, governance, cultural divide and conflicts both before and after the advent of colonial administration. As such, social identity may be understood in terms of ethnicity, religion, political factions, regionalism, physical appearance, gender, culture, and social class.

In this chapter, we focus on social identity in light of ethnic characteristics, social events and group membership, and their relation to conflict. In particular, we aim to point out the importance of social identity in relation to changes that have occurred in Uganda since the colonial era and perhaps led to the two and half decades of conflict in Northern Uganda. Before we draw from social identity theory and delve into explaining intergroup relations, it would be important to give a background to the recent history of Uganda.

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Colonisation and Ethnic Identity

Uganda is a former British colony with a population of approximately 35 million people and about 56 different ethnic groups (Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS], 2014). The population can be largely divided into the Bantu-speaking people who occupy the Southern part of the country (e.g. Baganda and Basoga); the Nilo-Hamites (e.g. Iteso and Karimojong) who live mainly in the Eastern and Northeastern part of the country; the Nilotics (e.g. Acholi and Alur) who live in the middle North of the country; and the Sudanic (e.g. the Lugbara and Kakwa), who occupy the Northwestern part of the country. Uganda gained independence from the British administration in 1962. The Acholi are the Luo-speaking people, believed to originate from the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal in Southern Sudan, and are known to have settled in part of Northern Uganda before the colonial era (see Okello, 2011 for full account of the Luo Origin of Civilisation). With further decentralisation, the Acholi districts have been divided into districts of Gulu, Amuru, Nwoya, Kitgum, Pader, Lamwo and Agago (UBOS, 2014). These Acholi districts were affected by the recent insurgency that occurred in Northern Uganda, and arguably at least every family have had their own share of the war. The Acholi have been stereotyped as "warriors" and a "martial" ethnic group both during the colonial time and in the postcolonial era. This stereotype may have led to greater suffering amongst the Acholi people, thus leading to further economic disparity and decline in the livelihood of the Acholi people in the current post-conflict period.

Although the colonial rule appears to have played a major role in shaping ethnic identity in Africa (Atkinson, 1994), it may be argued that the origin of culture and social identity of ethnic groups, in particular the Acholi, may be traced back to the precolonial period. Traditionally, the Acholi tribes were viewed by the British colonialist as warriors and perceived to be strong, with "fierce" looking characteristics. During the British rule, the perception of "elite warriors" did not go unnoticed. The colonial administration mainly recruited people from Acholi and Lango in the armed forces because they were aggressive and physically tall while they recruited and preferred ethnic Buganda in the civil service arguing that they were "intelligent, polite with good mannerisms" (see Amone, 2014). This led to under-representation of the Luo ethnic group in the white-collar jobs and over-representation in the army (Nannyonjo, 2005).

Apart from being grouped as belonging to the two major groups, the Nilotic and Bantu ethnic groups; people of Uganda have also been grouped according to the four major regions, Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western. Within these regions, the divide also follows tribal identification, with at least 56 tribes/languages identified in Uganda. This ethnic diversity was exploited by the British colonialists and post-independent leaders in two ways. First, by recruiting the people of Northern Uganda, mainly from the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups into the armed forces and the Bantu-speaking people of the south into civil service, the British and postcolonial administrators created the perception of the "martial" tribes and "civil tribes" among these ethnic groups (Lomo, Hovil, & Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), 2004;

Mamdani, 1996). This led to stereotype-based discrimination in employment into the armed forces and the civil service in Uganda (Lomo et al., 2004; Mamdani, 1996). Second, the British policies of "divide and rule" and "indirect rule" (Finnstrom, 2008) promoted ethnic division in which groups were effectively kept from engaging in political opposition, since no group could grow large enough to challenge the British and their colonial rule (Lomo et al., 2004; Mamdani, 1996).

Postcolonial Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity in the postcolonial era continued to reflect what the British propagated. For example, the majority of positions in the public service were filled with people from the south, even during the first leadership of Milton Obote, whilst the top positions in the armed forces were occupied by people from Acholi and Lango. Although this trend continued during the reign of Idi Amin, the Langi and Acholi soldiers perceived to be agents of Obote were ill-treated and many were killed. During the rule of Obote II and Okello Tito, Acholi commanders were elevated to higher ranks, but this was short lived as many of them were either killed or flee to exile. These historical changes and shift in power have seen many people from the Bantu-ethnic group, in particular the Banyankole, take over many public service and private sector jobs, in addition to some becoming top army commanders in the Uganda People Defence Force (UPDF).

The politics of favouritism of some tribes over others, from the time Milton Obote reigned as the first prime minister, to various Ugandan presidents seems to have been carried over to the current period. Thus, perceptions of social identity appear to be passed on (indirectly and directly) to the younger generation, who are arguably eager to continue perpetuating the same or similar attitudes. Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that leaders in Uganda have relied on their ethnic groups as reliable political and military constituencies to govern and maintain power.

Perception of Identity

According to International Alert (2013), youths in Uganda (especially those from the northern and western part of the country) appear to associate mainly with their ethnic group. At the same time, people in Uganda do show allegiance to their national identity, through symbols such as the coat of arms and the national flag, but ethnicity, geographical demarcation, religion and political factions seem to jeopardise the unity and equality that a common national identity can bring.

Individuals in Uganda use the presence of stereotypical physical characteristics to determine group membership, such as skin complexion, height and physical attributes. In describing the Northerners (Nilotic and Nilo-hamites), characteristics such as having a dark skin complexion, being tall and physically built have been

used; a stereotype which passes on from generation to generation among the people in Uganda. The type of food consumed, such as millet and cassava which are high in energy, also appears to have been associated with the people from Northern Uganda. On the contrary, people in the southern part of Uganda (Bantu-speaking groups) have mainly been perceived as having light skin complexion with a rounded soft body and with less physical strength. Their main staple foods tend to be "matoke" (green bananas) and potatoes which appear to be soft and low on calories, compared to millet and cassava. Until recently, perhaps in the last two decades, peanut butter (*commonly known as odii in Luo language*) had also been mainly associated with the Acholi and Langi people from Northern Uganda. This may be attributed to internal migration and displacement as a result of war which saw most people from Northern Uganda settle in the central region for security reasons, and perhaps other parts of the country, particularly those who served in the armed and police forces. Having migrated with their cultural food in the community and through intermingling in boarding schools, "odii" has become a popular delicacy among many tribes in Uganda.

In addition to physical appearance, names also indicate group membership. Within Buganda, for example, names are clearly identifiable with a clan. This attachment to names within the Baganda culture appears to protect Baganda from the same clan from marrying people they supposedly call their "brothers" or "sisters", but they can marry from other clans. In Uganda, mainly "Christian" names are to some extent also used to take on similar propensity of the Catholic or Protestant faiths, and similarly religious names are associated with the Muslim faith. However, another complexity of using names appears to be related to the ethnic groups. For example, surnames beginning with letters "O" and "A" are perceived to be associated with males and females from the northern region, while those with letters "R", "T" and "K" have been associated with people from the western region and those with letters "S" and "N" mainly associated with the males and females from the Baganda ethnic group. With recent "development" in the post-conflict Northern Uganda, many people, in particular those of the Christian faith, have adopted a new trend in child-naming. They appear to prefer the use of biblical words or meaning, for example, Rwotomiyo, *Rwotlagen*, *Lakica*, and *Lubangakene*.

Religious Identity

Religion is very significant for people in Uganda, young and old, with many institutions, including education and the first political parties (International Alert, 2013) being founded on religious values. Religion, however, coexists with ethnicity. Political groups are not only based on the dichotomy of Catholic–Protestant dimensions, there are other religious groups such as Muslim, Seventh Day Adventist and the Pentecostal sectors that have led to a complex "criss-cross" in social identities. This is similar to Crisp, Hewstone, and Cairns' (2001) observation from work in Northern Ireland that argues that "information concerning in-group and out-group

members was processed as an interactive function of both religion and gender inter-group dimensions" (p. 501). Arguably, it is this multifactorial complexity that needs to be understood in trying to explain the conflicts in Uganda. For example, the inter-religious wars in Buganda, between the Catholics and the Protestants, appear to have been caused by increased influence of European missionaries over the Kabaka and the Kingdom of Buganda (for history of Christianity in Uganda, see Ward, 1991). Therefore, inter-religious conflict appears to have shaped the basis on which political parties in Uganda are formed.

Political Groups

Political groups in Uganda, founded on the basis of religion and ethnicity, have sprung from the postcolonial time to the present day. Leaders in Uganda appear to blame their predecessors for governing the country based on ethnic factions. For example, the Obote I and II government were criticised for favouring people from the Acholi and Lango subregion. It is this perception that appears to have created the formation of the National Resistance Army (NRA), predominantly formed by members from the same ethnic group in Western Uganda that led to the "Bush" war. Nevertheless the idea of ethnic interests, both at individual and communal levels, may also have led to the formation of the Holy Spirit Movement of self-styled prophetess Alice Lakwena and later, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, that may have exacerbated the two and half decades of conflict in Northern Uganda (See Finnstrom, 2006 cited in Amone, 2015).

Post-independence parties such as the Democratic Party (DP) are primarily for Catholics and Uganda People's Congress (UPC) is dominated by Protestants. The idea that many parties seem to be integrated can be explained in terms of choice of social identity. For example, an individual can choose which religion to belong to, but not his or her ethnic group. Doornboss used this perception to explain the changes that took place in the postcolonial era between the Bahima and Bairu, as they identified with a particular political party despite their different religious backgrounds (see Doornboss, 1978 cited in Byaruhanga, 1999). Today, there appears to be a mixture of ethnic groups moving from one party to another. For example, the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups in Northern Uganda, and the Ateso, Kumam and Jopadhola groups in eastern Uganda, who were mainly UPC sympathisers appear to have joined other parties like the NRM and FDC; and a few may have defected to the DP, thus forging a common identity and reducing conflicts. This is in line with the common identity model of reducing intergroup bias by influencing social attitudes and enhancing personal well-being espoused by Gaertner and Dovidio (2000).

Although the current ruling party (NRM) seems to have integrated party members from different religious and ethnic groups, the majority of members are from Western Uganda. Arguably, this could be the reason why the current government appears to favour members from the western region more than their counterparts from other regions within the country. Alternatively, it could be that there is an

underlying ideology of "identity politics", in particular in the civil service and higher ranks in private sectors. An independent writer Morris Komakech, meanwhile, argues that political parties in Uganda are not only built on religious identity but also along "tribal" lines. He suggests that past and present political groups have served to divide the country by ethnic groups and that these groups suffer from identity conflicts that tend to lead to crisis in loyalty to Uganda and the public service. In agreement, opposition parties are blaming the government for favouring people from the western part of the country, as equated to the unequal share of the "national cake". It could therefore be argued that these ethnic divides in the postcolonial era have caused so many social changes and conflicts in Uganda. It appears as though every individual who assumes power does it with the idea to favour their own people in competition for economic goods based on the idea of sharing with your "own".

We argue that inequalities and control over state resources may be the main source of political conflict in Uganda and therefore understanding ethnic inequality and reconciling differences may reduce this gap and create peace. Whether the trend in ethnic inequality is revenge or just an identity crisis may warrant further research. Nonetheless, it is plausible that unless the cycle of ethnic identity favouritism is broken and "togetherness" is employed, as per the Ugandan Motto, "For God and my Country"; Uganda will continue to suffer from political conflict and civil war. How this should be done is a challenge that every aspiring leader needs to address. Perhaps leaders should be at the forefront to discourage conflict between ethnic groups and rather sow the spirit of nationalism. It may be suggested that African leaders could borrow "a leaf", not all of course, from the outgoing President Jose "Pepe" Mujica of Uruguay with regard to using state resources. Perhaps Africa would cease to see the repeat cycle of conflict that appears to be based on ethnic inequality, other than "tribal" hatred. Not forgetting that this may have been an individual's identity, but also understanding that some lessons could be learnt in terms of sharing state resources equally across the country to minimise conflict.

More importantly, intergroup contact, interaction and integration among different political and ethnic groups may create an opportunity to reduce intergroup conflict and prejudice and promote conflict resolution as espoused by Allport (1954) at the height of racial segregation in the USA and interpersonal relations among political leaders (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). For example, "the potential application of crossed categorisation research to the development of intervention strategies" (Crisp et al., 2001, p. 510) could help to reduce intergroup conflict. Therefore, it would be important to explore the basis of multiple group identification, in particular, crossed-categorisation in determining how information concerning group members is processed within the Ugandan context where one facet of political party (NRM) is considered dominant. Although it appears as though ethnic group could also be a dominant basis for social categorisation in Uganda; it would require empirical research, may be in an experimental context, to explore the salience of social categorisation in order to understand its impact on the repeat cycle of conflicts observed in Uganda in the postcolonial period.

Ethnic Group Prejudices

Uganda is an ethnic medley with each group comprising different tribal facets and distinct dialects. This ethnic diversity is often accompanied by prejudices that seem to take on a dyadic relationship. For example, an ethnic group considered to be superior may hold their own biases towards those considered less superior and vice versa. Thus, within the intergroup context, emotions may cause individuals to process information about members of the other group. According to Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, and Hunsinger (2009), such induced emotional states can increase unconscious prejudice towards the out-group members.

As such, it appears that specific emotions may arise as a response to social groups (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008). Take the 2009 Buganda riot and the concurrent 2010 Kasubi riot 2010 in Uganda's capital city Kampala as illustrative examples. Riots appeared to have developed when the Kabaka of Buganda was stopped from travelling to a youth ceremony in Bugerere (Mukono district), and afterwards the Kasubi Tombs were gutted by fire. The riots highlighted the suspected tension between the state and the supporters of the Buganda Kingdom (mainly the Baganda ethnic group). During these riots many people were stopped and asked to either sing the Buganda Anthem or pronounce the word "Namungoona" (a name to one of the city suburb), as a means to deduce ethnic group membership through accent. Arguably, this led to the emotional responses towards out-groups (including anger) and subsequent violence directed towards those who could not sing the anthem or correctly pronounce the word. Sadly, if not resolved, this complex situation could lead to growing animosity between the state and the Baganda, as well as other minority out-group members.

Although it appears that intergroup tension and conflict are characterised primarily by emotional responses to in-group love and out-group hate, it may also be suggested that most postcolonial conflict in Africa is not just a result of these emotional responses, but rather as a result of inequality among ethnic groups. Perhaps this may confirm Tajfel and Turner's (1986) argument that the preference individuals hold for their in-group may be important in understanding social problems. For the case of intergroup conflicts in Uganda, it would warrant further social psychological research into understanding the preference, beliefs and attitudes that ethnic groups hold about their own and other social groups.

To some extent, therefore, the categorisation of ethnic groups in the precolonial and during the colonial era in Northern Uganda seems to explain the prejudices and stereotype that ethnic groups hold towards out-group members, with the Acholi people remaining the disadvantaged group in this society. Yet, such categorisation appears to be an essential process that reflects social reality and helps us to understand the world around us. In fact, a tendency to categorise people appears to be the basis for prejudice and discrimination; but with no distinction between individuals, discrimination may not be observed among intergroup members (see Schaller, & Maass, 1989 cited in Crisp et al., 2001).

Identity and Conflict

Perhaps unsurprisingly, ethnic-related conflicts have been occurring in Uganda since before the pre- and postcolonial period. Since independence, the main conflict has been between the Nilotic from the northern region, and the Bantu from the southern region. This history has seen three personalities from Nilotic-Sudanic speaking group as head of state of Uganda, namely: Milton Obote, Idi Amin Dada and Okello Tito Lutwa, with Obote having ruled twice. The National Resistance Army (NRA) and the Bush war led by President Museveni was organised to overthrow Tito Okello. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) war, led by Joseph Kony, was speculated to also have been planned to overthrow President Yoweri Museveni. These two rebellions were believed to have been based on the social identity of the Banyankole and Acholi ethnic group, respectively. Meanwhile, another rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), that operated in the western border of Uganda was based on what appeared to be an Islamic radical ideology. Focusing on ethnic identity and religious ideology, the diversity within these groups appeared to have led to the outbreak of civil wars in Uganda.

Previous literature has suggested that identity is conflict in itself (an exhaustive account can be found in Byaruhanga, 1999). Therefore, it is plausible to note that political groups based on identity may split the country along ethnic and religious precincts that is likely to create political conflict, as evident in genesis of civil wars in Uganda (see Dolan, 2009; Finnstrom, 2008). While living in a country with protracted conflict is known to affect an individual's identity, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2011) report that people tend to strongly identify with ethnic group as opposed to the national identity. This is supported by Lapwoch and Cairns' (2012) findings where mothers from three different villages viewed the impact of the LRA conflict as a collective suffering that "the Acholi mothers" experienced. Mothers in these focus groups related more with the Acholi group and only identified themselves as Ugandans when they discussed matters related to peace, in terms of unity with other ethnic groups. Although social identity theory observes that people who identify with a group tend to favour their own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; See Hogg, 2016 for more details), it may be of great importance for political groups to learn to respect each other not only on the basis of ethnic or religious identity but as human beings in need of sanctuary, and to create "Nationalistic" ideology and reconciliation of differences. In fact, learning other people's culture and language could be a good starting point to integration.

It may be argued that social identity is influenced by both external and internal factors. In addition to ethnicity and religion, groups appear to identify themselves by theory of difference or emotional feelings, belongingness, collective memories, and cultural expectations (Byaruhanga, 1999). Even though ethnic identity appears to be governed by cultural, economic and political factors, it may be that ethnic identities in Uganda are relatively isolated by differences in language and culture. The diversity in ethnic groups appears to cause social problems and conflict. In fact, Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2011) report that ethnic diversity is a predictor of the occurrence of civil wars.

Byaruhanga in his chapter on "Social Identity and Conflict: A Positive Approach" explains that social identity is based on cultural practices and ideology. However, with the immense pressure from either side of the political factions, the social structure of the Acholi appeared to have created social breakdown that seems to persist in the post-conflict period (see Dolan, 2009). From history, it appears that cultural practices such as traditional dances, songs and informal education conducted at the *wang oo* (fire place) were woven into the social fabric that created togetherness and harmony. Yet, these are structures that Chris Dolan appears to explain in his book on "Social Torture" as being lost to war. To reflect on tradition and cultural practices that may have kept the Acholi cohesion intact before the conflict between LRA and Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), restoration of these practices could be of great importance in creating peaceful environment.

Recently, the people of Acholi appear to embrace cultural revivals. Therefore, we argue that reviving traditional practices and cultural values could be used to help people to work through the past, restore social cohesion and create a new identity in the post-conflict era. Although culture is perceived as a factor that can influence social identity tensions, if not incorporated and accepted by future generations, it may also cause recurrent conflict. That said, it would be of great importance if the dynamics that surrounds it evolves as time changes. For example, it is argued that

> Current tension exposed in the research indicates that this evolution is precarious in northern Uganda and more work led by cultural leaders is needed to strike a balance between the generations. This will enable the community to move forward collectively. Dynamic cultural support will also help communities recognise the importance, value and rights of other groups in Uganda, which is critical to national reconciliation (The Pincer Group Limited Report, 2010, p. 33).

Therefore, it could be suggested that factors relating to social identity may enhance the peace process and reconciliation among the Acholi people and other ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, Lapwoch and Cairns (2012) noted that mothers in focus groups described their pain and suffering during the LRA war by using collectivist terms such as "we", "our", "us", "mothers" and "the Acholis". Their individual description at the collective level could have portrayed their allegiance to Acholi/Luo identity having gone through similar traumatic experiences. Yet, these same mothers also used similar words to emphasise their Acholi and Ugandan identity in advocating for forgiveness, peace and reconciliation, the emphasis to end the war and refrain from repeat cycle of conflict between the government and "their" son Kony. Perhaps this signifies that social identity is not only conflict-inducing but also a solution to conflict that may help in creating lasting peace.

LRA Conflict in Northern Uganda

Among the Acholi people, war and conflict have been frequent throughout the Luo history (Atkinson, 1994). Intragroup conflicts were mainly observed through fights between different clans among the Acholi people; however, it is intergroup conflict

which is more prominent. For example, the LRA conflict is perceived to have been a fight between the Southerners and the Northerners (Banyankole vs. the Luo ethnic group) with regard to their differences in political ideology, as opposed to the misunderstanding between Bahima and Bairu from the Banyankole group or the Acholi and the Langi from the Luo group. Although there appears to be conflict at the individual level (tribal), social identity in terms of the region (collective level) appears to be paramount in the conflicts observed in Uganda, as many people in conflict areas appear to identify with their own ethnic group (Rohner et al., 2011).

The use of mixed/multiple identities was prominent during the LRA conflict. For example, at the peak of the war, people who moved to the Internally Displaced Camps (IDP) were considered by the rebels to belong to the government. At the same time, those who were still living in their homesteads were also alleged to belong to the rebel group (mother's focus group, in Lapwoch, 2014). The Acholi identity, though eminent, appeared to have been muddled within the identity of the rebels and/or the government during the peak of the conflict. It is likely that this crisis created a very intense relationship between the two factions and the innocent Acholi people, who appeared to be in a dilemma as to where they belong.

This identity crisis caused the indigenous Acholi people to make choices, either to show their allegiance to the rebels as "kinsmen" or to the government as "protector" at the cost of heightening the conflict, which saw many being massacred or having their limbs mutilated. The choice of belonging, perhaps, may explain why the Acholi people continue to be blamed for the war. However, we would also like to note that the choice of social identity for children in Northern Uganda is very complex. Many children abducted by the rebels were forced to choose the ideology of their captors at the cost of their own lives or that of the family members (Eichstaedt, 2009). What would a vulnerable child choose given this oppressive circumstance? We would therefore prefer not to compare the choice made by formerly abducted children, with freedom of choice observed between the Bahima and Bairu (see Byaruhanga, 1999) or perhaps the Acholi and Langi to join political party as per the circumstances that seem continue to surround them in the postcolonial era.

Identity and Peacebuilding

An entire generation in the Acholi subregion has grown up knowing only war and violence. This includes children born in camps during the height of war and those born to mothers in captivity, as well as those who were young when the conflict began. We suggest that a common identity of "children born of war", instead of different identities such as child born in IDP, town centres and captivity, in addition to their ethnic identity, would cause more confusion and conflict. Byaruhanga (1999) argues that it is not only an expression of conflict that occurs at both collective and individual level, "but also the possibilities of its rebalancing, reconciliation and tension resolution" (p. 107). Given the multiple identities of the Acholi children born

during the war and the fact that most of these children may have lost their parents to war, there could be a "fear factor" embedded in revenge in the future generation. This is most likely to depend on the information that children receive within their environment, whether they are sowing seeds of revenge or reconciliation as per their ethnic identity.

Whilst it may be argued, based on space and ideology, that different clans within the Acholi ethnic group would go to war (Atkinson, 1994), it could also be argued that it is on the basis of common cultural practices that these clans would reconcile. An example of this would be the *Mato Oput*, which is being advocated for reconciliation and the restoration of peace among the Acholi people. *Mato Oput* is a traditional ritual and process practised by the Acholi ethnic group whose aim is to restore relations among people who have been affected by either an intentional murder or accidental killing (Amone-P'Olak, 2006; Liu Institute for Global Issues, Gulu District NGO, & Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005). Although this seems to be criticised by most people of Christian faith as "satanic", some religious leaders appear to have embraced its place in the peacebuilding process.

Byaruhanga (1999) suggests that it is important to understand identity in terms of "conflictual relation" in order to work towards reconciliation, in particular looking at the context of personal and social identity as being mutually connected. Perhaps, looking at one's self and others as being interconnected and with the "spirit of togetherness" could be a solution to the repeat cycle of conflicts observed in Uganda and in other parts of Africa. In fact, Leggett (2001) argues that it is critical to tackle the way identity is perceived in terms of religion, political ideology and ethnic groups which appear to have caused divisions in Uganda in order to reduce and replace this perception with "a stronger sense of nationhood and national identity, the role of economic and social development as a means of minimising differences, rather than accentuating them" (p. 10).

Although it may seem clear that conflict, tension and hate occur within the individual and collective level, it is also apparent that reconciliation and peacebuilding may take on a similar trend. Therefore, it could be suggested that the northerners could reconcile with the southerners. There could also be reconciliation within the different clans in the Acholi subregions, in particular, people who feel that individuals from other clans caused them pain and misery during the war. In addition, other tribes within the Luo ethnic groups and the neighbouring region who appeared to have blamed the Acholi tribe for the atrocities committed in the northern region could also participate in this process of healing and forgiveness. Perhaps this could pave way for both individual and collective healing from what Volkan termed as "collective trauma" (Volkan, 2006 cited in Lapwoch, 2014).

Learning from other parts of the world, in particular South Africa and Northern Ireland, where various attempts appear to have been made to use integration to solve intergroup conflicts, Uganda could use similar techniques. For example, integrating ethnic, religious and political groups to create a common "national identity" could be one approach to help promote peace. That said, solving the issue of social identity related conflict is complex, particularly as tensions in Uganda have been exacerbated by the transgenerational transmission of group perception of war knowledge.

As such, particular prejudices may be being passed on from one generation to another. Therefore, it is important that information about ethnicity and religion is given to the younger generation with positivity in a clear package within a non-ambiguous socioecological environment. Given the fact that almost every generation in a protracted conflict has their intake of conflict, it is upon everybody who cares about peace in their country to pass information about intergroup relations within a very supportive socioecological system. Perhaps this may help in shaping children's perception of other ethnic or religious groups which appear to be the main source of conflict, in order to create harmony within different social groups. Alternatively, considering the fact that social categorisation is not a single unit, but one that can combine different facets, may also be of great importance to help us understand and perhaps reduce intergroup prejudices and conflict.

Conclusion

Ethnic diversity and social identity tensions appear to have caused many conflicts in Uganda and around the world. It is important that we understand the causes and consequences of this for peace because social identity is a concept that may not be wiped away; it is vital for our self-esteem (see Martiny & Rubin, 2016) and identity narrative and norms continue to live from generation to generation. We argue that to solve social crises that have been observed to be the root cause of many conflicts would require an understanding of identity within the social sphere, and the internal and external factors that cause such identity crises. With this in mind, national leaders arguably need to develop strategies to ensure equal opportunities and status, devise ways of cooperation, identify common goals, and support social and institutional authorities for its different ethnic groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Once the conflicting nature of social identity is understood, it could be plausible to work towards peacebuilding, while incorporating crossed-categorisation and identity that individuals are "clothed" with.

Although various writers have reported on ethnicity and conflict in Uganda, there is still limited literature on social identity drawn from empirical social psychological research that may be used to support literature that has already been documented in the field of economics, political science and history. Therefore, we would suggest that future researchers devote time into studying social identity in relation to the repeat cycle of conflicts observed in Uganda.

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Chapter 13
Representations of Social Identities in Rwanda

Sigrun Marie Moss

It is not like 'I am who I am because I am Hutu or Tutsi.' Before the genocide, this was the reality. The little divisionism left in Rwanda comes from the history we have. Our top leadership is planting a sense of unity, and wish to avoid divisionism. Since we are trying to avoid the divisions, we do not talk about the issues that divide us. Also if we talk about the genocide, we have to answer who was it who killed Tutsi? It was Hutu.

Young Tutsi male (11P, 2011).

In 1994, up to a million people were killed in Rwanda. The victims were mostly Tutsi, but also included an estimated 40,000 moderate Hutu who wanted coexistence with Tutsi, rather than extremist measures. The perpetrators were mainly Hutu. The nature of the divide between Hutu (85 % of the population), Tutsi (14 %) and Twa (1 %) is contested (Kiwuwa, 2012). There are stereotypical physical differences, but the groups share language, culture and religion. These subordinate identities have been actively manipulated throughout history. Increasingly, from 1959, the Hutu government claimed the Tutsi were foreigners who should "go back to Ethiopia where they came from". This anti-Tutsi rhetoric escalated and resulted in the genocide. Many accused the Tutsi-led army of committing atrocities against Hutu after the genocide. Handling these polarised "ethnic" identities was a key challenge for the Rwandan government post-genocide, and they have taken a radical approach: attempting to *replace* these "ethnic" identities with the national identity. This identity approach is akin to social psychology's single recategorisation model. This chapter focuses on what the representations of these social identities—the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa—are now, and how respondents justify these different representations. This is key in terms of the identity approach the government has taken. In single recategorisation, the subordinate identities are to be cast off. Abolishing consequential and salient identities is challenging, and particularly so soon after extreme

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intergroup conflict. The success of the single recategorisation process is likely to depend on the salience (see Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006) and the associated definitions of these subordinate identities. Each group has their view of the world, their social construction or social representations of reality serving as the basis for individual thought and interpretation of the world. In Rwanda, however, the question remains: what constitutes the groups, and what representations do people have of these subordinate identities? If these identities are perceived as ethnic, these may in consequence be seen as more static and "essential" compared to other social identity representations (e.g. social class), which may be seen as more malleable. Now, 22 years after the genocide, it is important to look at how Rwandans speak of these subordinate identities in Rwanda. Are they seen as true, false, essential, ethnic or non-ethnic? It is important to unravel what these groups are to people, as this will influence responses to the policy of single recategorisation.

Social Recategorisation

In social recategorisation, as stipulated in the common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), intergroup bias is attempted to be decreased through restructuring group categorisations. Through the inclusion in a common in-group identity, positive in-group bias should be extended to former out-group members. The model has received strong empirical support (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; González & Brown, 2006). Dovidio et al. (1997) found that the more distinct groups felt as a common group, the more the intergroup bias was reduced in evaluations, self-disclosure and helping behaviour. In research on European Portuguese and African Portuguese children, Guerra et al. (2010) found that recategorisation strategies produced positive attitudes toward the out-group children.

However, recategorisation is difficult. Most of the research has been done in laboratories, and proves harder to achieve in real life (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), especially in highly politicised contexts (see Brewer, 1997) and contexts involving powerful ethnic categorisations (Hewstone, 1996). Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic (1998) found resistance to recategorisation even in laboratory studies. As emphasised by Rutchick and Eccleston (2010): "it is not easy to induce people to set aside who they are" (p. 110).

There are two main recategorisation models: dual, where both subordinate and superordinate identities are retained, and single, in which the subordinate identities are replaced by the superordinate (as in Rwanda). These are closely related to strategies of multiculturalism and assimilation (Dovidio, Saguy, Gaertner, & Thomas, 2012). Preferences for a dual identity are related to preferences for multiculturalism, and preferences for the single identity are related to preferences for assimilation (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000). Crisp et al. (2006) found that the measured increased bias in high identifiers when subordinate groups were attempted recategorised into a superordinate identity was attenuated when room was given for the

subordinate identity to remain salient within the salient superordinate identity. However, the dual approach can make it more difficult to overcome conflict because the conflict categories are retained (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), which can make the sense of common identity difficult to sustain, and a return to conflict may thereby be more likely.

In the single approach, on the other hand, the subordinate categories are attempted to be *replaced* with the superordinate identity. In settings where one-group representation is the goal, the single approach has been more effective in reducing intergroup bias than the dual (e.g., studies on corporate mergers and stepfamilies, see Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001). This is in contrast to two-groups within one representation, for example, Africans and Europeans at the same school. According to Gaertner and Dovidio (2000), in contexts aiming for one-group representations "the continued existence of the earlier subgroup identities (even simultaneously with a superordinate identity) may be perceived as a sign that the amalgamation process is failing." (p. 101). However, the dual approach is widely criticised. According to social identity tradition, people strive to be part of positively valued groups, to ensure positive self-imagery. This entails motivation for positive differentiation. Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory (1991) postulates a need for balancing distinctiveness and inclusion. The single recategorisation approach hinders distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). The abolishing of subordinate identities can lead to social identity threat, especially likely to be experienced by high identifying group members (Crisp et al., 2006). Recategorisation can also lead to group members trying to retain their distinct identity, and thereby maintaining a high level of intergroup bias, (Dovidio, Gaertner, Hodson, Houlette, & Johnson, 2005), or experience an *increase* in intergroup bias as a reaction to the recategorisation (Dovidio et al., 1998).

In general, the dual approach has been more widely supported (Crisp et al., 2006; González & Brown, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). However, Dovidio et al. (2005) found that the dual identity approach can have a positive initiation effect, but single recategorisation may work better in the long run even if this may include an initial upsurge in conflict levels. This means that some contexts may be better served with the radical single approach as this offers an "escape" from the conflict categories (see Moss & Vollhardt, 2015 for a discussion of single recategorisation as a potential temporary approach).

Research also finds general differences in preferences between majority and minority group members, where the former prefer the single approach and the latter the dual (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007). This will vary with context, and what goals the groups have (Guerra et al., 2010). Related are issues of power; in cases where a high power group defines the content and specifics of the superordinate identity, minorities may not be included (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006). These variations and the potential negative ramifications of recategorisation emphasise the need to know more about in what contexts the different approaches will increase or decrease intergroup harmony. The trajectory of the recategorisation will be connected to what representations people have of the identities in question. Exploring these issues in the Rwandan context allows a rare window onto a single recategorisation policy put into life through comprehensive policies. Being able to

discuss the "abolished" "ethnic" categories with both political leaders and general population offers access to narratives on current Rwandan social fabric. Such contextually grounded non-Western identity representations seldom emerge within recategorisation research.

Empirical Background

Rwanda has a population of 12.1 million. The group divide has been in place for a long time, but how these groups differ is subject to debate (see Eltringham, 2004; Mamdani, 2001). The differences between the groups have been connected with social class, power and representation, with Tutsi as higher ranking (though, many Tutsi were also poor). In this reading of the categories, Tutsi were identified as being nearer power, and Hutu seen more as subjects (Mamdani, 2001). The groups have also been referred to as ethnic, often referencing the stereotypical physical differences (taller, lighter Tutsi with longer, smaller noses), and the "Hamitic myth" in which Tutsi are said to originate from Ethiopia. In 1933, the Belgian colonisers introduced ethnic identity cards, institutionalising the already existing subordinate group divide, making it likely that Rwandan social solidarity was greater before the Belgians arrived than after (Hintjens, 2001). Tutsi were the ruling class, but from 1959 the situation started changing. The Hutu overtook power during the "Rwandan revolution", in which thousands of Tutsi were killed, fled and were expelled from jobs and schools through quota programmes (Newbury, 1998). Tutsi in exile were denied re-entry to Rwanda (on accounts of the country being "full"), and anti-Tutsi propaganda increased. The Uganda-based Tutsi-led rebel movement Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda in October 1990 to topple the Hutu government. The war culminated in the 1994 genocide. RPF, under current President Kagame, won the war, and ended the 100 days genocide.

The current Rwandan government's identity approach is comprehensive. There are several programmes and policies in place to mobilise the Rwandan identity and demobilise the ethnic identities. These include an extensive value-training programme (Itorero), re-education camps to prepare and reintroduce prisoners and former rebel group members to society (Ingando), the grassroots justice mechanism (Gacaca), and monthly mandatory community work (Umuganda; see Straus & Waldorf, 2011 for several of these programmes and policies). The government has also replaced the flag, the national anthem, rewritten curricula and laws, and changed the second official language from French to English (demonstrating, as discussed above, the power an elite has to influence what the official, practised identity content should be). Further, there is a comprehensive government narrative on Rwandan identities, presenting the Rwandan identity as the true identity, and the "ethnic" identities as alien constructions, used to the disadvantage of the people. The essential Rwandan identity thus stands in contrast to the non-essential "ethnic" social constructs (Moss, 2014; see also Vandeginste, 2014). Strict anti-divisionism laws hinder alternative public narratives, where the concepts of Hutu and Tutsi are only accepted when discussing the genocide (Amnesty International, 2010). Several researchers

argue the identity policy is a cover for a "tutsisation" of power (Reyntjens, 2013; see also Gready, 2010), and that voicing concern over increased Tutsi power would be seen as divisionism and thus illegal. Either way, this comprehensive approach mobilises the Rwandan identity, and demobilises the "ethnic" identities.

Every year, however, during the 100 days mourning period commemorating the 1994 genocide, the categories are again emphasised as posters go up all over the country: "X years since the genocide against Tutsi". In the commemoration ceremonies tensions are at times exacerbated, as some Hutu say that they feel collective guilt is wrongly ascribed to all Hutu (Amnesty International, 2010). This concern is echoed by Eltringham (2004) saying that the polarisation of Rwandans into survivors (Tutsi) and perpetrators (Hutu) leaves no room for moderate Hutu, as this narrative assumes all moderate Hutu were killed during the genocide.

Some researchers claim the smooth surface in Rwanda hides strong ethnic bias (Reyntjens, 2013) that the identity model is counterproductive (Ingelaere, 2010), and that the ethnic differences should be discussed rather than silenced (Clark, 2010). Several of these echo concerns voiced by social psychologists against single recategorisation in general. Research finds that these subordinate groups are still highly salient, and that Rwandans express a strong desire to be able to categorise people based on these group memberships on a continuous basis (Hilker, 2009). Buckley-Zistel (2006) found intergroup antagonism between respondents of the two groups. The Rwandan government on the other hand says the reconciliation is on track, and that unity is improving (NURC, 2010).

Present Research

The Rwanda-focused research within psychology is still scarce (though see for example McGarty, 2014), and is less focused on the identity approach (exceptions include Moss & Vollhardt, 2015). The aim of this present research is to look specifically at how people speak of the subordinate group identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and what representations people have of these. Further, the chapter explores how these representations go together with the single recategorisation, as managing to replace the ethnic identities with the national identity depends on the representations of these identities.

Methods: Discussing Abolished, but Highly Salient, Identities

Semi-structured interviews, with a convenience sample from the local population ($N = 56$) and political leadership ($N = 9$), were carried out during 4 months in the field, covering the periods June–July 2011; June 2012[1] and November 2012.

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[1] Conferences, observations and preparations.

These time slots included tense periods, with grenade attacks within Rwanda and spillover effects from the heightened conflict in DR Congo.

The age range spanned from 21 to 80 (mode around 35 years), and occupations included farmers, shopkeepers, students, business people, nurses and carpenters. The political leaders included politicians (representing the three largest parties) and high-level representatives of unity implementation agencies (e.g. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; Itorero). Participants were recruited in rural and urban areas in three of five districts (South, North and Kigali), mostly in the capital, Kigali. Asking about group membership is not possible in Rwanda; however, 34 participants volunteered this information during the interview (Hutu: 16; Tutsi: 16; Twa: 1; mixed: 1). Four men declined the invitation to be interviewed. Women who were approached frequently said they were busy with work, and only 13 women were interviewed.

The interview guide was discussed with both assistants and a Rwandan researcher, and thereafter adjusted. The interviews were mostly individual, but, when participants preferred, the interviews were done in small groups (seven interviews, 2–4 respondents). Here respondents corrected, objected and debated each other's statements. To enhance trust and openness, several respondents were interviewed twice or more. Interviews were conducted in offices, at cafés, hotels or in peoples' homes, depending on the respondents' wishes, and were held in Kinyarwanda, English and French, with the help of research assistants. Both a Hutu and a Tutsi research assistant were present in the rural interviews (compared to only a Tutsi assistant in Kigali). Most interviews lasted approximately 45 min. As only ten respondents allowed the interview to be recorded, extensive note taking was relied on for the rest.[2] The study was described as examining Rwandan identities, and questions addressed how participants felt about the current peace, the potential transition from group identities to more focus on national identity, whether or not people identified more now as Rwandans, and what factors they thought could explain any changes in identification. Through these questions, it usually came up what respondents meant that these groups are (ethnic groups, non-ethnic groups, social groups, fake groups etc.). If not, I asked directly. "Ethnic identity" was only used in the interviews when the respondents themselves characterised these groups as such, if not these were referred to as "the group identities".

Analysis: Representations of Subordinate Identities Post-Genocide

The material was analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), where respondents' understandings were treated as valid—but subjective—constructions. After iterative readings of the transcripts, the material was ordered under thematic

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[2] Using a system of abbreviations (e.g. H = Hutu, R = Rwanda, Ri = Rwandan national identity), the transcripts were taken down almost word-to-word. Notes were also taken during the recorded interviews. When checking these transcripts against the recordings, these showed good overlap (covering an estimated 80 % of the words).

Fig. 13.1 Thematic map of interview responses

headings and subheadings. From this thematic mapping, I identified two main dimensions pertaining to the respondents' representations of the subordinate identities in Rwanda: ethnic and non-ethnic.

Three themes were identified for representations of the groups as ethnic: ethnicity is not the problem and should be retained; history and physical traits demonstrate that these groups are ethnic groups; and lastly, social classes having become ethnic groups. For the non-ethnic dimension, three themes were identified: these groups are social classes, not ethnic groups; the shared characteristics across the groups "prove" their non-ethnic nature; and as does the shared memberships in the same ancestral clans (see thematic map, Fig. 13.1). In the following, the chosen extracts are marked with respondent number, year of interview, and either P for general population respondents or L for leaders.

Ethnic Groups

Many respondents refer to these identities as ethnic identities. In a society where sentiments are strictly regulated, respondents were surprisingly open about these sensitive issues. Many voiced opinions that directly opposed government narratives (which emphasise that the groups are social classes). Three main themes were identified.

Ethnic Groups Not the Problem

Some respondents explain that the groups are ethnic groups, but that this is not and never has been the problem. A farmer said:

> For me, ever since we have had ethnic groups it never caused any problem. I just wonder, why did we utilise these ethnic groups to kill each other? Why did they become tools of hatred? We should stay the way we were before, with the ethnic groups, but focusing more on unity (51P, 2012).

She openly discussed the groups as ethnic, and she wanted these to be retained, but not used negatively. She continued:

> I think now we no longer have ethnic groups. We are supposed to be just Rwandan. Perhaps people have this in their hearts, but they can't show it. Before I say anything else, I need to emphasise that now, under this set up, these ethnic groups are no more (51P, 2012).

In the interview she was clearly frustrated that the government had removed these ethnic groups, pretending the groups were non-existent. She says they are *supposed* to be just Rwandan, and that people have to hide what identities they have in their hearts. That the groups are not a problem was reiterated—interestingly—by the head of a unity implementation agency:

> Before the colonialists came here to Rwanda, Rwandans were unified, were one. They used to live in harmony, there were no differences between Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi—no one would mind and think about ethnic groups. (…) Hutu and Tutsi has never been a problem. We should not make it a problem now. Even now I think these three things [Hutu, Tutsi, Twa] are not a problem. The problem is in one place—the stomach, where our interests are. *This* [pointing at his stomach] is a bad ethnic group (38L, 2012).

The first two sentences of the extract are in line with the official narrative: precolonial intergroup harmony. He then ventures off "official script", stating that the groups are ethnic, but that different ethnic groups per se is not the problem. An elderly Tutsi woman in a group interview had similar sentiments. Asking whether the categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were disappearing, she said: "I am not excluding ethnicity. (…) Ethnic groups and class were never a hindrance to unity, but we should not focus so much on ethnicities. We should focus on unity" (52P, 2012). The respondents cited here agree the focus should be on unity, but emphasise that ethnicity does not need to be removed to attain this.

History and Traits

Some discussed factors such as history, family and physical traits as "proof" of the ethnic nature of these groups. An academic in Kigali said:

> After the genocide, the ethnic labelling was removed from the identities. But still people know themselves, because I am affiliated with a family, I have a father and a grandfather. (…) Even if Israel was destroyed, you can't delete the Israelis. Similarly, you can't delete Hutus, you can't delete Tutsis (30P, 2012).

He thereby discusses ancestry and history embedded in perceptions of ethnicity. He further referred to the stereotypical physical differences, saying it was easy to differentiate between people based on looks. A Tutsi also referred to these stereotypes, saying it is crucial for people to establish what groups others belong to:

> Here it is a crime to ask people or accuse people of being one or the other group. But we still find out. There are many ways we use to figure it out. The first thing we look at is looks. For some people it is easy to establish what you are based on looks. Secondly we look at the behaviour. (…) It is easy to make a mistake when trying to judge what people are. (…)You need to live in this society to know exactly how this works. You need to just observe, sit back and look, and then you will know what group the person in question belongs to (11P, 2011).

This speaks to the continued need to still be able to categorise people into these groups. The existence of stereotypical physical group traits may make the groups seem more static and may make it harder to abolish these identities (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Social Classes Having Become Ethnic Groups

Some respondents spoke of the identities as having *become* ethnic, and that the problem is that these identities *now* are ethnic groups. For example, a young man discussed that former social classes had come to be ethnic groups:

> A Tutsi was someone rich; a Hutu was poor. If that had still been what they meant now when using these categories that would be fine because people can become both rich and poor. The problem is that now it means ethnic groups, and then talking about it, calling yourself Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, hinders the government policy of unity (20P, 2012).

This respondent claims the groups now are ethnic, emphasising the process of moving from social classes to ethnic groups (attesting to identity malleability). Interestingly, and in contrast to the extracts above, he uses the fact that the groups now are ethnic groups as an argument for the government policy of silencing the identities, not against. A student in Kigali put forward a similar argument:

> The division between Hutu and Tutsi went from being the difference between social classes to ethnicity. Violence brought about this change. Belgium came in, and they imported their divisionism. They made us move from economic classes to tribal groups, and they shaped it well, so it grew strong roots (11P, 2011).

He here attests to the strong current representation of these identities as ethnic, even though he sees these as having been social classes before the Belgians.

Not Ethnic Groups

Several respondents focused on what these groups are *not*: the non-ethnic nature of these groups. Respondents used different "proof" to back up this identity representation.

Social Classes

One of the more common responses (and importantly, government endorsed) is that the groups were not ethnic groups, but social classes. The head of a unity implementation agency (45L, 2012) said: "Many signs and evidence show they are social groups. One could pass from one group to another one, because of number of cows or his richness. It really is a social group". This was backed up by a student:

> Everyone who could acquire wealth was called Tutsi. The word does not mean anything. And the poor class was called Hutu. The Tutsi were generally the people who had cows, and Hutu were in agriculture and hunting. In that kingdom, Tutsi were the ones ruling. Kings came from this group (11P, 2011).

According to this man, the groups were social classes, and membership hinged on wealth. In a group interview with a Hutu and a Tutsi, the Tutsi said: "For me, the groups are social groups. Expressions like "I am not your servant", call servants Hutu. This proves it is social classes and not an ethnic group" (47P, 2012).

Related to the social classes, several respondents said one could move between the groups, as explained by a student: "Hutu could become rich and move from Hutu, as in the saying *Umuhutu y'ihutuye*, which means "he has come out of the class of Hutu and now he is in the class of Tutsi", or "he is now Hutu-free" (11P, 2011). A political leader referred to this as "proof" against the ethnic nature of these groups:

> Well, you could migrate from one position to another, so it means there is no identity there; if you can migrate from one position—if you are a Bahutu [Hutu, plural] you can go to Batutsi [Tutsi, plural], and it is valid, it is recognized by the society; it means that you are actually one people (35L, 2012).

Many respondents similarly defined the groups as former social classes. However, other statements indicate that this may not be as shared a sentiment, and that many people see the groups as ethnic. An academic in Kigali said: "In the strict sense, there are no ethnic groups in Rwanda. Many people will not agree with me, but it was social classes" (31P, 2012). The complexity of these representations is clear when comparing this theme to the third theme under the Ethnic representation as discussed above, where the focus was on that the groups had been social classes but now had become ethnic.

Shared Characteristics

Many referred to shared language, culture and religion as "proof" of the groups' non-ethnic nature, as this civil society representative in Kigali: "For me, for us, we are not Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, we are not separate ethnic groups—we have the same language, traditions and culture. In Uganda and Kenya, the separate tribes have their own languages, traditions" (5P, 2011). This man further asks: without such differences, how can these be different ethnic groups? This was reiterated by an academic: "I will not say they are ethnic groups, we have the same language, same understanding of culture all over the country." (31P, 2012). Similarly, a high level political leader said: "We [Rwandans] are the same at the level at culture, at the level of our language" (34L, 2012).

Clan Memberships

Several respondents also referred to clan memberships. Rwandan clans cut across the three subordinate groups, and clans commonly contain both Hutu and Tutsi, as explained by a musician in Kigali:

> They told us we have three tribes, but among these, people come from the same clans. The clans come from one shared ancestor each, and we have many, many different clans, but most or all contain all three tribal groups. So it does not make sense to talk about it [ethnic groups] like this (12P, 2011).

These shared memberships are used as "proof" against the ethnic nature of these groups, as this political representative explained:

> If you look at our societal composition in Rwanda today, we have what you commonly call ethnic groups, which has been described as ethnic groups but which are actually not; Batwa, Bahutu, and Batutsi—but when you go to the real clans (…) you will find that in those three classes you find different clans. I belong to the Basindi—you have a Mutwa [Twa, singular] who is a Musindi, you have a Tutsi who is a Musindi, you have a Hutu who is a Musindi. (…) The Western world and the Europeans who came here failed to understand this, and they took a machete, cut into the wood, carved out three groups (35L, 2012).

Using the clans and the associated shared ancestry, the respondent thereby challenges the logic of the ethnic labels applied to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.

Within these two dimensions—ethnic and non-ethnic—various representations of the social identities are evident, even within individuals, who at times argue for both dimensions. Respondents clearly engage in meaning-making and construction of identity narratives within a complex reality.

Discussion

The above discussions of the Rwandan subordinate identities as ethnic and non-ethnic entail a story with many players, from colonial powers, to different groups in power, through extreme violence, to something on the other side. Now, on the other side—having gotten through the most difficult of the post-genocide period—the nature of these group identities is still unclear. For many respondents this distinction seemed to overlap to some extent with an "essential" and "non-essential" quality of the categories, where these should or should not be abolished (without any of the respondents necessarily prescribing to primordial views of ethnicity). Elcheroth, Doise, and Reicher (2011) argue that social representations critically influence how people act, and the way they see the world. Further, these are shared meta-representations, influencing people more powerfully than personal beliefs, and these shared beliefs influence reality. Several aspects make this unclear in Rwanda: the public metanarrative; the forbidden alternatives and the private narratives resisting or partly/fully agreeing with the metanarrative. In the following, the two dimensions—sentiments describing the categories as ethnic and as non-ethnic—are discussed up against the two core aspects of single recategorisation theory: inducing a common identity and abolishing the subordinate identities.

Inducing a Common Identity

In almost all the interviews people spoke of the importance of a shared Rwandan identity, and none argued against the need for this. Only a few respondents said directly that there was little improvement in levels of unity (e.g. "I think it is not that much change, as people have different problems" (46P, 2012); "People still

stick on this issue [ethnic groups], and keep to this" (41P, 2012). Most respondents advocated for unity, and many referred to the salience of the Rwandan identity— both before the genocide, and now with the improvements in intergroup coexistence. Instead the main controversy was with regard to the second key aspect of single recategorisation.

Abolishing the Subordinate Identity

The different representations of the social identities vary in their fit with the single recategorisation model. Ethnic groups are often perceived as static (Verkuyten, 2012)—more so than non-ethnic categories such as social classes, which can change with alterations in economic status. If so, framing the group identities as social classes should—if successful—make these identities easier to abolish as they will seem less static. Those arguing for the identities as non-ethnic are not necessarily thereby claiming these should be removed, but may be more prone to support the single recategorisation model.

Several of those arguing explicitly for these groups as ethnic however, say in the same sentences that this is not where the problem lies and that the ethnic identities can be there, but that the focus should be on unity (e.g. 51P, 2012; 52P, 2012). These respondents do not argue against recategorisation, but indicate the need for a dual rather than a single approach where subordinate identities should be retained, nested within the superordinate Rwandan identity.

When it comes to group patterns, this study does not show ethnic differences in the representations of the subordinate groups (though only 34 of the respondents disclosed their "ethnic" group membership, so such claims cannot be made with certainty). The apparent lack of group differences in accounts of Rwandan identity may be due to several factors: the single recategorisation may have helped people to focus on the shared Rwandan identity instead; abolishing the contested "ethnic" groups may have made the public expression of aspects pertaining to these so difficult that such sentiments are not voiced; or these groups simply do not have separate social representations regarding this topic.

The material does however show that the interviewed Rwandan leaders—compared to the general population—are firmer on the need for the current identity approach (though with some variation, where one high level leader advocates directly against the ethnic groups being the problem, see sub-theme one under the Ethnic representation). The leaders also generally offer more elaborate reasoning to back up their arguments for the non-ethnic nature of these groups, and seem more aware of their choice of words, and what it means to call these groups ethnic. Such differences between the leaders and the general population are to be expected, as many of these leaders are directly involved in implementing the unity measures.

Limitations

The sample is small and non-representative, thus standing in the way of empirical generalisations. This was however never the intention. In getting to representations of social identities, the focus was on diversity and depth. Despite attempts to recruit both genders, few women were interviewed. Women approached often declined the invitation to be interviewed saying they had to work or that they were not comfortable discussing politics. This sample bias was detrimental for the study, and somewhat surprising in a country holding the highest number of women in parliament in the world. This increased gender balancing is still recent however, and has not necessarily translated down to lower levels.

Access to personal narratives and not mere reiterations of government propaganda is a challenge in Rwanda. There is a cultural and government imposed tradition of silence on sensitive issues, and people are sceptical as to whom they can trust. Research permits demonstrating permission to conduct interviews on this topic were shown to respondents in each interview. Repeated interviews with the same people were useful for establishing rapport, as were personal introductions and snowballing. The use of two research assistants seemed to facilitate openness, potentially as respondents had an "ally" when navigating histories of intergroup antagonism. All in all, the level of openness was surprising, and respondents frequently ventured far beyond the official narrative. The context is however sensitive, and awareness of the danger of re-traumatisation—both of respondents and research staff—was critical. Participants were given room to—but not pushed to—follow up on painful issues.

Conclusion

The categories of Hutu, Tutsi and partly also Twa have been actively placed at the core of this century's conflicts in Rwanda. Asking Rwandans about their representations of these subordinate categories is key to find out more about how these formerly extremely polarised identities are spoken of now, but also to put these perceptions and representations in connection with the government imposed identity policy. The interlink between contextually grounded identity representations, leadership's use of social identities and general population responses to such identity approaches is an area within peace psychology that requires further attention.

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Chapter 14
Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland

Neil Ferguson and Shelley McKeown

Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1981) and the Northern Irish conflict, or the 'Troubles' as the violence is locally known, have a long shared history. During the 1970s, local Northern Irish psychologists realised that biological deterministic or Freudian psychodynamic paradigms that explained political conflict as the result of individual differences, instincts, or abnormal behaviour did not explain the conflict they were witnessing in the streets around them (Cairns, 1982, 1987). Likewise, grand sociological, economic, and political theories could not account for the unconscious and often irrational forces clearly at work (Cairns, 1982). Thankfully, as local psychologists searched for a means to understand the conflict in Northern Ireland, Tajfel developed Social Identity Theory and it provided an approach that had more explanatory power than any other approach available to them.

The Northern Ireland Context

Northern Ireland represents the majority of the northern part of the island of Ireland, an island that lies beside Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean. Since the Norman conquest of Ireland in twelfth century, the island has experienced invasion from Great Britain and, as a result, been plagued by intergroup conflict and sustained but not continuous violence throughout this period (Cairns, 1987). Arguably, one of the most notable events in the history of the island was in 1801 when the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was declared and subsequently when the war

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of independence ended. Another was when the Government of Ireland Act (1921) partitioned the island into the six counties that made up Northern Ireland, to be ruled under the British monarchy, and the remaining 26 counties into the Irish Free State. Since this time, conflict on the Island escalated and culminated in the 1960s when the Troubles began.

A common misconception is that the Troubles was primarily a religious conflict, but, in fact, it was a conflict incited due to differences in opinion surrounding the constitutional state of the island, with religious identity representing a badge of difference (Moxon-Browne, 1991) bound up in political and national ideologies. These ideologies are typically understood through the dichotomy Nationalist/Unionist, represented by the Catholic and Protestant communities respectively. According to Whyte (1991), the Nationalist perspective is that the people on the island of Ireland represent one nation and Britain is at fault for the division of the island and the people. By contrast, the Unionist perspective is that Ireland comprises distinct peoples, represented by the Protestant and Catholic communities, and that the Northern Ireland problem exists because Nationalists do not recognise this fact (cf case of Québécois identity in Lalonde, Cila, & Yampolsky, 2016). As a result of these differences, Northern Ireland continues to be at odds with itself and identity remains an issue of contention understood best through the lens of social identity theory.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland raged for 30 years, from 1968 to 1998, and led to the death of over 3600 people and the injury of an additional 40–50,000. Given Northern Ireland's small population of 1.68 million, and its small geographical area of 5456 mile^2, this conflict had a substantial impact on the population well beyond the casualty figures (Fay, Morissey, & Smyth, 1998). Undoubtedly, the Northern Ireland conflict gripped the world's attention; it was one of the first global televised conflicts (Rolston & Miller, 1996) and as a result, international actors provided funding for children from conflict areas in Northern Ireland to take part in a relief holiday scheme during contentious times of the year (See Intergroup Contact and Identity for Peace below.)

Northern Ireland is now considered by many to be a post-conflict society; 17 years have passed since the historic signing of the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement and representatives of all sides to the conflict share power in a devolved legislative assembly based on consociationalist, in other words inclusive and power-sharing, principles. However, the conflict still casts a long dark shadow on Northern Ireland, and many challenges remain with legacy issues around how to deal with the victims. Moreover, perpetrators of the conflict still have the ability to raise tensions and open old wounds (Ferguson, in press).

Despite the signing of the peace agreement, politically motivated violence has not vanished. Dissident Irish republicans remain involved in shooting and bombing attacks and sectarian tensions around flying national flags and annual Orange Order parades in the summer months remain. Recent Northern Irish Life and Times surveys (NILT, 2012, 2013) and reports on the state of community relations in Northern Ireland (Morrow, Robinson, & Dowds, 2013; Nolan, 2014) have all reported a deterioration in community relations and a hardening of oppositional identities over the past few years. There is also much debate about a continuing 'cultural' war between

nationalism and unionism, in which nationalists are perceived to have undertaken a strategy to hollow out British cultural symbolism and weaken Protestant identity and associations to the United Kingdom (Halliday & Ferguson, 2015; McAuley & Ferguson, in press).

Even a cursory examination of these lingering legacy issues highlights the importance of understanding the role of social identity, social categorisation, and intergroup relations in Northern Ireland. The Northern Irish research utilising the social identity approach has tended to follow particular themes, namely: (a) the prevalence of social categorisation, social identification, comparison, and the impact on intergroup relations; (b) the role of identity in embracing the conflict; (c) the relationship between stress, coping, and identity; and (d) the role of intergroup contact in promoting identity for peace. These themes are explained in more detail in the sections below.

Social Categorisation, Social Identification, and Comparison

Some of the earliest SIT research conducted in Northern Ireland explored categorisation and the importance of categorisation in Northern Ireland, with much of this research focused on what is colloquially termed 'telling', or the considerations involved in trying to work out whether someone is a Catholic or a Protestant during every day interactions. It must be pointed out that it is a taboo subject to directly ask someone which ethno-religious group they belong to, as this line of questioning may cause the recipient anxiety and could trigger a hostile response. It is also important to remember that in Northern Ireland the differences between the communities are not racial or physiognomic, yet individuals in this society have the ability to categorise others as being either Protestant or Catholic through various social and geographical cues. Cairns (1980) reported a list of the five most frequently employed cues. These include area of residence (much of Northern Ireland's neighbourhoods are segregated along ethnopolitical lines), school attended (as we shall discuss later, most schools are also segregated), names (both given and surnames), appearance (which mainly relate to facial features and clothing), and speech (both language content and accent). Interestingly, all cues are employed by both sides. Since this pioneering early work (also see Cairns & Duriez, 1976; Stringer & Cairns, 1983; Stringer & McLaughlin-Cook, 1985), approximately 50 different ways of telling the 'other's' religion have been documented (Kremer, 1999).

It is perhaps fitting that the inaugural article published in the *Irish Journal of Psychology* dealt with social categorisation among children from Belfast. Jahoda and Harrison (1975) employed a colour vs. form sorting task with children from an area of Belfast that had been severely impacted by the conflict. In these tasks, European and North American children consistently display a shift from sorting on colour preference (e.g. sorting on the basis of a shapes colour) to form preference (e.g. sorting by shape) and this demonstrates a developmental advancement. In the Jahoda and Harrison (1975) research, however, unlike the control sample from

Edinburgh, the majority of the older Belfast children did not show a switch in preference from sorting on colour to shape. The reason for this developmental delay relates to the colours chosen by Jahoda and Harrison, as they chose red and blue (related to the Union Flag and viewed as Protestant) and green and orange (synonymous with the Irish Tricolour and viewed as Catholic). Importantly, almost half of the older Belfast children spontaneously mentioned the ethnopolitical symbolism behind their choices. Indeed when the researchers attempted to mix the colours by combining blue and green or red and green, many children protested that 'you can't put Protestants with Catholics' (p. 15).

Whereas research has demonstrated that identity in Northern Ireland is more complex than pure comparisons of Protestant and Catholic (Cassidy & Trew, 1998; Gallagher, 1989; Ferguson & Gordon, 2007), research has also consistently demonstrated the ease with which people in Northern Ireland categorise others and themselves, places, and activities as Protestant or Catholic (Cairns, Wilson, Gallagher, & Trew, 1995; Cairns & Darby, 1998; Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Whyte, 1991). Indeed, the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland will state whether they are a Catholic or Protestant, regardless of whether or not they even attend church (Niens & Cairns, 2001). This was clearly observed in the recent 2011 census, where 48 % of the resident population self-identified as Protestant and 45 % self-identified as Catholic. In Northern Ireland, Protestant or Catholic identity is ascribed from birth, producing impermeable group boundaries, which heightens the possibility of intergroup competition and conflict (Cairns, 1982; Ferguson, 2006). It has also been argued that identity processes differ for Protestants and Catholics with commentators suggesting that national identity choice is more complex and more situationally determined for Protestants, than for Catholics (Waddell & Cairns, 1986; Whyte, 1991).

Once these identity labels are accepted, Northern Irish research has demonstrated how the depth or strength of the in-group identity can impact on emotions, cognitions, reasoning, and behaviours, such as influencing in-group bias, prejudice, discrimination (Cairns, 1996; Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006; Ferguson, 2009), and the impact of intergroup contact on cross-community relations (Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007). This research (Cairns et al., 2006; Tausch et al., 2007) also indicates that compared to those who have a weaker identification, Protestants and Catholics who have a strong identification with their group express more in-group bias, regardless of their ethno-religious background.

Similarly, Cairns and Hewstone (2005) demonstrated that Catholics and Protestants with a stronger identification, or with 'pride' in their group, had higher levels of prejudice towards members of the out-group, and this was especially the case among Protestants. This study also indicated that levels of political stability or instability played a role in mediating this relationship, with high levels of political instability linking to higher levels of in-group bias, regardless of identity strength. Additionally, during periods of low levels of sectarian tension, bias towards the in-group can disappear among individuals who more weakly identify with their community.

As well as research focusing on the conflicting or competing identities of British vs. Irish or Catholic vs. Protestant, research has also focused on the increased usage

of the identity label of 'Northern Irish' among both Catholics and Protestants. In particular, there has been a focus on how this common label may offer a means to develop a shared identity and thus improve community relations and the prospects of a peaceful future (Muldoon, Trew, Todd, McLaughlin, & Rougier, 2007). The popularity of the Northern Irish identity has risen, since it was first included in social surveys in the late 1980s, with the most recent 2011 census indicating that 21 % of residents claim a singular Northern Irish identity. Indeed, most recent surveys suggest that approximately a quarter of adults use this label (Hayes & McAllister, 2009; Muldoon et al., 2007). It has been theorised that identification with a superordinate, or overarching, identity, such as Northern Irish, could transcend the existing competing identities, the boundaries between these identity groups, and reduce prejudice and discrimination (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is important because a Northern Irish identity is arguably less divisive and offers an alternative from the traditional British/Irish dichotomy. As such, it has potential to help Northern Ireland move towards a more inclusive society.

Indeed, research from Northern Ireland has demonstrated that those choosing to label themselves Northern Irish rather than British or Irish have more positive views around intergroup mixing in marriage, neighbourhoods, the workplace, and education (Hayes & McAllister, 2009). In addition, there is evidence to suggest that it is an identity with which both Catholics and Protestants can and do identify, despite differing interpretations on what it means to be Northern Irish (McKeown, 2014).

Nonetheless, Lowe and Muldoon (2014) found that those individuals who utilised the label Northern Irish could get thrown back into oppositional relationships due to the divided nature of Northern Irish society. For example, although being Northern Irish was associated with more prosocial attitudes towards the out-group, political attitudes towards issues, such as the sovereignty of Northern Ireland, reflected religious identity rather than national identity. This concern was similarly reported by Hayes and McAllister (2009) who suggested that the motivation to associate oneself with the Northern Irish identity may in fact be due to disillusionment with the current political status of Northern Ireland, rather than a move towards improved relations. Arguably, as Trew (1996) suggested, selecting the Northern Irish identity allows people to present themselves as inclusive and tolerant, without changing their 'real' political attitudes.

The Role of Identity in Embracing the Conflict

Showing support for political violence or becoming involved in paramilitary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), clearly involves the process of social identification with the group and its aims. Muldoon, McLaughlin, Rougier, and Trew (2008) research demonstrated how young people from Northern Ireland employed social identification with the in-group as an explanation for engaging in paramilitary violence. Additionally, research based on interviews with former prisoners and members of Northern Irish paramilitary groups

(Burgess, Ferguson, & Hollywood, 2005; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2008; Ferguson & Binks, 2015) indicates that strong identification with their in-group and in-group 'love' or pride are often key antecedent factors for those who choose to engage in politically motivated violence.

Contrastingly, in the years since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, very few former combatants re-engage in violence. Instead, many play an important role in maintaining the peace at the local level or are engaged in community work aimed to halting others from engaging in violence (Ferguson, 2010a; Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008). As with engagement in violence, strong identification with the in-group and local community also fuels the processes of disengagement from violence and involvement in conflict transformation (Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2015). These findings offer support for Brewer's (1999, 2001) view that in-group love does not equate to out-group hate and indicate that building peace in Northern Ireland does not mean that individuals will need to weaken their identity to the in-group to enable them to build peace with the other community. Rather, as Cairns and Hewstone (2005) suggest, peace can be built by helping the citizens of Northern Ireland to understand that it is possible to hold positive and secure social identities without out-group derogation. Such an interpretation fits with Hewstone and Brown's (1986) salient categorisation model in which it is proposed that it is important to maintain group salience in order to allow intergroup contact effects to generalise to the out-group.

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, legacy issues related to the conflict, particularly around how to deal with the victims of the conflict and how to pursue intercommunity reconciliation, are keenly debated but slow to resolve. Social identity research from within Northern Ireland has focused on group level forgiveness and collective guilt (Hewstone et al., 2004; Myers, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2009). Hewstone et al. (2004) reported that the people most affected by the conflict were less willing to forgive or experience collective guilt, whereas Myers et al. (2009) argued that higher in-group identification was associated with less collective guilt and lower levels of intergroup forgiveness. These findings again illustrate the importance of identity in building forgiveness and reconciliation. In order to move community relations forward, Protestant and Catholic identities need to be accepted and not threatened; otherwise they will become barriers to progress, again illustrating the need for positive and secure social identities in building peace.

Stress, Coping and Identity

Another part of the legacy of the Northern Irish conflict is the higher rates of mental health problems in comparison to Scotland, England, and the Republic of Ireland (O'Reilly & Stevenson, 2003). Muldoon, Lowe, and Schmid (2016) explore the role of social identity as a driver for psychological health, and much of the research exploring the role of identity in mental health and well-being is grounded in research conducted in Northern Ireland.

Social identity is key to understanding the stress created by conflict (Haslam & Reicher, 2006), with group membership mediating the experience of stress (Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes, 2009). Specifically, having a strong identity can have a moderating effect on experiences of post-traumatic stress and psychological well-being (Muldoon & Downes, 2007; Muldoon & Wilson, 2001). Additionally, changing social and political conditions play a role in shaping these processes.

For example, research from Northern Ireland has illustrated how the shifting sociopolitical context created by the peace process can devalue identities that once were viewed as positive. Mulcahy (2006) researched how members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) negotiated the changing sociopolitical environment in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement and the renaming and reformation of the RUC into the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as part of the Agreement. Through this reform process and in the discourse surrounding it, the RUC was no longer presented as the protectors of the population of Northern Ireland, but viewed as a party to the conflict. Although during the conflict members of the RUC had negotiated the conflict with limited mental health consequences (Wilson, Poole, & Trew, 1997), they began to present higher incidences of post-traumatic stress in the post-conflict space when the value and the meaning of their role in the conflict were challenged and delegitimised (Mulcahy, 2006). Therefore, research from Northern Ireland has also demonstrated that the role of identity in bolstering or weakening resilience to traumatic stress depends on the sociopolitical context. This has helped inform theories on the role of identity in shaping psychological well-being in the face of political conflict and war (see Muldoon et al., 2016).

Intergroup Contact and Identity for Peace

As well as exploring the role of identity in conflict and the impact of conflict on identity, research from Northern Ireland has also explored the role of intergroup contact (Allport, 1954) on group identities and intergroup prejudice (Ferguson, 2010b). Most of this research has focused on children and the role of integrated education or cross-community initiatives in reducing out-group biases, moderating conflicting identities, and producing more integrationist attitudes (McKeown & Cairns, 2012).

After residential segregation, segregated schooling is one of the biggest markers of communal division in Northern Ireland. Currently, 94% of children and adolescents attend religiously segregated schools with most children attending either State Controlled (but de facto Protestant) or Catholic Church maintained elementary and post elementary schools (Nolan, 2012). However, after years of campaigning by parents and charities, planned integrated schools began to open across Northern Ireland from 1981. Whilst the religious composition of each school differs, integrated schools are expected to maintain a religious identity ratio of their pupils of at least 70:30 (with 30 % reflecting the smallest religious community in the local

area) or 40:40 and 20 % from another background. Currently, there are 61 integrated schools in Northern Ireland educating approximately 19,000 pupils.

Research comparing pupils attending integrated and segregated schools has consistently reported that pupils from integrated schools experienced higher levels of intergroup contact; held more integrationist attitudes to mixing between Protestants and Catholics in marriage, the workplace and educational settings; and hold more optimistic views on future intercommunity relations in Northern Ireland (Hayes & McAllister, 2009; Stringer et al., 2000, 2009). At the same time, however, there is some evidence to suggest that some young people attending integrated schools may not be truly sharing their classroom space and often remain sitting in segregated clusters (McKeown, Stringer, & Cairns, 2015). McKeown, Cairns, and Stringer (2012) argue that such everyday segregation and the illusion of shared space is prevalent throughout Northern Ireland and we suggest that one of the key ways to address this is through promoting meaningful intergroup contact that tackles the divisive issues faced by those living in Northern Ireland. This fits with Niens and Cairns (2008) argument that schools need to go beyond physical co-presence to promote peace and indeed some of Northern Ireland's integrated schools are exemplary in this regard.

Even if a child does not attend an integrated school, he or she may be exposed to the mechanisms in place to promote community relations across all schools. One early example of this was the short-term cross-community educational schemes, Education for Mutual Understanding, which was introduced into segregated schools with the aim to improve group relations but results have been more mixed (Gallagher, 2010; Smith & Dunn, 1990). More recently, this approach has been replaced by the Shared Education agenda that focuses on creating and sustaining partnerships across schools, based on the premise of intergroup contact theory and developing from the Sharing Education Programme (Hughes, 2011). Other community-based interventions have been in place since during the Troubles. These developed due to concern about children facing conflict during contentious periods, such as the summer months when the Orange Order marches take place, have focused on children outside of the school setting, and have often involved taking the children to a different local, national, or international location for a short period of time (McKeown & Cairns, 2012).

Like integrated schools, school and community interventions have been criticised on the grounds that the contact does not address divisive issues, the children treat the experience as an outing, sports competitions are commonly used as a means for contact, and the teachers often lack the training to deal with divisive issues in class (O'Connor, Hartop, & McCully, 2002; Kilpatrick & Leitch, 2004; Murray, 2010). However, research does tend to suggest that young people who do engage in cross-community programmes hold more favourable out-group attitudes than those who do not. Programme attendees typically view their experience as positive and researchers suggest that community relations across Northern Ireland would be improved with more cross-community contact (Schubotz & Robinson, 2006; Schubotz & McCarten, 2008).

Despite the problems associated with promoting contact in areas of sustained conflict and the harsh realities of segregation (see Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005), we believe that the role of intergroup contact, through such interventions and initiatives as outlined above, has great potential for addressing the still evident segregation in today's Northern Ireland. We have particular sympathies for a time-focused approach, as outlined by Pettigrew (1998), in which intergroup contact takes place firstly on a personal level in which group identity is de-emphasised (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Following this initial contact period, and recognising the importance of identity for individual and collective self-esteem (see Martiny & Rubin, 2016), we suggest that group identity can then be made salient. This allows for the generalisation of these personalised impressions to the out-group as a whole (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). It is through this step in which individuals can be prepared to engage in discussions surrounding the causes and consequences of the conflict. The final step would be recategorisation (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), in which a common identity is developed which supersedes previous identities. The reality for Northern Ireland may be, however, that a dual identity is the most appropriate solution, in which subgroup identities (such as Protestant or Catholic) and a common identity (such as Northern Irish) are maintained simultaneously (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996).

Importantly, intergroup contact can create a ripple effect in which friends who do not directly partake in intergroup contact gain positive benefits and improved views on intergroup mixing (Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004). This finding is important as it suggests that although only a minority of children take part in integrated schooling or cross-community interventions, their positive experiences can be transferred to their friendship groups within their ethno-religious community and increase the impact of intergroup contact via this ripple effect caused by vicarious contact.

Conclusion

Whilst the Northern Irish landscape has changed drastically over the past 15–20 years, the conflict has had and continues to have devastating consequences on all aspects of life for Northern Ireland's citizens. In this chapter, we have shown how identity lies at the heart of the 'Troubles' but also how changes in the social, political, and national landscape have put Northern Ireland on the road to peace. What has become clear, however, is that dealing with the legacy of the past, such as parades and flags, is vital if Northern Ireland is to move towards true positive peace. We suggest that encouraging and facilitating shared space and shared values is one way to do this. At the same time, however, it is important to recognise that Northern Ireland is becoming increasingly diverse, and, as such, future research on identity in Northern Ireland needs to move beyond ethnoreligious divisions based on the Protestant/Catholic dichotomy and consider the wider range of identities expressed by those living in this society.

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Chapter 15
Social Identity in a Divided Cyprus

Charis Psaltis and Huseyin Cakal

The Cyprus issue is a complex problem of internal conflict between the two main communities of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but also an issue of external interventions by various other countries with most prominent the continuing occupation by 30,000–40,000 Turkish troops of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974, the division of the island, and the existence of a secessionist state in Northern Cyprus. Both dimensions of the Cyprus issue implicate identity politics (Papadakis, 2003) into the collective struggles of the two communities, internal ideological tensions and differentiations within each community (Psaltis, 2012). It is thus of great importance to understand the social psychological dynamics of social identity relating to intergroup relations between the two communities and relations with the so-called motherlands, Turkey and Greece, at the symbolic level of identification. Such identity politics and symbolisms become relevant to the prospects of a solution in Cyprus as they are also deeply rooted in the history of the Cyprus issue itself.

The Cyprus Issue and its Relation to Identity Politics

Cyprus is often described as one of the longer frozen conflicts in Europe and given the role of Greek and Turkish nationalism in leading up to intercommunal strife (see Papadakis, 2003) between the two communities in 1957–58, 1963–1964 and 1974, the role played by ethnic and national identities has been described as crucial in both

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the formation and sustaining of division that came after the invasion/intervention by Turkey and the war that ensued.

The status quo on the island today is that of division of the country in two by a UN-patrolled buffer zone. The North (37 % of the island) is occupied by 30,000–40,000 Turkish troops who intervened/invaded Cyprus in 1974 after a short-lived coup engineered by the junta in Greece that aimed at union (*enosis*) of Cyprus with Greece. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey declared an independent state that is recognised until today only by Turkey and condemned by the international community and UN resolutions. The rest of Cyprus is controlled by the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and governed by Greek Cypriots. In 2003, travel restrictions between the two sides were lifted and contact between members of the two communities became possible. The whole of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 but the *acquis communautaire* is suspended in the north pending a solution of the Cyprus problem. Negotiations are currently underway between negotiators and the two leaders of the two communities in order to reach a comprehensive settlement on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation after a failed attempt in 2004. The dossiers under discussion concern (1) Governance and Power Sharing, (2) Property, (3) Territory, (4) Economic Affairs, (5) European Union Affairs and (6) Security and Guarantees.

Divided Collective Memory in Cyprus

The two communities in Cyprus have distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Most Greek Cypriots are Greek-speaking, and Christian orthodox while most Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and are Muslims albeit rather secular in orientation compared to mainland Turks. The fact that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have been divided geographically across ethnic lines for almost half a century resulted in two distinct collective memories of the past, especially regarding the Cyprus problem and its history. These divided collective memories of victimisation are closely aligned to the official historical narratives disseminated for years through the separate educational systems of the two communities (Psaltis, 2016).

In the case of Greek Cypriots, and given the official policy on the reunification of the RoC, and the withdrawal of Turkish occupying forces, the political narrative goes along the following lines "*We have always lived peacefully with Turkish Cypriots and we can do it again once the Turkish troops leave the country*" and "*the key to the solution is located in Ankara and not in the TC community*". For Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, the political master narrative that promoted the ideal of two separate states in Cyprus is, more or less, like this: "*The experience of living with Greek Cypriots was one of domination and suppression and we will be better off having our own state*" and "*Turkey intervened in 1974 with a peace operation to save us from GCs*" (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011; Psaltis et al., 2014).

Such political discourses were championed for years by various political elites and the state administration for the corresponding "national collective struggles" in each community. The creation of different social representations of the Cyprus issue and its past contributed to the systematic use of rituals, national symbols (Psaltis,

Beydola, Filippou, & Vrachimis, 2014) memorials, commemorations, national strug-
gle museums, and propaganda from the media and the educational system. The
teaching of history in public schools systematically cultivated a specific mono-per-
spectival official narrative of victimisation by others, in both communities
(Makriyianni, 2006; Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Makriyianni, Psaltis, & Latif,
2011; Papadakis, 2005; Psaltis, 2012) that clearly ends up contributing to prejudice
and distrust towards members of the other community when uncritically internalised
by the individual (Psaltis, 2016).

Psychological Theories of Identity in Relation to the Master Narratives

Importantly, adherence to beliefs closely aligned with the official narratives relates
to issues of ethnic and national identification (Psaltis, 2012). According to Papadakis
(2008), the central nationalistic historical narrative in the Greek Cypriot (henceforth
GC) textbooks is one that begins with the arrival of Greeks (fourteenth century BC)
in Cyprus that led to the Hellenisation of Cyprus, where the moral centre is Greeks
(of Cyprus) and the major enemy is Turks. The plot concerns a struggle for survival
by Cypriot Hellenism against foreign conquerors and the end is tragic as it ends
with the "Barbaric Turkish Invasion" and occupation of 37 % of Cyprus.

The corresponding Turkish Cypriot (henceforth TC) narrative is[1] one that begins
with the arrival of Turks in Cyprus (in 1571 AD), the moral self is Turks (of Cyprus)
and the major enemy are "Rums".[2] The plot concerns a struggle for survival by the
Turks of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot domination. The war of 1974 marks a happy
ending with the "Happy peace operation" by Turkey in Cyprus.

Such adherence to the official narratives is directly related to peace and conflict in
Cyprus due to the fact that representations of the past structure present intergroup
relations and constrain or canalise the present–future transition towards specific ideal
solutions of the problem (Psaltis, 2012, 2016). In Cyprus, as in other parts of the
world, it was found that such beliefs are not only predictive of threats, of both realis-
tic and symbolic form (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009); but through these
threats, prejudice is increased and further distrust is created between the two com-
munities, which is eventually reflected in reduced will to coexist with the other com-
munity and reduced support for the UN sponsored proposed solution of Federation.

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[1] In 2004, new history books for the history of Cyprus were written by the new elected leadership
of Mehmet Ali Talat offered an alternative narrative that challenged the separatist and nationalistic
narrative that was in place up to that point (see Papadakis (2008) for an analysis of these short-
lived books). However, in 2010 with the election of a new nationalist administration these text-
books were replaced by new ones that reverted to the old nationalist narrative described in the text
above (see Makriyianni et al., 2011).

[2] Turkish word for Greek Cypriot, it is also a word used for Christian Orthodox Turkish citizens
today in Turkey and Orthodox Christian subjects during the Ottoman era in Turkey.

It could therefore be argued that such representations aligned with the master narratives furnish positions of a "proud" but threatened and exclusionary "identity" in the representational field. This "proud and threatened identity" in turn is predictive of both distrust and prejudice towards the other community. The social identities implicated in the ideological struggles around the Cyprus issue cannot be readily mapped on the original formulation of SIT of an in-group and an out-group as they engage "motherland" countries, both on premises of cultural similarity with the mainland ethnic group, and also on more pragmatic grounds as a stronger ally that supports the collective struggle of the in-group towards the primary out-group. Such a complex situation makes competing forms of identification within each community germane. Similar forms of identification can be found in other ethnically heterogeneous nations with secessionist movements, like the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada and China, who experience social tension between ethnic group attachment (ethno-territorial or regional or subgroup identity) and national attachment (state identity; Moreno, 2006; Sidanius, Feshbasch, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). In such contexts, dual identities or compound nationality become relevant. This is because individuals could identify themselves in sub-state minority nations or regions. In such cases, stronger ethno-territorial or regional identity often leads to higher demands for political autonomy and self-government between sub-state communities (Moreno, 2006).

The methodological ramifications of the need to capture the position of an individual between these two competing forms of identification were discussed by Moreno (2006) who introduced a scale (the so-called Moreno question) aiming at capturing the tension between sub-state claims for autonomy and a superordinate category of a central state or authority. For example in the case of Scotland-UK, the question consisted of a five-category scale concerning dual self-identification by the Scots on how they see themselves in terms of their nationality: (1) Scottish, not British, (2) More Scottish than British, (3) Equally Scottish and British, (4) More British than Scottish, or (5) British, not Scottish. This type of scale could be modified in different surveys for different populations (e.g. Spain—Catalonian or Spanish), concerning national self-identification and identity attachment to both state and sub-state levels (Moreno, 2006). Respondents thus have to balance the relative weight of two identities, usually a sub-state level and state level.

In segregated Cyprus, there are thus various forms of identification that become relevant to identity politics and ideological contestation. At the subgroup or communal level, one can identify as Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Given the secession claims of the Turkish occupied north, and the history of the claims for union with Greece by Greek Cypriots, testing the strength of ethnic identification or a "motherland" identification (being Greek or Turkish) in relation to the strength of identification of a superordinate national identity (identification as being Cypriot) is also very important and could be captured by the Moreno question. This is a scale that was adapted in the past for use in the Cypriot context (Peristianis, 2006; Psaltis, 2012), and it proved useful since it was indeed related to the quality of intergroup relations in Cyprus.

In the Greek Cypriot community, there is an ideological contest concerning the national identity of the Greek Cypriots. National identity is shaped according to two

ideologies: Hellenocentrism, giving emphasis to the Greek identity of Cypriots; and Cypriot-centrism, often related to left-wing political orientations, giving emphasis to the Cypriot identity (Peristianis, 2006) which is a form of resistance to Hellenocentrism but also a proposal for the construction of a Cypriot identity (either in its civic form that encompasses both communities irrespective of ethnic origin, or an identity premised on cultural similarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots).

Identification as Greek in the context of Hellenocentrism as an ideological position is often an expression of conservative, right wing and nationalistic views, accompanied with adherence to a system of beliefs stressing the attachment of Greek Cypriots to Greece as the "motherland", also tending to agree with statements like "I am characterised by the Greek cultural origin", "Cyprus is historically a Greek place" and "Christianity is an indispensable part of our identity"; which form part of an identity position historically traced as abiding to the "Hellenochristian ideals" and a continuity of Greek nationalism in Cyprus.

The corresponding pattern occurs in the Turkish Cypriot community, with those attached to Turkey as their motherland and protector (Turko-centrism) also tending to agree with statements like "I am characterised by the Turkish cultural origin", "Cyprus is historically a Turkish place" and "Islam is an indispensable part of our identity". There are also those Turkish Cypriots who adopt a Cypriot-centric ideology that is again a form of resistance to the Turko-centric ideology giving emphasis to local traditions of Turkish Cypriots, attachment to the land of Cyprus and its people and similarities with Greek Cypriots (Vural & Rustemli, 2006).

Given this complexity, it is only natural that discussions about a possible solution to the Cyprus issue and the creation of a Federal Reunited Cyprus that entails the end of Turkish occupation, withdrawal of Greek troops in Cyprus and amendment of the Security Guarantees by Turkey, Greece and Britain often get entangled with the aforementioned issues of identification. (See Fig. 15.1 for a graphic depiction of current complexity of identifications and possible transition in case of a solution).

Another important dimension of the Cyprus issue entangled in the identity politics discussed above is the existence of a large number of individuals of Turkish origin who moved in Cyprus after 1974. These individuals are generally referred as "settlers" by Greek Cypriots and by Turkish Cypriots as "immigrants" (see Loizides, 2011). Most

Fig. 15.1 The complexity of identity in a divided Cyprus and the transition to a Reunited Federal Cyprus

people outside Cyprus are well aware of the Greek Cypriots' hostile feelings and attitudes towards Turkey as the invading enemy force. These "settlers/immigrants" therefore are seen as a threat to the demographic nature of Cyprus and thus are considered as one of the by-products of Turkish war crimes committed by Turkey against Cyprus. However, not many people are aware of the less known, but not less complex, conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Settlers/ Immigrants who first arrived following the Turkish invasion/intervention under decrees and the protection of Turkish State and army to fill the vacuum when the coup and the invasion/intervention resulted in the displacement and ethnic homogenisation of Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus controlled areas and Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish controlled areas. Research on this "lesser known schism of Cyprus" (Christiansen, 2005: p. 156) is rather scarce, but it reveals that the intergroup relations between the Turkish Settlers/immigrants and Turkish Cypriots is problematic and complex at its best and started to turn from sweet to sour some time ago (Navaro-Yashin, 2006). In the following section, we elaborate on the nature of these "souring" intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Immigrants/Settlers drawing from existing research and our own research as they relate to issues of social identity.

Paramount to the complexity of the issue is the increasing Turkish presence in the Turkish-controlled areas. Under heavy political and social influence from Turkey and despite its illegal circumstances, the Turkish presence in the north has grown without any international interference effectively triggering a complex range of social psychological processes (Cakal, 2012). While the Turkish influx created an opportunity for interaction between Turks from the "motherland" and Turkish Cypriots, it also created a range of complex intergroup problems. The ever increasing numbers of Turks engulfing the Turkish Cypriots created a multidimensional conflict, e.g. social, political and economic, between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Immigrants adding yet another dimension to the Cyprus issue. Turkish Cypriots perceive the settlers as threats to their economic, political and social values and settlers remain underrepresented in the political arena, and have access to lower economic and social resources (Hatay, 2005). Although comparative studies examining these processes in a tripartite fashion using data from Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Settlers are scant, preliminary findings imply that intergroup relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the related identities are heavily influenced by the existence of the Turkish Settlers and the related social psychological processes, including intergroup contact with and attitudes towards settlers especially among the Turkish Cypriots. Research conducted has shown that frequent positive contact with Turkish settlers is associated with increased perception of threats from Greek Cypriots and negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots among Turkish Cypriots. In similar vein, more contact with Greek Cypriots is associated with less trust in Turkish Settlers and negative evaluations of them (Cakal, 2012).

In relation to these observations, it should be noted that the vast majority of peace and reconciliation initiatives that have been taking place in Cyprus are of a bi-communal nature and rarely, if ever, include any settlers/immigrants from Turkey despite the fact that mainland Turks currently probably outnumber population figures of native Turkish Cypriots in the North of Cyprus (Sapienta, 2014). Such initiatives from 1974 to 2003,

given the absence of free movement between the two communities, took the form of conflict resolution workshops led by academics and conflict resolution trainers outside Cyprus or in the UN Buffer Zone under special permission from the UN (see Broome, 1998). However, after 2003 and the opening of the checkpoints, more bottom-up and locally rooted initiatives, of an emerging pro-reconciliation civil society made their appearance and are aiming at contact between members of the two communities covering areas relating to education (even history teaching), business, human rights, women's issues and sports (See Loizos, 2006; Psaltis et al., 2014).

In the following section, we first explore the complex dimensions of social identity among Turkish Cypriots. We then discuss how these dimensions interact with the social, economic and political phenomena to influence the intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Intergroup Relations and Social Identities in Cyprus: Empirical Evidence

Earlier, Tajfel (1982) emphasised the relational nature of social identity by proposing that individuals seek to achieve a positive social identity by comparing the in-group with the socially relevant out-group (See Hogg, 2016 for more detail). Most research on intergroup conflict and social identity has focused on binary intergroup relations so far (but see Glasford & Calcagno, 2012) and ignored the intergroup relations in complex societies in which multiple groups coexist. One of the aims of the present research is to bridge this gap by focusing on the intergroup relations beyond binary distinctions.

In a survey of a representative sample from both communities conducted in 2007 (Psaltis, 2012) only 9.3 %, of the overall respondents in the Turkish Cypriot community identified themselves as Cypriots as opposed to 66.1 % who identified themselves as Turkish Cypriots (*Kibrisliturk*). At the other extreme end, however, a notable number of Turkish Cypriots (17.7 %) identified themselves as Turk. It should be noted that about 20–25 % of the electoral list in the TC community in 2005 was comprised by mainland Turks (Hatay, 2005). This is also reflected in the fact that almost 90 % of the participants identifying themselves as Turk do hold a Turkish citizenship from Turkey.

While it is difficult to speculate how many of these respondents are settlers, immigrants or individuals who were born in Cyprus to parents from either groups, recent evidence on the intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turks from mainland Turkey suggests that there is a clearer separation of the two communities, especially in the last decade (Cakal, 2012). In a similar vein, there has been a recent shift towards a more Cypriot-centric Turkish Cypriotness among the Turkish Cypriots. For example, in a recent survey in both communities, using the Social Cohesion and reconciliation Index (SCORE, 2014), it was found that in a representative sample of the Turkish Cypriot community of native Turkish Cypriots that were given the opportunity to choose between Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and European as

identification, for the first time in the last decade there were more participants identifying as Cypriot (43 %) compared to Turkish Cypriot (41 %) which indicates that Cyprio-centric views might be on the rise, in the Turkish Cypriot community. Indeed, in the most recent election, Mustafa Akinci who was elected as the Turkish Cypriot leader campaigned on a Cypriot-centric platform and he is well known for his criticism of Turkocentric views.

As we argued at the start of this chapter, it is possible to speak about several layers of social identity among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, e.g. supranational, national, religious and ethnic layers (see Fig. 15.1). Therefore, untangling this complex web of identities is a challenging task. Social identity theory observes that individuals identify with a group on the basis of two fundamental motives: (a) subjective uncertainty reduction and (b) enhancement of self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Martiny & Rubin, 2016). Even before individuals form such motives, of course they are ontogenetically first positioned from early childhood by their social milieu as ethnic subjects. While identifying with a particular group reduces the uncertainty about one's identity, how one and others should behave on the basis of this identity, and being able to differentiate that group from the other group could also positively boost self-esteem. Results from a recent correlational investigation of different layers of social identity among Turkish Cypriots suggest intergroup relations, especially social ties and contact with the relevant out-group(s), is an important factor influencing these motives. Yetkili (2007) investigated how central Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, Cypriot, Muslim and European are to their self concept and social identity and how strongly they identify with these groups, among Turkish Cypriots (N=217). He found that individuals perceive being Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot as being equally most central to their self-concept and being Turkish and Muslim are least central to their self-concept. Comparing the strength of different social identities revealed that people identify highly as Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, while identification is significantly lower for Turkish and Muslim. More recent findings from representative samples of two communities (Psaltis & Lytras, 2012) reveal that in both communities the strength and importance of identification with both the superordinate and the subgroup identity is indeed very high: For GCs, mean level of strength of identification as Cypriot was on a 5-point Likert scale was (M=4.26, SD=0.62) and identification as Greek Cypriot was (M=4.07, SD=0.74) while for TCs (native only) identification as Cypriots was (M=3.98, SD=0.77) and identification as Turkish Cypriot was (M=4.01, SD=0.79). It is worth noting that in this research when participants were asked to choose between the various forms of identification the one that best describes themselves, only a very small percentage in both communities chose to identify with "motherland" ethnic identity: Only 1.2 % identified as a "Greek" for Greek Cypriots and 9.2 % as "Turk" for TCs (in a sample consisting of mainland Turks and native TCs) which supports the view that "motherland" ideologies are becoming marginalised in Cyprus in both communities.

In the same research, the Moreno question was asked in both communities. In the Greek Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Greek and not Cypriot (0.8 %), Greek and a bit Cypriot (5.2 %) to the same extend Greek and Cypriot (57.9 %), Cypriot and a bit Greek (16.2 %) and Only Cypriot and not Greek (19.9 %).

Table 15.1 Identification and the Moreno question in the Greek Cypriot community

	Only Greek and not Cypriot	Greek and a bit Cypriot	To the same extent Greek and Cypriot	Cypriot and a bit Greek	Only Cypriot and not Greek	
Cypriot (%)	0	4.3	60.9	31.5	3.3	100.0
Greek Cypriot (*Ελληνοκύπριος/α*) (%)	0	5.7	77.6	15.1	1.6	100.0
Greek of Cyprus (%)	0	30.8	55.8	9.6	3.8	100.0
Greek (%)	23.1	38.5	30.8	0	7.7	100.0
Moreno question answers total (%)	0.4	5.8	48.5	28.7	16.6	100.0

In the Turkish Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Turkish and not Cypriot (7.6 %), Turkish and a bit Cypriot (7.3 %) to the same extent Turkish and Cypriot (61.8 %), Cypriot and a bit Turkish (12.4 %) and Only Cypriot and not Turkish (10.9 %). It should be noted once the answers of native TCs only are taken into account, then the percentage of participants identifying as "Only Turkish and not Cypriot" drops to 2.6 % while positions giving more weight to the Cypriot than the Turkish element become more similar to the situation in the GC community (about 1/3 of the sample).

Cross-tabulating the answers to the Moreno question with identification questions proves to be a very interesting exercise as it reveals the multiplicity of meanings behind categorisations and identifications. For example, in an earlier research with data collected in March 2007 with a large-scale questionnaire survey using a representative sample from both Turkish Cypriots (*N*=853) and Greek Cypriots (*N*=800) between the ages of 18 and 65 (see Psaltis, 2012) such a variability of meaning was clearly visible in both communities.

The results reported in Table 15.1 suggest that with the exception of the GCs who identify as Greeks who give more importance to being Greek than Cypriot, the rest of the categorisations underneath reveal giving equal importance to the Cypriot and Greek elements in their social identity. The picture is similar in the Turkish Cypriot community (see Table 15.2) since, with the exception of the TCs who identify as Turks who give more importance to being Turkish than Cypriot, the rest of the categorisations underneath reveal giving equal importance to the Cypriot and Turkish elements in their social identity.

Comparing the subgroups of our sample who identify with these different categories, as expected it is revealed that in both communities participants identifying as Cypriot exhibit significantly lower levels of threat, prejudice and distrust for members of the other community compared to participants who identify as Greek/Turks of Cyprus or simply Greeks or Turks correspondingly in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community.

Table 15.2 Identification and the Moreno question in the Turkish Cypriot community

	Only Turkish and not Cypriot	Turkish and a bit Cypriot	To the same extent Turkish and Cypriot	Cypriot and a bit/Turkish	Only Cypriot and not Turkish	
Cypriot (%)	1.4	2.7	45.9	32.4	17.6	100.0
Turkish-Cypriot (*Kibrisliturk*) (%)	0.9	3.3	84.2	10.6	0.9	100.0
Cypriot Turk (%)	0	10.0	80.0	10.0	0	100.0
Turk of Cyprus (%)	7.7	23.1	53.8	7.7	7.7	100.0
Turk (%)	67.1	5.4	24.8	2.0	0.7	100.0
Moreno question answers total (%)	13.1	4.3	69.2	10.9	2.5	100.0

It is worth noting that on the whole, GCs seem more willing to embrace the superordinate identity and distance themselves from "motherland" and we believe this is in line with one of the classic predictions of the common in-group identity model which suggests that the majority group members are more motivated to support a "single group" representation. In the long run, however, such an emphasis on a single group representation might have unintended consequences for social change, especially among the minority group members. That said, it is also relevant to explore the content of identification with Cypriot identity because for some GCs, Cypriot = Greek Cypriot in their everyday discussions and understanding, which is functioning as an exclusive form of identification as the subgroup could be projected to the superordinate (*Pars Pro Toto*, Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Correlational analyses of the *strength of identification* with superordinate identity and various measures of intergroup relations often show "feeling proud of being Cypriot" is essentially taken to be synonymous with "feeling proud of being a Greek Cypriot". From this perspective, it should be no surprise that in some studies strength of identification with being "Cypriot" is related to higher levels of prejudice, threats and distrust. This was documented also in a research with 11-year-old GC children (Makriyianni, 2006).

These two dominant forms of identification in both communities (the subgroup and superordinate identification) are not seen as mutually exclusive by the majority of participants. In fact, the correlations between the *strength of identification* for the two communities, as research often shows, varies from 0.40 to 0.50 which is an indication that many individuals might be actually projecting the in-group to the superordinate category (Wenzel et al., 2003) which is to one extent expected given the geographical separation of the two communities for so many years that leads to a socialisation into a Cypriot identity that is mostly exclusive of the other community.

Although these findings reveal the complex structure of social identity among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and their dominant forms of identification, they are unable to show how these identities interact with out-group attitudes or other social psychological processes, e.g. intergroup attitudes, positive or negative intergroup affect or collective action. We discuss these issues below.

In the Turkish Cypriot community, despite the opportunities for contact created by the influx of settlers in the north, the two communities remain largely segregated. Findings from recent research conducted among the Turkish Cypriots reveal that even if they exist, neighbourhood and workplace opportunities for contact are seldom utilised. Looking at three dimensions of contact, i.e. general, neighbourhood, school/workplace contact, Turkish Cypriots reported to have no or very little contact (Combined Mean = 1.56, SD = 0.97; measured by 5-point Likert scales; Cakal, 2012). Given such a lack of contact, perhaps it is not surprising to see that Turkish Cypriots generally evaluate the Turks negatively, report a lack of trust towards Turks, and think that the economic, social, and political differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in favour of the former group is legitimate (Out-group evaluation M = 2.20, SD = 1.05; Out-group Trust M = 1.09, SD = 1.13; Legitimacy M = 3.97, SD = 1.13, measured by 5-point Likert scales; Cakal, 2012).

In a similar vein, this lack of contact is also reflected in perceptions of threat posed by Turkish immigrants/settlers. Among the Turkish Cypriots, Turkish immigrants/settlers are regarded as a source of threat to the social and economic resources that the Turkish Cypriot in-group controls. Findings from the same study (N = 437) suggest that over 85 % of those who took part reported high level of perceived symbolic and realistic threat from mainland Turks living in Cyprus (Combined Mean = 4.11, SD = 1.12; Both types of threats are measured by 5-point Likert scale; Cakal, 2012). The levels of threat by individuals of Turkish origin were actually higher compared to the levels of threat felt by GCs who were traditionally seen as the primary out-group in the conflict. In addition, the majority of the participants reported that their group esteem as Turkish Cypriots is undermined by Turkish Settlers (M = 4.22, SD = 0.90).

Using the same data from Cakal (2012), we conducted additional analyses to explore how strength of identification as Turkish Cypriot interacts with attitudes towards the two most relevant out-groups, i.e. Turkish Settlers/Immigrants and Greek Cypriots. Our findings revealed that stronger identification with the Turkish Cypriot in-group is associated with negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots via perceived threats. More specifically, stronger identification as Turkish Cypriot was associated with higher perceived threats which in turn were associated with more negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots. To explore the multidimensional aspect of intergroup relations, we then tested the effect of social identity as Turkish Cypriot on out-group evaluations for Turkish Settlers via symbolic and realistic threats from Greek Cypriots. We found that social identity as Turkish Cypriot was associated with more positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers via perceived realistic threats from Greek Cypriots. More individuals identified as Turkish Cypriots and more perceived realistic threats from Greek Cypriots which in turn were associated with more positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers.

A similar set of analyses revealed that social identity as Turkish Cypriot was associated with less positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers via perceived realistic threat. Looking at cross-group effects, we found a similar effect of social identity on out-group evaluations of Greek Cypriots via perceived threats from Turkish Settlers.

Taken together, these results reveal how complex intergroup relations are in multi-ethnic societies. In particular, the impact of social identity on out-group evaluations of a particular group seems to be influenced by the perceived threats, i.e. realistic threats, by a third group. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, this finding resonates well with the official historical narrative promoted for years by separatist-nationalists that Turkey intervened in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots. From this perspective, the feelings of Turkish Cypriots towards Turks take an instrumental nature since the less they feel threatened by Greek Cypriots, the less they would feel the need of attachment to Turks and Turkey for protection.

Given the close relationship between the strength of identification between the subgroup and the superordinate identity discussed earlier, it would be interesting to also explore whether the strength of various kinds of identification discussed earlier retain a similar pattern of correlations with threats as mediators of the identification-prejudice or distrust relationship. It is also interesting to explore whether the well-known distinction in the Cypriot context between a Helleno/Turko centric and Cypriot-centric ideology is more relevant to intergroup relations than the classical SIT approach to *strength of identification* given the complexity of relations with third countries like Greece and Turkey. A conceptual model therefore to explore these connections would be the one presented in Fig. 15.2. In this model, all independent variables should be considered interrelated.

Fig. 15.2 A conceptual model of social identities in Cyprus and intergroup relations

Discussion of Empirical Findings and Future Directions for Research

The available data from our own research support a pattern of correlations in both communities, seen in Fig. 15.2. Beyond being related to each other, strength of identification with both superordinate and subgroup identification predicted more negative intergroup relations with the other community. One might expect that strength of identification with the superordinate would have a more unifying function but the geographical division and the low levels of contact between members of the two communities suggests that Cypriot identity is still not an identity that symbolically encompasses both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for most of the participants in our research. In fact, one of the main challenges for the viability of a reunited federal Cyprus is the promotion of an inclusive form of civic identity or constitutional patriotism as Cypriots irrespective of the ethnic origin of the inhabitants of Cyprus.

Implications for the Local Context and Peacemaking Efforts

These results have important implications for current attempts at the intercommunal level as they directly inform current negotiations on the reunification of the island. The form of Cypriot identity, that carries a symbolical weight pro-unification of Cyprus, is the one that appears as a form of resistance to Helleno-centric and Turko-centric views which encompasses a clear vision of a civic identity and allegiance to a possible joined future under a Federal state. This is supported by the fact that identities that symbolically prioritise Greece and Turkey (in the Moreno question or measurement of Helleno/Turko Centrism) over Cyprus bare stronger relationships with threats, thus leading to reduced trust and more prejudice towards the other community. In particular, reduced allegiance to a civic Cypriot identity and more attachment to "motherlands" leads to a worsening of relations with members from the other community. Adherence to views like "Cyprus is Greek" or "Greece is the motherland" in case of Greek Cypriots or "Cyprus is Turkish" or "Turkey is the motherland" for Turkish Cypriots are clearly empirically related to exclusionary identities and a sense of threat coming from the other community of Cyprus. Unfortunately, such views are difficult to change as they are until today supported by collective memory, master narratives, rituals and "national" celebrations (see Psaltis, 2016) which become highly problematic for the efforts to reunify Cyprus.

Implications for Future Research

As for future research, the issues we discussed in this chapter imply that research on social identity and intergroup contact should move beyond the classic binary approach to identity and intergroup conflict. Multiethnic societies such as Cyprus, India or

South American countries (see González, Gerber, & Carvacho, 2016) where ethnic and religious groups are an integral part of the mainstream society present a challenging context to the social identity theory and intergroup contact theory. In such contexts, it is important to situate identities in the social representational field of social conflicts and identify a variety of identity positions that could be forms of resistance to various and heterogeneous systems of meaning (see Psaltis, 2012).

Given that intergroup relations between two given groups have an immediate effect on the intergroup relations that one of these groups has with a third group, a phenomena known as "secondary transfer effects of contact" (Tausch et al., 2010), it is expected that such transferable effects will not be limited to positive ones only and that there is the need to explore "Negative Secondary Contact Effects" also. Current research on the transferable effects of intergroup contact suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact extends beyond members of those groups who have frequent contact with each other to members of third or fourth groups who do not have contact with any of the immediate groups. Our results suggest that negative or paradoxical effects of contact too are transferable. Given the recent surge of interest in negative intergroup contact (Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010), it would be interesting how extendible are the negative effects of contact between two groups on a third group.

Another possible and equally interesting avenue for future research would be to explore how a common in-group identity could influence social change. The majority of the existing research suggests that a common in-group identity could have negative effects on social change among the minorities and disadvantaged groups. Emerging research conducted in non-WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic) countries, however, (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) suggests together with intergroup contact common in-group identity can motivate members of different groups to engage in collective action for the mutual benefit of both groups (Cakal, Eller, Sirlopú, & Perez, in press; Cakal, Hewstone, & Eller, under review; Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). Future research can also investigate how sub and common in-group identities would interact towards a mutual collective action especially in post-conflict societies where previously rival groups could engage in collective action against a common out-group.

Conclusion

We started this chapter by discussing the complexities of social identity in culturally and ethnically diverse societies in the Cypriot context. We then discussed the necessity of moving beyond the conventional "binary" approach to intergroup relations in complex societies such as Cyprus and illustrated the necessity of such a move with findings from existing and our own research. In particular, we showed that classic theorising on social identity and related processes, while useful in less-complex societies, do not readily map unto the social identity processes in complex multiethnic societal structures or divided communities. Thus, to echo Henrich et al. (2010), if we are to move beyond non-WEIRD societies, we need novel conceptual tools to adequately address the complexities presented by such societal structures.

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Chapter 16
Building National Identity in Newborn Kosovo: Challenges of Integrating National Identity with Ethnic Identity Among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs

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> *"NEW life is born*
> *NEW hope is born*
> *NEW future is born*
> *NEW country is born"*

On February 17th 2008, these slogans, together with the typographical sculpture "NEWBORN", were revealed at the centre of Prishtina, marking Kosovo's Declaration of Independence. Every year, tribute to independence is paid by having Kosovo citizens paint the letters of the monument to reflect major events that marked the past year. On its first anniversary, NEWBORN was painted on the flags of all countries that accepted Kosovo's independence, thanking them for their support. However, on marking the 7th birthday in 2015, NEWBORN reflected a very different reality, after the glow of independence had worn off: It represented newborn Kosovo in bright multi-colours, with letter E completely painted in black to symbolise the gloom of the recent "Exodus" of about 10,000 Kosovo citizens who fled to European countries in just 1 month at the beginning of 2015 (Bytyçi & Than, 2015). The black E was also said to be reflective of the country's gloomy "Economy", one of the main reasons people seek a better life abroad.

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Most of the people seeking asylum from Kosovo into European countries are young, as is Kosovo's population. Demographically, it represents the country with one of the youngest populations in Europe, with over 60 % under the age of 35 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics [KAS], 2012). However, despite the potential and big dreams following independence, Kosovo remains one of the poorest countries in Europe (World Bank, 2010). Although the country has a lot of potential, one of its major problems is that it struggles with its history and the ethnic segregation among its population. The two largest ethnic groups, an overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians and a much smaller minority of ethnic Serbs, have a conflicting past and now have to come to terms with one another in the new country. In the current chapter we present our first steps in a new research project that aims to uncover the difficulties of creating a new national identity based on these two highly segregated ethnic groups. In so doing, we first provide a short historical background of the territory and these ethnic groups to understand the particularities of the context. Then, we present a recent study into the identities of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs with the goal of determining strategies to improve relations between them.

Historical Background

Located between Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, the tiny former Yugoslav territory that is now Kosovo ethnically comprises a majority of Albanians (93 %), with the remaining 7 % from other ethnic groups: Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, and Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma or RAE (KAS, 2012). The Serb ethnic group at 5 % is considered to be the largest non-dominant ethnic minority group in the country (Kosovo Government, 2015). As such, it has reserved rights, including a reserved 10 out of 120 seats in Kosovo's Parliament.

In order to understand Kosovo's ethnic groups today, one needs to consider the differences that construe Albanian and Serb identities in terms of religion and language (for more background information see Judah, 2008; Malcolm, 1998; O'Neill, 2002). For Serbs, identity is primarily moulded around their Orthodox Christian religion, and the Orthodox Church is strongly entwined with what is now a Serb identity in the Balkans (Judah, 2008). For Serbs, language, however, is not identity-defining as Serbs use the same language as Bosnians and Croats, although with regional variations (Judah, 2008). For Albanians, culture and language are identity-defining as they are distinctive and unify Albanians throughout the Balkans. Religion, however, is not defining of Albanian identity because, although the majority of Albanians is Muslim, there are also Catholic and Orthodox Albanians. In Kosovo, Albanians speak Albanian, and Serbs speak Serbian. Because of this difference, both Albanian and Serbian languages have been officially recognised as formal languages in the new Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo, 2001).

Kosovo's Significance in Albanian and Serbian Construal of History

Historically, Albanians and Serbs both groups feel entitled to Kosovo. Although mainly populated by Albanians, Kosovo has been a nationalist aspiration for both ethnicities. To Albanians, Kosovo represents the place where the Albanian national movement was launched in 1878 (in Prizren, East of Kosovo). Decades later, Kosovo's territory was given to Serbia in 1912 and not included in today's borders of Albania (Judah, 2008). On the other hand, for Serbs, Kosovo is viewed as the holy place where most of their historic churches are located. In essence, for Serbs Kosovo is what Jerusalem is to Jews (Judah, 2008). The discrepancies in what Kosovo means to each of the ethnic groups have always been problematic and continue to fuel the differences even today. While Albanians see Kosovo's independence as historical justice finally being brought to the people, Serbs view it as unjust separation from Serbia, fragmenting the heart of Serbian identity.

There was a time when Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo coexisted peacefully. When the Yugoslav Federation was created and led by President Tito, his economic and diplomatic policies maintained peace within the Federation. However, following Tito's death, his Serb successor Slobodan Milosevic (1989–2004) gave rise to Serb nationalism, annulling Kosovo's autonomous status within the Federation. As the Yugoslav constituent Republics revolted against his nationalist politics and left the Federation, Kosovo became the site of uprisings, reprisals, and general shedding of blood (Malcolm, 1998). This eventually erupted in an armed conflict in 1998 that left more than 10,000 people dead and that only ended through international military intervention.

Kosovo Today

Today, Kosovar Albanians continue to live with the memory of the recent conflict, with over 1600 people still missing and mass gravesites being opened throughout Kosovo and Serbia (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2014). The Kosovar Serbs have settled in segregated "pocket regions" throughout the country and maintain allegiance to Serbia. Although there is Serb political representation, contact across ethnic lines is minimal. Both ethnicities have settled into parallel lives with very little to do with one another (Judah, 2008).

The secession from former Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence in 2008 led to the creation of the newest national identity in Europe, the Kosovar Identity, as an overarching identity that gathers various ethnicities and religions. In an attempt to provide a national identity that is free from ethnic-references (especially for Albanians and Serbs), symbols of the new republic have all been neutrally designed. This includes a text-free anthem that has only instrumental music, to exclude possible ethnic biases in wording. The flag is pale blue, resembling the European Union flag, with Kosovo's map at the centre to symbolise the territorial compactness of the country's fragile borders (see Fig. 16.1). The top of the flag is

arched with six white stars, each representing a formally recognised ethnic group in the country. As such, these important symbolic means of representation for the Kosovar identity provide a vague identification for all ethnic groups.

Despite the small but significant political progress, Kosovo remains a segregated society characterised by conflict. The potential of the country continues to be hindered by discrimination among ethnicities and poor quality of life (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2010). As a result, the lives of Kosovo's people are far from normalised. Apart from daily hassles and struggles, people in Kosovo are now faced with yet another challenge: the creation of an overarching Kosovar national identity, as they need to adapt to their new national identity, re-evaluate old ethnic identities, and negotiate possible conflicts between old and new identities. Our work tries to shed light on this process in this context. The goal of our research is to examine how Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs shape their identity, and to find ways that bring them closer under a common national identity.

Building a Kosovar Identity for All Ethnic Groups

The new Kosovar national identity provides an opportunity for the improvement of relations between Albanians and Serbs. Past research on social categorisation and common in-group identity has already shown that if members of different groups can conceive of themselves as belonging to a common superordinate category (Kosovar national identity in this case), this improves attitudes toward out-groups (e.g. ethnic out-groups) because former out-group members are perceived as in-group members in the superordinate category (Brewer, 1979; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; McKeown, 2014). In this case, if Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo recategorise themselves more in terms of their national identity, then, despite ethnic differences groups may start to see themselves as part of a common national group and thus extend positive in-group attitudes to the ethnic out-group.

However, there are several reasons why a Kosovar national identity may not have this beneficial effect. Firstly, as posited by the in-group projection model

(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), the Albanian majority group is likely to perceive their ethnic group as being more representative of the superordinate identity. This means that they will project features of their own ethnic group onto the superordinate Kosovar identity, leaving little room for features of other ethnic groups. Although Kosovar Albanians may identify strongly with the superordinate Kosovar identity, this does not mean that this improves their perceptions of Serbs, as they may not see Kosovar Serbs as fitting the Kosovar identity.

Kosovar Serbs, meanwhile, may benefit from superordinate identification with the new Kosovar identity, but are less likely to do so as they may feel that their ethnic identity is insufficiently acknowledged in this new identity. Research from the social identity perspective has already shown that people strive to make their group positively distinct from out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and when this is not the case, a sense of social identity threat (i.e. "distinctiveness threat") arises (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Jetten, Spear, & Manstead, 2001). This threat is particularly pronounced among members of disadvantaged or low status groups like minorities, and especially among group members who strongly identify with the group (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999). In Kosovo's case, such threats are likely to create reluctance in Kosovar Serbs to identify with the Kosovar nationality, especially among those who identify highly with their ethnic identity. Indeed, previous research has revealed that while there is a positive relation between national and ethnic identification for majority groups, for minorities this relation is absent or even negative (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998). Given that distinctiveness threat has been associated with increased intergroup bias (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten et al., 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006 for a review on intergroup threat), it seems unlikely that emphasising the new superordinate Kosovar identity will magically improve intergroup relations.

Because of the differences that these two ethnic groups were predicted to have in relation to national identity, the first goal of our research project was to examine the degree to which Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs identify with their ethnic and national identity. Knowing this allows us to understand how these groups define what it means to be Kosovar. Moreover, this allowed us to test whether the degree to which Albanians and Serbs identified with the common national identity predicts more positive intergroup attitudes.

Integrating Nationality and Ethnicity Through Social Identity Complexity

Apart from testing whether intergroup relations in Kosovo benefit from superordinate categorisation, we propose that it is also important to take into account the *complexity* of the Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb identities. According to social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), simply *belonging* to different social categories that are cross-cutting (as is the case for Albanians and

Serbs with Kosovar nationality) may not be sufficient for positive intergroup attitudes. Instead, intergroup relations may improve to the degree that people *subjectively combine* their multiple identities in complex in-group representations (Brewer, 2010). When people belong to different groups (e.g. ethnicity, religion, nationality), there often is overlap between these identities, i.e. members of one's ethnic group are also part of one's religious or national group. However, there are also parts of the groups that do not overlap, for example, when not all people from a national group are of the same ethnicity. People differ in the degree to which they manage the presence and absence of overlap in their identity, and this is what we refer to as "social identity complexity". Identities are low in complexity when they reflect only the overlap between the multiple groups to which people belong (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). In our case, when Kosovar Albanians with low identity complexity think about Kosovars they think, for example, about Kosovar Albanians from their own region who share a similar religion (high overlap). We speak of higher identity complexity when people define their in-group not only with the people who share the different group memberships (e.g. Kosovar Albanian Muslims from the same region) but also with people who share one identity but not others (e.g. Kosovar Serbs from a different region). Based on shared nationality, Kosovar Albanians with higher identity complexity would include Serbs into their in-group, even though there is little overlap with them on other (e.g. ethnic and religious) identities. As a result, although all Kosovar Serbs and Albanians are part of Kosovo, only those with relatively complex identities are likely to perceive their ethnic out-group in a positive way.

Indeed, higher social identity complexity has been shown to positively predict a number of positive intergroup outcomes, including more favourable attitudes towards out-groups, more support for diversity policies and less distinctiveness threat (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, & Hughes, 2009). In this study we also examine whether, over and above the effects of superordinate categorisation, increased identity complexity is related to more positive intergroup relations. This will allow us to then predict ways in which relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo could be improved so that reconciliation between groups is achieved in the peace-building process of the new country.

Based on these principles we predict that Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs will differ in social identity complexity. We expect Kosovar Albanians to be low in identity complexity and to perceive more overlap between ethnicity and nationality (most Kosovars are Albanian). Serbs, on the other hand, are more likely to have a more complex identity as they need to reflect the fact that many Kosovars are not Serbs in their identity. However, even within the reality of their minority status, Kosovar Serbs will vary in how much overlap they perceive between the groups to which they belong (e.g. ethnicity, nationality, religion). Indeed, attesting the subjectivity of complexity research on minority groups in Australia (Brewer, Gonsalkorale, & Van Dommelen, 2013) found that minority members showed significantly lower complexity (high overlap) than majority members, despite them being objectively less represented in the population (Brewer et al., 2013). We aimed to test whether for both ethnic groups

higher identity complexity predicted more positive intergroup attitudes, including higher warmth towards the ethnic out-group, more willingness for intergroup contact and more positive evaluations of out-group members (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid et al., 2009). We also wanted to examine how social identity complexity relates to distinctiveness threat for these groups as previous research showed that higher distinctiveness threat is associated with lower social identity complexity (e.g. Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid et al., 2009).

Kosovar Identity Among Albanian and Serb Nationals: First Evidence

What follows, is our research findings on the ethnic and national identification and identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Our main aim was to test the two ways of improving intergroup relations described above—superordinate categorisation and social identity complexity—and examine which of the two would prove most effective in improving intergroup relations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. To our knowledge, no research exists examining social identity and its association with peace and conflict in Kosovo and we are thus pioneers in this context. Apart from practical relevance, our work is important because of the unique characteristics of the intergroup situation. Not only is there limited research on the intergroup dynamics between groups that are as different in size, as segregated and as unwilling to have intergroup relations as the two groups under investigation here, the situation of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is unique because their new national identity is a very recent development. Therefore, our research uniquely contributes to existing research on identity development, superordinate categorisation and intergroup relations because the content of the new identity is still under negotiation.

In the following section we give a review of our initial results from a survey among 229 Albanian participants from the University of Prishtina "Hasan Prishtina", and 80 Serb participants from the University of Prishtina in North Mitrovica (see Maloku, Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2015 for details). We first present our findings on ethnic and national identification among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Then we provide an initial picture of how complex identities are for these groups. Finally, we discuss current intergroup attitudes and examine which strategy, i.e. superordinate categorisation or social identity complexity, seems most promising in improving intergroup attitudes.

To What Extent Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs Identify with Their Ethnicity and Nationality?

As predicted, for Albanians the Kosovar identity was almost equivalent to Albanian identity: Kosovar Albanians identified to the same degree with both their ethnicity and their nationality. The strong correlation between these two measures suggests a

high degree of overlap between ethnic and national identification. Similarly, Albanians felt just as warm towards Albanians as towards Kosovars, again suggesting the psychological similarities of these groups to Albanians. For Serbs however, nationality and ethnicity appeared to imply very different constructs: Whereas they identified with their ethnicity to the same degree as Kosovar Albanians did, they identified much less with their Kosovar nationality. Also, Serbs felt warm towards other Kosovar Serbs but neutral towards Kosovars in general. For Serbs, there was no relationship between ethnic and national identification, consistent with previous studies on American ethnic minorities (e.g. Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998). Combined, these results suggest that superordinate categorisation does not yet function as a conflict reducing mechanism as for Albanians the superordinate national identity is conflated with ethnic identity, while it is a non-identity for the Serb minority.

How Complex Are the Identities of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs?

As in previous work (see, for example, Brewer & Pierce, 2005) social identity complexity was assessed by measuring perceived overlap between four categories (apart from ethnicity and nationality, participants self-selected their two most important groups from a list; for most participants this was their religious and student identity). Our findings reveal that, as predicted, Kosovar Albanians indeed have identities that are low in complexity (e.g. high perceived overlap between Albanian and Kosovar identities). Reflecting their minority status Serbs are slightly higher in identity complexity (i.e. lower perceived overlap between Serbs and Kosovars). Comparing the means with previous work with majority-minority groups (e.g. Brewer et al., 2013; Brewer & Pierce, 2005) revealed that it is not so much the case that Serbs have *a more* complex identity. Rather, Albanians have identities that are *extremely low* in complexity.[1] Finally, replicating previous work, for both ethnic groups lower complexity was related to higher national identification. Although this finding may seem counterintuitive it may suggest that lower identity complexity allowed Albanians and Serbs to identify with Kosovo more strongly (e.g. Albanians projecting their

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[1] Although in our results Serbs did show relatively high complexity, we have to take into account their low national identification. Most previous work on complexity induced participants to self-select their most important identities. However, because we were specifically interested in the complexity of national identity we included this category in the complexity measure regardless of whether people identified with it. Given Serbs' low national identification it is possible that their relatively low overlap between ethnicity and nationality reflects national disidentification (which would also result in Serbs reporting that there is low overlap between Kosovar and Serb identity) rather than identity complexity. However, attesting the reliability of the complexity measure for Serb participants, results based on measures of their identity complexity without the national category (i.e. based on their ethnicity and the two self-selected categories only, see, for example, Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012) were highly similar to the results presented here.

in-group on national identity, see Brewer et al. (2013) for a similar argument).[2] However, even when lower complexity makes it easier to identify with nationality this does not necessarily benefit the quality of the national identity or the relations between the two ethnic groups. Therefore, it is important to test the independent effects of the national identification and identity complexity on intergroup outcomes.

How Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs Differ on Intergroup Outcomes?

We also found that Albanians and Serbs are equally warm towards members of their ethnic in-group and equally cold towards members of their ethnic out-group. Similarly, they show comparably high evaluations of their group's morality, sociability and competence. Out-group evaluations on these three dimensions gave us insight into the content of the stereotypes that Albanians and Serbs have of each other (i.e. warmth and competence; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Whereas Albanians' stereotype of Serbs emphasises low warmth (low sociability and morality) but relatively high competence, Serbs' stereotype about Albanians is one of both low competence and low warmth. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; also see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) this suggests that whereas Albanians might feel envious towards Serbs, resulting in negative and even destructive behaviour, Serbs' responses towards Albanians are more likely to reflect contempt, leading them to reject or even harm Albanians. This pattern is intriguing and atypical in light of the status of Serbs relative to Albanians. When examining perceptions of group status, both Albanians and Serbs indeed perceive Albanians as having higher social status than Serbs. However, Serbs perceive this social hierarchy as less legitimate, less permeable and more stable than Albanians do. Finally, as expected, Serbs also experience more distinctiveness threat than Albanians: They report more concern for the acknowledgement of differences between Albanians and Serbs within Kosovar identity. Combined, Serbs perceptions of their low social status as illegitimate and stable with little opportunities for individual advancement, their contemptuous stereotype of Albanians and their experienced distinctiveness threat make for a rather volatile intergroup climate in which Serbs may revolt and choose disruptive forms of collective action if they perceive opportunities for improvements of their group's status as hopeless (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

Our data also reveal that there is generally little contact between ethnic groups, although Serbs, being a minority, have more contact with Albanians than vice versa. More importantly, both ethnic groups are equally unwilling to have contact with one another (e.g. talking in the street, working together, being neighbours or friends).

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[2] Importantly, the moderate size of this correlation in both groups allowed us to compare the independent effects of superordinate categorisation and social identity complexity on intergroup outcomes within one analysis.

Which Identity Process Predicts More Positive Intergroup Attitudes?

Next, we examined which of the two presented models for improving intergroup relations — increasing superordinate categorisation with nationality or increasing identity complexity — best predicted positive intergroup outcomes in each group. To this aim we performed hierarchical regression analyses in which we predicted intergroup outcomes from strength of superordinate identification and social identity complexity simultaneously, while also taking into account participants' ethnic identification.

For Albanians, we found positive relations between intergroup attitudes and social identity complexity, but not with stronger superordinate categorisation. Results show that Albanians with more complex identities experienced less distinctiveness threat, had more positive evaluations of the competence of Serbs and were more willing to have contact with Serbs. However, although superordinate categorisation with the Kosovar nationality predicted more warmth towards Albanians and towards Kosovars in general, other relationships suggest negative effects for intergroup relations. When we ran hierarchical regression to predict intergroup outcomes from superordinate identification and social identity complexity only, we found that identification with Kosovar nationality among Albanians predicted more positive evaluations of the in-group (i.e. more competence and morality for Albanians) but reduced warmth towards Serbs. Together, these findings suggest that whereas complexity may benefit Albanians' attitudes towards Serbs, identification with the "common" national identity does not.

For Serbs, we found a very different pattern. As predicted, their ethnic identification predicted more negative intergroup outcomes, i.e. more positive evaluations of their own group, less warmth towards the out-group (Kosovars and Albanians), and more distinctiveness threat. However, over and above these effects, there were positive relationships between identification with the superordinate Kosovar identity and intergroup outcomes. Identification with nationality was found to predict more warmth towards the Kosovars and Albanians, more positive stereotypes of Albanians in terms of morality, sociability and competence, and more positive in-group evaluations (only on morality of Serbs). We found no relationships whatsoever with social identity complexity. This suggests that although national identification among Serbs is currently low, finding ways to increase identification with the superordinate national category might be a way to improve their perceptions of Albanians.

Combined, these results suggest that in order to improve intergroup relations in Kosovo different strategies may be effective for different ethnic groups. Whereas for Kosovar Albanians a more complex and inclusive identity definition is related to more positive intergroup outcomes, for the Serb minority identification with the superordinate Kosovar nationality predicts more positive perceptions of Albanians.

Conclusions and Future Directions

Our initial work (Maloku et al., 2015) has shown that majority Albanians and minority Serbs in Kosovo continue to be highly segregated, with very little interaction, negative intergroup evaluations and little willingness to establish contact. This situation is problematic because segregation has been found to maintain and exacerbate intergroup tensions by mutual ignorance and suspicion (see Whyte, 1990; Gallagher, 1995; for segregation in Northern Ireland), but also reinforce other forms of segregation (e.g. Boal, 1969) like separate schooling systems or different kinship networking. Such separation creates space for prejudice and stereotypes to flourish even more (Whyte, 1990) thereby maintaining negative intergroup evaluations between Albanians and Serbs in our case. In our first study we examined which of two models of improving intergroup relations—the common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) or social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer, 2002)—would offer most opportunity for improving intergroup relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Our findings suggest that both superordinate identity and social identity complexity are needed depending on the group under examination. We found that Albanians are low in identity complexity, so for them increased identity complexity predicts more positive intergroup outcomes. On the other hand, Serbs are low in superordinate identity, so for them strengthening the superordinate identity is related to more positive intergroup perceptions. Regarding the Albanian majority, we found that their intergroup attitudes and perceptions were more positive to the degree that they defined their multiple identities in a more complex way, with lower overlap between people belonging to their national, ethnic and other identities. Albanians with more complex identities were more positive about Serbs and were more willing to have contact with them, for example, by chatting with them in the street, working with them, and even becoming friends. Moreover, higher identity complexity was related to less concern for the distinctiveness of Albanians from Serbs in Kosovo. By contrast, among Albanians higher superordinate categorisation with Kosovo predicted only negative outcomes, possibly because, consistent with the in-group projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), for Albanians national identity was highly similar to ethnic identity. As a result, the more strongly Albanians identified with Kosovo, the less warmth they felt towards Serbs.

By contrast, we found that social identity complexity was unrelated to intergroup relations for the Serb minority. Instead, their negative perceptions of the out-group (i.e. low warmth for Albanians and Kosovars) and concerns for maintaining the distinctiveness of their group within Kosovo were predicted by their high ethnic identification. Interestingly however, over and above the effects of ethnic identification, identification with the superordinate identity of Kosovo positively predicted warmth towards Albanians and Kosovars, and more positive stereotypes of Albanians (i.e. warmer and more competent). This suggests that finding ways to increase Serbs' identification with Kosovo would be a second avenue towards improving intergroup relations in Kosovo. Moreover, the independence of Serbs' identification with their ethnic and national groups suggests that identification with the superordinate

national category does not have to come at the expense of identification with the ethnic group.

Based on these first correlational insights, future work should examine how to increase identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and test whether increasing the complexity of Albanians' identity indeed improves their perceptions of Serbs and their willingness to interact with them. Work on the antecedents of social identity complexity has suggested that identities tend to be more complex when people become more aware of the non-overlapping parts of their identities, for example, when they interact with ethnic out-groups or live in more diverse neighbourhoods, and when they experience lower distinctiveness threat (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Schmid et al., 2009; Schmid, Hewstone, & Al Ramiah, 2013). Indeed, in the current study we also found that Kosovar Albanians displayed higher identity complexity to the degree that they reported less concern for the distinctiveness of their ethnic identity within the Kosovar identity. In future work we plan to examine whether inducing Kosovar Albanians to focus on parts of their national identity that do not overlap with their ethnic identity, while simultaneously satisfying distinctiveness needs (for example, by enabling Albanians to affirm the distinctiveness of their group) will increase their identity complexity and subsequently result in more positive attitudes towards Kosovar Serbs.

Similarly, future research should establish the beneficial effects of national identification for the intergroup attitudes of Kosovar Serbs. Previous research has established that identification with a superordinate category only improves minority group members' out-group attitudes when they perceive their group as prototypical for the overarching group (Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels, & Dovidio, 2012). Moreover, for Serbs the common in-group may pose threats to the distinctiveness of their ethnic group. More recent developments in the common in-group identity model have related the importance of emphasising dual identities—an emphasis on the superordinate identity as well as the subgroup identities—especially for minority group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). By focusing on dual identities attention is paid to the distinctive features of both groups, but the connection with the former out-group is improved through the common superordinate category. In future research we aim to test whether a dual identity approach will also improve national identification among Kosovar Serbs, and whether this will subsequently improve their perceptions of Albanians and willingness to interact with them.

Although our investigation sheds light on the intergroup dynamics between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, and offers some suggestions for how to improve their relations, our investigation also uncovered two unsettling aspects of current intergroup dynamics in Kosovo that may limit any attempt to improve the peace-building process in the country. Firstly, in terms of intergroup stereotypes, our findings show that both groups have quite a negative stereotype of each other that seriously limit opportunities for positive intergroup contact. Albanians' stereotype of Serbs can be characterised as envious, depicting Serbs as low in warmth but competitive because of their high competence. This stereotype has been associated with harmful and ambivalent behaviour, involving both resentment and respect (Cuddy et al., 2007). Moreover, out-groups that are perceived as high in ability but low in warmth tend to

be scapegoated when societies experience instability (Glick, 2005). Given the insta-
bility of Kosovo in terms of economic outcomes and intergroup relations, the way
Kosovar Albanians perceive Serbs does not bode well for future intergroup
relations.

At the same time Serbs' stereotype of Albanians is one of low warmth and low
competence. Based on the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002), this stereo-
type predicts contempt and disgust of Serbs towards Albanians, which may moti-
vate Serbs to distance themselves from Albanians by excluding and demeaning
them (Cuddy et al., 2007). In combination, the content of the stereotypes Albanians
and Serbs have of each other may prove to seriously limit opportunities for improved
intergroup relations. On a positive note, among Serbs superordinate identification
with Kosovo was also related to a more positive out-group stereotype on both
warmth and competence dimensions. However, among Albanians higher identity
complexity was related only to more positive perceptions of the competence of
Serbs, but not to their perceived warmth. Consequently, attempts to enhance identity
complexity among Albanians may actually result in even more envious stereotypes
of Serbs as more competent but still cold. As such, the increased willingness to have
contact with Serbs among Albanians with more complex identities found here may
reflect an increased passive facilitation of Serbs that fits interaction with an envied
out-group (Cuddy et al., 2007), rather than cooperative intergroup interactions that
are associated with out-groups that are perceived as high in both competence and
warmth.

Secondly, our findings reflect another disturbing quality of intergroup dynamics
in Kosovo, namely the illegitimacy, impermeability and stability of the social hier-
archy that ethnic minority Serbs perceive. Our measures of perceptions of the status
hierarchy revealed that Serbs not only perceive their ethnic group as having much
lower societal status than the Albanian majority, they rate this situation as extremely
unfair, and unlikely to change in the future. From a social identity perspective
(Wright et al., 1990), this situation reads as a recipe for underground resistance,
subculture gang formation, and non-normative collective action, especially with so
many young people, the high unemployment rates in Kosovo and the perception that
this is unlikely to change. In order to improve intergroup relations in Kosovo the
first step therefore seems to be to distribute opportunities and outcomes more fairly
between Albanian and Serb Kosovars. The fact that the Albanian students in our
sample acknowledged to a certain degree the illegitimacy of the higher status of
their ethnic group might be a first step towards improving the opportunities of Serbs
in Kosovo and moving towards more positive intergroup relations in Kosovo.
However, given the current hostile climate, improving positive intergroup relations
may prove to be a long process.

To conclude, the research project reported in this chapter provides first insight
into the intergroup dynamics that operate when two ethnic groups who have been
involved in one of the deadliest European wars since World War II, seek peace,
reconciliation and integration. The first results suggest that, even when intergroup
relations are tense and actual integration between former conflicting groups is far
away, current models of intergroup relations such as the common in-group identity

model and the social identity complexity perspective help to describe and explain current intergroup processes. Moreover, even in these tense and highly segregated circumstances these two models can aid in developing a more stable and less conflictuous future for post-conflict societies.

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Chapter 17
Canada, a Fertile Ground for Intergroup Relations and Social Identity Theory

Richard N. Lalonde, Jorida Cila, and Maya Yampolsky

Social identity theory (SIT) has impacted Canadian social psychology since its inception, and it is noteworthy that some Canadian social psychologists were of some influence in its development. This mutual influence began when Henri Tajfel (University of Bristol) had a visiting appointment at the University of Western Ontario in 1964 where he collaborated with Robert Gardner (e.g. Tajfel, Sheikh, & Gardner, 1964). Then in the early 1970s, Donald Taylor (who trained with Gardner) from McGill regularly visited the University of Bristol where he formed intellectual alliances with Howard Giles, Rupert Brown, and John Turner. As part of the McGill-Bristol exchange, Richard Bourhis (UQAM), a McGill graduate, went on to do his PhD with Giles, but he also collaborated with Tajfel (Bourhis, Giles, & Tajfel, 1973) and later with Turner (Turner & Bourhis, 1996). Taylor and Bourhis were active collaborators with Giles, and much of their work focused on issues of language and ethnicity. While early work on Canadian social identity issues was summarily dismissed by certain social psychologists as being of borderline relevance (Rule & Wells, 1981), this view was countered by a seminal book entitled *A Canadian Social Psychology of Ethnic Relations*. This book, edited by Gardner and Rudy Kalin (1981), germinated while they were both on sabbatical leave at the University of Bristol in 1976. In this chapter we revisit some of the intergroup issues identified by Gardner and Kalin through the lens of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the social identity approach (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

We discuss three different Canadian contexts of intergroup relations that offer a fertile ground for SIT. The first context is that of Aboriginal Canadians and their evolving relationship with non-Aboriginal Canadians. The second context focuses on French–English relations, as their history and languages lay the foundation

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for a bilingual and bicultural context of intergroup relations. The third context focuses on immigration (i.e. older vs. newer Canadians) and how changing patterns of immigration have led to different intergroup issues involving social identities based on language, ethnicity, race, and religion. For each of the three contexts we delineate (1) the nature of social identity, (2) the disadvantaged status of the target group, and (3) the strategies used by group members in each context to achieve a positive social identity.

Aboriginal Peoples and Social Identity

The Nature of Social Identity of Aboriginal Peoples

The selection of the term Aboriginal for this chapter underscores the complexity of Native identity in Canada. It was chosen because it is an inclusive label that encompasses more than 600 First Nation communities, the Inuit, and the Métis peoples. Data from the National Household Survey (Statistics Canada, 2011) indicate that about 4.3 % of the Canadian population identify with an Aboriginal group (First Nation at 2.6 %, Métis at 1.4 %, and Inuit at 0.2 %), and although national statistics are not available for the many possible ethnic ancestries of Aboriginal Canadians (e.g. Anishinaabe, Cree, Haida, Mi'kmaq), they do report that over 60 Aboriginal languages are still spoken (Statistics Canada, 2014). The tragic reality, however, is that these languages are nearing extinction with few exceptions (Cree, Inuktitut, and Ojibwa). Although the term Aboriginal as a group label is useful, it is so broad that it may, in fact, be removed from the lived experience of the individuals to whom it applies. For example, one might use the term Aboriginal to identify oneself when interacting with a government official, but could use Indian or Haudenosaunee in another social context. The lack of a good collective label has been aptly observed by Thomas King (2012)—"the fact of the matter is that there has never been a good collective noun because there was never a collective to begin with" (p. *xiii*).

Given the cultural variability of Aboriginal groups in Canada throughout history, and the conflictual relationships that existed between some of these groups, why should we expect a unified Aboriginal *collective identity*? Moreover, it has been difficult for Aboriginal peoples to pass along their distinctive or shared histories given that their languages and cultural traditions have been decimated through colonisation and its aftermath. Taylor and de la Sablonnière (2014) have summarily observed that colonialism destroys cultures, and Aboriginal peoples find themselves in a cultural identity vacuum.

When viewed from a SIT perspective, the absence of a unified collective identity should make it difficult for Aboriginals to engage in strategies that would be beneficial for their collective. We would like to argue, however, that there are two key identity features that are shared by all Aboriginal peoples and that these can be instrumental for facilitating a unified basis of identity. The first key marker of identity is a traditional one that involves a deep psychological connection to the

Land (often referred to as Mother Earth). The second identity marker is their shared experience of an oppressive colonial past.

What is meant by a deep connection to the Land? The meaning of First Nations refers to the fact that these Aboriginal peoples, along with the Inuit, were the first humans to live on what is now Canadian soil. Although this landscape has changed dramatically over the past three centuries, almost half of First Nations people live on reserves and thus are closer to more natural environments and farther away from urbanisation (Statistics Canada, 2006). The psychological connection to the Land, however, is far more than a geographic proximity. There is a cultural history that binds Aboriginal peoples to their natural environments, and the idea of coming from the earth is rooted in their mythology (Highway, 2003). This traditional connection to the land has been described as spiritual ecology by Cajete (1999)—"For Native people throughout the Americas, the paradigm of thinking, acting, and working evolved because of and through their established relationships to Nature (…). They understood ecology not as something apart from themselves or outside their intellectual reality, but rather as the very centre and generator of self-understanding" (p. 6). This psychological connection to the Land is still very much alive today and is underscored by all of the major Canadian Aboriginal organisations: the Assembly of First Nations, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and the Métis National Council.

The Aboriginal conception of Land stands in sharp contrast to the notion of land as property that was brought to North America by French and English colonisers, for whom private land ownership is a cornerstone of their economy and culture. Thus, when First Nations are involved in disputes with governments over land treaties, the dispute is one that is steeped in cultural identities. For Native people, Land is a defining cultural element. For colonisers, land was something to be appropriated, and for governments, land is a resource to be bought and sold, and not something to be shared by all peoples. We will return to the Aboriginal conception of Land when discussing the application of social identity theory for constructive social change, but first we address the dark reality of Aboriginal peoples' disadvantage in Canada.

Aboriginal Peoples and Social Disadvantage

The second shared identity marker for Aboriginal peoples is the social disadvantage that ensued from their history of colonisation. The disadvantaged position that is held by the majority of Aboriginals in Canada is appalling and well documented. King (2012) offers an accessible introduction to the tragic history of colonisation and Native people (past and present) in North America in *The Inconvenient Indian*. His narrative paints a devastating picture of the ways in which Aboriginal peoples have suffered at the hands of European colonisers. For a more academic account, Taylor and de la Sablonnière (2014) document the challenges faced by Aboriginal peoples in five domains that have significant psychological consequences: academic underachievement, unemployment, suicide, substance abuse, and crime, violence and sexual abuse. Recently, Gilmore (2015) compared the situation of Aboriginal

Canadians to that of African Americans (whose deplorable situation has been well documented), only to find that the Aboriginals fared worse on a number of important social indicators, including rates of employment, life expectancy, and educational attainment.

Ironically, the mistreatment of Canada's Aboriginal peoples has also been the subject of Canadian government enquiries (e.g. Royal Commission on Aboriginal peoples, 1992). The most recent enquiry delved into the residential school system which took Aboriginal children away from their homes and put them in schools where Christian missionaries "educated" them using a rigorous assimilative approach that forbade them to follow their cultural and linguistic traditions ("Truth and Reconciliation", 2015). The lingering effects of this form of systemic racism and linguicide (see Wright & Taylor, 2010), as well as the brutal improprieties of many of the teachers, are still being felt by former First Nation, Inuit, and Métis school residents.

Aboriginal Peoples and Social Identity Strategies

Given the social disadvantage of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, how can they strive to achieve a positive social identity? When it comes to the conceptualisation of identity-related strategies for maintaining or improving social identity, SIT makes predictions depending on what types of beliefs the individual holds regarding the social structure (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). If the individual believes that the boundary conditions between social groups are permeable, they will likely hold individual mobility beliefs. If the boundary conditions are perceived as being impermeable, they are more likely to hold social change beliefs.

It would be difficult for individuals from Aboriginal groups to have a social mobility belief given their history of disadvantage and the impermeability of group boundaries that have been created by a colonial system. It has been argued that a shared belief in disadvantage likely cuts across Aboriginal groups and, in social identity terms, this would translate into individual group members being more likely to hold social change beliefs. Rather than categorising identity management strategies as involving social creativity or social competition, however, we believe that both strategies can be combined for positive change.

We have presented evidence of two shared features of social identity across the diversity of Aboriginal groups in Canada. One is a history of oppression that is likely to motivate social change strategies for achieving a positive social identity. The other is the intimate link between Aboriginal identities and the centrality of the Land in conceptions of self. These two features are linked, as the loss of Aboriginal languages with the endemic oppression of colonisation has likely weakened the ties of the Land in the conceptions of self. Aboriginal languages such as Cree are rooted in nature and the earth, and it is partly through language that Aboriginals traditionally acquired their sense of self and of place (Highway, 2015). We maintain that the Land still plays a central role in Aboriginal identity and we present two studies that demonstrate its importance for constructive social change and the maintenance of positive social identity.

A landmark study by Chandler and Lalonde (1998) demonstrates the importance of cultural continuity as a buffer against suicide vulnerability. Their study revealed that First Nation communities that had more markers of cultural continuity (e.g. cultural facilities) also had lower suicide rates, a problem that is endemic in many Aboriginal communities. The two cultural markers associated with the greatest reduction in suicide were self-government and land claim negotiation—both markers reflect the importance of the Land in the social identity of healthier First Nation communities; self-government involves some control over traditional land and land claim negotiations reveal an active strategy for exerting further control of traditional land.

A study by Giguère, Lalonde, and Jonsson (2012) provides further evidence of the importance of the Land for Aboriginals. They found that the more First Nation individuals held traditional beliefs (e.g. *Appreciating the interconnection between all things—such as spirits, animals, humans—is important to the well-being of Native people*), the more likely they were to support a land-claim action that involved blocking housing development on traditional land. Claiming Aboriginal land rights is an assertion of the traditional and cultural worldview that places the Land at the core of an individual's life, as it offers balance and health (Wilson, 2003).

The *Idle No More* movement provides an illustrative example of how a core belief in the Land as a marker of a shared cultural identity can be tied to social change beliefs that involve both social creativity and social competition. In December of 2012, this grassroots protest movement was started by a group of four women—three were First Nation and one was a non-Native ally. The growing and active movement calls upon people to "join in a peaceful movement to honour Indigenous sovereignty and to protect the land and water" (http://www.idlenomore.ca). Although a full discussion of the movement is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Wotherspoon & Hansen, 2013), it demonstrates the creative strategy of coalition building between individuals from different groups (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal), who can share a common identity that can be used to fuel social protest and positive social change. A psychological attachment to the Land is at the core of Aboriginal identity, but it also reflects a form of ecological identity that is part of our common humanity (e.g. Mayer & Frantz, 2004). The beauty of the *Idle No More* movement is that it uses a social creativity approach—specifically that of redefining the value of land—in order to bring about social competition and social change and the capacity for peace building between groups (Aboriginal groups and environmental activists) that share a common identity.

French–English Relations in Canada: Focus on Québécois Social Identity

The second oldest context of intergroup relations in Canada is French–English relations. The French (sixteenth century) and the British (seventeenth century) had a long history as rival colonising powers in North America. Within Canada, one of the key turning points in this rivalry was the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759 that was won by the British. This eventually led to the Treaty of Paris (1763) which

gave Great Britain possession of what was referred to as New France. The French (Canadians), who had been members of the dominant colonising power, were now forced to become subjects of the British Empire. The British had to contend with the fact that the French were a numerical majority in large parts of their new territory. The French-speaking community was primarily concentrated in the province of Québec. Although there are several French–Canadian communities outside of Québec with their own intergroup issues (e.g. Sioufi, Bourhis, & Allard, 2015), as well as groups within Québec who do not have French as their mother tongue, we limit our focus to the Québécois, as they are the most prominent of the French–Canadian communities. We use the term Québécois with the accents, rather than Quebecois or Quebecker, to highlight that our focus is on Francophones in Québec.

Québécois Social Identity

French Canadian identity was traditionally rooted in the interaction between colonial French language and culture, the Catholic Church, and rural-agricultural practices. Language, as a marker of identity, is commonly used when discussing intergroup issues in the province of Québec where distinctions are made on the basis of one's mother tongue; there are Francophones, Anglophones, and Allophones (neither French nor English). Since the early 1960s, however, French–Canadian identity within Québec shifted from an ethnic identity that was focussed on religion, language, and the *Survivance* of the group, to a Québécois nationalist identity that asserted this group's power within their province (see Breton, 1988). Given their long endogamous tradition in Canada, there is an element of essentialism within this nationalistic identity (i.e. perceived biologically inherent *peuple Québécois*) for many Québécois; for these individuals, Québécois is largely defined by a blood lineage that can be traced to early settlers who came from France (see Bourhis, Barrette, & Moriconi, 2008). This is made apparent through the use of expressions *pure laine*, meaning "pure wool", or *de souche*, meaning "of origin". It should be noted that not all Québécois subscribe to this essentialist viewpoint, but the notion of the bloodline as defining for Québécois identity forms part of the cultural narrative.

Debates persist about what it means to be Québécois (and Quebecois), with several key factors shaping this identity as its status has shifted with time (see Gagnon, 2004). Throughout their history, the Québécois have sought recognition for the distinctiveness and preservation of their society within Canada (Bourhis, Montaruli, & Amiot, 2007), and they have fought for equitable treatment and opportunities relative to the dominant Anglophone majority (Bourhis, 2012). Given their place in the legacy of British imperialism and Canadian Anglophone dominance, the fight for the favourable status of their group has yielded movements calling for sovereignty or separation from the rest of Canada. Yet there is much variability within Francophone Québec society regarding Québec's autonomy. Some Québécois still hold a Canadian identity, while maintaining their desire to recognise Québec's uniqueness; others disidentify with Canada and focus on Québec as an autonomous nation (Beauchemin, 2004).

Changing immigration patterns in Canada and Québec (see Part III) add complexity to issues of social identity in Québec, particularly within the sovereignty movement where a number of identity questions are raised (Beauchemin, 2004). Should being Québécois be based on Caucasian French bloodlines? Should identifying with a Québec nation involve the recognition of cultural diversity? A bloodline identification with Québec takes a defensive stance against "outsiders", favouring an exclusive identification with the ethnic in-group while failing to recognise the diversity of Québec's population. Recognising the plurality of a Québec nation may call into question the grounds of sovereignty itself, if there is no clear demarcation between a diverse Québec and a diverse rest of Canada. Another perspective suggests that there can be a simultaneous French majority backdrop within Québec, along with the recognition of plurality within the Québécois nation (Beauchemin, 2004). These different perspectives demonstrate the complexity of a Québécois social identity that can be rooted in a strongly surviving community that is simultaneously fragile and threatened by the ever-present dominating presence of English in North America. SIT can assist in providing a nuanced examination of Québécois identity through the lens of past and current intergroup relations.

Québécois and Social Disadvantage

With the advent of British colonial rule in 1763, clear economic, social, and political disparities between the Anglophone and Francophone communities emerged. British officials consistently attempted to assimilate the French Canadian community into the Anglophone community by excluding the use of the French language in official contexts and by limiting the degree of power held by French Canadians in official positions (Bourhis, 2012). The majority of Québécois were relegated to lower status positions, while Anglophones (including the minority in Québec) held positions of power and prestige in the private and public sectors. One significant exception to this social disparity could be found in the domains of education and social welfare, which were controlled by the French Catholic Church (McRoberts, 1988). Although the Church supported the preservation of Québécois culture and the French language, it enabled British dominance through agreements with Anglophone authorities (Laxer, Carson, & Korteweg, 2014). This changed in the 1960s (see below), when language came to replace faith as the pillar of *la survivance*.

The dominance of English–Canadians over the French for two centuries seriously threatened the ethnolinguistic vitality of French Canadians. A group's ethnolinguistic vitality "makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup situations" (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977, p. 306). This collective ability to survive and thrive is based on the degree to which the members hold positions of influence (i.e. status), the number of members a group has (i.e. demographics), and the means to control their fate (i.e. institutional support). By the 1970s, following the Quiet Revolution (see below), clear threats to the ethnolinguistic vitality of the Québécois were identified: (1) the birth rate of Québécois

saw a decline from the highest to one of the lowest in North America, (2) immigrant families were choosing English over French for their children's education, and (3) Anglophones dominated the economy (Bourhis, 2012). Moreover, English was the dominant language of public signage, making the visible public space highly Anglicised relative to French (Bourhis et al., 2007). We now examine how social identity strategies discussed within SIT were used to address the social disadvantage of the Québécois.

Québécois and Social Identity Strategies

The history of clear ethnolinguistic divisions between the French and the English in Québec made strategies of social change (i.e. social competition and creativity), as opposed to individual mobility, especially prominent. We cannot address the full history of these French–English relations, but we will refer to a pivotal time of change in Québec that begins with the "Quiet Revolution". During the 1960s, an increasing number of Québécois began to spurn the authority of the Catholic Church, including its presence in education, its power in marriage and the promotion of large families, and its existence as the community's moral compass. It was during this time that the focus of Québécois identity shifted from a narrative that was heavily based on faith, to a narrative that was more language based. This change in narrative can be seen as reflecting both social creativity (i.e. redefining the focus of social comparison) and social competition (i.e. turning away from traditional authorities to bring on social change). These strategies were captured by the slogans that were used by the political party that started this quiet revolution (*Il faut que ça change*—Things have to change and *Maîtres chez nous*—Masters of our own house). This revolution quickly led to the formation of a new political party, the Parti Québécois (PQ), whose goal was to achieve political, economic, and social autonomy for Québec. It needs to be noted that many key players in the Quiet Revolution and the independence movement had previously adopted individual mobility strategies, as they had received some of their education in English and/or had participated in the federal (i.e. Canadian) political arena.

The Quiet Revolution and subsequent sociopolitical policies enforced in the 1970s turned the tide from Québécois marginalisation to valorisation, and the preservation of the community's language and culture which is quite apparent today. The most notable of these policies were the language laws (e.g. Bill 101), which put restrictions on the public use of English and favoured French as Québec's official language (Bourhis, 2012). Bill 101 required (1) most parents to send their children to French schools, (2) public signage to be in French (additional languages had to be in smaller script), and (3) French to be the official language for the workforce. At the federal level, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism moved the government to officially recognise both English and French as official languages, giving French greater value in the rest of Canada (Yalden, 2013). From a SIT perspective, the above examples demonstrate that social change is possible with relatively little social conflict.

Consistent with SIT, the perceived disparity between the Québécois in-group relative to the Anglophone Canadian out-group (i.e. social disadvantage) can certainly be seen as a contributing force behind the social initiatives taken for the Québécois community. Research examining relative deprivation and Québec's nationalist movement (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983) demonstrated that when Québécois perceived disparity between their in-group and the Anglophone Canadian out-group, they reported stronger Québec nationalist attitudes and greater endorsement of making French the dominant language in the province. Moreover, Québécois' perceptions of disadvantage, relative to Anglophone Canadians, were related to endorsement of greater political autonomy for Québec.

Although the Québécois are now an advantaged and ruling majority in their province, the perception of threat from the English influence of the rest of Canada and America still exists for many (Bourhis, 2012), and there are still a significant number of Québécois desiring an independent state (i.e. an ultimate social change strategy). Two provincial referenda on Québec sovereignty (1980 & 1995) were put forward by sovereigntist PQ governments, and the slim margin of difference in the 1995 vote draws attention to a continued fragility of Québécois identity within Canada. With the ensuing debates during these referenda, and the push to favour French over English and other languages, Québec has seen a decline in the presence of its Anglophone and immigrant communities (Bourhis, 2012). Recent evidence of how a perceived threat to Québécois identity can result in a backlash against new Canadian communities will be presented in the following section (see Charter of Values).

Immigration and the Changing Cultural Mosaic of Canada

The Nature of Social Identity of Newer Canadians

The nature of Canadian immigration started changing rapidly in the latter part of the twentieth century, marked by a significant increase not only in numbers of immigrants, but also in the number of countries of origin of these immigrants (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). These demographic shifts together with policy changes (i.e. *Multiculturalism Act* of 1971) marked an important step in Canadian multiculturalism. (See Stathi & Roscini, 2016; for a full description of multiculturalism.) Canada is now home to individuals representing over 200 different ethnic groups (Chui, Tran, & Maheux, 2008), who speak over 200 different languages (Corbeil, 2012), and who represent all of the major religions. (See Law & Mackenzie, 2016; for a discussion of multiculturalism in Australia.)

A discussion of social identification among these newer Canadians is not an easy task, primarily because there is no single social identification that is at play. For most immigrants, social identities associated with their heritage culture (e.g. Chinese) remain important in how they see themselves and are seen by other Canadians. In addition, given that most immigrants arrive in Canada with the intention of making Canada their permanent home, they also are likely to begin to endorse

a Canadian social identification. These two social identities are usually successfully negotiated by new Canadians (e.g. Indian at home and Canadian at school), although there are instances when the values and norms associated with each might clash and become problematic for the individual (Giguère, Lalonde, & Lou, 2010).

In addition to the above two social identifications, newer Canadians are also ascribed a third type of social identity, that of "immigrant". The term immigrant encompasses individuals that come from vastly different ethnic, religious, or linguistic backgrounds. Whereas this term might be a convenient heuristic for the majority, there is some evidence that immigrants themselves endorse this higher-order identity and that this endorsement can be tied to greater perceived discrimination (Lalonde, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1992). In part, this is because many are faced with similar challenges and obstacles as they settle in Canada. These experiences may help create a sense of a shared immigrant identity and being part of this larger collective may at times offer new Canadians opportunities for engaging in strategies for establishing positive social identifications and improving social standing. This might be especially important for members of smaller communities (e.g. Albanian Canadians), who on their own would not have the power and leverage to improve their situation, in contrast with large communities (e.g. Chinese Canadians).[1]

In addition to the *immigrant* identity, many new Canadians, as well as some established Canadians, share yet another higher-order social identity, that of a visible minority. According to Statistics Canada, the category of visible minority includes individuals who are non-Caucasian/non-White and who are not Aboriginal. Data from 2011 indicates that just over 19 % of the population identify as visible minority (Statistics Canada, 2013), and population estimations predict that by 2031 between 29 and 32 % of the Canadian population could belong to a visible minority group (Statistics Canada, 2011). Visible minorities consist of ethnic groups (e.g. Asian), but also religious groups (e.g. Muslim). Members of these groups often share certain physical characteristics (e.g. skin colour) or symbols (e.g. the veil) that are not common among many of the more established Canadians, and which can serve to set them apart from mainstream society. Importantly, the label of "visible minority" can carry over through generations, and affects both 1st and future-generation Canadians.

The Disadvantaged Status of Newer Canadians

Whereas most immigrants face numerous challenges to their successful integration in the host society, certain racial or ethnic groups, such as visible minorities, are particularly at risk of prejudice and discrimination (Esses, Dietz, Bennett-Abuayyash, & Joshi, 2007). While 1st generation Canadians, on the whole,

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[1] Whereas such higher-order identities are certainly a practical choice, they also carry the risk of overgeneralisation. There are differences between as well as within immigrant groups, which may have distinctive impacts on social issues and attitudes (e.g., Haji, Lalonde, Durbin, & Naveh-Benjamin, 2011).

suffer from higher unemployment (Statistics Canada, 2015) and underemployment rates compared to their Canadian-born counterparts, these differences are starker for certain groups in particular. Specifically, those groups originating from South and Southeast Asia appear to have the highest rate of mismatch between their level of education and type of job held in Canada (Galarneau & Morissette, 2004).

Visible minorities involving religion have also been in the spotlight in Canada. At a federal level, the government of Canada established the Office of Religious Freedoms in February 2013, with the purpose of protecting religious minorities, opposing religious intolerance, and promoting religious pluralism and tolerance. Nevertheless, this narrative of tolerance is not necessarily mirrored across Canada. There was a recent failed attempt in the province of Québec by the then governing PQ sovereigntists to enshrine a "Charter of Values", which would have forbidden the bearing of religious markers by public servants; the charter was widely criticised as a threat to religious diversity, tolerance, and freedom (Bourhis, 2013). Although the Charter was presented as an attempt at furthering State secularism, many critics argued that it targeted particular groups, whose faith prescribes the use of visible religious symbols, such as the hijab, the kippah, and the turban.

Social Identity Strategies of Newer Canadians

Most, if not all, immigrants come to Canada for a better life for themselves and their families. Many are well educated, communicate well in English and/or French, and are driven by a belief in individual mobility. They believe that this can be achieved by successfully integrating in Canada's economic system (e.g. getting a job) and social life (e.g. making Canadian friends). Canada's multiculturalism ideology further supports these expectations. In practice, however, getting ahead proves to be a difficult endeavour, particularly if one is a member of a visible minority. Group boundaries may not be as permeable as once thought, and there are power and status differences among groups that can hinder individual mobility. Over time, 1st generation Canadians may come to realise that individual mobility might never happen for them, and some eventually resign and accept the reality of being "immigrant working class poor". Official data lend support to this assertion, with newer immigrants and visible minorities in particular suffering from higher levels of unemployment and underemployment, and being more likely to live in low-income households (see Reitz & Banerjee, 2007).

Nevertheless, many newer Canadians manage to move up the social ladder, by pursuing higher education and becoming respected professionals. Academic and professional achievements have the potential to bring the individual closer to the higher-status, dominant group and thus foster a positive identity, especially if they are recognised by the majority. This strategy, however, is more likely to be effective for 2nd generation Canadians. Recent research has also examined another potential individual mobility strategy, that of baby-naming. Newer Canadians who decide to give their Canadian-born child a name that is common in mainstream Canadian

culture, as opposed to a name that reflects their heritage culture, are doing so in part to facilitate their child's identification and belonging with the majority group, thus increasing their child's similarity with its members (Cila & Lalonde, 2015; Haji, Cila, & Lalonde, 2015).

For many newer Canadians, particularly those that belong to socially disadvantaged groups such as visible minorities, individual mobility may be severely restricted. From a SIT perspective, these individuals will be more likely to hold social change beliefs, and consequently engage in social competition or social creativity strategies in the pursuit of a positive social identity. Let us examine a few examples of how these strategies may be adopted by immigrants.

Social competition and collective strategies can be either normative (e.g. political lobbying on behalf of one's group) or non-normative (e.g. rioting). The strategies that have been typically adopted by newer Canadians have predominantly been normative. Some research by Lalonde and Cameron (1993) found that 1st generation Canadians who perceived greater group disadvantage were more likely to endorse collective strategies that were normative in nature. For 2nd generation Canadians, however, they found that the link between perceived disadvantage and collective acculturation was more likely to be found for individuals from a visible minority group (i.e. Canadians of Caribbean heritage) than for individuals who blend in with the majority (i.e. Italian Canadians). It is apparent from this study that when attempts are made to predict social change strategies from a SIT perspective, the generational status as well as the visible-minority status of the groups need to be taken into consideration. In addition, context may also play an important role in deciding which specific strategies newer Canadians employ to achieve positive distinctiveness. Specifically, opportunities for individual mobility, or at the very least beliefs in mobility as well as social change, may be higher in large metropolitan areas with a high immigrant population, compared to smaller places that are less diverse.

We now turn to a discussion of social creativity strategies that immigrants may adopt to achieve positive distinctiveness of their group. First, immigrants may choose to redefine the value attached to specific attributes. For instance, Ruby's (2006) qualitative research with Muslim Canadian women revealed that for many of the women who wore a veil, the importance attached to that veil seemed stronger in Canada than in their countries of origin. In Canada, where Muslims are a minority, wearing the veil was interpreted by some women as a way to publicly proclaim their religious identity and to bring about positive feelings about being a Muslim woman in a non-Muslim country.

Another possible social creativity strategy employed by immigrants is that of identifying new relevant out-groups against which to compare one's own group. Because more established Canadians tend be at an advantage compared to newer immigrants, comparing oneself with the former would not prove beneficial, as it would not lead to a positive identity. Consequently, immigrants may choose to compare themselves (e.g. how well they have integrated in the labour market) to other immigrants, rather than to more established Canadians. Usually this comparison will involve a group that is seen as lower status or as doing more poorly than one's

own group. This downward comparison has the potential to provide a more positive social identity.

A third social creativity strategy that may be employed by newer Canadians is that of choosing new dimensions of comparison. Research suggests that one way in which out-group members are viewed and evaluated is in terms of competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and minority group members would rarely be perceived to have both. For instance, Asians are typically stereotyped as being high-achievers, but lacking social skills and warmth. Thus, an Asian Canadian striving for a positive social identity would likely compare herself to out-group members along the competence dimension, while possibly downplaying the warmth dimension, thus bolstering a positive social identity.

Our discussion for this third section focused exclusively on "mono-racial" individuals. We were not able to discuss issues of social identification among bi/multi-racial individuals. This is a growing demographic in Canada and one which presents new theoretical and empirical considerations (e.g. Lou & Lalonde, 2015; Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2015), such as the development of overarching identities (e.g. a global identity), which may help promote a focus on group similarities and a more peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion

In this chapter we briefly touched upon three contexts of intergroup relations and social identity in Canada. When these are examined within a global perspective and within the context of SIT, it can be observed that although intergroup conflict is present in Canada, these conflicts are currently being played out in relatively peaceful ways. This does not mean that there are not groups who are at a serious disadvantage in Canada (i.e. Aboriginal groups) or that the intergroup climate will always be stable.

From a SIT perspective, we believe that three factors facilitate the maintenance of this relatively peaceful climate. One is that there is no clear majority group that is attempting to assert its dominance over other groups. Given that Canada is a country with two official languages, one linguistic group cannot fully dominate over the other. For more than 200 years, the English and French have had to negotiate their coexistence and biculturalism is now enshrined in many Canadian institutions. A second factor that is related to the absence of a clear dominating majority (particularly outside of Québec) has been the magnitude of immigration to Canada during the twentieth century; huge numbers of immigrants came from continental European countries in the first half of that century, with a sizeable shift to visible minority immigration starting in the 1970s. Given the influx of new Canadians has been primarily evidenced in the larger Canadian cities where the majority of the country's population resides, these centres are quite multicultural. No distinct ethnic majorities dominate in cities such as Toronto and Vancouver. A third factor bolstering peaceful relations is that multiculturalism is now a defining feature of Canadian national identity (e.g. Lalonde, 2002)

Maintaining peaceful intergroup relations is always a challenge and SIT offers a rich theoretical framework for understanding the importance of positive social identities for the maintenance of such a peace. In this chapter we presented a number of possible strategies that individuals from disadvantaged groups can engage in to bring about positive social identity. The various factors that influence the adoption of these strategies, how successful they are, and the implications they may have for the individual and the group, are all topics for further inquiry.

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Chapter 18
Social Identities and Conflict in Chile: The Role of Historical and Political Processes

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Historical and political processes have shaped the construction of the most relevant social identities in Chile. In this chapter, we will discuss how these processes have been related to the development of meaningful social identities in the Chilean society and how their structure, experiences of threats and the nature of their intergroup relations can be seen as relevant factors associated to the development of conflict between the groups involved. Specifically, drawing on social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & turner, 1986), we will analyse five social identities across different contexts: ethnic identities, national identity in the context of immigration, political identities, gender identities, and social class identities. For each of these, we describe the historical background that gave rise to status and power differences, the nature of their intergroup relations, the social conflicts that emerge among the groups involved, threats to social identity, as well as out-group derogation.

We seek to contribute to the integration of historical and contextual perspectives with socio-psychological theories to better understand the development of social identities and conflicts. Psychology has focused on psychological factors (e.g. the way we perceive the social world and the way we think and feel about others and ourselves) to explain human behaviour. However, the social identities and related conflicts we analyse in the Chilean context have been heavily influenced by historical and political contextual factors (social conflict, ideologies and social change forces) that are often disregarded in social psychology. Indeed, we argue that sociopolitical contexts normally shape the psychological functioning of human beings (e.g. social identities). This influence in turn, motivates several psychological processes that contribute to maintaining the status quo, group differences and power relations that

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characterise the relationship between in-group and out-group members. Thus, a dynamic process of influence between psychological and historical–contextual factors might shed light on the relationship between social identities and conflict.

In the first section, we discuss ethnic identities in Chile. As has been well documented, the process of colonisation that began in the fifteenth century gave rise to an important differentiation between those who descend from White (mostly European) colonisers and those who have indigenous ancestors (see Eller, Cakal & Siropu, this volume, for a further discussion of these issues). Since then, the relationship between ethnic groups has been hierarchically organised: White people enjoy a disproportionate share of social goods in comparison to mestizo and indigenous groups. We reason that this historical–situational factor has shaped the way in which indigenous and non-indigenous group members relate to each other in the present, and more importantly, how perceptions (stereotypes and prejudice) and behaviours (discrimination) exhibited particularly by member of the majority non-indigenous group have fostered the development of conflicts for more than 300 years.

In the second section, we focus our attention on national identities in the context of the migration process that has occurred in Chile during the last century and discuss how it has influenced the development of negative attitudes toward immigrants and enhanced a sense of national identity. Chile's economic success and political stability have made it a very attractive country for Latin American migrants. The migration process has accentuated differences between nationals and immigrants bringing about negative as well as positive outcomes (González, Sirlopú, & Kessler, 2010). As such, this particular social context offers an opportunity to analyse some relevant social-psychological factors that explain attitudes and behaviour toward immigrants in general and Peruvian immigrants in particular (the biggest immigrant group in Chile).

In the third section, we turn our attention to the Chilean political context and offer antecedents that contribute to explaining how political identities have been developed. Political polarisation in the twentieth century (including the occurrence of a dictatorship) created severe conflicts between left-wing and right-wing political factions in Chile. As a result of the polarisation of political conflicts, and the extreme violence used by some political forces, political ideologies remain as sources of social identities and drive negative attitudes (and in some cases, violence). Particularly relevant for the present discussion is the process of reconciliation and forgiveness associated with past wrongdoing of groups involved in the political conflicts prior, during and after the Chilean dictatorship.

In the fourth section, we address the social phenomenon that involves gender identities and conflict: Machismo. It represents a patriarchal ideology of domination that has characterised gender relationships in Chile since colonial times. Until these days, gender-based violence, gender inequality and gender discrimination are widespread practices in Chile. We discuss the stereotype of being "macho" and how this conception is related to conflict and violence toward women and gay people and how in the last decades, women have achieved important advances in the social and political arenas.

Finally, this analysis would not be complete if we do not address one of the most noticeable social phenomena in Chile, namely social class. Differences among social classes tend to go hand in hand with some of different social identities we discuss in this chapter. White people disproportionately compose the upper class, while indigenous people, immigrants and single mothers tend to be in high risk of poverty. Today, Chile remains as one of the most unequal countries both in the region and in the world (Torche, 2006; World Bank, 2013). However, strong movements opposing wealth disparities and income inequality, organised by left-wing political parties or charismatic leaders, have started to dominate the public agenda and foster the discussion of social class and inequalities in the country. This realistic source of tension and conflict is also related to the psychological sphere where negative stereotypes and different forms of classism have been developed in the Chilean society as a whole.

Ethnic Identities in Chile

The process of conquest and colonisation of Chile by Spanish forces began in the fifteenth century and had significant consequences for the indigenous people who lived in the area (Bengoa, 2000). Crucially for this chapter, this process gave rise to an important differentiation between those who descend from white colonisers and those who have indigenous ancestors. Since the foundation of Santiago de Nueva Extremadura (today, Santiago de Chile) by Pedro de Valdivia in 1541, Spanish forces began the conquest of the indigenous lands across what currently is Chilean territory. While the indigenous groups living in the northern part of the country were easily subdued, the Mapuche people—the largest ethnic indigenous group in Chile-resisted for more than three centuries in the southern part of the country. By the end of the nineteenth century, finally the Chilean State invaded and occupied ancestral lands of Mapuche people. The area was divided into reservation lands and distributed to non-indigenous buyers. From this time onwards, the Mapuche people have claimed for their right to ancestral lands and for the recognition of rights and autonomy of their people. Part of the land was restored to indigenous owners during the land reform of the 1960s and 1970s. However, during Pinochet's dictatorship, hydroelectric and forestry companies received land concessions exacerbating the conflict. Between 1884 and 1980, Mapuche people had their land ownership reduced from 6.1 to 0.8 hectares per person (Agostini, Brown, & Roman, 2010), which has translated into a consequent impoverishment of the community.

When Chile recovered democracy in 1990, a number of measures were taken to guarantee the rights of indigenous groups: an indigenous development institution was created at the government level, public policy aimed at repairing the past damage and recognising their cultural tradition were implemented (Programa Origenes, Ministry of Social Planning) and an indigenous law was passed. Yet, these actions have been argued to be insufficient by many, and particularly so, by some leaders of indigenous communities. As a result, the demands of indigenous groups (the return

of ancestral land, economic benefits, cultural recognition and the creation of an independent territory) have been growing significantly during the last few years. Alongside peaceful strategies to claim for land rights (e.g. collective actions, public calls and meeting with authorities), some radical Mapuche activists have turned to the use of violence against industrial and forestry companies and private landowners (Bengoa, 2000; Carruthers & Rodriguez, 2009; Mella Seguel, 2007). Meanwhile, the police have responded in more and more violent ways and Mapuche territories have become increasingly militarised (Carruthers & Rodriguez, 2009; Mella Seguel, 2007). The criminal justice system, on the other hand, has applied anti-terrorist and internal security laws (Carruthers & Rodriguez, 2009), hereby limiting the rights of Mapuche defendants. As a result of this conflict and of a severe lack of social cohesion, the region suffers an under-production of public goods and, thus, persistent underdevelopment (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2013).

Today, indigenous people in Chile clearly belong to a minority low-status group in opposition to high-status non-indigenous Chileans (Terwindt, 2009): they enjoy a disproportionately lower share of social goods compared to the non-indigenous majority. This situation is particularly clear regarding Mapuche communities (for which there is more information available): Mapuche people have lower education levels (Cantero & Williamson, 2009), are poorer (Agostini et al., 2010), have poorer health, lower levels of income and show lower rates of upward mobility (Cantero & Williamson, 2009).

Identification with ethnic minorities or with non-indigenous Chileans, however, is not clear-cut (Terwindt, 2009). First of all, even though 44 % of the genetic contribution in Chile is indigenous (Fuentes et al., 2014), only 8 % of people self-identify as indigenous (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2013). To blur the distinction even further, a great proportion of Mapuche people live in cities and have assimilated into the majority's culture, while many non-indigenous Chileans support the Mapuche struggle (González et al., 2015; Terwindt, 2009; Zagefka, Brown, & González, 2009). It is thus not surprising to find a number of people in Chile identifying with indigenous minority groups as well as with the non-indigenous majority group. Indeed, identifying with both groups could bring about positive outcomes in terms of intergroup attitudes. For instance, Pehrson, González, and Brown (2011) demonstrated that the more non-indigenous people perceived themselves as having Mapuche roots as part of their Chilean identity, the higher the willingness to support policy aimed at repairing the damage toward indigenous groups. González et al. (2015), on the other hand, examined how the normative support for, and quality of, social interaction between Mapuche and non-indigenous Chilean children in school contexts affected identity development and acculturation preferences over time. The study revealed that the more indigenous and non-indigenous children perceived their family, peers and friends to support intergroup friendship, the stronger their identification with the Mapuche identity. In turn, greater Mapuche identification predicted greater support for the maintenance of Mapuche culture. On the other hand, quality of contact was particularly effective for non-indigenous children: better quality of contact with Mapuche students predicted greater Mapuche identification, which in turn predicted greater support for Mapuche cultural maintenance and

Chilean cultural adoption. Altogether, this evidence supports the idea that fostering norms for promoting cross group friendship as well as increasing the quality of cross group friendship between indigenous and Chilean non-indigenous groups would seem to be a positive means for building peaceful intergroup relations while recognising the value of group identities.

Above and beyond this overlap in indigenous and non-indigenous identities, intergroup relationships are still characterised by conflict stemming from both realistic and symbolic threat. First, the main issue of (peaceful and violent) contention is land ownership. Access to land not only affects economic opportunities for indigenous groups and hydroelectric/forestry companies and owners. Working the land is also at the heart of what constitutes the Mapuche identity. Second, cultural distance between indigenous and non-indigenous people in Chile is also relevant. Mapuche people—mainly those living in rural areas—have kept their own culture alive, still speak their own language (Mapudungun) and maintain their own health system and religion (Zagefka et al., 2009). Intergroup relations are also affected by this ongoing conflict. Zagefka et al. (2009) showed that Mapuche people are frequently stereotyped as brave warriors (Saiz, 1986), but also as being conflictive, rude, violent and lazy (Saiz, Rapimán, & Mladinic, 2008).

When we observe the attitudes of the members of the minority groups, things are not clear-cut. Minority group members overtly express an evaluative preference for their in-group but, at the same time, devalue it in a covert manner. It has long been stated that minority groups sometimes internalise a sense of inferiority (Allport, 1954), particularly under low-status conditions (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Indeed, Haye et al. (2010) found that non-indigenous Chileans expressed an evaluation of the Mapuche group equally positive to their in-group evaluation at the explicit level. However, they expressed a clear preference for their in-group at the implicit level. Mapuche participants, on the other hand, showed in-group favouritism at the explicit level and out-group favouritism at the implicit level. According to Haye et al. (2010), the latter situation provides evidence of system-justification tendencies among Mapuche respondents. Importantly, Mellor, Merino, Saiz, and Quilaqueo (2009) showed that Mapuche people report negative feelings, shame and powerlessness as a result of perceived discrimination.

Mapuche people have adopted different strategies to work around this situation of disadvantage. Some have adopted an individual strategy of assimilation, actively trying to conceal their indigenous background (e.g. avoiding talking in Mapudungun, their aboriginal language or changing their names); assimilating into the majority's culture and even discriminating against other Mapuche people (Terwindt, 2009). However, the majority of Mapuche people have opted for integration, that is, they value both maintaining their group identity and keeping contact with non-indigenous members. Others have adopted strategies of social change by actively resisting conforming to the national culture, emphasising their ethnic background, mobilising around a collective identity and demanding official recognition (Zagefka et al., 2009). Among different possible strategies for social change, violent means have been chosen by some radical Mapuche groups as a result of the perceived cultural distance and discrimination inherent in the Chilean legal system, as well as

due to a high ethnic identification (Gerber, Carvacho, & González, 2015). Finally, Terwindt (2009) discusses the adoption of social creativity strategies, whereby some Mapuche people have based their identities in the image of the "true" Mapuche and in opposition to the negative dominant image. "True" Mapuches live in harmony with nature, use medical plants, have a traditional language and resist being exploited, among other things.

National Identity in the Context of Immigration in Chile

International migration to Chile began in colonial times. By the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, immigration from Europe was promoted to colonise southern territories (for a review, see Stefoni, 2011). During the same period, Asian and Latin American immigrants arrived to work in nitrate fields in northern Chile. Since the latter unwanted migration began to outnumber the planned migration of colonists, by 1947 policies were adopted to allow migration only in specific situations. A decree promulgated in 1953 explicitly stated that migration should contribute to improving racial biological conditions in Chile and avoid the entry of undesirable individuals for whom adaptation would be difficult. In 1975 (during Pinochet's dictatorship), a migration law was passed to limit the access of migrants to the national territory. According to Stefoni (2011), this law presented migrants as a threat to the nation (migrants are since then officially called "foreigners") and established a number of highly bureaucratic procedures to obtain temporary and definitive resident visa.

After democracy was regained in 1990, migration to Chile experienced important transformations (Martinez, 2004; Stefoni, 2011). Chile became an attractive place for Latin American migrants due to its comparatively high quality of life and work opportunities (Mora, 2008). Since then immigration waves have increased by 200 % and are expected to continue increasing. According to the estimations of the Ministry of Interior (2009), 352,344 migrants live in Chile (2.08 % of the total population). Among these, the largest immigrant groups come from Perú (37.1 %), Argentina (17.2 %) and Bolivia (6.8 %). According to this report, the majority of Peruvian immigrants have indigenous origins and belong to low socio-economic groups, and include a disproportionally high proportion of women between 15 and 44 years of age.

Intergroup attitudes between Peruvian immigrants and Chileans can be argued to stem from both realistic and symbolic threats. The arrival of immigrants to any given country can impact on feelings of realistic and symbolic threat on both sides (immigrant and native-born), as they have contact with each other. Stephan and Stephan (2000) argue that realistic threat derives from perceptions that the ingroup's material well-being, as well as economic and political power, which may deteriorate because of the presence of immigrant groups. In the Chilean case, realistic threat can be observed in the competition between Peruvian immigrants and lower-class Chileans for low-skilled jobs (see González et al., 2010). While

women often find jobs in domestic service and housekeeping, men tend to be employed in unskilled labour such as construction (Sabogal & Núñez, 2010). Participation in low-skilled jobs hinders the possibility of obtaining a residents visa because visa applicants need to present a work contract for two consecutive years and employers are reticent to hire immigrants. At the same time, not having a visa generates a range of social and economic vulnerabilities: undocumented migrants are not allowed access to social services such as health, housing and social subsidies (Stefoni, 2011). Stefoni argues that there is currently a lack of laws that specifically attend to migration issues, which has redirected the migration problem to a social problem of poverty, exclusion, violence and marginalisation.

On the other hand, at the symbolic level, while Peruvians and Chileans share relevant cultural characteristics (such as language and religion), there are noticeable differences when it comes to ethnic origins: while Chileans have a stronger White-European descent, Peruvian immigrants have a stronger Andean indigenous origin (see González et al., 2010). In part because of their indigenous roots, Peruvian immigrants are perceived as being low in status by Chileans (González, 2005).

Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven (2013) measured negative affect toward Peruvian immigrants, perceived threat and acculturation preferences among a random sample of Chileans. They found that it was those with low SES who felt more threatened, exhibited stronger negative affect and showed less support for multiculturalism. On the other hand, González et al. (2010) found that Chilean's intergroup contact (number of friends) reduced prejudice toward Peruvians because it reduced feelings of realistic threat and intergroup anxiety. Interestingly enough, this process operates in the same way for the Peruvian immigrants regarding their experiences of contact and prejudice toward Chileans. Thus, the more they reported to have Chilean friends, the less they experienced feelings of threat and anxiety, and through that mechanism they reduced their prejudice toward Chileans. Thus, fostering the development of cross-group friendship among Peruvian immigrants and Chileans could be a fundamental way of promoting social cohesion and developing peaceful intergroup relations among people who have experienced conflict in the past.

Second, negative stereotypes of Peruvian immigrants also seem to serve the function of strengthening the Chilean identity. According to Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven (2013), negative attitudes toward Peruvian immigrants are based on the common assumption among Chileans that the country is homogenously White and shares a European background (see also Staab & Maher, 2006). Chileans have a preference for white-skinned people and distrust people with indigenous ethnic origins (see Meeus et al., 2015; Uhlmann, Dasgupta, Elgueta, Greenwald, & Swanson, 2002). Staab and Maher (2006) conducted interviews among Chilean middle-class employers of Peruvian domestic workers and found that they perceived Peruvian domestic workers as being more obedient and hard-working than Chilean workers. However, they also tended to stereotype Peruvian domestic workers as uncivilised, with little education and dirty. The authors reasoned that this double discourse thought to, on the one hand, justify hiring migrants under poor working conditions (bad jobs are better than no jobs) while, on the other hand, constructing a positive Chilean identity as white and modern in opposition to

indigenous and backward Peruvians. The authors also found a tendency among middle-class employers of Peruvian domestic workers to switch back and forth from an identity based on class (to distinguish between them and low-class Chileans) and an identity based on nationality (to distinguish between all Chileans and Peruvians). Differences with other Chileans seemed to be rather irrelevant when employers talked about their opposition to Peruvians.

Political Ideology and Political Identities

The most salient conflict in Chile during the last hundred years has been between political groups (Carvacho, Manzi, Haye, González, & Cornejo, 2013). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxist political parties—socialist and communist—were formed to represent the interests of the working class, which had not been represented by political institutions. These parties gained relevance when, with a centre-left coalition, they won three consecutive general elections in the first half of the twentieth century. However, this coalition ended when in 1948 the elected president—Gabriel González Videla, a member of the largest party in the coalition—outlawed the Communist Party and persecuted its members. By that time, the Marxist parties were already a strong electoral force (Navia & Osorio, 2015). The most important victory for the Marxist parties was the election of Salvador Allende, member of the Socialist Party, as Chilean president in 1970. Its presidency got enormous international attention. Since his election, international agencies, such as the CIA, and Chilean right-wing groups conspired against Allende and finally overthrew him in a military coup d'état on September 11th, 1973. The Chilean dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet lasted 17 years and repressed, persecuted, tortured and killed thousands of Chileans, mainly because of their political identities. Political participation was banned and a society that, until then, was largely organised by political institutions became severely depressed and demobilised (Remmer, 1980).

In 1990, democracy was re-established in Chile. As a result of the polarisation of the political conflict, and the extreme violence that was used by the dictatorship, Chileans faced the challenge of not only rebuilding democracy but of healing deep differences rooted in the political identities and the history of conflict (Cornejo, Rojas, & Mendoza, 2009; González, Manzi, & Noor, 2013; Manzi & González, 2007).

Nowadays, differences between Chileans based on their political identities seem to have lost relevance, for instance, party affiliation and even self-identification with the left-right continuum have decreased (Angell, 2003; González et al., 2005). However, research has also shown that, although people might not be as explicit as before the dictatorship about their political identities, these identities define the way people perceive the past (Carvacho et al., 2013; Manzi et al., 2004), their positions regarding reparation toward the victims of the dictatorship (Carvacho, Zick, et al., 2013), their willingness to forgive and reconcile (González et al., 2013; Noor, Brown, González, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008) and have an impact on the organisation

of the party system and voting behaviour (Colomer & Escatel, 2005). Though Chile recovered its democracy more than 25 years ago, there still persists a significant level of tension and conflict between new generations of Chileans who identify with the left and those with right wing political orientations (González et al., 2008; Manzi et al., 2004). These tensions and conflicts are mainly related to the recognition of the wrongdoing committed by members of the out-groups (killing, disappearing, torture) in the past, the process for achieving reparation and forgiveness, as well as legal processes that are still open and waiting to be concluded (González et al., 2013, Manzi et al., 2004), but are rooted in deep ideological differences (Carvacho, Zick, et al., 2013).

The construction of new and stable party coalitions has restructured the political system and the identification with the coalition derives in positive attitudes toward members of other parties within the coalition and negative attitudes toward members of the opposing-coalition parties (González et al., 2008). Therefore, nowadays, political identification still remains a relevant dimension to understand intergroup dynamics in Chile.

Gender

Machismo is a patriarchal ideology of domination that has characterised gender relationships in Latin America since colonial times (Gissi, 1974). From Gissi's (1974) perspective, Spaniards imported gender roles and gender ideologies rooted in Catholicism together with modern institutions and technologies. *Marianismo* or the idea that Mary, mother of Jesus, was at that time the example of virtue and a role model for all women was deeply entrenched in the Latin American culture. Consistent with the latter, obedience and maternity were defined as the core values of women's roles in society. In opposition to this, the stereotypical view of men was based on the idea of the Spanish conquistador, a brave and tough warrior, or on the image of the also brave and tough Mapuche warrior. Men were educated to fight while women were educated only to care and look after the family and children. With the process of colonisation, previous gender identities that had more dynamic definitions among the Mapuche culture, where replaced by Machismo and Marianismo (see Barrientos & Cárdenas, 2013; Diekman, Eagly, Mladinic, & Ferreira, 2005; Gissi, 1974).

Huge gender disparities have been maintained until deep into the twentieth century. However, profound changes have happened in the last decades. During the dictatorship, women's political participation played a crucial role in both the opposition to the oppressive regime and in political activism (Chuchryk, 1994). Women led the public expression of the opposition to the Pinochet regime and the fight against human right violations through associations of families of victims of political violence. The formal political participation of women drastically changed as well. Women obtained full voting rights in the 1940s while in 1999 two women ran for president for the first time in Chilean history (although without real chances

to win). In 1990, with the first democratic government after Pinochet's dictatorship, no woman was appointed as minister. By 2006 Chile elected Michelle Bachellet, who was the first female president in South America (which has been now also replicated in Brazil and Argentina). She established a gender parity system in her first government in which women occupied half of the minister positions and an important percentage of all seats dependent on presidential nomination.

There have also been important changes in gender roles in contemporary Chile: First, there has been an increase in women's participation in the formal labour force (Diekman et al., 2005). Second, there have been important changes in perspectives toward traditional gender roles among younger generations, who have adopted critical views about the traditional gender division of labour and male participation in child rearing (Alcalay, González, Reinoso, & Lizana, 1994).

However, despite the deep transformation in gender equality, women's rights, and gender roles, gender inequalities in the Chilean society still remain. For instance, the participation of women in the formal labour market still remains among the lowest in Latin America, despite the fact that Chilean women are highly educated (second only to Cuba) and that there has been stable economic growth during the last three decades. This phenomenon, known as the Chilean Exception, can be explained as a function of the beliefs concerning the roles women have in parenting and housekeeping (Contreras, Hurtado, & Sara, 2012). Moreover, gender ideologies have also had a negative impact on the quality of life for males who do not conform to stereotypical gender roles, such as gay men (Barrientos & Cárdenas, 2013). In particular, forms of prejudice rooted on gender ideologies (such as sexism and homophobia) have not yet been removed from the Chilean culture. However, the creation of the Woman and Gender Equality Ministry alongside a new antidiscrimination law is a clear signal that the Chilean society is addressing gender inequality and violence toward women in a more systematic way.

Social Class

Chile has been and remains a highly stratified society. During colonial times, a clear distinction was established among Spanish colonisers, indigenous groups and mestizos (mixed race). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Basque and non-Spanish European immigrants joined the Spanish descendants to form Chile's socio-economic elite (see Nuñez and Gutiérrez, 2004). These groups gained control over land and developed industries and were able to concentrate a significant proportion of economic and political power. The working class, on the other hand, was formed by agricultural workers, miners, and railway and port workers, among others. The working class began as early as the end of the nineteenth century to form labour organisations to protest against bad working and living conditions, giving rise to a strong labour movement and to violent repressions (Roddick, 1981). At the end of the nineteenth century, the Chilean State experienced an important financial growth due to the expansion of the sodium nitrate mining. The

latter translated into an important change from an economy based on agriculture to one based on industry. The State increased significantly the number of public servants giving rise to a new middle class (Barozet, 2006). By 1973, 14 % of the labour force worked in the public sector (Torche, 2006). Even though the Chilean middle class has been characterised by increasingly high levels of education (even compared to the upper classes), they still rely on wages which puts them in a situation of vulnerability similar to that of the lower classes (Barozet, 2006).

During the military dictatorship (1973–1989), the Chilean economy experienced yet another important change toward neoliberal policies and the reduction of financial support for lower social classes (Koch, 1999). According to Koch (1999), these changes transformed the social structure. At first, important negative social consequences were observed: unemployment rates rose, the informal sector grew and wage levels were reduced. However, by the end of the 1990s, and supported by several new public policies, the economy strongly recovered, unemployment declined and wages rose significantly over the years, raising Chile up to its current high status position within the Latin American region. Nevertheless, wage differences between occupational categories steadily increased. For example while in 1972 managers earned 6 times more than workers in the lower classes, in 1994 managers earned 11 times more. At the same time, after the dictatorship collective organisation declined and jobs became more flexible and deregulated. By the year 2000 almost one-third of the labour force in Chile belonged to the informal sector (this is, workers without a formal contract and access to social security). Another important change was the decline in the percentage of public workers (who generally experienced better working conditions than workers in the private sector) from 14 % in 1973 to 8 % in 1985 (see Torche, 2006). Thus, Koch (1999) concludes that the neoliberal transformation brought about a "flexible and pluralist class society" (p. 17).

Today, Chile is one of the most unequal countries in the world (see Torche, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Specifically, Chile is extremely unequal when it comes to the difference between the incomes of the first decile and the rest. Differences between medium and low socio-economic classes are comparatively smaller (Torche, 2006). Even though there are high levels of income mobility, the latter tends to occur within the lower income deciles, while the probability of upward mobility is low (see Núñez & Risco, 2005). The same is true for mobility across occupational positions: most processes of mobility occur between positions of similarly lower social status (Torche, 2005).

Important differences among members of different social classes can be observed when considering both structural differences in access to education and work, as well as ideological attitudes. Income inequality has a strong effect on access to education: the chances of attending higher education for people in the richest quintile are five times the chances of people in the poorest quintile (see for a discussion Barozet, 2006). All in all, the strongest predictor of people's achievements in Chile is the education and status of their parents (Puga & Solís, 2010). Class discrimination also seems to play an important role in the labour market: Nuñez and Gutierrez (2004) found significantly higher income levels among professionals with higher socio-economic backgrounds than those who

have lower socio-economic backgrounds, even after controlling for a number of relevant factors such as academic performance and language proficiency.

Finally, studies have consistently shown differences among social classes in Chile in relation to ideological attitudes, such as authoritarianism and pro-democratic attitudes (e.g. Carvacho & Haye, 2011; Carvacho, Zick, et al., 2013; Haye, Carvacho, González, Manzi, & Segovia, 2009). Particularly, people from lower social classes tend to express more authoritarian and conservative attitudes. For example, Carvacho, Zick, et al., 2013 drew on a longitudinal survey of Chilean respondents to analyse the effects of social class (operationalised as education and income) on prejudice and whether these effects were mediated by ideological attitudes (right-wing authoritarianism, RWA; and social dominance orientation, SDO). The authors found negative associations between levels of education and prejudice toward immigrants, as well as between education and SDO. Furthermore, SDO mediated the effect of education on prejudice. Consistent with system justification theory, these findings suggest that in Chile members of the working class legitimise the system to a greater extent than members of higher social classes.

Societies, therefore, need to set up ambitious goals with regard to increasing the level and quality of education of their population as a whole. This is a key element that should provide equal opportunities for people to succeed at the individual and group level, promoting both social mobility and social change. Education is expected to foster the value of recognising social diversity and the importance of group identities, rendering authoritarianism as a less attractive ideology. On the other hand, education seems to be a fundamental driver for stimulating pro-democratic attitudes and values, key elements for building peace among social groups.

Conclusions

We have analysed how historical and political processes have shaped the construction of the most relevant social identities in Chile, namely ethnic identities, national identity in the context of immigration, political identities, gender identities and social class identities. For each of these, we have described the historical background that gave rise to status and power differences, the nature of their intergroup relations, the social conflicts that emerge among the groups involved, threats to social identity, as well as out-group derogation.

The Chilean society has been experiencing significant changes over the last few decades at the economic, political, cultural and socio-psychological levels. However, huge disparities and inequalities in levels of income remain between the rich and the poor. The political stability and the democratic system have been a fundamental corner stone and building on this strength Chilean society has started to develop policies aimed at building trust among conflicting political perspectives and groups. Culturally, Chilean society became much more liberal and less conservative and certainly more diverse since increasing number of immigrants arrived to settle in the country. Many of these changes have impacted the way social identity functions

in Chilean society. Thus, there is an undeniable link between social change and psychological change. We will now discuss some issues regarding the social identities that we considered in this chapter and the challenges we face in order to promote social cohesion, tolerance and diversity; the three major values that the Chilean society advocates as part of its new identity.

First, it is clear that the indigenous ethnic groups in Chile, particularly the Mapuche people, are at present fighting with different strategies to be culturally recognised and socially and symbolically reparated for the wrongdoing committed by the Chilean State in the past. The salience of the current conflict requires that indigenous groups and authorities develop national initiatives aimed at reaching those goals. In order to build harmonious intergroup relations indigenous and non-indigenous groups need to recognise the values that both groups bring into Chilean society to identify pathways of reconciliation and establish a clear way in which both groups can develop a sense of common belonging or identity while simultaneously recognising and valuing the existence of several identities (e.g. complex identities and dual identities, Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011; González & Brown 2003, 2006). This complex representation would allow group members not to feel threatened by the social context and more importantly to mutually recognise the cultural differences that will certainly enrich the Chilean society (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). This is particularly relevant in a context in which dominant groups display high assimilation drives and exhibit prejudice and discrimination toward minority group members such as indigenous or immigrant people.

Second, there is also evidence demonstrating how important it is to develop a common identity that preserves group distinctiveness to deal with identity threat feelings in rather different contexts. Indeed, we have witnessed in the Chilean political context, how groups with different political identities and ideologies have joined forces in order to pursue common goals. The creation of coalitions naturally brings about tensions between the groups that belong to it driven by political differences. However, the sense of being a member of the same coalition and especially the positive affect that members feel concerning the coalition with which they identify helps them cope with group differences that normally bring them apart. This common identity helps preserve political distinctiveness and reduces feelings of threat from other political groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011; González & Brown, 2003, 2006; González et al., 2008). These findings could be understood within the social identity framework, especially in terms of optimal distinctiveness and dual identity models. Optimal distinctiveness theory assumes that the need for assimilation or the need to belong and feel included in groups competes with the need for differentiation or the need to feel distinctive from others (Brewer, 1991). These competing needs are at the heart of intracoalition, interparty attitudes. On the one hand, there is some benefit to maintaining or promoting both political distinctiveness and coalition identities simultaneously. As political members become included in an increasingly large, expansive in-group—the coalition—they satisfy their need for assimilation. In addition, as long as they preserve their political identity at the party level, members will have the opportunity to meet their differentiation needs, reaching a balance or an optimal distinctiveness level. This rationale is also consistent with the dual identity hypothesis

(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; González & Brown, 2003, 2006) which suggests that simultaneously maintaining both the in-group–out-group distinction (party) and a superordinate identity (coalition) could be useful for the promotion of positive intergroup attitudes.

Third, integration into Chilean society is a major challenge for immigrants (Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Following Berry's (1997) ideas, a preference for integration exists only if immigrants wish both to maintain their original cultural identity (identity or group distinctiveness) and to have contact with majority members. Integration brings less stress among minorities, reduces in-group bias (Zagefka & Brown, 2002) and promotes more favourable intergroup attitudes (González et al., 2010: Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Martin, 2007). But members of the majority group also have preferences about how they would like immigrants to live (e.g. Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzalek, 2000; Zagefka et al., 2009). Therefore, in order to understand and introduce policies aimed at fostering positive intergroup relations and preserving social identities, we need to consider the perspective of both immigrants and members of the host society in such a way that the needs to belong and distinctiveness desired by both groups are psychologically well satisfied (Brewer, 1991, Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Creating such a policy will require Chileans thinking of themselves as a multicultural society that has changed over the last decades rather than a homogenous one.

Finally, drawing on social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) we advance that the different social identity distinctions analysed in this chapter have not necessarily translated into social identity complexity yet (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). As an example, social groups tend to converge: Mapuche people and Peruvian immigrants most often comprise lower social classes. People from lower classes tend to have an indigenous background while people from upper social classes tend to have to a greater extent a European background. That is, distinctions are not crosscutting and individuals who are out-group members in one dimension tend to be out-group members in other dimension, too. Thus, even if the society is multicultural, this overlap has reduced the experience of complex social relationships. Based on Roccas and Brewer (2002), we speculate that other antecedents that inhibit social identity complexity (e.g. low tolerance for ambiguity, the predominance of conservative values as opposed to openness to change) are at play in the Chilean society. The latter might increase the sense of identity threat and bring stress, tension and conflict between the groups involved.

Thus in order for a modern society to tackle the challenges imposed by multiculturalism and social diversity, the historical and political processes that have shaped the construction of the relevant social identities need to be taken into account, in addition to the needs of belonging and distinctiveness as well as the factors that might threaten social identities. Moreover, it is crucial to provide a variety of opportunities to experience positive intergroup encounters in which groups can learn from each other and more importantly can live in peace without feeling threatened by the presence of other groups. Only by following these paths people from other countries facing similar conflictive situations will be able to live in more cohesive and integrated societies that value diversity and recognise the existence of different identities.

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Chapter 19
Identity, Contact, and Health Among Majority and Minority Ethnic Groups in Mexico and Chile

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This chapter explores the relationships between different levels and different categories of social identity, intergroup contact, and various health-related measures among a sample of *mestizos* (i.e. people of combined European and Native American descent) and a different sample of indigenous people in Mexico as well as indigenous and non-indigenous samples in Chile.

In theoretical terms, we build on two connected theories: social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). SIT posited a distinction between personal and social identity. People derive the latter primarily from group memberships (e.g. gender, ethnic group, nationality) and generally strive for a positive social identity, which can be achieved by means of favourable comparisons with relevant out-groups. In certain cases, this in-group bias can lead to prejudice, stereotyping, infrahumanisation, and discrimination against out-groups. Relatedly, SCT proposes categorisation of the self at different levels of abstraction (personal, group, humanity, etc.) and points out that the group and its norms become a frame of reference of how to behave for its members.

In Mexico and Chile important identities are based on ethnicity (mestizo or non-indigenous Chilean vs. indigenous; subordinate level) and nationality (Mexican or Chilean; superordinate level). A more inclusive superordinate level of identification

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would be Latin American, which is often invoked as a differentiation from the USA and Canada and is also utilised. We should also note that in both Mexico and Chile ethnicity is confounded with socio-economic class: indigenous people tend to be at the bottom of the social ladder while mestizos and non-indigenous Chileans, respectively, are situated higher up.

Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, Dingle, and Jones (2014) argue that traditionally health outcomes have been studied at the individual level and group memberships have been left out of the equation. However, groups and social identities are very important in the realm of health—for example, people get sick in groups (say, on a cruise ship) and they get well in groups (as patients on a particular hospital ward). More recently, the link between social identity and relationships on health—something that Jetten, Haslam, and Haslam (2011) refer to as *the social cure*—has been recognised by a growing number of researchers, such that there is now a burgeoning literature. Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, and Haslam (2009) compiled a list of articles, from 1970 onwards, whose titles, abstracts, or keywords jointly reference "social/ organisational/ethnic identity/identification" and "health and/or well(-)being". The trend line shows a logarithmic increase in the number of publications that include those terms while there was a quadratic increase in the number of times these publications have themselves been cited.

To provide some examples of this novel literature, social identification has been found to buffer individuals from the negative impact of a range of stressors, including illness (Haslam, Jetten, & Waghorn, 2009; Muldoon, Lowe & Schmid, this volume). Large, representative community samples demonstrated social identification to predict life satisfaction and general well-being (Helliwell & Barrington-Leigh, 2011). A review study by Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, and Jetten (2014) has shown social connectedness to be implicated in the development, progression, and treatment of depression. St Claire and He (2009) demonstrated that older adults who self-categorise as "elderly people" are more likely to think that they suffer from hearing loss and require a hearing aid, independent from objective measures of their actual hearing acuity. Social identification has even been shown to affect the progression of HIV in gay men. Disease progression was significantly faster among those gay men who were sensitive to rejection because they were not able to maintain certain social identities (Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Visscher, & Fahey, 1996). In an educational context, Bizumic, Reynolds, Turner, Bromhead, and Subasic (2009) observed that teachers' and students' identification with their school strongly predicted participants' decreased anxiety and depression. Finally, a longitudinal study during a religious mass gathering (Prayag Magh Mela) in India found that shared identity with other pilgrims impacted positively on self-assessed health (Khan et al., 2014).

Taken together, this growing body of evidence already is impressive, and it is likely to expand considerably in the coming years. What has been left rather unexamined, however (but see Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009), is the interplay of different levels of categorisation/identification on health-related variables. As outlined in SCT, categorisation is a malleable and context-dependent process and daily social life is sufficiently complex as to allow for two (or more) simultaneous salient categories and identification therewith. In the present research, we investigate main and interactive effects of subordinate (ethnic) and superordinate (national) identification on health.

What is more, the literature employs terms relating to social identity and concepts relating to social contact interchangeably. However, it is very important to clearly define these concepts and tease them apart such that it emerges whether it is the identification with a social group or category or the contact with its members or a combination of both that affects health-related outcomes. In this vein, Jetten et al. (2014) have defined the key concepts of social connectedness, social networks, social relations, social integration, social isolation, and social support. In isolated studies, social identity and social contact have been differentiated. For instance, Sani and colleagues (Sani, Herrera, Wakefield, Boroch, & Gulyas, 2012) conducted two studies with different social groups (i.e. the family and an army unit) and found that group identification was better than social contact at predicting mental health. In contrast, a meta-analysis on more than 300,000 people, followed for an average of 7.5 years, showed that people with adequate social relationships (i.e. contact) had a 50 % great likelihood of survival compared to those with poor or insufficient relationships. Remarkably, the magnitude of this effect compares to that of smoking cessation, and it is larger than many other established risk factors for mortality (e.g. obesity, physical inactivity; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010).

Thus, it emerges very clearly that both social identity and social contact play pivotal roles in health-related outcomes. In our research, we conceptualise these terms as independent variables, such that their separate and joint impact on health-related variables can be assessed. Moreover, we focus on intergroup (as opposed to intragroup, as in the literature discussed above) contact. Social groups and categories, based on nationality, ethnicity, political party affiliation, gender, sexual preference, university affiliation and many other criteria, are omnipresent in daily life. Additionally, a globalised world heightens people's mobility and makes contact across group boundaries more and more common and likely.

Intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954) is probably the most widely used technique for reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations. It stipulates that intergroup contact needs to be qualified by certain conditions, such as equal status in the situation and friendship potential, in order to have beneficial effects on intergroup relations. During the past 60 years, hundreds of studies have attested to the theory's effectiveness, using different methodologies, participant populations, bases of group membership, etc. (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Eller & Abrams, 2003, 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). More recently, it has been suggested that indirect contact is also effective at reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations. The *extended contact hypothesis* (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997) proposes that the mere awareness that an in-group member has an out-group friend can improve intergroup relations. Associations between extended contact and lower prejudice have been observed among (racial) majority and minority group participants in the USA (Wright et al., 1997), Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004), friends of international exchange students (Eller, Abrams, & Zimmermann, 2011), and other intergroup contexts (see Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011). Taking together the direct and extended contact literature, while the protective influence of relationships *within a social group* on health is well documented (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010), it has hitherto been neglected whether the beneficial effects of direct and extended *intergroup* contact can expand to health-related variables.

Context of the Present Research

Both Latin American countries of Mexico and Chile have a colonial past and are home to indigenous groups albeit at different percentages of their population. According to recent census results, in Mexico 60 % of the overall population identify themselves as of mestizo descent while 30 % of the population identify as indigenous. In Chile, however, 88 % of the overall population identify as of White European descent while only 11 % identify as indigenous (Cakal, Eller, Sirlopú, & Pérez, under review; Van Cott, 2007). Straightforward interpretation of these numbers, however, is problematic as in both countries the census defines "indigenous" by means of people's self-categorisation, and this might be a problem because of the lower status of indigenous people in both countries and hence, the unwillingness of indigenous or mestizo people to identify as such. As Ruiz-Linares et al. (2014) argue, the actual distribution of indigenous versus European-descent (or mestizo) individuals in Chile might be closer to an equal distribution of both ethnicities.

In Mexico, ever since colonial times, relations between the numerical majority of mestizos and the minority of indigenous people have been ambivalent at best and fraught with difficulties, discrimination, and violence at worst. Despite a national sense of pride in their Native American history and notwithstanding the fact that more than 80 % of the Mexican population has some indigenous physical features, there is widespread prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination on the part of mestizos toward indigenous people. According to the National Discrimination Survey (ENADIS, 2010), a quarter of people living in Mexico City openly discriminate against indigenous people. Being the target of social exclusion and discrimination can have serious consequences on psychological and even physical health, as the literatures on stigmatisation, bullying, and ostracism have clearly shown (e.g. Quellet-Morin et al., 2013).

Chile's largest ethnic group are the Mapuche. Current statistics shows that 11 % of Chileans consider themselves to be part of one of the 11 recognised ethnic groups in Chile (CEPAL, 2012). Of these, the vast majority is identified with being Mapuche (84 %). The nature of the intergroup relationship between White Chileans and Mapuche has not changed fundamentally. For instance, Merino and Quilaqueo (2003) found that a vast majority of non-indigenous Chileans show prejudice and hold negative stereotypes toward Mapuche in their everyday discourse. Moreover, the state has been increasingly less tolerant toward the Mapuche. For instance, a Mapuche individual who is presumed guilty of attacks on non-indigenous Chilean property or another violent acts can be punished with strong legal penalties under the provision of Anti-Terrorist Law passed during the military regime (De la Maza, 2014).

We believe that it is particularly important to study such under-researched populations as indigenous people. They rank as lowest in quality of life as indicated by much higher rates of poverty, exclusion, and child mortality rates than the mainstream societies (Hall & Patrinos, 2014). By studying indigenous populations, we also respond to recent criticism on the perils of studying WEIRD (Western, educated, and from industrialized, rich, and democratic countries) populations and generalising to other non-WEIRD populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Study 1 consisted of a sample of mestizos

and a sample of indigenous participants, responding to the superordinate category *Mexican*. Study 2 involved a sample of non-indigenous Chileans (who could be White or mestizo; see difficulties of categorisation discussed above) and a sample of indigenous people responding to the superordinate category *Chilean* and another sample of non-indigenous Chileans responding to the superordinate category *Latin Americans*. This was done in order to assess the effects of superordinate categories that differ in level of inclusiveness (cf. Turner et al., 1987).

Hypotheses

In light of the positive effects of identification, on the one hand, and social contact, on the other, on psychological and physical health, as outlined above, our global prediction is that subordinate and superordinate identification as well as direct and extended intergroup contact will be associated with better current health, improved health over the previous year, better psychological health, and lower incidence of stress-related diseases. If we were to make more refined predictions, we would hypothesise that the impact of intergroup contact on improved health would be weaker for minority than majority groups (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Building on Sani's (2011) argument that curative relationships are built on trust, cooperation, and mutual support, we would also expect contact with other indigenous groups to be more beneficial than contact with the majority groups for indigenous participants. Moreover, it is likely that subordinate identification as indigenous will have more (positive) impact on health-related variables for minority group participants while superordinate identification on the national or perhaps even regional level (Study 2) will have stronger effects for majority group participants (see Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010).

Study 1: Mexico

Method

This questionnaire-based study consisted of two samples in Mexico City, one of 237 self-categorised mestizos (44.1 % men; mean age 21.5 years) and another sample of 152 self-categorised indigenous people (37.1 % men; mean age 37.1 years). Participation was voluntary; mestizos were recruited via social media websites, completed the questionnaire online, and were entered into a draw for several monetary awards. Indigenous participants were recruited from indigenous communities in Mexico City, interviewed by a research assistant, and received some monetary compensation for their time.

Unless otherwise indicated, variables were measured by five-point Likert-type scales. In terms of predictor variables, participants were asked about their direct

contact with the respective other group: contact as friends (number); quantity of contact in daily life, visits to people at their homes, via the internet (1 = *never* — 5 = *all the time*; cf. Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; Eller, Abrams, & Gomez, 2012); and quality of contact (cooperative, positive, respectful, important for you, makes you feel accepted, enjoyable; 1 = *little* — 5 = *much*; Eller et al., 2011). These measures were combined into a single direct-contact score, which loaded on two factors for mestizos, explaining 39.3 % and 19.1 % of the variance, respectively (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79) and two factors, explaining 43.7 % and 17.7 % of the variance, respectively, for indigenous people (α = 0.85).

We also asked participants about their extended contact with the respective out-group (cf. Wright et al., 1997): how many in-group members they knew who had close out-group friends as well as whether the relationship between the in-group member and their out-group friend was cooperative, positive, respectful, important for the person, made them feel accepted, and enjoyable (1 = *little* — 5 = *much*). These measures were combined into a single extended-contact score, which loaded on one factor for mestizos, explaining 68.4 % of the variance (α = 0.90) and one factor, explaining 69.2 % of the variance, for indigenous people (α = 0.91).

In the case of indigenous participants only, they were additionally asked about their quantity and quality of contact with other indigenous groups in Mexico, using equivalent measures to the ones reported above. These measures were combined into a single other-indigenous-contact score, which loaded on two factors, explaining 46.7 % and 21.6 % of the variance, respectively (α = 0.87).

In terms of moderator variables, we further asked our respondents about their level of identification with the subordinate category (mestizo or indigenous, four-item scale, five-point Likert-type scale from *do not agree at all* to *agree completely*) and the superordinate category (Mexican), for example, "I'm proud to be mestizo [Mexican]" (Eller & Abrams, 2003). These measures were combined into a single subordinate identity score, which loaded on one factor for mestizos, explaining 72.6 % of the variance (α = 0.87) and one factor, explaining 79.1 % of the variance, for indigenous people (α = 0.90) as well as a single superordinate identity score, which loaded on one factor for mestizos, explaining 84.4 % of the variance (α = 0.94) and one factor, explaining 87.7 % of the variance, for indigenous people (α = 0.95).

Finally, in terms of outcome variables, participants rated their current health (1 = *bad* — 5 = *excellent*); their current health compared to that a year earlier (five-point Likert-type scale, from *much better than a year ago* to *much worse than a year ago*, reverse-scored); their psychological health (5-items, 1 = *never* — 5 = *always*, e.g. during the past year, how often have you felt anxious and nervous? How often have you felt disenchanted and sad?; Goldberg et al., 1997); and whether they had suffered any of a seven stress-related conditions (back pain, insomnia, headaches, colds, etc.) during the past year. The measure of psychological health was combined into a single score, which loaded on two factors for mestizos, explaining 40.4 % and 29.7 % of the variance (α = 0.71) and one factor for indigenous people, explaining 67.3 % of the variance (α = 0.75). For the indigenous sample, two items were excluded from the final score because they reduced scale reliability substantially. The number of stress-related conditions checked by participants was added up to arrive at a single score.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 19.1. For mestizo participants, direct contact with indigenous people was just below the mean while extended contact was comparatively high. Both types of identity were above the mean, but mestizos' subordinate identity was lower than the superordinate national identity. Current health, health compared to a year ago, and psychological health were all above the mean for mestizos but still not especially high. Finally, the number of stress-related diseases was relatively low at 2.62 out of a maximum of 7.

For indigenous participants, all three contact congregate measures were above the mean and direct and extended intergroup friendships were very high. Both subordinate and superordinate identities scored very high, as well. Indigenous participants rated their current health to be rather poor; however, health compared to a year earlier and psychological health were both above the mean and the number of stress-related illnesses was rather low.

After mean centring direct and extended contact (Aiken & West, 1991), we used simultaneous multiple regression analysis to test the effects of direct and extended contact, subordinate and superordinate identity, and their interactions on the four health-related variables. In the mestizo sample (see Fig. 19.1), direct contact with indigenous people was associated with less psychological health, $\beta = -0.03$, $t(234) = -1.96$, $p = 0.051$. Higher subordinate identity was related to a deterioration of health compared to a year earlier, $\beta = -0.06$, $t(234) = -2.99$, $p = 0.003$, while

Table 19.1 Means and standard deviations for mestizos and indigenous participants in Mexico (Study 1)

Measure	Mestizos	Indigenous
Out-group friends[a]	1.02 (4.42)	9.57 (16.31)
Direct out-group contact[b]	2.89 (0.73)	3.48 (0.96)
Out-group friends of IG members[c]	1.92 (5.71)	14.55 (28.43)
Extended out-group contact[b]	3.95 (1.01)	3.72 (1.21)
Contact w/other indigenous groups	–	3.66 (0.92)
Subordinate identity[b]	3.62 (1.08)	4.60 (0.79)
Superordinate identity[b]	4.16 (1.03)	4.58 (0.91)
Current health rating[b]	3.24 (0.95)	2.77 (0.87)
Health compared to 1 year ago[b]	3.43 (0.97)	3.48 (0.99)
Psychological health[b]	3.51 (0.73)	3.40 (1.18)
Stress-related diseases[c]	2.62 (1.64)	2.29 (1.72)

Note: *IG* in-group.
[a]Number, open-ended
[b]Five-point scale
[c]Number between 0 and 7
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Out-group friends and direct out-group contact are presented separately; for further analysis, these variables were *z*-transformed and combined. Out-group friends of in-group members and extended out-group contact are presented separately; for further analysis, these variables were *z*-transformed and combined

Fig. 19.1 Path diagram to show the results of regression analyses for mestizo participants in Mexico (Study 1). *Note*: *Solid lines* represent significant paths; *interrupted lines* represent interactions; numbers are standardised partial regression coefficients (*β*). +*p*<0.06; **p*<0.05; ***p*<0.01; ****p*<0.001

higher superordinate identity was associated with improved health over time, $\beta=0.04$, $t(234)=2.04$, $p=0.04$, as well as with better psychological health, $\beta=0.05$, $t(234)=3.09$, $p=0.002$. We also found a significant interaction between extended contact and subordinate identification on psychological health, $\beta=-0.04$, $t(234)=-2.08$, $p<0.04$. Analyses of simple slopes (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) showed that extended contact was significantly associated with decreased psychological health when participants' subordinate identity was high, $\beta=-0.25$, $t(121)=-2.84$, $p=0.005$, but not when it was low, $\beta=-0.07$, $t(114)=-0.70$, $p=0.49$ (see Fig. 19.1).

In the indigenous sample (see Fig. 19.2), direct contact with mestizos was associated with improved health over the previous year, $\beta=0.07$, $t(134)=2.15$, $p=0.03$, and with a decrease in stress-related diseases, $\beta=-0.17$, $t(134)=-2.22$, $p<0.03$. Contact with other indigenous groups was related to improved health over the previous year, $\beta=0.21$, $t(134)=2.06$, $p=0.04$, as well as to lower psychological health, $\beta=-0.42$, $t(134)=-3.29$, $p<0.001$. A higher superordinate, Mexican identity was associated with lower ratings of current health, $\beta=-0.08$, $t(134)=-2.74$, $p=0.007$, but also with higher psychological health, $\beta=0.07$, $t(134)=1.99$, $p<0.05$.

We also found a significant interaction between extended contact and superordinate identification on stress-related diseases, $\beta=-0.23$, $t(134)=2.15$, $p=0.05$. The association between extended contact and stress-related diseases was not significant when superordinate identity was low ($\beta=-0.12$, $t(134)=-0.69$, $p=0.48$), but it was significant and negative when superordinate identity was high (1SD; $\beta=-0.47$, $t(134)=-2.98$, $p=0.003$).

Fig. 19.2 Path diagram to show the results of regression analyses for indigenous participants in Mexico (Study 1). *Note*: *Solid lines* represent significant paths; *interrupted lines* represent interactions; numbers are standardised partial regression coefficients (*β*). *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

The relation between contact with other indigenous groups on improved health over the previous year was qualified by a three-way interaction: contact × superordinate identity × subordinate identity, $\beta=0.09$, $t(139)=1.94$, $p=0.049$. More specifically, more contact with other indigenous people and stronger identification as Mexican was associated with poorer health when indigenous identity was low ($-1SD$; $\beta=-0.15$, $t(139)=-1.92$, $p=0.046$). This association, however, became non-significant when indigenous identity was high ($1SD$, $\beta=0.001$, $t(139)=-0.086$, $p=0.93$). Unpacking this three-way interaction, we observed that contact with other indigenous people positively predicted improved health over previous year when superordinate identity as Mexican was low ($-1SD$; $\beta=0.22$, $t(140)=2.41$, $p=0.02$) but not when superordinate identity was high ($1SD$; $\beta=0.15$, $t(140)=1.59$, $p=0.11$).

In summary, direct out-group contact had negative effects on (psychological) health among mestizos while it had positive effects on (physical) health among indigenous participants. For these participants, contact with other indigenous groups was associated with positive physical but negative psychological outcomes. Moreover, this contact had negative effects on physical health at low subordinate identification, and it had positive effects on health at low superordinate identification. For mestizos, health over the previous year was predicted positively by superordinate identification but negatively by subordinate identification. For indigenous participants, superordinate identification was related to lower physical but higher psychological health. Finally, extended contact had beneficial outcomes for mestizos when subordinate identification was low and for indigenous participants when superordinate identification was high.

Study 2: Chile

Method

This questionnaire-based study consisted of three samples. Two samples, composed of non-indigenous Chileans, were recruited through universities from Concepción, a city located in the south of Chile. One of them comprised 209 Chileans (64.6 % men; mean age 19.5 years) responding to *Chile* as the superordinate identity. The another comprised 205 Chileans (71.1 % men; mean age 20.9 years) responding to *Latin America* as superordinate identity. Finally, the Mapuche sample comprised 180 participants of different professional occupations (61.4 % men; mean age 36.7 years), responding to *Chile* as the superordinate category.

All participants of the three samples completed anonymous questionnaires and decided to participate voluntarily. Non-indigenous Chilean people were recruited in a university classroom settings by four research assistants. Mapuche people were recruited from some indigenous communities located in rural zones of Concepción, and a research assistant with Mapuche origins interviewed them.

All variables were equivalent to Study 1. Direct and extended contact excluded contact as (extended) friends because these variables decreased scale reliability substantially. The direct-contact score loaded on two factors for the first sample of non-indigenous Chileans, explaining 54.4 % and 20.3 % of the variance, respectively (Cronbach's alpha $= 0.85$), three factors for the second sample, explaining 34.9 %, 24.7 %, and 12 % of the variance, respectively ($\alpha = 0.79$), and two factors (40.7 % and 22.9 %) for indigenous participants ($\alpha = 0.81$). The extended-contact score loaded on one factor for the first sample of non-indigenous Chileans, explaining 76.5 % of the variance ($\alpha = 0.93$), on two factors (70.9 % and 14.4 %) for the second sample ($\alpha = 0.90$), and one factor, explaining 70.0 % of the variance, for indigenous people ($\alpha = 0.91$). Contact with other indigenous groups in Chile (only indigenous participants) loaded on two factors, explaining 52.8 % and 23.5 % of the variance, respectively ($\alpha = 0.87$).

The subordinate identity score (as mestizo or indigenous) loaded on one factor for the first sample of non-indigenous Chileans, explaining 79.9 % of the variance ($\alpha = 0.92$), on one factor (78.5 %) for the second sample ($\alpha = 0.91$), and one factor, explaining 79.8 % of the variance, for indigenous people ($\alpha = 0.90$). The superordinate identity score (as Chilean or Latin American) loaded on one factor for the first sample of non-indigenous Chileans, explaining 83.9 % of the variance ($\alpha = 0.94$), on one factor (83 %) for the second sample ($\alpha = 0.93$), and one factor, explaining 88.0 % of the variance, for indigenous people ($\alpha = 0.95$).

Stress-related conditions included diabetes and gastrointestinal disorders for the first sample; heart problems, asthma, colds, gastrointestinal disorders, and self-defined "other" diseases for the second sample, and colds and cancer for the third sample. The measure of psychological health loaded on two factors for the first sample, explaining 40.1 % and 30.3 % of the variance ($\alpha = 0.64$), one factor (73.5 %) for the second sample ($\alpha = 0.64$), and one factor for indigenous people, explaining

61.8 % of the variance ($\alpha = 0.69$). For the second sample, three items were excluded from the final score and for the third sample two items were excluded because they reduced scale reliability substantially.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 19.2. For the mestizo samples, direct contact with indigenous people was just below the mean while extended contact was comparatively higher. Both types of identity were above the mean, but for the first sample, curiously, non-indigenous Chileans' subordinate identity was higher than the superordinate national identity (for the second sample, it was the other way around). Current health was at the mean of the scale while health compared to a year ago and psychological health were both above the mean for non-indigenous Chileans but still not especially high. Finally, in the first sample 5 % of participants had diabetes whereas 35 % had gastrointestinal problems.

   For indigenous participants, all three contact congregate measures were above the mean and direct and extended intergroup friendships were very high. Both subordinate and superordinate identities scored very high, as well. Current health was at the scale mean and health compared to a year earlier was substantially better, as was psychological health.

Table 19.2 Means and standard deviations for indigenous and non-indigenous Chileans (Study 2)

Measure	NI Chileans (first sample)	NI Chileans (second sample)	Indigenous
Direct out-group contact[a]	2.94 (0.80)	2.86 (0.72)	4.43 (0.63)
Extended out-group contact[a]	3.76 (1.19)	3.39 (1.12)	4.24 (0.87)
Contact w/other indigenous groups[a]	–	–	3.69 (0.87)
Subordinate identity[a]	3.75 (1.08)	3.68 (1.03)	4.70 (0.70)
Superordinate identity[a]	3.46 (1.16)	3.76 (1.00)	4.28 (1.02)
Current health rating[a]	3.01 (0.99)	2.98 (1.02)	2.99 (1.30)
Health compared to 1 year ago[a]	3.70 (0.98)	3.56 (1.02)	4.13 (1.18)
Psychological health[a]	3.63 (0.70)	3.89 (0.70)	3.61 (0.79)
Stress-related diseases[b]	–	1.03 (0.96)	–
Diabetes[c]	0.05 (0.22)	–	–
Gastrointestinal disorders[c]	0.35 (0.48)	–	–
Colds[c]	–	–	0.16 (0.36)
Cancer[c]	–	–	0.006 (0.07)

Note: *IG* in-group, *NI* non-indigenous
[a]five-point scale
[b]number between 0 and 5
[c]0: disease not present, 1: disease present
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses

Fig. 19.3 Path diagram to show the results of regression analyses for first non-indigenous sample in Chile (Study 2). *Note*: Numbers are standardised partial regression coefficients (*β*). $^+p<0.06$; $^*p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

The regression analyses yielded few results for the first mestizo sample (see Fig. 19.3). Current health, health over the previous year, and psychological health were not predicted by contact or identity variables. Extended contact was marginally associated with an increase in gastrointestinal disorders, $β=0.37$, $t(201)=1.90$, $p=0.059$, and subordinate (mestizo) identity was related to higher incidence of diabetes, $β=0.30$, $t(201)=2.95$, $p=0.004$, while superordinate (Chilean) identity was related to lower incidence of diabetes, $β=−0.38$, $t(201)=−3.73$, $p<0.001$.

The effect of contact with indigenous people on improved health over the previous year was qualified by a three-way interaction, $β=−0.18$, $t(197)=−2.08$, $p=0.04$. More specifically, more contact with indigenous people and stronger identification as mestizo was associated with improved health when superordinate identity as Chilean was low ($−1SD$; $β=0.58$, $t(197)=2.33$, $p=0.02$). When superordinate identity was high ($1SD$), however, this association became non-significant ($β=0.10$, $t(197)=−1.17$, $p=0.28$). Unpacking this complex relationship, contact with indigenous people positively predicted health over the previous year ($β=0.20$, $t(203)=2.21$, $p=0.027$) when subordinate identification as mestizo was high ($1SD$) but not when subordinate identification as mestizo was low ($−1SD$; $β=0.11$, $t(203)=1.05$, $p=0.24$).

In the second mestizo sample (see Fig. 19.4), direct contact with indigenous people was associated with better psychological health, $β=0.13$, $t(195)=2.25$, $p=0.026$, and with fewer stress-related diseases, $β=−0.75$, $t(195)=−3.37$, $p=0.001$. Extended contact was marginally related to better health over the previous year, $β=0.12$, $t(195)=1.78$, $p=0.076$, and to better psychological health, $β=0.09$, $t(195)=2.15$, $p=0.03$. A higher incidence of stress-related diseases was

Fig. 19.4 Path diagram to show the results of regression analyses for second non-indigenous sample in Chile (Study 2). *Note*: *Solid lines* represent significant paths; *interrupted lines* represent interactions; numbers are standardised partial regression coefficients (*β*). +*p*<0.08; *p*<0.05; **p*<0.01; ***p*<0.001

predicted by lower subordinate (mestizo) identity, $\beta=-0.14$, $t(195)=-2.70$, $p=0.008$, and marginally, by higher superordinate (Latin American) identity, $\beta=0.10$, $t(195)=1.81$, $p=0.072$.

We also found two two-way interactions, both relating to current health: direct out-group contact × superordinate identity ($\beta=-0.16$, $t(201)=-2.56$, $p=0.01$) and extended contact x subordinate identity ($\beta=0.22$, $t(191)=2.99$, $p=0.003$). More specifically, direct contact was positively associated with current health ($\beta=0.21$, $t(201)=2.21$, $p=0.03$) when superordinate identity was low ($-1SD$). However, when superordinate identity was high ($1SD$) this association became negative and non-significant ($\beta=-0.12$, $t(201)=-1.24$, $p=0.21$). As for the extended contact × subordinate identity interaction, contact was significantly and negatively associated with current health ($\beta=-0.25$, $t(191)=-2.28$, $p=0.028$) when subgroup identity was low ($-1SD$). When subordinate identity was high ($1SD$), however, contact positively predicted current health ($\beta=0.20$, $t(201)=1.98$, $p=0.05$).

In the indigenous sample (see Fig. 19.5), direct contact with non-indigenous Chileans was associated with better current health, $\beta=0.07$, $t(145)=2.35$, $p=0.02$, while extended contact related to better psychological health, $\beta=0.06$, $t(145)=2.26$, $p<0.03$. A higher subordinate (indigenous) identity was associated with improved health over the previous year, $\beta=0.06$, $t(145)=2.36$, $p=0.02$, as well as with a lower incidence of colds, $\beta=-0.27$, $t(145)=-2.96$, $p=0.004$, and cancer, $\beta=-0.33$, $t(145)=-3.26$, $p=0.001$. A higher superordinate (Chilean) identity was related to higher psychological health, $\beta=0.04$, $t(145)=2.06$, $p=0.04$.

Fig. 19.5 Path diagram to show the results of regression analyses for indigenous participants in Chile (Study 2). *Note*: *Solid lines* represent significant paths; *interrupted lines* represent interactions; numbers are standardised partial regression coefficients (*β*). *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

The relation between direct contact with Chileans on improved health over the previous year was qualified by a marginal interaction with superordinate identity, $\beta = -0.08$, $t(145) = -1.82$, $p = 0.07$. More specifically, contact was significantly and positively associated with improved health over the previous year when superordinate identity was low ($-1SD$; $\beta = 0.31$, $t(147) = 2.80$, $p = 0.006$); but only marginally when superordinate identity was high ($\beta = 0.22$, $t(139) = 1.79$, $p = 0.07$).

In addition to the interactions we discussed earlier, we found two more interactions. First interaction was between contact with other indigenous groups and superordinate identification on current health, $\beta = -0.13$, $t(145) = -2.99$, $p = 0.003$. Although not significant, the association between contact and current health changed direction at different levels of superordinate identity, at low identity contact was related to better health, ($-1SD$: $\beta = 0.17$, $t(145) = 1.09$, $p = 0.27$), while at high identity contact was associated with worse health ($1SD$; $\beta = -0.14$, $t(145) = -1.15$, $p = 0.25$). The second interaction was between extended contact and superordinate identification on improved health over the previous year, $\beta = 0.08$, $t(145) = 1.81$, $p = 0.07$. Similarly, the association between extended contact and improved health over the previous year changed at different levels of superordinate identity; at low identity contact was related to improved health ($-1SD$: $\beta = 0.11$, $t(145) = 0.81$, $p = 0.41$) while at high superordinate identity contact was associated with decreased health ($1SD$; $\beta = -0.15$, $t(145) = -1.25$, $p = 0.21$).

Moreover, there was a three-way interaction: direct contact × subordinate identity × superordinate identity on health over the previous year, $\beta = 0.22$, $t(144) = 2.69$,

$p < 0.008$. More specifically, more contact with the mestizo out-group and stronger identification as Chilean were associated with deteriorated health when subordinate identity as indigenous was low (-1SD; $\beta = 0.34$, $t(144) = -2.74$, $p = -0.007$). When subordinate identity was high (1SD), however, this association became non-significant ($+1$SD, $\beta = -0.001$, $t(144) = -0.74$, $p = 0.99$). Unpacking this complex relationship, contact with mestizos positively predicted health over the previous year ($\beta = 0.20$, $t(144) = 2.80$, $p = 0.006$) when superordinate identification as Chilean was low (-1SD), but not when it was high (1SD; $\beta = 0.22$, $t(144) = 1.79$, $p = 0.08$).

In summary, with the exception of extended contact in the first mestizo sample, direct and extended out-group contact had exclusively positive effects on physical and psychological health for the second mestizo sample and the indigenous sample. Again with the exception of the first mestizo sample, higher subordinate identification (mestizo or indigenous, respectively) had exclusively positive effects on physical health—in the indigenous sample, it was even associated with a lower incidence of cancer. When the superordinate identity was *Chilean*, it related to better physical health (first sample) and better psychological health (third sample). When the superordinate identity was *Latin America*, it was associated with more stress-related diseases (second sample). In combination with contact, low superordinate identity consistently produced more positive effects than high superordinate identity whereas low subordinate identity consistently produced more negative effects on health than high subordinate identity.

General Discussion

The research presented in this chapter explored the impact of social identity and intergroup contact on psychological and physical health among samples of ethnic majority and minority groups in Mexico and Chile. This research is innovative in that (a) it examined the effects of different levels of categorisation/identification, (b) it differentiated social identity and social contact as discrete predictors of health, (c) it assessed the effects of *intergroup* contact on health-related outcomes, and (d) it employed under-researched, non-WEIRD populations (see also Khan et al., 2014).

Our analyses revealed a very complex pattern of results that confirmed our predictions in most cases but contradicted them in some other instances. In both studies, direct and extended out-group contact had exclusively beneficial effects on physical and psychological health among indigenous participants while their impact for mestizo participants was more mixed. Contact with other indigenous groups had positive physical but negative psychological outcomes (Study 1). Tropp and Pettigrew's (2005) meta-analytic results relating to contact between majority and minority groups showed stronger effects for the former than the latter. On the one hand, the fact that contact had such positive effects on health among indigenous participants is very positive. On the other hand, the fact that

contact with indigenous groups in some cases worsened health for majority members might be due to the fact that contact with indigenous groups is not approved of, not normative among majority members. The negative psychological effect of contact with other indigenous groups might be explained by the fact that through this contact indigenous people are reminded of their inferior position in society and their plight. In general, it is intriguing that for indigenous participants in Mexico psychological and physical health were not affected uniformly through contact. These non-expected findings notwithstanding, it is remarkable that intergroup contact had any effects whatsoever—and more so, mostly positive ones—on health-related outcomes.

The impact of the identification variables was mostly in line with our predictions. Subordinate identification had detrimental effects for mestizos in Study 1 while it showed mixed impact for indigenous people in Study 1 and only beneficial effects for the second and third samples in Study 2. Specifically, it decreased stress-related diseases in non-indigenous Chileans and reduced the incidence of colds and even cancer in indigenous participants. Superordinate identification had positive impact among mestizos but mixed effects among indigenous participants in Study 1. In Study 2, superordinate identification had positive outcomes for White and indigenous participants when the superordinate category was *Chile* but not when it was *Latin America*. Interacting with contact variables, we found low superordinate and high subordinate identities to be beneficial in terms of improved health for all three samples. This is in line with the Hewstone–Brown model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005) of categorisation during contact, which holds that clear group distinctions during intergroup contact will result in better intergroup outcomes than identifying with a common, superordinate category.

The positive effects of subordinate identity on health, mainly among indigenous samples, can be elucidated with Schmitt and Branscombe's (2002) rejection-identification model. In it, the authors argue that the shared social identity of members of stigmatised groups provides a basis for giving, receiving, and benefiting from social support that provides individuals with the emotional, intellectual, and material resources to cope with and resist the injustice of discrimination, prejudice, and stigma (see Haslam, Jetten & Waghorn, 2009). A longitudinal study of immigrants from Russia to Finland exemplifies these processes. It demonstrates how the maintenance of identification with an ethnic group of origin and the development of identification with a new national group combine to define people's experiences of discrimination and the resulting stress (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). A study by Oyserman, Fryberg, and Yoder (2007) proves instructive to explain the often negative effects of superordinate identification on indigenous people's health. These authors found that members of ethnic minority groups that do not identity with mainstream society often react against health-related messages from the majority.

The predominantly positive effects of superordinate identification on health among majority group members makes sense when considering Mummendey and Wenzel's (1999) in-group projection model (IPM). Grounded in SCT, Mummendey

and Wenzel argue that in-group and out-group members compare themselves on dimensions that define the superordinate category. The groups' evaluation depends on their relative prototypicality of the superordinate category. In-group members tend to see their own group as more prototypical and hence, they view the out-group as a deviation from the norm. As shown empirically, high-status groups often legitimise status differences between the groups by pointing to their greater perceived prototypicality of the superordinate category (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002).

Applying this reasoning to our research, non-indigenous majority group members in Mexico and Chile are bound to see themselves as more prototypical than indigenous participants of the categories of Mexicans and Chileans. Not only do they have numerical majority but they also hold higher status positions that need to be justified. Moreover, at least in the case of Mexico, where superordinate identification had solely positive effects among mestizos, the superordinate, national category provides a more "natural" basis for identification than the subordinate majority ethnicity. This is different for minority group members for whom their ethnic group membership is actually more important than their nationality, as evidenced by the descriptive statistics.

It is also interesting to note that in Study 2, superordinate identification produced beneficial effects for both majority and minority groups when the category was *Chile* but not when it was *Latin America*. Latin America includes other Spanish-speaking White people, but more importantly, it also includes other indigenous minority groups with whom indigenous participants in Chile might have formed a psychological connection. In contrast, it appears that the category of Latin America is simply too inclusive. Findings might have been different if the frame of comparison and intergroup contact related to specific other Latin American countries.

Related to these issues Jetten et al. (2014, p. 112) ask "is this relationship, group or role important in defining who I am? We argue that only when the answer to this question is "yes" will social connectedness have the capacity to predict outcomes such as health behaviour and well-being." Similarly, Sani (2011) discusses (interpersonal) relationships that do *not* cure. A substantial number of studies have shown that negative relationships impair physical and mental health (e.g. Holt-Lunstad, Uchino, Smith, & Hicks, 2007). Similar processes might hold for intergroup relations.

Our research had certain limitations. Firstly, we relied on self-reported data, which is open to subjective interpretations, particularly with regard to the health-related questions. Some people might tend to over report their incidence of certain diseases while others might under report this. Objective data, such as individual health records or physiological data, would have been more accurate. A second limitation is our use of cross-sectional data, which cannot establish a causal chain of events. Therefore, while it is plausible that more and better contact and higher identification improves health, it is equally feasible that participants that suffer from diseases lose social connections and identify less with their groups and categories. This circularity between contact and health was captured nicely by Putnam (2000) who noted that "It is not just that because we are well we are more likely to partici-

pate in group life, but also that because we participate in group life we are more likely to be well" (in Haslam, Jetten & Waghorn, 2009, p. 15).

To conclude, our research was the first to show the (mostly) beneficial effects of different levels of identification as well as intergroup contact on health-related outcomes. This broadens both the social cure and the intergroup contact literatures considerably. Given the ubiquity of social groups/categories and, following from this, of intergroup contact, our findings are very encouraging. Future research should focus on more objective measures of identity, contact, and particularly, health variables. Moreover, longitudinal research could not only illuminate how the relations among identity, contact, and health transform over time but also how the variables relate to each other causally.

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Chapter 20
Social Identity and Peace in the Modern Middle East: Insights from the United Arab Emirates

Angela T. Maitner and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll

Social identities in the United Arab Emirates are complex, intertwined, and sometimes contradictory. The UAE is a federal system that united and established statehood only 44 years ago. This federalisation brought together seven pre-existing Emirates with divergent identities and historical inter-Emirate rivalries. Since then, Emiratis have constructed and maintained identities based in tribe, Emirate, and nation, while holding allegiances that are shared with other Gulf states and Arab nations. The UAE is also home to expatriates from around the globe, with 89 % of the resident population holding a passport from a foreign country. Within the UAE, identities vary in nationality, religion, culture, socio-economic status, and multiple other dimensions. Intergroup interaction is, therefore, a mundane part of daily life that is nevertheless critically shaped by identity, and which shapes identity in turn.

This chapter focuses on the role of social identity in conflict and peace at multiple levels, considering (1) ways that the Emirati identity has been created and protected; (2) how higher order identification with other Gulf and Arab nations has created overlapping patterns of international conflict and cooperation; (3) how a multicultural social hierarchy has been created and maintained within the UAE, and the role that stability, permeability, and legitimacy of the social system plays in regulating individuals' reactions to their place in the social system; and finally (4) how culture interacts with identity to create complex multicultural individuals whose cultural frames, goals, motives, and interests can shift dramatically along with shifts in self-categorisation.

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National Identity: Construction and Protection

The UAE constructed a loose federation of Emirates in 1971 when the individual sheikhdoms' crucial allegiances with the British were formally dissolved (Legrenzi, 2011). Because the nation emerged after the withdrawal of the British protection and not from a drive for self-determination seen elsewhere in the Middle East, comparative politics scholars argue that the construction of an Emirati identity resulted from an inward-looking process that probed what it meant to be Emirati, rather than from an outward-looking process of identity contrast (Partrick, 2009). In other words, in the beginning, the Emirati identity was constructed around the question of "who is the in-group" rather than "how are we different from some salient outgroup?" Social identity theory, in contrast, argues that because groups exist only in relation to other groups, they derive prototypes and positive distinctiveness through a process of social comparison (Turner, 1975). It is this social comparison process that likely drives the continual construction of identity today.

Partrick (2009) argues that the identification many locals had developed with both a ruling sheikh and local territory provided fertile conditions for state-building rooted in the authority of ruling families. Indeed, both nation and identity construction were spearheaded by ruling sheikhs who are overwhelmingly beloved by the national population. Hogg (2001) argues that leaders who are well liked tend to have their ideas more readily accepted by in-group members, while Reicher, Haslam, and Hopkins (2005) go a step further, suggesting that charismatic leaders are capable of redefining group norms, suggesting that "those who control category definitions are therefore in a position to make and remake the world" (p. 557). The discovery of oil and subsequent rapid development of the country is likely to have further solidified rulers' influence as studies show that people are more likely to make personality-based attributions to leadership, rather than attributions to contextual factors, when leaders preside over organisations (in this case, countries) that go through change (Haslam et al., 2001). Thus, the love and loyalty given to ruling sheikhs, alongside the rapid development and modernisation of the country, placed the rulers in a strong position to create a new prototypical definition of what it means to be Emirati. (See Reicher, Haslam, Platow, & Steffens, 2016; for more on leadership.)

To that end, the federal government has made national identification a strategic priority (Vision 2021). The identity that has emerged in the last 44 years is distinctly Arab (but not Arabist) and Muslim (but not Islamist). Indeed national identity is shaped by Arab and Islamic values, though Arab nationalism and Political Islam are viewed as dangerous influences that are carefully controlled (Partrick, 2009). In 2014, the Minister of Culture, Youth, and Community Development suggested that national identification is a commitment to the cultural values, customs, traditions, language, dialect, doctrine, and faith of the nation and reported that 90 % of Emiratis feel a sense of belonging and identification with the country (Salama, 2014).

Such identification is likely amplified by the high status associated with the Emirati identity, combined with its impermeable group boundaries (cf. Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries, & Wilke, 1988). Emirati citizenship is exclusive. Until

2011, citizenship was granted only to children of Emirati fathers. On the eve of the 40th National Day, however, Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, issued a decree opening citizenship to children of Emirati mothers and foreign fathers on their 18th birthday, so long as they meet certain eligibility requirements (Salama, 2012). Thus, the Emirati identity is granted only to individuals who, by birth, closely fit the national prototype (cf. Lalonde, Cila, & Yampolsky, 2016; discussion of Québécois identity).

A national document on the values and behaviours of an Emirati citizen outlines that prototype, prescribing attitudes, feelings, and behaviour in such explicit fashion that the identity should serve as an effective mechanism for uncertainty reduction in the face of regional instability. (See Lüders, Jonas, Fritsche, & Agroskin, 2016 for more on anxious uncertainty reduction.) It suggests that an Emirati should: abide by Islamic principles and values, while showing respect for all religions, tolerance, and moderation; show awareness of the country's traditions, observe traditions in daily life, and present a good image of the Emirati identity, while respecting other cultures in the country; believe in equal opportunity, work towards social harmony, and pledge loyalty to the UAE and its leadership (Swan, 2013).

As articulated in the national document, the government and much of the Emirati population pride themselves on their culture of openness and on the diversity that characterises the UAE's population. Nevertheless, there remains a significant worry amongst the Emirati population about the overwhelming proportion of non-nationals living in the country. Emiratis represent only 11 % of the resident population (United Arab Emirates National Bureau of Statistics, 2011) and this "demographic imbalance" has increased the perception that the Emirati identity is under threat (see Mohammed, 2008). In 2007, "the UAE's demographic imbalance was ranked the top current and future 'challenge', ahead of health-related, economic and traditional security challenges" (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2011, p. 28), reflecting a widely held concern that young people may be motivated to adopt or integrate foreign values or traditions, and that doing so will erode the national identity. As a result, social comparison processes likely play an increasing role in reinforcing the Emirati identity; which is now defined both by what it is, and by what it is not (see Turner, 1975).

Others have argued that urbanisation puts the Emirati identity under threat as cultural heritage such as the recitation of poetry, domestication of birds of prey, traditional handicrafts, and local cooking disappear (Al-Qassemi, 2011). Such losses are especially problematic as it is common cultural values and traditions that mark identity for the majority of Emiratis (Richardson, 2008). The overlapping issues of demographic imbalance and urbanisation present a complex challenge to the UAE as the economic development plan that has achieved tremendous success over the past few decades relies on the continuation of both.

Public discussions of threats to national identity have focused on the loss of symbolic indicators of identity such as national dress and the Arabic language (see Phillips De Zalia & Moeschberger, 2016; for more on identity and symbols). In 2014, the Federal National Council debated whether it was necessary to adopt a policy to protect national dress, which, as one local claimed "gives us a sense of belonging and uniqueness" (Zacharias & Leech, 2014). Likewise, in 2015 *The*

National newspaper published a special report focusing on opinions of teachers and a report by Dubai's Knowledge and Human Development Authority. Teachers argued that Arabic was becoming a foreign language, while the report from the Human Development authority showed that "[a]lmost three-quarters of [private] schools had shortcomings in Arabic as a first and additional language" (Pennington, 2015). One commentator suggested: "Because language is tied to the national identity of a country … once you turn your own language into a foreign language, it starts impacting your identity and there are so many implications for this" (Pennington, 2015). Thus, it seems that threats to symbolic markers of identity are perceived as threatening to the identity as a whole, which is then defended and protected by leaders and group members alike (cf. Lalonde et al., 2016).

Clearly, the national leadership has a difficult job of attempting to balance the fears of citizens against goals of continual development. The solution thus far has been to (1) highlight and prioritise positive feelings of national identity through specified definitions (such as the national document discussed above) and celebrations, such as the UAE National Day (which was marked by a three-day public holiday in 2014; Wam, 2014); (2) defend and protect the national identity with exclusive privileges associated with citizenship, including a policy prescription of "Emiratisation" of (a governmental policy-driven process of requiring increased employment of nationals in) the private sector; and (3) foster values of tolerance for diverse ways of life—rather than encouraging assimilation, outsiders are encouraged to maintain their heritage culture, thereby protecting the distinctiveness of the national identity.

The eventual success of these solutions is as yet undetermined, although research would suggest that (1) the leadership has the legitimised authority to define group norms and identity that are embraced by the national population (cf. Reicher et al., 2005); (2) demonstrations of in-group favouritism associated with Emiratisation and other citizenship privileges may in turn increase support for leadership (cf. Haslam & Platow, 2001), while also providing a sense of esteem associated with a high status group membership; and (3) maintaining the distinctiveness of the national identity may help increase national loyalty as, when identities are under threat, identification tends to be highest in very small groups (see Badea, Jetten, Czukor, & Askevis-Leherpeux, 2010).

It is worth noting that the Emirati national identity is a superordinate identity amongst a diverse set of groups rooted in family, tribe, and Emirate. Given the far longer history of inter-tribal rivalry within the territory that makes up the United Arab Emirates today (Davidson, 2011), the generation of a sense of unity amongst the different tribes and the seven Emirates around shared symbols and beliefs is a significant accomplishment.

Higher Order Identities: Peace and Conflict

Extending beyond the national context, Emiratis hold a series of higher order identifications that have important implications for intergroup attitudes and behaviour. One identity held by most Emiratis is that of Gulf national (Khaliji). This classification generally refers to nationals of one of the six member states of the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) and not of Iraq or Iran, which also border the Gulf. The identification with this grouping is shallower than is nationality, and reflects more strongly shared history and culture than a political construct (Partrick, 2009). However, there has been an active effort by elites to foster a sense of shared identity amongst Khaliji nations since the formation of the GCC in 1981. More specifically, the Khaliji identity reflects a shared Arab heritage, Sunni Islamic religion, and allegiance to traditional monarchical governments. Indeed, the counsel noted "the ties of … similar systems founded on the creed of Islam which binds them; and…having the conviction that the coordination, cooperation, and integration between them serve the sublime objectives of the Arab Nation" in the preamble of its founding charter (GCC, 1981).

The Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war represented an existential threat to the Gulf regimes that subsequently created the Council with two primary purposes in mind. First, the organisation is intended to be a shared effort to internally stabilise member states in periods of instability and to protect the Gulf monarchies. In other words, the shared identity may help reduce uncertainty in the face of regional instability, while also helping ensure that shared values are maintained in the face of external challenges. Second, it is meant to create a shared effort to defend against external threats. This collective defence component has evolved over time, arguably becoming more deeply institutionalised during the 1991 Gulf War in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Partrick, 2009). This evolution points to a deepening of the Khaliji identity over time and a sense of shared security amongst the populations of the GCC in light of emerging threats. The development of the Khaliji identity then, has been fostered as the glue that binds the populations—and therefore more than the ruling regimes—together in a common "imagined community" (Anderson, 2006) that stands in contrast to threatening out-groups who do not share as many cultural ties. In other words, the superordinate identity can be invoked to increase the relative power of the in-group when contrasted against powerful external threats such as Iran, "the West" or radical militants.

One area where the Khaliji identity has been a source of a shared threat perception is with regard to the challenge of violent radicalism—particularly with respect to revolutionary Sunni groups. One of the most critical strategic threats for the UAE and other Gulf states derives from this movement, though there is some discrepancy in which groups are perceived as particularly threatening amongst the GCC states (Kolaif, 2014). The activities of groups such as Al Qaeda and Daesh (also known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL) present the monarchies of the UAE and other Gulf states with a direct challenge to the legitimacy of their concept and implementation of political order (Kissinger, 2014). These groups do not accept the current regimes or indeed their state borders. Moreover, they believe themselves to be qualified to practice *takfir* (a declaration of one Muslim against another of apostasy) against Muslims whose religious interpretations and practices are not consistent with their own. The accusation of apostasy, of not being a true Muslim, is extremely significant as the penalty for those who renounce Islam is severe, and is argued by many Islamic scholars to be death. Such designations thus allow these groups to justify holy war against these *kafir* (infidels in light of the takfir), who make up the mainstream of Gulf society. Such

groups are therefore rejected and treated as existential threats to both the regimes and the identity of Khalijis in general. The activation of this shared identity threat is fostered through various media of communication, over which the states have significant control (Matthiesen, 2013). In so doing, they can further project an image of the in-group, which provides and an alternative (indeed better) depiction than that provided by the threatening out-group.

It is interesting to note, though, that the coherence of this threat perception amongst Khalijis varies across distinct Salafist groups. Salafism is a fundamentalist approach to Sunni Islam, which tries to emulate the practices of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers as closely as possible. This general category applies to various groups with different interpretations and behaviours. The UAE is clear in its consideration of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan in its local Emirati form) and the Al-Nusra Front as threats, whereas Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are far less clear in their shared opposition (Kolaif, 2014). Additionally, the Gulf states have engaged in various disputes over territorial boundaries since the formation of the UAE (Peterson, 2011), and the smaller five share concerns about Saudi hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula (Wright, 2011). Moreover, "the progressive and moderate Islamic values" that comprise the Emirati identity (United Arab Emirates Government, 2011) stand in stark contrast to the Wahhabism of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the alleged support shown by Qatar to organisations such as Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other radical Sunni groups in Syria and Libya.[1] Such discrepancies become particularly visible and problematic when national identities and concerns are activated, and identity contrast is highlighted. They are minimised, however, when the Khaliji identity is contrasted with more salient external threats.

The Khaliji identity has intermittently been activated by elites in opposition to the perceived threat of Shiism to the Gulf states. In particular, the governments of Saudi Arabia (who possess a significant and underprivileged Shia minority in their oil-rich eastern province) and Bahrain (who have a largely underprivileged Shia majority) have amplified attention to sectarian divisions since the Arab Spring protests of 2011 (Matthiesen, 2013). Moreover, the claim that external actors (Iran) are operating to de-stabilise some Gulf states by manipulating their fellow Shias as a cohesive and subversive element of society is persistent. When the Bahraini government determined that it needed assistance in quashing the Shia uprising, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent in a joint police force as part of the "Peninsula Shield" collective defence arrangement of the GCC (Matthiesen, 2013). In March, 2015, the UAE joined a Saudi coalition conducting bombing raids in Yemen for much the same purpose, protecting the peninsula from the threat of Shia militants supported by Iran (Sly, 2015). Importantly, these actions occurred despite the fact that UAE elites have not utilised the strategy of encouraging sectarian divisions in the way the Sauds and Khalifas (Bahrain's ruling family) have. Thus, the police and military action clearly reflects a concern adopted from the shared Khalijii identity, and we

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[1] The position of Qatar towards these groups appears to have shifted since September 2013, when it asked several Muslim Brotherhood leaders to leave the country. It followed this action in January 2015 with the deportation of Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal (globalsecurity.org, 2015).

may expect similar sectarian attitudes to emerge or be expressed when that higher order identity is activated (cf. Ferguson & McKeown, 2016; discussion of sectarianism and Northern Irish identity).

Another superordinate identity to which the Emirati population subscribes is that of being an Arab state. While the UAE was never an active participant in the Pan-Arab movements of the mid-twentieth century, it does identify itself as belonging to the Arab community. Indeed, it is arguably this identity that has led the UAE to actively engage itself in UN Security Council authorised (and Arab League requested) air operations over Libya in 2011 (Daalder & Stavridis, 2011) as well as subsequent participation in interventions in Libya and Syria (Kingsley, Stephen, & Roberts, 2014; Osborn, 2015). Further, it was as a member of the Arab League that the UAE supported the Saudi generated peace plan for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the midst of the second intifada in 2002 at the Beirut Arab Summit (Cohen, 2009). Motivated by the shocking images presented in the media against members of another Arab population, and the perceived lack of constructive participation by the United States, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah submitted a peace proposal which was unanimously supported by Arab states (Lacey, 2009). The plan (never accepted by the conflict's participants) guaranteed that all Arab states would normalise relations with Israel in exchange for its withdrawal to the internationally recognised borders of 1967 (Khalidi, 2003). Thus, it represented a unified Arab action where states that had their own internal disputes acted together on behalf of the superordinate identity in engaging with a shared out-group.

Emirati nationals have several distinct identities that extend beyond national borders. These identities can be invoked to change attitudes from ones of peace and affiliation to ones of conflict and competition. Indeed, research shows that when individuals shift social categorisation from, for example, American to student, or from one's individual identity to one's field of study/major, perceptions of and emotional reactions towards target out-groups shift in line with the structural relations established between the salient identity and target out-group (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). In this way, allegiances with other Gulf or Arab states can be suppressed or invoked to increase or decrease international tensions and support for international action.

Social Hierarchy and Social Interaction

Within the UAE the national identity exists in contrast to a complex set of converging and diverging identities held by the non-national resident population who represent different national, ethnic, religious, and cultural identities. While the diverse ways that individuals can be identified may help reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict within society overall (cf. Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001), identities are also highly correlated, reducing some of the benefit that may be gained from crossing social categorisations (cf. Hall & Crisp, 2005).

The identities that tend to dominate social categorisation on a daily basis include national or ethnic categories, with national statistics on anything from salary to road accident rates reported by these social categories (see Anderson, 2014 and Emirates 24/7 Staff, 2012 for public examples). Salary reports, in particular, highlight how diversity has been organised into an ethnically based socio-economic hierarchy in private sector employment, as Western expatriates tend to earn more for the same job than Arab expatriates, who earn more than South Asians (although the difference between Western and Arab expatriates has recently decreased; see Al-Awad & Elhiraika, 2003; Anderson, 2014; Nagraj, 2013). Emirati employees occupy the top of the hierarchy, earning as much as 44 % above the industry standard (Hay group). This hierarchy is explicitly discussed in national news (Al Subaihi, 2012; Salama, 2004), and is accurately recognised by a diverse group of UAE-based student research participants (Maitner, 2015; Maitner & DeCoster, 2015).

The social identity perspective suggests that perceptions of the stability, permeability, and legitimacy of the social system impact individuals' reactions to their position in a status hierarchy, and each plays a predictable role in the UAE. First, it is worth noting that the social system within the UAE is highly stable, with laws that reduce both the possibility and probability of social change (Issa, 2006). Research suggests that when systems are highly stable, people may seek individual mobility strategies, especially when the system is perceived as permeable (Ellemers et al., 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). Indeed, we have shown that Arab participants are less emotionally reactive to explicit reminders of their group-based disadvantage when they anticipate that the system permits upward individual mobility based on merit (i.e. when they endorse meritocracy beliefs, and receive no explicit message contradicting those beliefs; see Maitner, 2015). However that same work also showed that when the impermeability of the system is made clear, individuals who otherwise expect an opportunity for individual mobility become angry (Maitner, 2015). Because Arab culture tends to operate on a negotiation-based, rather than a rule-based system, and because rules are rarely made explicit even when employed, the illusion of socio-economic permeability may exist even if its likelihood is low. Thus, the stability of the system likely interacts with the cultural context to increase efforts for individual mobility while reducing efforts for social change.

Research also suggests that social systems are more tolerated when perceived as legitimate (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993), and that justifications for existing inequality help maintain stability in the system (see Jost & Banaji, 1994). We find that, although individuals publicly report dissatisfaction with inequality, they also seem to endorse stereotypes that explain nationality-based payment differences, pointing to differences in both national wealth and national skill to understand the existing social hierarchy (Maitner & DeCoster, 2015). In this way, peace between different groups is likely facilitated by stereotypes that implicitly legitimise the system, thereby ensuring it is maintained.

Peace and stability may also be maintained by the promotion of a multicultural ideology and intergroup interaction. As referenced above, UAE laws make it difficult for any person not born to an Emirati parent to become a citizen (Salama, 2012). These laws reduce the expectation that the non-national resident population

assimilate to local norms and values, and instead increase the likelihood that foreign residents maintain their own language, dress, cuisine, school curriculum, and other cultural practices. Indeed, the government protects the rights of foreign residents to maintain and practice their own religion, and even provides mechanisms for foreign residents to be treated under different systems of civil law. As noted above, all of these efforts protect the optimal distinctiveness of the Emirati national identity, while ensuring that non-nationals maintain a way to define themselves.

Both implicitly and explicitly, the government is encouraging residents to embrace a multicultural ideology, acknowledging differences that exist between groups in society, but respecting and embracing those differences. (See also Lalonde et al., 2016, on multiculturalism in Canada; and Stathi & Roscini, 2016, for relevant theoretical perspectives on multiculturalism.) Indeed, research shows that relative to embracing a colour-blind strategy, embracing a multicultural ideology more strongly reduces both implicit and explicit prejudice (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Endorsement of a multicultural ideology is also associated with collective self-esteem in ethnic minorities in the United States (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006), suggesting that the national strategy may promote positive subgroup identities while reducing evaluative bias. It is worth noting, however, that the promotion of multicultural ideology may lead to increased prejudice in individuals who endorse right-wing authoritarianism (Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, & Wagner, 2013), and therefore the current approach may increase prejudice in individuals who prefer conformity and security. It is these members of society who may be most attracted to regime-threatening organisations such as Daesh that provide an alternative, hierarchical, authoritarian view of how members of society should be organised.

The social system goes beyond encouraging residents to embrace their heritage culture by also encouraging intergroup interaction. Institutions such as Global Village, an outdoor venue hosting national shopping pavilions, cultural shows, and ethnic food stalls encourage individuals to experience other cultures and provide opportunities to interact with people from diverse backgrounds. When individuals take advantage, research shows that intergroup contact reduces prejudice and intergroup anxiety (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). Exemplifying this, one Emirati woman told *Gulf News* "we grew up with a lot of expat friends and got invited to everything from Christmas to Diwali. As children it was part of our lives. We embrace all the nationalities that are here" (Seth, 2012). Others, however, eschew intergroup interaction, and doing so may once again have negative implications for intergroup attitudes.

Social Identity, Culture, and Conflict

Even for individuals who prefer to interact with in-group members, intergroup interaction is a mundane part of daily life in the UAE. Such intergroup interactions are shaped by the goals, motives, and beliefs that individuals associate with their salient self-categories. However, over time, intergroup interaction, intercultural interaction, and multicultural experience likely play a reciprocal role in defining group identities.

One thing that should be clear is that residents of the UAE vary not only in well-investigated social categories such as gender and religion, but also in cultural background. Differences in cultural styles may importantly influence when conflict will erupt, or when peace will be maintained. Theorists have recently differentiated amongst dignity, face, and honour cultures, with the way in which self-worth is derived playing a critical role in differentiating amongst the three cultural systems (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Individuals who come from dignity cultures, for example, have a sense of self-worth which is self-generated and inalienable; whereas individuals from honour cultures first assert their worth, then have it confirmed or threatened by external sources. Blatant signs of disrespect are reacted to strongly in defence of one's honour (IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007). Because of this, individuals from honour cultures may be more likely to escalate insulting interactions into aggressive ones (see Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdell, & Schwarz, 1996).

Arab cultures are traditionally honour cultures (see Dodd, 1973), and this cultural style may be expected to increase volatility in responses to insults or challenges in the Arab population. However, previous research has centred on how honour values are linked to personal, family, and gender roles, and it has remained unknown whether individuals would also show heightened defence of other social identities.

Recently, we investigated whether social identities are universally subsumed under the overarching cultural styles, or whether in such a highly multicultural society, culture might also be subsumed under identity (Maitner, Mackie, Pauketat, & Smith, 2015). Investigating Arab students at an American-style university, we showed that honour values were conferred to the Arab, but not student, identity; and as a result, participants showed heightened anger and aggression when their Arab, but not when their student, identity was insulted.

These results suggest a number of important implications. First and foremost, they point out that cultural styles that importantly guide how individuals think, feel, and behave may not influence all identities equally. Instead, for some individuals, cultural styles may be subsumed under social identity—becoming yet another diagnostic element of a group prototype. That means that when certain identities are threatened in the UAE, including gender, family, and Arab identities, conflict may be a culturally afforded response. However, individuals who participate broadly in the multicultural system may also show evidence of emerging biculturalism, utilising alternative cultural responding when alternative social identities are activated. Individuals who avoid intergroup interaction, in contrast, will not show such culturally flexible ways of responding, again highlighting the special concern that individuals who endorse authoritarian beliefs and avoid intergroup contact can evoke in trying to assure security in a highly multicultural society.

Multicultural experience, it seems, can create complex multicultural individuals whose cultural frames, goals, motives, and interests can shift dramatically along with shifts in self-categorisation. Thus, individuals from all nationalities and ethnicities in the UAE, despite being members of several overlapping social categories, may be particularly high on social identity complexity. This may especially be the case for individuals who live in diverse neighbourhoods or apartment towers (Schmid, Hewstone, & Al Ramiah, 2012) or have more intergroup contact in general (Schmid,

Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, & Hughes, 2009). Because social identity complexity is linked to increased out-group tolerance (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Schmid et al., 2009) and identification with the host culture in immigrants (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012), this could be another way that the multicultural nature of the country can itself decrease intergroup conflict and ensure peace and stability.

Conclusions

In only 44 years, the UAE, formed by the union of seven Emirates that were historically independent, has constructed a complex and multicultural system that is generally stable, peaceful, and dynamic. Although competing identities may increase the risk of conflict, they can also be invoked to maintain peace at national and international levels. We have suggested that the UAE has worked to create a stable superordinate national identity that allows subordinate identification with tribal affiliations and family. In balancing these levels of identity, the rulers of the UAE have successfully created a deep sense of national identification amongst the population. This national identity is protected through strategies that aim to create positive esteem and optimal distinctiveness for nationals who live as a numerical minority in their own country. Emiratis hold their national identity alongside higher order identifications with regional, ethnic, and religious groups, which likely helps reduce conflict with anyone deemed members of the (temporarily salient) in-group while creating conflict with entities that remain (temporarily) outside. The multicultural society has organised into a stable social hierarchy based in nationality and ethnicity that prioritises Emirati nationals and places other nationals in order of national wealth and perceived skill. Although this might seem to invite opposition, it garners a substantial perception of legitimacy amongst nationals and many non-nationals alike. Finally, we suggest that the mundane, daily intercultural interaction that individuals engage in may lead cultural styles to shift along with shifts in self-categorisation, changing the values and expectations individuals have, thereby increasing or decreasing conflict and peace in line with goals to protect an activated identity.

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Chapter 21
Collective and Social Identities in Philippine Peacebuilding: Does a Superordinate Bangsamoro Social Identity Mediate the Effects of Collective Ethnic Identity?

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When Philippine President Benigno Aquino III signed the Comprehensive Agreement for the Bangsamoro in 2014, the country found itself looking at a possible end to the centuries-old Muslim–Christian conflict in Mindanao. The agreement proposed a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), establishing a self-governing territory for Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao.[1] Moro refers to a Filipino Muslim. The proposed law asserted the unified identity of Muslim constituencies in Mindanao as a "bangsa" Moro, or Moro nation (Majul, 1973). With distinguishable governing and identity provisions, the proposed BBL aimed to end intergroup violence between Christians and Muslims on the southern island of Mindanao.

Unsurprisingly, many Christian Filipinos opposed the BBL, because of its provisions of power and wealth sharing in territories carved out for the Bangsamoro. However, what surprised BBL supporters was resistance among Moros themselves. In the western region of the proposed Bangsamoro areas, for instance, Moro leaders blocked the BBL on the grounds that they were excluded from the peace process (Casauay, 2015).

The Mindanao conflict has often been branded as a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians. We argue, however, that apparently religious conflicts go beyond differences in religious identities. (As noted in Ferguson & McKeown, (2016), the Northern Irish conflict between Catholics and Protestants also goes beyond differences in religious identities.) In many cases, underlying conflict during a peace process emerges from the differences in tribal identities like, for example, the ethnic identities of the Moro people. Using identity theory, more specifically, the concepts of collective and superordinate social identities, we aim to understand

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[1] Mindanaoans generally see themselves as belonging to either of three groups, namely the Christian settlers, Islamised ethnic groups or Moros, and indigenous peoples or Lumads.

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why those belonging to the Moro group are divided in their support of the BBL, in spite of their religious homogeneity as Muslims. In order to understand the play of collective and social identities among Mindanao's Islamised ethnic groups, we first need to review a brief history of the Mindanao conflict.

A Brief History of Politico-Ethnic Cleavages Among Moros in Mindanao

The so-called Muslim–Christian conflict in Mindanao draws its history back to the Spanish Colonial Philippines in the sixteenth century and the subsequent US annexation of the entire Philippines during the early half of the twentieth century. Both Christian-dominated Spain and the USA failed to conquer Muslim populations in Mindanao (Gowing, 1977; Rodil, 1994). However, these colonial regimes and post-colonial Philippine governments established political and economic policies favouring Christians, eventually marginalising Moros in Mindanao (Majul, 1973; Santos, 2005a).

Animosities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos escalated sharply in 1968 when the Marcos-led Philippine government was accused of massacring Moro recruits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Santos, 2005b). This Jabidah Massacre opened the flood gates of ill feelings among Moros, paving the way to their politicisation and eventual radicalisation (Vitug & Gloria, 2000).

The most notable group that emerged at that historical moment was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a politicised group that succeeded in organising and mobilising a broad front of students, rural residents, traditional leaders, and so on from across the Muslim enclaves in the Southern Philippines (McKenna, 1998; Santos, 2005a). The rise of the MNLF put the issue of Bangsamoro on the forefront of Philippine politics, as the group succeeded in occupying large swaths of Moro-majority areas, and forced the Philippine government to deploy a significant military force to repulse their advances. While the MNLF were winning ground battles, its leaders, particularly chair Nur Misuari and vice chair Salamat Hashim, found themselves entangled in deep-seated discord toward the late 1970s. The disagreements led to a leadership split, splintering the MNLF to those who stayed behind with Misuari and those that joined Hashim Salamat in forming what was then known as the MNLF Reform group but later changed to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF; McKenna, 1998).

The fragmentation partly exposed the cleavages of ethnic division within the Bangsamoro secessionist movement, with most of the Tausug ethnic group members in Western Mindanao standing firmly behind Misuari's MNLF faction. On the other side of the divide, Bangsamoro armed constituencies in Central Mindanao, many of whom were from the Maguindanaon ethnic group, left the MNLF and joined Salamat's armed wing (Guiterrez et al., 2000; McKenna, 1998).

The differences between Maguindanaons and Tausugs date back to precolonial times. Tribal groups thrived in Mindanao, even before the coming of Islam in the

fourteenth century. When Muslim traders landed on Mindanao shores, at least two local sultanates had already risen to political–economic dominance, the Tausugs in Southwestern Mindanao and the Maguindanaons (and spatially proximate Maranaos) in Central Mindanao. Both Tausugs and Maguindanaons fought Spanish and American colonisers in the sixteenth century and thereafter. But the two sultanates resisted foreign invasions without forming a united front, because they were geographically distanced, and spoke different languages (Frake, 1998). As various Muslim–Christian peace talks ensued, so did cracks between different Islamised ethnic groups emerge.

After the Marcos Dictatorship ended in 1986, the Philippine government and the Moros—with the MNLF as the standard bearer—entered into a tripartite peace agreement mediated by Indonesia. This peace agreement would be broken twice, first in 2002 when the MNLF protested the failures of the Philippine government to follow through its commitments, and in 2013 when the Philippines ended the peace agreement with MNLF in order to push through the peace agreement with the MILF, a Maguindanaon-dominated armed group. This second event marked the transfer of the position as the lead negotiator of peace negotiations from the MNLF to the MILF.

The faltering of the government-MNLF peace agreement and the forging of a separate government-MILF accord further complicated political relations between the MNLF and the MILF. Attempts were made to reunify both groups but, despite such efforts, the split only deepened and further highlighted underlying ethnic divides among pioneering members of the MNLF.

The shift of Moro leadership during the peace talks from MNLF to MILF was supported by the MILF-associated Maguindanaon ethnic group, but did not receive enthusiasm among the MNLF-linked Tausugs. As the government and the MILF moved toward the finalisation of the remaining details of the Bangsamoro peace accord, Misuari himself mobilised loyal MNLF members largely composed of Tausugs to block peace moves between Muslims and Christians. In Western Mindanao, the Misuari-led MNLF declared an independent "United Federated States of the Bangsamoro Republik" before mounting a daring but ultimately failed armed offensive on a strategic Christian-populated city, Zamboanga, in September 2013 (Celebrating 1st anniversary declaration of Bangsamoro republik and using "rule of law" in land-grabbing causing Mindanao war and invoking Philippine constitution in perpetuating colonialism, 2014).

This chapter aims to understand the deeply rooted issues of clash of identities included in the overarching Moro world, as activated during endgame peace bargaining with a Christian national government. By understanding the intergroup dynamics between the two Moro ethnic groups involved in the history of peace negotiations, we may more clearly see how collective identities of Islamised Muslim groups affect the way each ethnic group perceives the superordinate identity of Bangsamoro and how they identify with it (cf. Ferguson & McKeown's, 2016, discussion of meanings of the Northern Irish superordinate identity).

In the following two sections, we distinguish between collective and social identity. We further expound on collective ethnic identities of the Islamised ethnic groups, and the notion of a superordinate Bangsamoro social identity that includes both Tausugs and Maguindanaons. We likewise examine how collective and social identities can be linked with a peacebuilding variable, namely support for the BBL.

Collective Ethnic Identities of Moro Subgroups and Support for the BBL

Collective identity, in a nutshell, is the shared identity of a group. It can be as simple as group membership to a tribe or a group; it can also be derived from the shared beliefs, cognition, practices, or expressions of the group (Klandermans, 2014; Polleta & Jasper, 2001; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). In our study, collective identity can be seen as "We are Tausugs/Maguindanaons", rather than "I am a Tausug/Maguindanaon".

Collective identity is a strong predictor of social behaviour, particularly in situations of social change. The relationship between collective identity and the support for social change processes has been well documented (Klandermans, 2014; Simon et al., 1998; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Moreover, collective identity has been a strong explanatory variable for political actions undertaken by a whole group during times of crisis. If a political process affects a group in one way or another, there is a higher tendency for the individuals of that group to take collective action.

The agentic function of collective identity is strategic in an asymmetrical relationship. Dominant groups hold respect and agency, while marginalised groups are often powerless and discriminated against. In the ongoing Muslim–Christian peace process, the Maguindanaons' collective identity claims more agentic power because Moros' negotiations with the Christian Philippine government are led by the MILF which is Maguindanaon-linked, and not by the MNLF which is Tausug linked. Hence, the Tausugs' collective identity holds less agentic sway in the current peacebuilding efforts.

Support for the BBL may be fractured across collective identities of Islamised ethnic groups, or in the claims that "We are Maguindanaons" or "We are Tausugs". Therefore, we hypothesise that the collective identity of an ethnic group antecedes BBL support, with the lead negotiating group of Maguindanaons favouring the peace agreement more than their counterpart Moros among the Tausugs. The regression path *c* in Fig. 21.1 illustrates our proposition linking collective ethnic identity with support for the BBL.

The Superordinate Bangsamoro Social Identity and Support for the BBL

In contrast to collective identity, social identity is a part of an individual's personal identity that is derived from one's social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel, 1974). A person's identification with a social group, and more importantly, the strength of that identification, indicates one's social identity. The notion of social identity assumes that members of groups do not have a singular mind that shapes them to commit collective actions. Individuals who support joint actions see their group membership as an integral part of who they are (see La Macchia & Louis, 2016, for more on social identity and collective action).

In many of the studies on identity theory, there is often a finding showing that people are more likely to participate in pro-group change if they strongly identify with the group (Friedman & McAdam, 1992). This notion of personalised identification with the group overlaps with the concept of social identity, where one's social identity is derived, but distinct from, membership in a social group (Tajfel, 1974). Among Moros subgroups, a social identity may claim, for example, that "I am a Tausug", rather than "We are Tausugs", with the latter being a description for collective identity.

Social identity has been seen to be an important aspect of whether or not one will participate in a collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel, 1974). More importantly, it is through participation in collective action that people highlight their social identities (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). When a group with which a person identifies is threatened with injustice and deprivation, there is a shift of the problem from being a larger, more political problem, to a personal affront to a person. In this case, the person is mobilised into collective action because the social identity of a person feels threatened (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Indeed, threats to the social identity of the person more often than not, compel the person into action. A person who identifies with the group tends to participate in collective action more often than those who do not self-identify with the group. In this sense, social identity plays a vital role in understanding how people commit themselves to collective action. This is elevated into a more important issue when talking about superordinate social identities.

A superordinate identity is a social identity that includes multiple subgroups (Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999; McKeown, 2014). Superordinate social identities allow the reduction of bias between two groups by allowing a form of consensus in negotiations (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002). It is possible that strong identification with a superordinate social identity allows one to support social change due to threat to the superordinate identity regardless of one's ethnic group membership. For example, if Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao identify more strongly with their religion Islam, rather than their ethnic group Tausug or Maguindanaon; then, a threat to Muslim religious identity by Christians would unify Islamised ethnic groups, regardless of their different ethnic origins. In our research, we investigate a superordinate social identity, that is, identification with the Bangsamoro. A superordinate social identity would be that part of a person's identity associated with one's claim that "I belong to the Bangsamoro group". Strong identification with the Bangsamoro will allow various Islamised ethnic groups to coalesce together as a united front when facing the Other Christian-based Philippine government at the negotiating table.

If superordinate social identification with the Bangsamoro does affect participation in support for the BBL, then Mindanao Muslims who socially identify with the overarching identity of Bangsamoro would tend to support the BBL as a form of peacebuilding. The regression path *b* in Fig. 21.1 presents our predicted relationship between the strength of one's superordinate social identity with the Bangsamoro, and one's support for the BBL.

Fig. 21.1 Hypothetical model of direct and indirect effects

Support for the BBL: Bangsamoro Social Identity Mediates Effects of Ethnic Collective Identities

In this section, we propose that Moro support for a BBL depends on how one's collective ethnic identity is mediated by one's adherence to the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity. We follow the general argumentative flow required to establish a mediating causal relationship (Wu & Zumbo, 2008). Our theoretical frame rests on three subpremises needed to establish a mediation argument, namely that among Moros: (a) ethnic collective and superordinate social identities jointly influence support for the BBL; (b) collective identities influence one's superordinate social identity; and (c) the indirect effect of collective identity on BBL-support "passes through" or is mediated by the strength by which an individual identifies one's self with the Bangsamoro.

Both Collective and Social Identities Affect Support for the Bagsamoro Basic Law

Collective identity affects collective action and support for social change by mobilising the group members against a collective deprivation (Klandermans, 2014; Polleta & Jasper, 2001). Social identity, on the other hand, causes people to mobilise because

they perceive injustice toward the collective as personal attacks on their social identity (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Threat toward the group becomes a threat toward themselves. Groups tend to seek avenues by which they can avert the external threat or help stop it. Both collective and social identities lead to collective action. We aim to study the contribution of these two types of identity toward peacebuilding in Mindanao. The regression path b' and c' in Fig. 21.1 shows the combined effects of collective and social identity.

In the context of the Mindanao peace question, interrogations about the collective and superordinate identities should address the inverse effects of these identities on BBL support. If collective ethnic identities were to completely predict support for the BBL, then chronic inter-ethnic divisions would fracture the Moro front vis-à-vis Christian negotiators. More specifically, Maguindanaons more than Tausugs would support the BBL due to the former's ethnic affiliation with the lead Moro negotiators, the MILF. On the other hand, if a superordinate social identity held absolute weight, then any Moro, regardless of ethnic origin, would support the BBL to the extent that he or she identified with the superordinate Bangsamoro identity. To nuance this segment of our research problem, we first ask whether collective and social identities are causally connected in our model.

Collective Identities Influence One's Superordinate Social Identity

In an earlier part of this chapter, we stated that social identities are derived from collective identities. This relationship is asymmetric and cannot be reversed. Chronologically, a group should first exist before social identification with the group can take place. In the case of a superordinate social identity, at least two groups have to exist, before a superordinate identity emerges, fusing social identities of these two groups into one unifying identity.

The collective identity of an ethnic group and the social identity of a group member can be strongly related by group identification (Klandermans, 2014). Being part of a group shapes the way a person sees the world. One of the basic tenets of social identity is in-group favouritism and discrimination toward the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel, 1974). Belonging to a group shapes the way a member sees other things. The rituals, the shared beliefs, and experiences act as a filter through which one sees the external world (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995). In our research, being a member of an Islamised ethnic group can further increase one's identification with the Bangsamoro; a unified Moro identity with shared Muslim–Mindanao practices, beliefs, and experiences. The regression path a in Fig. 21.1 presents the direct relationship between one's ethnic collective identity and one's superordinate Bangsamoro social identity.

Superordinate Social Identity Mediates Collective Ethnic Identity

The effect of collective identity is more distal, whereas the effect of social identity is more proximal (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). What dilutes the effects of collective identity? We ask why mere membership in the Maguindanaon or Tausug ethnic group insufficiently predicts support for the proposed BBL. The extent to which such a collective identity is tied to one's superordinate social identity needs to be known. One's superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro can mitigate the impact of ethnic identity on support for the BBL.

Here lies the argument of our mediation model, which depicts a unidirectional indirect effect from ethnic collective identity toward support for the BBL, through the mediating path of the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity. In Fig. 21.1, the regression paths *ab′* and *c′* illustrate the mediation model using these three variables.

Our identification of the Bangsamoro social identity as a mediating, rather than the more common moderating third-variable, builds on the features and predicted relationships among our research variables. In their essay on third variables, Wu and Zumbo (2007) assert that mediators are temporary conditions, link a cause and an effect, come after the independent variable and before the dependent variable, and correlate with the dependent variable. On the other hand, moderators are stable traits, modify an effect, antecede both the independent and dependent variables, and do not correlate with the independent variable. In our research, the Bangsamoro identity mediates the effect of collective identity on support for the BBL because the superordinate identity (a) is psychological and changeable across time; (b) links one's collective group with support for the BBL; (c) comes after membership in an Islamised group, and before orienting toward the BBL; and (d) correlates with BBL support.

Our mediation model reveals an interesting explanation of why Moros perceive the BBL as they do. Ethnic group membership may explain a fractured support for the BBL. Being a Maguindanaon can possibly lead to a stronger identification with the Bangsamoro; and in contrast, being a Tausug can possibly lead to a rejection of the Bangsamoro social identity. But that may not be the whole picture. Ethnic membership may not perfectly overlap with a superordinate Bangsamoro identity. Hence, the impact of a superordinate Bangsamoro identity on support of the BBL may operate even among Tausugs.

Other studies have supported the mediating and positive properties of superordinate social identities during conflict. The ability to form a shared consensus with multiple groups through a superordinate identity has been shown to create better experiences of negotiations (Eggins et al., 2002; McKeown, 2014). If indeed superordinate Bangsamoro identities dilute the stifling effects of ethnic group membership, such a social psychological condition may open up avenues for a united Moro front among Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao, in support of the BBL. Our research aims to test our proposed mediation model, by examining relationships predicted in Fig. 21.1.

Method

To test our mediation model, we collected survey data from two Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao. We now describe the sample, survey items, and data analysis procedures employed in our research.

Participants

A total of 308 Muslims from Mindanao in Southern Philippines participated in our survey. Respondents were from the cities of Jolo ($n = 157$) and Cotabato ($n = 151$). Cotabato is home to Muslim Maguindanaons and the MILF; whereas Jolo is populated by Tausugs, the dominant ethnic tribe of the MNLF. There were 53 % females and 47 % males with a mean age of 32.5 years. Respondents came from varied social classes and occupations. All respondents gave their informed consent and were assured of confidentiality and anonymity.

Measures

We used three sets of survey items to measure the variables specified in our mediation model. To code our exogenous variable, the participant's collective ethnic identity, we simply asked respondents to indicate whether they were Maguindanaon, Tausug, or from another Islamised ethnic group. A collective identity is a sociological demographic, not a psychological variable that needs to be subjectively scaled. Hence, only one survey item was necessary and sufficient to obtain a valid score of a respondent's collective. We then further analysed the Maguindanaon and Tausug responses.

The second set of our survey items measured our mediating variable, namely one's psychological identification with the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity. The scale was found to be reliable ($\alpha = .91$). The following list shows the questions that measured the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity on a Likert scale.

1. During the ongoing peace process in Mindanao, all Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao should simply be seen as a single Bangsamoro
2. In the ongoing peace process, there are too many differences between Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao for everyone to be regarded as a single Bangsamoro people
3. I would lose an important part of my identity as Tausug/Maguindanaon if all Muslims in Mindanao were regarded as a single Bangsamoro people
4. I would feel happy belonging to one "Bangsamoro"
5. All Tausugs/Maguindanaon would be happy belonging to one "Bangsamoro"
6. A single "Bangsamoro" identity is an identity that I could personally accept
7. A Bangsamoro identity is an identity that all Tausugs/Maguindanaon could accept

The third component was a single survey item that assessed our endogenous variable, the participant's level of support for the BBL, with higher scores representing more support to the BBL. We used one survey item to measure support for the peace agreement because at the time of our data collection, the Bangsamoro issue stimulated much informal talk among Muslim communities. Hence, respondents could clearly express their positions toward the peace process by positioning themselves on a scale indicating support or rejection of the BBL. We asked our respondents:

Last March 2014, a peace agreement was signed between the Philippine government and the MILF to prepare for a new Bangsamoro. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?

_____strongly support
_____mildly support
_____mildly against
_____strongly against

Data Analysis for Mediation Effects

We tested for mediation effects in five steps, corresponding to the theoretical models illustrated in Fig. 21.1. We employed three simple linear regressions to test directional relationships between variable pairs (Paths *a*, *b*, *c*); and multiple regression to verify the combined effects of collective and social identities on support for the BBL (Paths *b'* and *c'*).

The last analytical step involved the testing of the mediation model in Fig. 21.1, which asked whether the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity indeed mediated the effects of ethnic collective identity on support for the BBL. We used the Monte Carlo method (Preacher & Selig, 2012; Zhang, 2013) that tested for indirect or mediation effects—that is, whether the relationship strength of a direct cause decreases significantly with the introduction of a mediating variable. This method is similar to bootstrapping (Hayes & Preacher, 2013).

Results

We now present our regression results in chronological order, referring to the theoretical relationships hypothesised in Fig. 21.1, and measuring each relationship with its corresponding β values. We found a positive significant relationship between collective identity and support for the BBL ($\beta = 0.40$; $p < 0.01$). Maguindanaons demonstrated a higher tendency than Tausugs to support the BBL. This finding confirmed the regression path *c*. We likewise found a significant relationship between the superordinate Bangsamoro social identity and one's support for the BBL ($\beta = 0.61$; $p < 0.01$). This result affirmed regression path *b*.

We then investigated the combined effects of collective and social identities, on support for the Muslim–Christian peace agreement, as depicted in regression paths b' and c'. This statistical procedure addressed the query about whether people supported the BBL mainly because of their collective ethnic identity, or their social identification with Bangsamoro. Our multiple regression analyses affirmed that support for the BBL can be traced to both membership in an Islamic ethnic group and the strength of identification with Bangsamoro. However, the tests also revealed that the strength of superordinate identification is stronger ($\beta = 0.53$; $p = 0.01$), than the impact of ethnic membership ($\beta = 0.22$; $p < 0.01$) when both variables are simultaneously considered in an equation. In terms of predictive relationships with support for the BBL, superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro is more influential than collective identity with an ethnic group.

We then employed simple linear regression to test whether collective identity, or membership in an ethnic group, affected the way people identified with Bangsamoro (Path a). Findings confirmed our prediction that Maguindanaons, the lead negotiating group, are more likely to strongly identify with the Bangsamoro superordinate identity ($\beta = 0.37$; $p = <0.01$).

Our final analytic step determined the significance of the indirect effect of ethnic collective identity as mediated by one's superordinate social identity. Our Monte Carlo analysis confirmed a significant indirect effect. Hence, in relation to support for the BBL, one's superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro does mediate the effect of ethnic collective identity. Figure 21.2 shows the empirical findings of our confirmed mediation model. Results affirmed that the direct impact of being a Tausug or Maguindanaon, on support of the BBL ($\beta = 0.40$; $p < 0.01$ in path c) is reduced considerably ($\beta = 0.22$; $p < 0.01$ in path c') when we likewise considered one's identification as Bangsamoro. Our Monte Carlo computations further confirmed that this difference between the two β weights is significantly different from zero.

The β weights in Fig. 21.2 show that ethnic group membership does influence support for the BBL not only because of its direct effects on such a support ($\beta = 0.22$; $p < 0.01$), but more so because one's group membership affects one's superordinate Bangsomoro identity ($\beta = 0.37$; $p < 0.01$), which in turn strongly predicts one's support for the BBL ($\beta = 0.53$; $p < 0.01$).

Discussion

Our results indicate that collective identity with an ethnic group and superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro both contribute to the support for the BBL. One's ethnic group affects one's support for the BBL. In addition, the extent to which one identifies with the superordinate Bangsamoro group also influences one's support for the BBL. The findings however, indicate that superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro is a stronger predictor of the support for the BBL. Mindanao Muslims tend to support the BBL even though they are not part of the dominant negotiating ethnic group, as long as they identify strongly as a Moro. In a sense, the strongest

Fig. 21.2 Path values of the direct and indirect effects. Direct effect = $c' = 0.22$; Indirect effect = $a b' = 0.37 \times 0.53 = 0.20$; Total effect = $c' + ab' = 0.42$

possible proponents of the law are the ones who belong to the Maguindanaon dominant group, and who also strongly identify with the Bangsamoro. In contrast, the strongest possible opponents of the law are those who belong to the non-negotiating group, the Tausugs; and who at the same time weakly identify with the Moro group, as reflected on their Likert-scaled scores on the Bangsamoro social identity.

Our significant mediation results show that psychological orientations can mediate how one's sociological classification impacts on peacebuilding. Fixed ethnic identities can fracture a united Moro front toward peacebuilding in Mindanao. However, the influence of collective identities on one's support for the BBL is diluted by one's dynamic psychological identification with the Bangsamoro. In comparison to collective ethnic identity, it is this superordinate identification that more strongly shapes support for the BBL.

The divide between the two subgroups of the Moros suggest that Tausugs disagree with aspects of the content and process of the BBL, as shaped by the Maguindanaon-based MILF. This is further corroborated by the fact that people who identify with the concept of Bangsamoro are mostly Maguindanaons.

Although it is true that the two subgroups have been in conflict in the past (Torres, 2007), the problem may lie with differences in superordinate Bagsamoro self-identification. Tausugs may identify themselves with a Bangsamoro different from the Bangsamoro identity embedded in the BBL.

The politics of the BBL goes beyond Muslim–Christian relations in the Philippines. Power plays between the Maguindanaon lead negotiating group and the Tausug non-lead negotiators affect the way these Islamised Muslim groups support the BBL. The fact that the Maguindanaon MILF leads the negotiation rather than the Tausug MNLF is in itself a factor that determines Moro support for the BBL. The 2013 Zamboanga siege is a fitting example of this situation. The MNLF initiated armed hostilities in this Christian-populated city because the government apparently scrapped the MNLF peace agreement in preference for the peace negotiations with the MILF. Reconciling the different Moro sub-groups may pave the way to smoother Muslim–Christian peace negotiations. Indeed, the leader of one of the MNLF factions stated that the only way for the peace negotiations to succeed is to reconcile peace negotiations with the MNLF and peace negotiations with the MILF (Arguillas, 2012). Appealing to the super-ordinate identity of Bangsamoro in order to reach a common standpoint between the two groups may prove helpful in the creation of a united Moro front during Mindanao peacebuilding.

Our research offers suggestions toward making the BBL a viable solution acceptable to Mindanao Muslims, regardless of their ethnic origins. Both the process and content of the BBL may need to be acceptable to the various Islamised ethnic groups in Mindanao. Crafting a law that effectively caters to all ethnic groups can facilitate identification with the Bangsamoro among all Mindanao Muslims. The BBL may be improved by allowing Islamised ethnic groups to engage in problem-solving discourse. Eventually, a nested form of power sharing may emerge among Moro ethnic groups to create a more inclusive form of Bangsamoro identity and law.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the interactions between collective identity with an eth-nic group, superordinate social identity with Bangsamoro, and support for the BBL. We saw how collective identity with an ethnic group shapes the way Muslim Mindanaoans perceive the world, and in turn, affects how they self-identify with the Bangsamoro. The world formed by their group memberships oriented them to identify with the subjective version of the world they per-ceived. This, in turn, created a divide between the two ethnic groups, resulting

in varying reactions to the BBL. We then suggested avenues by which to address the differences, with inter-ethnic discourse and political power-sharing forming the core of the possible solutions toward a shared victory for peace.

Understanding is part of the key to actualising the dream of achieving peace in the Mindanao. The examination of how Moros perceive Bangsamoro reveals to us a psychological diversity among Islamised ethnic tribes in Mindanao. This poses a challenge, but more importantly, a possible solution, to the dilemma facing the Mindanao peace process. Finding a way to build a superordinate Bangsamoro social identity, with which all Islamised Moro ethnic groups could actually identify, is crucial to establishing a common Moro front in a Mindanao peace process.

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Chapter 22
"Aussie, Aussie, Aussie, Oi, Oi, Oi": Situating and Understanding Social Identities in Australia

Siew Fang Law and Cynthia Mackenzie

As in many settler societies, the topic of identity in Australia rests on an unstable and highly contested debate (Hage, 1998; Hollinsworth, 2006). It collides and elides with national policy seeking to "name" identities of belonging as opposed to identities of otherness (Pietsch, Graetz, & McAllister, 2010). The ways in which identities are constructed and represented by different groups may threaten to expose conflict and violence beneath the peaceful surface of this seemingly prosperous, harmonious southern land.

Studying *identity* in the Australian context is a pivotal starting point to examine the intersections of peace, conflict and violence. Both authors, Siew Fang and Cynthia, like a quarter of the population who call Australia home, are "newly arrived migrants" meaning they were not born in Australia. Sharing an outside–insider perspective, we have not only observed the vividly contradictory meanings of Australian Day, but also have witnessed the complex, conflicting and subjective sense of identities shared among various groups of Australians. In this chapter, we aim to provide an overview of the context and issues facing this ancient land in a contemporary setting. The chapter begins with an outline of different interpretations of Australian history and discusses the ways in which the past has influenced the way identity is constructed in contemporary Australian society. We then examine some of the key psychological research that contributes to a greater understanding of identity issues in Australian society. We acknowledge there are many eminent social identity researchers in this country, and we draw on a sample of the literature to showcase a range of social constructs and critiques to deepen understanding identity issues in Australia. Finally, we discuss the importance of drawing out different

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privileged and marginalised versions of identity realities, and we advocate the need to consider broader ontological and epistemological approaches to complement the empirical findings from social identity theory.

It was a coincidence that we began drafting this chapter on Australia Day, January 26. Australia Day is the official national day of this country yet this iconic day has become one of the most controversial public events in this nation.

The officials named it Australia Day because it marks the anniversary of the 1788 arrival of the First Fleet of British Ships at Port Jackson, New South Wales,[1] and the raising of the flag of Great Britain at that site by Governor Arthur Phillip, hence in the past it was described as "First Landing Day" or "Foundation Day" (Australia Day, 2015). For many local Australians, it is informally celebrated as a day when families and friends have a day off from paid work. The typical image of Australia Day is as a day that many "White" Australians go to the beach, invite friends and families to barbeques, watch fireworks and go to concerts. International tourists who witness these celebrations are often bombarded with "images of people adorning [themselves with] various flag paraphernalia, parades, boozy BBQs, and bikini-clad girls on beaches" (Bond, 2015).

In contrast, many Indigenous Australians observe January 26 as a day of mourning instead of celebration: it marks the invasion of the British, leading to the massacre of many Indigenous people, and the long-term displacement of the rich Indigenous cultural heritage including their languages, botanical knowledge and identities. Hence, for many Indigenous Australians, it is a day that reopens the wounds of structural and cultural violence inflicted by colonialism on the oldest continuing culture in human history. As Bond (2015) puts it, "the iconic Australia Day images … [show] complete disregard for the Indigenous lives, lands and languages that were lost as a result of the British invasion of this country and the persisting inequalities that exist" (p. x). Hence, for Indigenous Australians, January 26 is better described as *Invasion Day, Survival Day* or the *Day of Mourning* (Lui, 2014).

Numerous protests occur in the streets of capital cities of Australia on January 26 each year (Warrall, 2015). The protesters hold Aboriginal flags and chant slogans such as "always was, always will be Aboriginal land" and "no pride in genocide" (Warrall, 2015, n.p.). An Indigenous woman author explains her alienation on Australian Day as "the disconnect I feel on January 26 is not a rejection of my mother's history. Rather, it is a rejection of the privileging of one version of history at the expense of another … celebrating Australia Day on this day is a symbolic and irreconcilable act of exclusion. This exclusion… reminds us of the continued whitewashing of Australia's history, national identity and day of celebration" (Bond, 2015). Therefore for some of the population, Australia Day is actually the day when they feel the least Australian.

In another example, strong emotions and debate about the identity of Australians resurfaced on Australia Day in 2015 when Prime Minister Tony Abbott awarded a newly minted honour, the Knight of the Order of Australia, to a non-Australian, Prince Phillip—Duke of Edinburgh and the husband of Queen Elizabeth II of England. This decision seemed out of touch with contemporary Australia as it

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[1] In fact, the First Fleet actually arrived on the 13th of May 1787, not on the 26th of January 1788.

reminded citizens of the formerly close historical ties between Australia and the British royalty. Adding to further identity confusion is the fact that a majority of Australians voted against the establishment of a republic of Australia, and supported constitutional monarchy with the Queen of England as sovereign, in 1999.

Different Interpretations of History in Australia

To help readers make sense of the complexity of identity issues in Australia, we have developed a matrix to outline five different notions of "identity" in Australia. The matrix describes the ways in which these identity issues are linked with different interpretations of history in Australia, and how peace, conflict and violence are related in this country (Fig. 22.1).

The Ancestor

Different interpretations of Australian history are directly linked with the ways Australians see themselves and each other. One version of this history is that the Indigenous people are the "first peoples" of Australia. This version of history, described as "The Ancestor" identity in the matrix, acknowledges that the Indigenous people are the original inhabitants of the Australian continent and the neighbouring islands for as long as 50,000 years (BBSRC, 2011).[2] Indigenous ancestors have established societies, tribal and kinship systems, countries, sophisticated knowledge-base of the land, and over 200 languages and 600 dialects (Nathan, 2007). The invasion of the British colonisers in 1788 led to direct violence including genocide and massacre of the Indigenous population. For many years, the British introduced and maintained policies that denied the identities and rights of Indigenous peoples, such as the "Flora and Fauna Act" which categorised the Indigenous people under the same classification as Australian wildlife, a policy which was only overturned in 1967. Since 1788, the Indigenous people have continually suffered from structural violence and this continues up to the present day; they have much higher than average rates of criminal records, imprisonment, unemployment, and shorter life expectancy than non-Indigenous Australians (Lunn, 2008; Gribbin, 2015).

The White Nation

Historians have used the term "history war" to describe the conflict that arose from disputed versions of history in Australia (Macintyre & Clark, 2003). Another interpretation of Australian identity focuses on the arrival of the British First Fleet in

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[2] With a possible range of up to 125,000 years ago.

The Wounded - "Stolen generation" - newly arrived migrants, refugees and asylum seekers - victims of discrimination and racism - White guilt; the discontent of White Australians - Conflict with representation of identities in institutions and policies	**The Pluralists** - Multiculturalism - Inclusion of other cultures, religions and identities - Immigration - Advocacy for asylum seekers and refugees - Reconciliation with the Indigenous people

The "Gold and Green"
- a social construction
- a future, forward-looking identity
- transcend different groups
- national sport identity

The White Nation - Australia history starts 200 years ago - White Pride - "White Australia Policy" - ANZAC - Identification with the Americans - Ties to Britain (Queen) - Disregard of Indigenous history	**The Ancestors** - Australia history starts thousands of years ago - Indigenous land - Invasion of British - Indigenous identity, culture and knowledge

IDENTITIES ... IDENTITY

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE ⟷ PEACE

Fig. 22.1 A matrix presenting different interpretations of identity in Australia

Botany Bay in 1788 as the "starting point" of Australian history, based on the assumptions that the land was empty and never peopled (McQuire, 2014). This interpretation of history, described as "the White Nation" in the second category of the matrix, is highly controversial and contested. It legitimises the British right to settle in this continent without any consensual requirements for sovereignty over the land, like those achieved in other colonised countries. The British government in Australia established colonial policies such as *terra nullius*, a Latin term which means "land belonging to no one", which was used to deny Indigenous sovereignty, law and social order (Buchan & Heath, 2006). They also maintained the political

rhetoric that there was little conflict and violence between the White settlers and the Indigenous peoples in the early stages. One of the consequences of British settlement was the appropriation of Indigenous culture and identity, as well as land and water resources, which continued throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. British settlers cleared and converted lands for farming, sheep and cattle grazing without consent from Indigenous people. The extermination of up to 90 % of Indigenous population in the nineteenth century was largely attributed to unintended factors such as the spread of diseases such as measles, smallpox and tuberculosis rather than the imperialist policies. The colonialist interpretation of history led to a sense of White nationalism. After achieving Federation status in 1901, the government used the Immigration Restriction Act, or more colloquially, the "White Australia Policy" to systematically restrict immigration to those with an Anglo-Celtic heritage (Pietsch et al., 2010).

Examples of the "White Nation" identity are plentiful in more recent times in Australia. For example, in the 1990s, a sense of "White pride" was influential in the emergence of the "new right" political party "One Nation" led by Federal MP Pauline Hanson. The party claimed to represent the voices of the ordinary (i.e. White) Australians and argued that Australia was in danger of being "swamped by Asians" (Hanson, 1996). Hanson argued that White Australians' privilege and status were under threat, and that "reverse racism" had been applied to mainstream Australians who were not entitled to the same welfare and government funding as minority groups. Hanson called for the abolition of Aboriginal support, proposed the dismantling of multicultural policy, and introduction of a ban to non-White immigration policy in Australia.

Hanson's argument was a response to the shift in Australian demography since the changes to immigration restrictions where policies such as the Multicultural Australia Policy enacted in the 1970s, allowed waves of migrants of non-Anglo Saxon backgrounds to call Australia home. These migrants, or the "others", include a range of non-Anglo "ethnic" backgrounds including the Italians and Greeks who arrived in the 1960s, immigrants from Asia who migrated here especially in the 1970s–1990s, and African and Middle Eastern immigrants who have settled here over the last 20 years. This makes contemporary Australia one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse societies in the world. In fact, almost one in four Australian residents were born outside of Australia and many more are first or second generation Australians (Australia.gov.au). The 2011 census recorded that 44 % of Australians were either born overseas, or have at least one parent born overseas. Further, 289 countries of birth were listed in the 2011 Census data, with nearly half of Australians claiming a direct or first generation migrant background. It is clear that the myth of a national identity dependent on a British origin cannot be sustained (Anderson & Taylor, 2005, p. 470). It must also be noted that in the 2011 census data, Indigenous people make up only 2.4 % of the total Australian population (about 460,000 out of 22 million people). A diverse basis for identity formation nationally is thus a reality for all Australians. The "new Australians" have different interpretations of history, and differing senses of identity in Australia. The next two categories of the matrix characterise these increasingly plural concepts of identities.

The Wounded

The third category of the matrix described a range of "wounded" Australians who do not feel as though they "belong" to the mainstream identity. This category includes newly arrived migrants, refugees and asylum seekers who experience episodes of racism and discrimination; Indigenous Australians of the "Stolen Generation" who lost their sense of cultural identity (Condon, Barnes, Cunningham, & Smith, 2004); and Anglo-European Australians who feel discontented with their White privilege and experience a sense of "White guilt". In general, we consider the "wounded Australians" as those who feel for some reason as though their identities are questioned by "legitimate people"—the dominant group, mostly White, who claims entitlement to the lands, places and spaces. The "wounded" also believe themselves to be silenced in the mainstream representation of Australians and/or denied inclusion by dominant institutions. The wounded Australians recognise or have experienced structural violence and the inequality existing in both public and private spheres.

An example of identity-based episodic violence is the 2005 Cronulla Riots. The riots were time bombs that exploded long-suppressed racial tensions between White Australians and Australians of Middle-Eastern background in southern Sydney. The Cronulla Riots put "race" and "national identity" at the forefront of national debate, and raised questions such as who are the "real Aussies" and "true blue Aussies" (Collins, 2007). Rhetoric inculcating Australian values reappeared with expressions such as "a fair go", generosity and concepts of mateship and a relaxed easy-going lifestyle (Smith & Phillips, 2001). This trope has often been used in contrast to those whose values and beingness express "Otherness" and are therefore "un-Australian" (Smith & Phillips, 2001). The forms of public discourse that link identities with privilege and power are noted by many Australian scholars. The descriptions of being "Australian" or "unAustralian" usually surround certain characteristics of social behaviours or way of life (Jupp, 2002).

Responding to the events of terrorism, the binary views of Australian-ness have been exacerbated. For example, in the current Prime Minister's condolence motion on Martin Place Siege (Abbott, 2015), the rhetoric of Australia as a country that is free, fair and peaceful was used. Australia was described as a beacon of hope and liberty throughout the world. The Otherness was contrasted as "evil", "criminal" and "unAustralian". Political rhetoric like this demonstrates that multiculturalism in Australia has shifted from being an assimilationist to an integrationist project, with a meta-logic that new arrivals to Australia must be "integrated" into the space of the imagined and coherent nation in the interests of "social cohesion" (Hage, 1998). For those new migrants and refugees "allowed" into the country, Australia's multicultural policies have made significant investment in programmes designed to "integrate" and assist new migrants in their settlement to Australia, as well as to acknowledge Indigenous peoples in the fabric of the society. While the success of the services in promoting inclusion and belonging has been publicly debated (Forrest & Dunn, 2010), there have been both settlement success stories (DIAC, 2011) as well as difficulties (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Quayle & Sonn, 2009) in

establishing a sense of belonging in Australia. "Legitimate" settlement, that is migration processes that are approved by the officials, is an increasingly powerful trope in public rhetoric about migration and refugee arrivals.

The Pluralists

The fourth category of the matrix, "the Pluralists", describes Australians who are proud of their nation's multicultural heritage and both advocate and celebrate plural identities. Statistics have found an increase in positive attitudes toward a more multicultural Australia in recent years. For example, 85 % of Australians agree that multiculturalism has been good for the country, and 92 % of Australians feel a great sense of belonging to the country (ABS, 2011). The year 2014 marked the lowest level of concern over immigration in Australia, with 58 % of Australians agreeing that Australia could take on more immigrants (the highest reported level of positive sentiment toward immigration in the western world) (Marcus, 2014). Positive efforts have been made to promote harmony and social cohesion at all levels of society. For example, Harmony Day was been established on March 21 to celebrate Australia's cultural diversity, and promotes inclusiveness, respect and a sense of belonging for everyone.

The "Gold and Green"

The fifth category of identity is situated in the centre of the matrix. It refers to the "created" nationally constructed identity that amalgamates a range of characteristics that the country wants to claim as its identity: Australia as a youthful, future-oriented, competitive, united, liberal and modern country. It is often symbolised by the official "Gold and Green" colours[3] of national competitive sport. Unlike the red, white and blue Union Jack found in the flag of Australia that identifies with the British, and the red, black and yellow Aboriginal flag that signifies Indigenous status, rights and history, the "Gold and Green" is identified by Australians who shares the "Aussie" spirit that transcends different sociocultural boundaries and categories. The spirit of "Aussie, Aussie, Aussie, Oi, Oi, Oi", a chant performed at Australian sport events, is often used to unite people of all backgrounds to support the national team. One example of such "bridging" and hybrid identity can be illustrated by the famous image of Cathy Freeman who made history in Australia at the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. Freeman is a 400-m sprinter of Indigenous Australian heritage and is widely considered by Australians as "the athlete that sprinted into the nation's

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[3] Gold is a reflection of Australia's beaches, mineral affluence, arid shrub/scrublands and desert areas of the island-continent nation. Green represents the flora of its forests, eucalyptus leaves and meadowlands of the Australian countryside.

hearts" (SBS, 2014). After winning the championship of the women's 400 m race at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Freeman, in her green and gold bodysuit, took a victory lap carrying both the Aboriginal and Australian flags. The athlete's achievement was embraced by the Australian public and media.[4] "Cathy United Nations" announced one newspaper headline (Bruce & Hallinan, 2001, p. 257). Freeman's gesture was described in the mainstream media as signifying the coexistence of the Indigenous inhabitants with the "Invaders". The gesture connected the past, present and future; it linked her Indigenous identity, her national identity and her acceptance of these different constructs, and the image has become an "icon of reconciliation" (Bruce & Hallinan, 2001, p. 257). However, a study conducted by Toni and Emma (2009) have revealed that, some Indigenous people have scrutinised Freeman as "not one of us" due to her celebrity status, her youthfulness (i.e. they claim that she did not endure the racism of the past) (p. 90) and as "a ploy by the Australian Government" (p. 95) to demonstrate their notion of "positive race relations" to the world (Hallinan & Judd, 2012, p. 917). Others in the general public commented on what they perceived as reverse racism "I could not believe I had to watch Cathy Freeman take the greatest Olympic accolade of lighting the cauldron … while half a dozen of the greatest Olympic women of Australia … were relegated to watching because they were not the right colour" (quote taken from Toni & Emma, 2009, p. 95). This example, once again, highlights the complexities of identity around the place of Indigenous people in Australia. Hence, the fifth category of Australian identity is fluid, but is situated in various forms of contradictions and conflicts. As Bruce and Wensing (2009) contend, "in debates over the future of the nation, the main issue has been … the extent to which Australia's identity will be anchored in an historically exclusive, narrow, hierarchical and white dominant vision, or one that is inclusive, multicultural, democratic and progressively hybridized" (p. 258).

The above examples highlight the dynamic and complex nature of identities in Australia. The construct of social identity in the Australian context is situated in layers of interpretations of history, and relates to contemporary social identities that are the effects of these diverse representations, co-created by institutions, structures and systems.

Central to these interpretations of identity are the meaning-making processes that lie within the researchers' own social identities. Sonn (2004) contended that as researchers we need "to examine and deconstruct our own social identities and the power and privilege afforded by those identities because these can impact our research and practice" (p. 134). When conducting research on "identities", especially in the contentious context in Australia, it is necessary to reflect on, and be critical of, our own culture, values, assumptions and beliefs and to recognise these may not be the "norm" and that the lens that the researcher wears, inevitably colour the world they examine. The different readings of, for example, Australia Day, provide a particularly valuable insight into the need to be aware of, and open to, differ-

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[4] According to Toni and Emma (2009), Freeman's gold medal race became the second most watched television event in Australian television history and the top-rated sports event ever. Over 8.8 million people saw the race live or on television.

ent epistemologies and ways of knowing. They also remind researchers to consider whose stories are being privileged and whose stories are being marginalised in any representations of the Other, and hence whose history and whose identities are being acknowledged and denied. This leads to the next section, which explores psychological studies that take account of the four categories of identity complex.

Psychological Theories of Identity Account for Different Interpretations of History

Numerous peace psychologists and social psychologists in Australia have contributed to greater understanding of identity in Australia. Interested readers would find the volume *Peace Psychology in Australia* a useful source of references of psychological theories of identity in Australia. In particular, in that volume, Mellor (2012) provides a detailed and compelling review of the complex relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations in Australia. He contextualises colonisation, debates the national rhetoric of control and "protection" of the Indigenous community (i.e. part of the "protection" entailed removing children from their families and an attempt to breed out the Aboriginality) and links psychology with human rights. Moreover, Bastian (2012) engages in the quest of "who is Australian" in a contemporary, multicultural context. He extensively explored different ways in which identity was constructed, limited and extended and provides overviews of studies that used psychological theories such as intergroup contacts, prejudice and acculturation. In addition, Louise, Barlow, and Greenaway (2012) explore the construct of the Australian identity and its relation to other social identities, and examine the constantly shifting profiles of Australian insider–outsider identities. They also conducted a comprehensive review of psychological studies, and discuss relevant concepts such as stereotypes, normative attitudes and human identification.

To avoid replicating the extensive literature review of Australian identity research that have already been featured in *Peace Psychology in Australia*, this chapter sets out to review psychological literature that draws on wider theoretical frameworks beyond social identity theory (SIT). We believe that these broader theories are useful and complement the major psychological theories such as SIT.

While SIT is a mainstream and influential concept in the field of social psychology (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012; Reicher, 2004), it has its shortcomings (e.g. Augoustinos, 2013; Sonn, 2004). Some have argued that SIT has not placed enough emphasis on history (Dashtipour, 2013), or cultural and structural contexts (Reicher, 2004). Others claimed that SIT has been overly used in controlled, experimental or laboratory research settings, and as a result, it tends to make artificial predictions about individual and group behaviours (Dashtipour, 2013). As Brown and Lunt (2002) assert, "what is problematic…in the way SIT relates to individuals and society is the artificial separation of individual rational agents from wider processes of power and representation" (p. 9). Dashtipour (2013) has

cautioned that the disconnection of history in identity-oriented experiments could result in over-simplistic assumptions of identity. As SIT is predominantly implemented in controlled settings, it tends to carry assumptions that identity is *static*, involves short-term social relationships and exists in a sterile social environment. Other criticisms of SIT include its over-emphasis on individuals or "micro" and reductionist perspectives (Reicher, 2004). There may also be the risk of reaching conclusions with universalist assumptions (Dashtipour, 2013). Moreover, SIT has been critiqued for its analysis of intergroup relations that are usually framed in the perspectives of the dominant groups (Dashtipour, 2013), and its tendencies of bias toward dimensions of superiority, dominance, and preservation of in-group privilege (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012).

These limitations give rise to the need to look beyond SIT in this chapter. We aim to explore some of the emerging, and less dominant theories in the field of social psychology. These theories include critical theory (Geuss, 1981), critical race theory (Delgado, 1995), postcolonial theories (Mohanty, 2003); the theatre of the oppressed (Boal, 1979), narrative theory, discursive psychology (Potter, 2012) and critical discursive theory (Fairclough, 1992, 2003, 2010). While these theoretical frameworks and methodologies may seem diverse, they share common characteristics. They are critical of cultural and structural violence linked with different interpretations of history, and they have emerged to challenge the dominant approach of understanding of social relationships. These theories also have common principles and philosophies. They were developed in contexts of oppression, and are useful to address issues that relate to social inequality, structural injustices, privilege and power. Moreover, a critical approach is also about being "self-critical" (Spears, 1997) so researchers who adopt critical theory in their research are required to engage in self-reflexivity in their practices. Discourses are: "historically constructed regimes of knowledge. These include common-sense assumptions and taken-for-granted ideas, belief systems and myths that groups of people share and through which they understand each other" (Mama, 1995, p. 98). In particular, postcolonial and critical methodologies have often been adopted to study identity as these approaches capture and empower the voices of "the Other" (Montero, 2014), and are used to problematise the discourses of the dominant (Sonn & Green, 2006). In short, these alternative theoretical approaches are valuable to produce counter stories from communities which are usually silenced, and marginalised with an aim to compare different versions of stories and achieve social change.

Martha Augoustinos, for example, is one of the influential psychologists who explored various notions of Australian identities using critical and discursive psychological approaches. Through a comprehensive narrative analysis approach, she explores the notions of being "Australian" and "un-Australian" among various groups of Australians. Augoustinos asserts that the identities of Australians are multifaceted, fluid and politicized (Augoustinos & Riggs, 2007). In assessing one study, Augoustinos and Riggs contended that the Australian government has never fully made peace with the Indigenous people. They argue that Indigenous people have suffered from an ongoing dichotomous representation of identities. The government's use of divisive concepts such as "us" versus "them"; "true" Indigenous and "false" Indigenous; and an "imperialist metaphor

of hierarchy" (2007, p. 123) have often implied that the Indigenous people are "beneath" White Europeans who are perceived as "above". She argued that the rhetoric and meanings of Australian identities are tainted by power, privileges and rapidly shifting social structures. In other studies, Augoustinos and her team used critical discourse analysis as a method to analyse the relationships between power, race and identities. They studied the effect of political rhetoric on Australian identity (Augoustinos, Hastie, & Wright, 2011), and examined the different ways Australians talk about race and racism and their attitudes toward the Aborigines (e.g. Augoustinos & Riggs, 2007; Augoustinos, LeCouteur, & Soyland, 2002). Rather than drawing on a hypothetical situation, their work often centres on critical, real events occurring at local as well as national levels, such as the passing of the Mabo land-right case, and the recognition of the common law rights to land of Australia's Indigenous people, the Native Title Act (1993). For example, Augoustinos et al. (2002) examined the political rhetoric of then Prime Minster of Australia, John Howard, based on his speech on the topics of reconciliation and apology to the Stolen Generation of Indigenous people, delivered at the Reconciliation Convention. Augoustinos and colleagues asserted that as an Australian authority Howard used rhetorically self-sufficient arguments to serve as "a powerful primary resource in the legitimation of existing power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia" (p. 105). The Prime Minister framed the issue using the dominant version of history which presents Australia as a "heroic triumph over hardship and adversity that is to be celebrated in the present" (p. 100). This served to strategically undermine the alternative versions of the meanings that reconciliation and apology held for Indigenous Australians. By ignoring the other version of history that focused on the tragedy of invasion, conquest and violent destruction to Indigenous cultures and identities that continue to impact on the current generations, the Prime Minister justified and legitimated his refusal to offer a formal apology to the Stolen Generations of Australian's Indigenous peoples (p. 100).

Instead of conducting laboratory-based research, many studies using critical theory opt for the real, everyday life experiences of Australians. A variety of data may be drawn on, including everyday conversations among people, in print and social media (e.g. Pickering, 2001), talk-back-radio (e.g. Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011), "letters to editors" (Bruce and Wensing 2009), stories (e.g. Sonn, 2012) as well as political speeches (e.g. Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2010). For example, in examining the identity of newly arrived migrants, several studies that drew on these "real-life" sources have found dichotomous social representations of the Anglo-Saxons and White Europeans as the "higher" civilised groups, hence these groups are perceived as more "Australian", and peaceful, in comparison with those whose Australian identity is seen as more ambiguous (Ali & Sonn, 2010), such as the African Australians often associated with "violent gangs" (Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2010) and Muslim Australians who are perceived as "terrorists" (Strelan & Lawani, 2010), and less peaceful.

In this politicised context, it is necessary for Australian researchers to deconstruct meanings of "identity" that are influenced by social institutions and struc-

tures (Augoustinos, 2013). For example, the contested issues on asylum seekers in Australia are directly linked with the ways their identities are framed. There is plenty of evidence that asylum seekers are usually represented in various social systems as "illegal migrants" and "queue jumpers" (Every & Augoustinos, 2007, 2008; Suhnan, Pedersen, & Hartley, 2012) who take advantage of "Australians" (Every & Augoustinos, 2008), and therefore threaten the country's social cohesion and sovereignty (Pedersen, Watt, & Griffiths, 2007; Pedersen, Watt, & Griffiths, 2008; Pedersen, Watt, & Hansen, 2006). The negative framing of asylum seekers has invoked negative ideas, emotions and prejudice against those seeking asylum in Australia (Marr & Wilkinson, 2003; Suhnan et al., 2012). Analysis linking the broader, macro systems to micro-psychological analysis of identity suggested that the identities of asylum seekers are not homogenous. Perspectives of their legitimacy to stay in Australia and their social status are tied with the ways and means by which asylum seekers and humanitarian refugees arrive in Australia, that is, either by airplanes or boats (Tascón, 2004; Tascón, 2008). Those who arrived by airplane have generally been represented as having more legitimacy to stay in Australia, than those who arrived by boats (Pedersen, Tilbury Fozdar & Kenny, 2012). Asylum seekers arriving by boat have often aroused negative emotions such as threat, fear and anger, while those who arrive by airplane have been found to receive greater public sympathy and acceptance.

Deconstruction and analysis of dominant discourses can be useful to make sense of the variability, fluidity and contradictive nature of identity. For example, Every and Augoustinos (2008) use a critical discursive approach to examine parliamentary debates on asylum seekers in Australia. Their study demonstrates that the same construction of "national identity" could be used for both exclusive and inclusive purposes "depending on the function to which the talk and texts are being put" (p. 563). For instance, the rhetoric of Australian values such as "fair go" and "generosity" were used in both sides of the debate (i.e. asylum seekers as threat to the country and asylum seekers as benefiting national interests) in political speeches. This critical analysis of "identity" yields findings that are different from findings gathered using controlled experimental approaches. As Every and Augoustinos (2008) assert, a "nuanced analysis is not possible at the level of content", instead it requires an assessment of the subject and the ways in which it positions the construct of identity within the space of political and social realities (p. 577). The example of Cathy Freeman demonstrates this nuance, subjective and fluid notion of identity.

Other studies responded to recent world and local events that have increased the visibility of people of Muslim religion in the public sphere, in the Australian context. Narrative and discursive theories have been used to retell stories and narratives of identity-based structural violence, racism and exclusion experienced by various minority groups. For example, Fijac and Sonn (2004) examined the narratives of Muslim communities in Australia responding to the broader contexts of violence toward them in the period post-September 11. They found that the racism experienced by many Muslims was primarily based on the fact that they are Muslim,

rather than being non-White migrants. They argued that perceptions of the Muslim population shed light on the ways in which White Australians have failed to understand the complexities of social groups. For example, other Australians may see that "being Pakistani or ethnic, [a] dark complexion, dress, lifestyle and culture highlighted them as Muslims as "westerners think it's all the same thing" … westerners confuse the Pakistani and Muslim cultures [and] perceiving Muslim identity as race and not a religion…" (p. 24).

Other psychological studies have looked at the dynamics of power and cultural racism. For example, Ali and Sonn (2010) used critical whiteness theory to deconstruct the identity of second-generation Cypriot-Turkish Australians. They defined "whiteness" in the Australian context in terms of the ways in which people who were described as "ethnic" are positioned against the Anglo Australians who occupy a privileged, dominant and normative position. The study also usefully explained the complexities and subjectivities in identity construction so that such distinctions as those between "Cyprus-Turkish Australians" and "Cyprus-Turkish living in Australia" were real when perceived through the eyes of those who have differential access to privilege. This study provides a useful lens for making marginalised identity visible, and challenged structural violence because of its focus on questioning dominance and normativity (Ali & Sonn, 2010).

The voices of young people of diverse cultural backgrounds yield unique insights about Australian identities as they represent the generation who are most likely to defy the traditional classification of identities (Harris, 2006). The work of Sonn, Quayle, MacKenzie, and Law (2014) has de-centred whiteness by examining and resurfacing the notions of not being accepted as Australians. Their study, facilitated through oral history theatre, brought young Australians of migrant and Indigenous backgrounds together to share stories of personal history and identity. Participatory, artistic and theatrical performances were used as contact zones for exchanges of deeper meanings and experiences of identities, belonging, race and racism in Australia. The findings of this study rupture the dominant narratives of belonging and non-belonging, surface whiteness, and highlight the importance of understanding subjectivities of belonging.

Limited space has prevented us from showcasing every psychological study of identity in Australia. However, the above sample of literature demonstrates some of the less dominant, yet valuable and important theories that could contribute to the knowledge of identities in Australia. These theories ground the analysis of history, power and identities in contemporary research. "Identities" need to be understood in wider sociocultural and political contexts and take account of its subjectivities of social realities. Our social systems are like webs of interconnected elements that function within the complex ecologies of the world. Identity-based violent events occurring in another part of the world often trigger other identity-related responses at a local level. For example, the increased tensions of terrorism in Sydney and Paris have led to increased incidents of Muslim women being attacked in public spaces (Aston, 2014; Salleh Hoddin & Pedersen, 2012). Similarly, identity perception and prejudice at individual levels may result in broader implications, such as at policy level. Public prejudice, anger and fear toward asylum seekers could influence social

policy on refugees (e.g. Pedersen, Tilbury Fozdar, & Kenny, 2012; Haslam & Pedersen, 2007). Hence, researchers may need to include greater consideration of the fluid and dynamic nature of social reality and real-world phenomena (Dashtipour, 2013), and consider more expansive and critical psychological approaches to make sense of identities in their social ecology.

Conclusion

Completion of this chapter coincides with another national celebration, Harmony Day on March 21. This day is about inclusiveness, respect and a sense of belonging for everyone (DSS, 2015). Sadly, a few days after Harmony Day we witnessed incidences of fractured identity across the nation. Over 16 rallies (and counter-rallies) focused on "identities" were carried out in capital cities, regional and rural centres during Easter weekend on April 4, 2015. The protesters of Reclaim Australia claimed that they are proud Australians who fought for Australian democracy, cultural identity and way of life. Many protesters draped in Australian flags, chanted "Aussie, Aussie, Aussie, Oi, Oi, Oi" and carried banners against Islam, protested against sharia law, halal food, wearing of the burka, and minority groups who threaten Australian identity. The protesters were faced off by counter-rallies organised by supporters of multiculturalism, including Indigenous people, who gathered and called for an end to racism, social division and Islamophobia. This, once again, unveils the difficulties of theorising social identity in this southern land.

In consideration of deep structural divisions and the complex nature of identities in Australia, notions of peace, conflict and violence are inimical to identity. Different interpretations of Australian history shape the understanding of contemporary identity issues in this country. We call for the need to consider broader, not narrower, perspectives and theoretical frameworks to better understand various contested notions of identities and conflict. To do that, we review literature that draws on less dominant but relevant theories that have been used to study social identity in Australia. This approach is appropriate as the role of challenging normative and privilege position is in line with a peace psychology agenda (Bretherton & Law, 2015), as well as being necessary to understand complex conflict (Fink, 1968). We emphasise that the wider theories are not necessarily competing with SIT. They are equally valid and potentially compatible approaches to different aspects of this social phenomenon (Augoustinos, 2013; Duckitt, 1992).

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Chapter 23
Conclusion: The Next Voyage

Shelley McKeown, Neil Ferguson, and Reeshma Haji

In our journey we have circumnavigated the globe and our eyes have been opened to the wide-ranging contribution social identity theory has already made to our understanding of peace and conflict. In doing so, we have become aware that the impact of the theory goes far beyond race and ethnic relations and addresses some of the biggest challenges facing today's world; health, inequalities, social change, and sustainability. One clear outcome of this journey is the discovery that it does not matter where you are in the world or how far along the road to peace you are, social identities are integral to our lives. As such, we believe that our journey does not end with this conclusion; rather we hope that it sets the course for the next voyage in which social identity research is brought to the fore.

In this conclusion, we aim to consolidate and grapple with the challenge of how we, as peace psychologists, researchers, educators, practitioners, and policy makers, can permeate an understanding of social identity into the mainstream. First, we bring together the themes that we believe summarise the contribution of our book to understanding social identity, peace, and conflict. Second, we consider the importance of the historical and socio-political context in providing a coherent understanding of social identity's role in promoting positive peace. Third, we discuss the theoretical implications of these themes and goals. Fourth and finally, we situate this

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in relation to the Global Goals of addressing climate change, ending poverty and repairing social inequalities and injustice.

Overarching Themes

Upon reading the expert contributions to our book, a series of themes became apparent that warrant further careful consideration. Below we discuss these in more detail, relating them back to chapters in the book and to our thoughts on how we should and could make these themes central in our future research endeavours.

Psychological and Physical Health

The first theme to be discussed is social identity theory's contribution to psychological and physical health. Not only does social identity relate to and influence the need for individual and collective self-esteem (see Martiny & Rubin, Chap. 2), but there is evidence supporting the view that social identities can influence both individual and group well-being (see Muldoon, Lowe, & Schmid, Chap. 9). Whilst it is not surprising that political violence and inequality create negative health consequences, what is innovative is the application of social identity theory to understand how identity can be used to counteract these negative experiences (see Wessells, Chap. 7). The influence of social identity on health is also discussed in relation to research in various contexts. For example, Northern Ireland (see Ferguson & McKeown, Chap. 14), where the legacy of the conflict has been found to have both bolstering and buffering effects influenced by social identity processes. These positive associations with identity and health are also evidenced in research conducted in Mexico and Chile (see Eller, Cakal, & Sirlopu, Chap. 19). Eller et al. provide evidence that intergroup contact experiences can transcend prejudice reduction and impact the physical and psychological health of indigenous people.

Moving forward, there is potential for more work on social identity, well-being, and health behaviours. It is especially important to further examine how identity can be used to buffer negative conflict experiences and the lingering psychological legacy of recent and not so recent conflicts. Moreover, there is a necessity for investigation on how interventions aimed at promoting peace, such as those based upon intergroup contact theory, can be used in initiatives that move beyond prejudice reduction outcomes. In particular, what is needed is a greater understanding of the role of identity in the interpretation of threat associated with political conflict and its role in the transformation of conflict. This would help to guide interventions or policy aimed at protecting groups and individuals harmed through conflict or where threatened identities are creating obstacles to conflict transformation.

Multiculturalism and Multiple Identities

As globalisation results in an increasingly interconnected world, and greater mobility and migration lead to an increasing prevalence of dual and multiple identities; the question "where are you from?" will get more and more difficult to answer for more and more of the world's people. As such, understanding how and when certain identities matter in society is of vital importance to researchers and policy makers alike.

This brings us to another theme in the book, which is that of the emergence and impact of multiple and changing identities. This is particularly important as dichotomous identities are no longer a true representation of society. Indeed, the complexity of identity is represented in many of our contextual chapters. For example, on their discussion of identity formation in Uganda, Lapwoch and Amone-P'Olak (Chap. 12) address the intertwined and complicated nature of ethnic and political identities pre- and post-colonialism. In their chapter on the United Arab Emirates, Maitner and Stewart-Ingersoll (Chap. 20) not only consider national identities, but also the importance of higher order identities such as identification with the Gulf nations. Likewise, Eller, Cakal, and Sirlopu (Chap. 19) explore subordinate and superordinate identities in Mexico and Chile; Psaltis and Cakal (Chap. 15) relate this to social identity in Cyprus. In a similar vein, Lalonde, Cila, and Yampolsky (Chap. 17) examine implications of multiculturalism in terms of identity-related concerns among older and newer Canadians, bicultural identity conflict, and the ascription of the immigrant identity. Moving beyond ethnic and racial divisions, González, Gerber, and Carvacho (Chap. 18) address broader social identities in Chile including gender and social class. In doing so, they bring together a comprehensive understanding of identity that moves beyond the traditionally studied ethnic divisions.

The impacts of multiculturalism and associated dynamics are addressed in our book in-depth by Stathi and Roscini (Chap. 4). The authors discuss how we can best work towards integration, acknowledging that top level announcements of multiculturalism are simply not enough to promote cohesion. They also relate this to the development of a common in-group identity, which is further discussed by Ferguson and McKeown in relation to Northern Ireland (Chap. 14), Marie Moss in her discussion of the Rwandan identity (Chap. 13), Maloku, Derks, Van Laar, and Ellemers (Chap. 16) in their work on the Kosovar identity, and by Montiel, Macapagal, and Canuday (Chap. 21) in their research on superordinate identity in the Philippines. In these chapters, the authors outline the complexities and challenges involved in the development of superordinate or common identities, which will offer possible strategies to improve intergroup relations in other contexts.

Looking to the future of social identity research, we must be mindful of these changing social and political landscapes if we are to truly understand the impact of identity on peace. In particular, we should pay more attention to how individuals negotiate and work with multiple identities including social class, gender, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, and higher-order identities. This requires a comprehensive

approach to identity, acknowledging the complexity and shift in importance of these different identities. In doing so, we will be able to better determine the best approaches for promoting inclusion and cohesion for all members of society; achieving this is our challenge and will require a toolbox of varied methodological approaches that can be drawn upon according to the context.

Addressing Inequalities

A theme related to multiculturalism, but deserving its own discussion, is that of addressing inequalities and promoting social change. This is evidenced throughout the book in discussions surrounding identity and majority/minority perspectives, democracy, leadership, and collective action. It also resonates with the changes required to address structural inequalities and achieve positive peace, as seen in many of our contextual chapters. For example, in their discussion of identity in Canada, Lalonde et al (Chap. 17) relate to three different identity relations between (1) aboriginals and non-aboriginals, (2) French and English Canadians, and (3) older and newer Canadians. In doing so, the authors recognise the importance of considering historical context and associated factors which have contributed to disadvantage. Similarly, minority and majority relations are discussed in this volume in relation to disadvantaged experiences among indigenous people in Mexico, Chile, and Australia. But perhaps the idea of oppressed identities is articulated most dominantly in Meyer, Durrheim, and Foster's (Chap. 11) work on identity in South Africa. In this chapter, the authors not only discuss the nature of marginalisation, but note how such oppression of identity can promote social change. In addition, Maitner and Stewart-Ingersoll describe differential privileges accorded to groups belonging to the national identity hierarchy in the UAE, in which the Emirati identity represents a privileged minority.

We believe that social change is the key mechanism required to address structural inequalities and one way to help achieve social change is through the mobilisation of groups to engage in collective action processes. Determining how and when this works best requires a nuanced understanding of collective behaviour. La Macchia and Louis (Chap. 6) go some way to addressing this through their discussion of crowd behaviour and its relationship to social identity and the promotion of social change. In particular, they call for expanded and integrated models of collective behaviour. This is vital if we are to develop a comprehensive approach to collective action in which the contradictory effects of promoting cohesion, through contact, and the desire to engage in social change are to converge and make positive impacts on building peace and transforming conflict and injustice.

Once we promote and engage in these social change processes, we must work towards understanding and ending tyranny. This process is related in our book by Reicher, Haslam, Platow, and Steffens (Chap. 5), who espouse a social identity perspective to tyranny and leadership. In doing so, they highlight the importance of understanding how and why people obey tyrannical leaders, and the need for strong leadership if tyranny is to be consigned to history.

What is clear is that social identity theory has a lot to offer to our understanding of how to address inequalities. What is unclear, however, is how we can bring the theory into the mainstream and involve more peace psychologists in the policy discussions surrounding these issues. Doing this will require a concerted effort to go beyond traditional outlets, such as, journal articles and academic conferences. When we publish our work, we need to think more closely about the societal impact of findings and how we can engage with practitioners and policy makers in bringing positive changes. While psychologists have undoubtedly played a role in our understanding of conflict and violence (see Christie, Wagner, & Winter, 2001 for a review), at times this has been to the detriment of human and societal welfare; we only have to think about the recent APA torture scandal. At the same time, however, we must note that psychologists have been instrumental in key social change processes, such as desegregation of schools in Brown vs. Board of Education, the implementation of peace education across the globe, and the implementation and evaluation of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, to name only a few important achievements. In addition, there are a number of organisations, such as the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence, Psychologists for Social Responsibility, and the Committee for the Psychological Study of Peace, who have tasked themselves with using psychological understanding to promote peace and justice through working with policy makers and practitioners. We challenge you, our readers, to be leaders in this regard.

We also ascribe to the belief that prevention is better than cure. As such, we should be preparing to use social identity practices to promote peace before violence occurs, thereby preventing the shift from conflict to violence. Support for this comes from Wessells (Chap. 7), who argues that we need to put our efforts into preventing children being recruited as child soldiers, in addition to developing our understanding of how to re-integrate these children once they return to their community.

Historical and Socio-Political Context

Our journey has also confirmed our belief that a deep understanding of the historical and socio-political context in which we are working is essential if we are to promote peace. This is important because as psychologists, we often drive to develop and test theory in highly controlled laboratory settings, which has of course added much to our understanding of social identity. In doing so, however, we sometimes fail to fully consider the importance of context including the culture in which the research was conducted. In this book, we included worldwide perspectives in order to highlight the need to embed our understanding of peace and conflict in the historical and socio-political processes salient in a given society and to advocate for contextually grounded interventions and prevention strategies which demonstrate the strength of social identity theory to be applied across contexts.

Indeed, the need for understanding history and associated narratives is evident throughout our contextual chapters. Law and Mackenzie (Chap. 22) present the different interpretations of history in Australia and the impact this has on identity and Australia Day celebrations. Through this, the authors are able to articulate how the past and interpretations of the past influence contemporary identity in Australia. Similarly, Psaltis and Cakal (Chap. 15) discuss the importance of history and narratives in forming and maintaining oppositional identities in Cyprus. They consider the influence of history textbooks, which they argue often provide a one-sided perspective on the conflict, and the nature of master narratives that influence identity and intergroup relations in today's Cyprus. González et al. (Chap. 19) also place great emphasis on historical and political processes in Chile. The authors address how history has contributed to disadvantage for certain groups in contemporary Chile and argue that a consideration of historical and political processes is required before peace and justice can be achieved. We are sympathetic with this argument and believe that the future of social identity theory lies not only with policy implications and theoretical development, but also with contextually grounded interventions.

Another factor inherent to context that is observed in many of chapters is the use of symbolic markers of identity, which can be used as a source of conflict or a source of peace. In particular, Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger (Chap. 8) point to the fact that symbols are often used to tell historical and cultural narratives and can represent and show identity as an entity. They also argue that a closer consideration of the symbols of identity will facilitate an understanding of how these are embedded across multiple identities. As such, history, narrative, and socio-political context lie central to understanding and situating social identity in policy and practice.

Theoretical Implications

In the first section of our book, we traced the history and development of social identity theory starting with the work of Henri Tajfel at the University of Bristol. Doing this has allowed us to observe and admire how far the theory has come and the sheer volume of research and interventions it has inspired. It has also highlighted some of the newest perspectives on the original theory, which appear to be bounded in motivations to engage in positive and negative identities, such as the importance of entitativity (see Hogg, Chap. 1), identity uncertainty (see Lüders, Jonas, Fritsche, & Agroskin, Chap. 3), and a reformulation of the self-esteem hypothesis (see Martiny & Rubin, Chap. 2).

Each of these has implications for social identity theory's contribution to peace and conflict. For example, Hogg argues that promoting the status and entitativity of social identities can have antisocial consequences. Indeed, seeing identity as an entity is also related to the use and meaning of symbolic markers of identity (see Phillips DeZalia & Moeschberger, Chap. 8). Hogg argues that this has particular consequences for self-concept which is an important part of understanding identity

motivation. Reframing the relationship between social identity and self-esteem, Martiny and Rubin ask important questions such as what motivates people at both individual and collective levels to seek out identities to boost self-esteem. Building upon this, Lüders et al. address some these questions and argue the importance of understanding threat and the role it plays in personal and collective motivations for self-esteem. Together, these advances suggest that we need to examine further the antecedents of social identity formation and salience, moving away from understanding the consequences that have already been heavily researched.

Final Thoughts

We would like to end by reflecting on how our overarching themes apply to the global context. In doing so, we come to realise that the themes observed in our book are closely aligned with the Global Goals, 17 goals committed to by world leaders designed to (1) end extreme poverty, (2) fight inequality and injustice, and (3) fix climate change (see www.globalgoals.org). Indeed, social identity theory allows us to understand disadvantage and equips us with the necessary framework to design programmes and interventions that aim to fight poverty, improve well-being, address inequalities, and bring about social change to produce strong and sustainable institutions and societies. We have already discussed the importance of health, inequalities, and social change, but the Global Goals also bring sustainability to the fore, something that social identity theorists are beginning to tackle. This is vital because according to Ferguson, McDonald, and Branscombe (Chap. 10), intergroup conflict over natural resources is likely to become more normalised due to resource depletion. In their chapter, Ferguson et al. offer a social identity perspective to climate change, arguing that climate change represents one of the biggest threats to peace in the modern world. This is understood in terms of the depletion and need for natural resources and the accompanied direct and structural violence associated with such resources. What becomes apparent from Ferguson et al. is that, as peace psychologists, we need to be prepared to undertake the challenge of creating and facilitating a sustainable peace that mitigates potential new forms of intergroup conflict arising from our ever-changing world.

To that end, we hope you have enjoyed this journey but now it's on to the next voyage; it's over to you to continue this journey, to take the challenges we have presented and take social identity theory into the world.

Reference

Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). *Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

ERRATUM TO

Chapter 12
Social Identity and Conflict
in Northern Uganda

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Affiliation errors in the original chapter are regretted.

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